Chapter 3 – Findings and Applications

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22 This chapter presents the findings of an extensive literature review, phone survey of 18 transit agencies, and follow-up communication with those agencies for TCRP A-45. This research was done to obtain a comprehensive look at the current issues, lessons learned, and leading practices of fare enforcement programs. The chapter is organized in 13 sections: ⢠Section 3.1, Overview of Fare Evasion: Definitions of fare evasion, the types of fare evaders, and factors that influence fare evasion. ⢠Section 3.2, Fare Enforcement Program Goals and Objectives: Sample actionable goals and objectives to assist in planning a fare enforcement program and in measuring and evaluating performance. ⢠Section 3.3, Fare Enforcement Strategies and Practices: Types of personnel used for fare enforcement and their authorities and responsibilities (Section 3.3.1) and specific strategies used to deploy fare enforcement personnel and conduct fare enforcement (Section 3.3.2). ⢠Section 3.4, Fare Enforcement Program Management and Oversight: Program management oversight activities and performance management tools to evaluate and improve performance results. ⢠Section 3.5, Methods for Measuring Fare Evasion: Strategies, including the use of fare eva- sion audits, used by transit agencies to measure fare evasion rates and calculate revenue loss. ⢠Section 3.6, Fare Inspection Levels: Relationship between fare inspection levels and evasion rates, factors that influence effectiveness of fare inspection levels, and determining inspection rate goals. ⢠Section 3.7, Legislating and Adjudicating Fare Evasion: Authority for transit agencies to enforce fares, fare evasion penalties (including fines and nonmonetary alternatives), decrimi- nalization of fare evasion, in-house resolution processes for fare citations, and constitutional- ity of fare enforcement. ⢠Section 3.8, Fare Policy and Customer Education: Fare policies to reduce fare evasion by making fare payment easier, simpler, and more affordable and customer education about fares, enforcement, and the consequences of fare evasion to promote fare compliance. ⢠Section 3.9, Public Perception of Fare Evasion and Passenger Security: Impact of the per- ceptions of fare evasion and fare enforcement on the publicâs perceptions of the agency and passenger security. ⢠Section 3.10, Discrimination in Fare Enforcement: Increasing awareness of potential of bias and discrimination in fare enforcement and identifying, measuring, and addressing potential discrimination. ⢠Section 3.11, Transitâs Role in Assisting Vulnerable Populations: Initiatives to assist vul- nerable populations who may be experiencing homelessness, drug addiction, or a mental health disorder. C H A P T E R 3 Findings and Applications

Findings and Applications 23  ⢠Section 3.12, Capital Infrastructure to Reduce Fare Evasion: Capital investments to improve revenue collection and reduce fare evasion through station hardening and off-board fare collection. ⢠Section 3.13, New Fare Collection Technologies and Fare Enforcement: Opportunities and challenges for fare enforcement using new technologies for fare collection. 3.1 Overview of Fare Evasion Fare evasion is generally conceptualized as the use of public transit services without paying the full and appropriate fare, but the practical definitions of fare evasion used by academic researchers and transit agencies can differ widely. Each definitional variation has implications for an agencyâs policies, operations, and data collection. Noncompliance in fare payment can be classified as those traveling with âno ticket,â âno valid ticket,â and âticket forgottenâ (Keuchel and Laurenz 2018). Researchers who have explored fare evasion have determined that the sub- sets of passengers who choose to evade fare, the type of fare evasion, and factors that influ- ence their decisions vary. In the words of González et al. (2019), â[fare evasion behavior] can be explained by variables reflecting values, attitudes and ideologies, social norms, anti-evasion measures and user satisfaction, as an expression of a social phenomenon.â Barabino et al. (2014) describe a personâs propensity to evade fare as a combination of both internal attributes (e.g., socioeconomic, psychological, ethical) and external attributes (e.g., fares, fine amounts, number of inspectors). Because the decision to evade fare is influenced by such a variety of factors, one-dimensional strategies to enforce fare payment, such as gating the system or launching a broad market- ing campaign, are unlikely to be effective (González et al. 2019). Instead, some agencies (King County Metro, Sound Transit, TTC) have evaluated the root causes of fare evasion on their system and tailored their responses to address those factors directly. Additionally, the percep- tion of what constitutes fare evasion varies. Understanding how agencies define fare evasion, the types of fare evaders, and the factors that influence fare evasion can help agencies assess ways to reduce fare evasion more holistically and encourage fare compliance. Later in this report, strategies for reducing fare evasion are described. 3.1.1 Defining Fare Evasion Transit agencies define fare evasion in several ways. A best practice is for agencies to clearly communicate what constitutes fare evasion for the benefit of passengers, the public, and agency staff, including fare enforcement personnel. Defining explicit types of fare evasion helps codify and enforce fare payment. An agencyâs definition of fare evasion affects its policies, operations, data collection, and analysis. Box 3-1 groups some common definitions of fare evasion according to the three categories for fare noncompliance developed by Keuchel and Laurenz (2018): passengers traveling with âno ticket,â âno valid ticket,â or âticket forgotten.â In addition to defining different types of fare evasion, transit agencies may establish terms of validity. For example, in the absence of transfers, light rail single-ride tickets used for proof of payment may be valid for 90 minutes to enable a passenger to complete a trip. Similarly, BART requires passengers to have valid exit-coded fare media with sufficient value for the minimum fare on the service and processed properly to enter the fare-paid area. The validity of the exit code is limited to a 4-hour window. Definitions of fare evasion are often codified in laws or ordinances that give a transit agency the authority to conduct fare enforcement and issue citations, as detailed further in Section 3.7.1, Authority to Enforce Fares.

24 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Box 3-1. Common Definitions of Fare Evasion No ticket ⢠Not possessing a valid ticket, transfer, or pass. ⢠Illegal entry into station or fare-paid area without a ticket. ⢠Entering a fare gate without paying (including pushing a gate, hopping over a gate, tailgating) or holding a gate open. ⢠Boarding vehicle without paying fare or refusing to pay. ⢠Refusing to show a valid ticket, transfer, pass, or other proof of payment. No valid ticket ⢠Using a discount/concession fare, ticket, or pass when not meeting the qualifications. ⢠Possessing a pass that does not belong to the user (e.g., employer or college pass). ⢠Paying less than the correct fare (e.g., short fare on bus). ⢠Using a transfer beyond the transfer window. ⢠Riding with fare media that has expired or has not been activated. ⢠Traveling beyond distance paid (e.g., overriding). ⢠Using ticket or pass that is not valid on that mode. ⢠Riding with stolen fare media. ⢠Using counterfeit fare media. ⢠Placing something other than a valid fare inside a farebox, TVM, or other fare collection device. Ticket forgotten ⢠Not carrying pass or forgot it at home. ⢠Failing to tap or swipe a pass prior to boarding. ⢠Not carrying proper proof of eligibility for a discount/concession fare [Note: some agencies (e.g., MTS, SFMTA) allow passengers to follow up with proof of eligibility (e.g., within 72 hours) to avoid being cited and to recover a confiscated or suspended pass.] Source: City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Gupta and Chen 2014; LACMTA 2016a; Metropolitan Council 2016; New South Wales Audit Office 2000; PwC 2007; TTC 2019a. As an alternative to time-based restrictions, transit agencies can also set the number of trips (e.g., complete a single one-way trip) and require passengers to alight at terminal stops or stations or, in the case of circular routes, limit the number of trips around the system. For example, passengers must alight the Atlanta Streetcar vehicle after traveling two times around the full streetcar route. Trip-based restrictions like these on fare validity are more difficult to enforce than time-based restrictions. While the examples in the âticket forgottenâ category may be considered fare evasion from a fare enforcement perspective and the passenger may be subject to a warning or citation, these acts of evasion do not necessarily result in a loss of fare revenue for the transit agency. For example, an agency may neither generate additional revenue nor lose revenue if a passholder does not properly validate prepaid fare media. As a result, this can bring into question whether the passholder is evading the fare by not validating a pass.

Findings and Applications 25  Egu and Bonnel (2020), in their study of the transit system in Lyon, France, established two categories for fare-evading behavior based on whether the behavior created a loss of revenue. The categories can also be differentiated on the basis of the type of fare media (e.g., pay-as-you- go, pass). For example, forgetting to tap when transferring between vehicles or modes within the transfer validity period may be seen as fare irregularity without loss of revenue, while making a first boarding without tapping under pay-as-you-go would be seen as fare evasion with loss of revenue. Differentiating between fare evasion with loss of revenue and fare irregularity without loss of revenue is critical for considering what an agency considers to be fare evasion and for measuring revenue loss due to fare evasion. While historically agencies have focused the definition of fare evasion and the ability to issue citations on fare evasion with loss of revenue, the line between these two categories has become more complex as agencies have implemented fare capping that replaces passes with a pay-as-you-go fare payment and relied on utilization data from the auto- matic fare collection system to price pass programs or to determine revenue-sharing allocation for multiagency transit systems. While transit agencies may not directly lose revenue in fare irregularity without loss of rev- enue scenarios, some agencies choose to define these scenarios as fare evasion because they may indirectly result in revenue loss for an agency because of revenue allocation among partner agencies or pricing of passes. TriMet requires passengers to tap every time they board, even if they have hit a fare cap, because tap data are used to carry out revenue-sharing agreements. The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) (2012) includes in its definition of fare evasion âfailure to produce proof of payment . . . including . . . a validated fare payment card.â This means that even if passengers have a valid pass, if they do not tap their card, they are considered to be evading fare. Agencies participating in the One Regional Card for All (ORCA) smart card system in the Seattle, Washington, area use tap data to allocate revenue among the agencies for transfers and passes and to establish pass program pricing. Conversely, while RTD uses smart card data to price its pass program, and failure to tap indirectly affects the fare revenue collected, by board policy RTD is unable to cite passengers with a valid pass for failure to tap. There may be additional reasons to require passengers to validate their fare media for each boarding. These include data collection or mitigating the perception that passengers who do not validate their fare have not paid. TransLink requires passengers to tap every time they board so that the agency receives the best ridership data possible. Any TransLink passenger without an active 90-minute transfer may be cited. Some types of fare evasion can be characterized as fraud and do result in direct revenue loss for an agency. The Oxford English Dictionary (2020) defines fraud as âwrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain.â Fraud related to fares can include counterfeits; misuse of transfers; unvalidated tickets; ticket manipulation (e.g., manipulating a ticketâs validity date or time, stamping the back instead of the front of a ticket); use of expired tickets, passes, or transfers; or illegal transfers of fare media. Fraudulent fare media and the fraudulent use of fare media can result in significant revenue loss for an agency (Starcic 2002). There are many strategies that agencies can use to tackle fraud. One option is to change the fare policy. After realizing that passengers were using transfers well past their validation limit, the Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) replaced transfers with a day pass that was easier to limit to the validity period. Transit agencies can choose to lower the stored value limits on refundable fare media to minimize revenue loss from counterfeiting (Starcic 2002). Agencies can also take advantage of technological developments to combat fraud. Electronic tickets, including mag- netic stripe tickets, smart cards, quick response (QR) codes, and barcodes, when implemented properly, are more difficult to forge than paper tickets (Fürst and Herold 2018; Starcic 2002).

26 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion If an agency decides to keep paper tickets, investing in low-cost anticounterfeiting features, such as foils, holograms, or embossing, makes the creation of counterfeit tickets more difficult and can be well worth their value in fare revenue capture (Starcic 2002). While some researchers have advised transit agencies to better educate their operators on how to spot fraud (Starcic 2002), prompting operators to intervene can lead to fare disputes. TCRP Synthesis 26: Bus Transit Fare Collection Practices interviewed 18 U.S. transit agencies as part of a synthesis of bus transit fare collection policies and practices and found that arguments over transfers, proper cash fares, expired or invalid passes, and reduced fare authorizations, which are all potential types of fraud, were, in that order, the most common causes of fare disputes (Stern 1997). While there are steps an agency can take to minimize its fraud risk, not all fraud can be pre- vented. Although passes and transfers are often labeled ânontransferable,â for example, it can be difficult for fare enforcement personnel to identify instances of transferred fare media during inspection, especially if the pass or transfer is valid. Although fraud is a form of fare evasion, nonpayment (i.e., traveling without a ticket) and other common evasion tactics appear to be the most common forms of fare evasion, with fraud accounting for a smaller portion (Fürst and Herold 2018). In a recent study of fare evasion on its streetcar services, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that the most prevalent form of fare evasion by far was nonpayment or traveling without a ticket (i.e., not paying, having no proof of payment, or not tapping a PRESTO card to pay or validate the fare). After nonpayment, invalid uses of various fare media, including passes and transfers, were the most common forms of fare evasion. Fare evasion on SFMTA also seems to follow this pattern. A fare evasion study in San Fran- cisco found that the most common types of fare evasion were failing to produce proof of pay- ment (41%) or presentation of an invalid transfer/fare receipt (26%) (Lee 2011). Walkaways accounted for 9% of fare evasions. Other types of evasion included misuse of a senior or youth pass or an invalid disabled ID card (9%), unvalidated ticket (6%), wrong monthly pass (2%), and observed underpays (2%). Only a very small portion (1%) actually used counterfeit media. Four percent responded âotherâ and 2% âpossibly valid.â There may be several reasons for nonpayment. Sound Transit (2020a) explored the reasons for passenger nonpayment in the customer engagement portion of a review of its fare enforce- ment program. The agency categorized the reasons stated by passengers who were unable to provide proof of payment when requested. The top two reasons passengers gave were forgetting to tap their ORCA card (22%) and claiming they tapped their ORCA card but it did not work (14%). Other commonly cited reasons included thinking their transfer was still valid (8%), could not find where to tap (7%), would have missed the train if they stopped to tap or buy a ticket (6%), and forgot their ORCA card (5%). Only 1% stated that they could have paid the fare but decided to take a chance. 3.1.2 Subsets of Passengers Like the three categories of fare evasion discussed above, passengers can be divided into three subsets: those who never evade (honest passengers), those who always evade (chronic evaders), and those who evade on the basis of conditions and the utility of evading versus paying the fare (calculator passengers) (Barabino and Salis 2019). There are also passengers whom Delbosc and Currie (2016b) consider accidental evaders who do not usually evade and have strong views against fare evasion but become fare evaders unintentionally (e.g., forgot their pass at home). While honest passengers are assumed to always pay, chronic evaders are assumed to always evade. This leaves a subset of passengers who are sensitive to fare inspection levels, fares, and fines. These calculator passengers can be subdivided into those who pay the fare because they Accidental evaders are differentiated from other types of evaders on the basis of intent and are discussed in Section 3.1.3, Types of Fare Evaders.

Findings and Applications 27  find it to be more profitable to pay the fare and those who choose to evade because it is more profitable to evade (Barabino and Salis 2019). Revenue is only generated if a passenger pays the fare or if a fare evader is caught and cited and then pays the fine. No revenue is generated by chronic fare evaders and calculator passen- gers who choose to evade but are not inspected, are inspected but not fined, or are inspected and fined but choose not to pay the fine (Barabino and Salis 2019). Figure 3-1 illustrates how the decisions of the different passenger types influence the revenue collected from fares and fines. Differentiation between the types of passengers who evade fare is important. While chronic fare evaders may be insensitive to strategies to deter fare evasion (e.g., increased enforcement, increased fine amounts) or encourage increased fare compliance (e.g., creating a culture of paying through education and customer service), calculator fare evaders may respond to these strategies and choose to pay the fare. 3.1.3 Types of Fare Evaders While Barabino and Salis (2019) define subsets of passengers, other researchers have defined different types of fare evaders. Understanding the types of fare evaders that use its system can Figure 3-1. Passenger types and impact of revenue collected.

28 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion enable an agency to better understand potential causes of fare evasion, think about how to address each subset of fare evaders, and analyze which subsets of evaders result in the most revenue loss or other negative operating impacts. While Barabino and Salis (2019) define fare evaders as either chronic or calculator, other researchers include another type of evaders, the unintentional or accidental fare evader (Bijleveld 2007; Delbosc and Currie 2016a; Salis et al. 2017; Fürst and Herold 2018). In their discussion of fare evasion cases in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, Fürst and Herold (2018) generally classify those who do not pay their fare (âfree-ridersâ) into two groups: unintentional and deliberate. The examples given for unintentional free-riding include âcases where a transport user forgets to buy or validate a ticket, or the holder of a ticket mistakes its validity (regarding period or area of validity or other ticket conditions) and uses it falsely, unintentionally becoming a free-rider.â Deliberate free-riders, in contrast, make an active deci- sion not to pay their fares. While the public may consider chronic fare evaders or those who evade fare on the basis of a calculated risk as passengers who participate in âdeliberateâ fare evasion, the public may not view accidental fare evaders as participating in fare evasion because it was unintentional. During focus groups conducted to understand transit passengersâ views on fare evasion, Delbosc and Currie (2016b) found that focus group participants tended to interpret fare evasion along a spectrum from uncontrollable (e.g., malfunctioning equipment) to unintentional (e.g., boarding before realizing that they have insufficient funds, boarding without paying because of a queue at the TVM when train arrives) to slightly intentional (e.g., not validating because traveling a few stops or because the vehicle is crowded) to clearly intentional (e.g., jumping over barriers, never buying tickets). Participants generally considered intent as what distinguished true fare evasion from unintentional fare evasion, that is, they associated deliberately not paying as fare evasion and did not view unintentional circumstances as fare evasion. While circumstances may be unintentional, they may still result in a loss of fare revenue for a transit agency. As a result, the agency may clas- sify these passengers as fare evaders, while the public may view them differently. On the basis of the results of the focus groups, Delbosc and Currie (2016b) stratified fare evaders into four key attitude segments: 1. Fare evasion is wrong/the accidental evaderâpeople who have strong views against fare evasion and only evade fare by accident, 2. The âitâs not my faultâ evaderâpeople who mean to pay but sometimes find themselves evading fare because of difficulty or barriers to obtaining valid tickets, 3. The calculated risk-taker evaderâintentional fare evaders who only engage in the activity on occasions when they believe the reward outweighs the risk, and 4. Career evadersâpeople who almost always engage in fare evasion and take pride in the activity. Each of these four key attitude segments displays different intentions and feelings. While the failure to pay the fare is unintentional for the first two segments, those in the last two are inten- tionally evading fare (Delbosc and Currie 2016b). Even chronic fare evaders can be divided into separate groups by looking at the rationale behind their decisions. Suquet (2009) identified fare evader types and their rationale for evading as follows: ⢠People who have no choiceâThey cannot afford the fare but need to take the bus. ⢠GamblersâThey know they are not likely to meet inspectors and take the chance because it is economically rational.

Findings and Applications 29  ⢠Ideological opponentsâThey challenge the legitimacy of inspections and many of them say they âhateâ inspectors. ⢠Dissatisfied clientsâThey protest against poor service quality by not buying a ticket. ⢠CheatsâThey pretend to accept the fine but give a false address and never pay it. ⢠People who have no clueâThey honestly do not understand the ticketing system. 3.1.4 Factors That Influence Fare Evasion According to economic theory, humans act rationally according to the costs and benefits of a situation and then make a decision based on what will yield them the highest benefit proba- bilistically (Boyd et al. 1989). While passengers theoretically choose whether to evade on the basis of the utility of fare evasion, fare evasion behavior is also influenced by societal norms, past experiences, and sociodemographic variables (González et al. 2019). The embarrassment of being fined, damage to their image, or bad conscience also influence passengersâ decisions against fare evading (Fürst and Herold 2018). This section divides the factors that influence fare evasion into three general categories: psycho- logical, structural, and demographic. Table 3-1 presents an overview of these factors and the opportunities available to agencies who wish to address them. 3.1.4.1 Psychological Factors That Influence Fare Evasion Passengersâ opinions of the system, satisfaction with the service, perceived likelihood of being caught, and social norms and values affect their likelihood of fare evading. Multiple studies have Psychological Structural Demographic Factors ⢠Satisfaction with service ⢠Perceived likelihood of being inspected ⢠Individual passengerâs norms and values ⢠Vehicle design ⢠Operating characteristics ⢠Infrastructure design ⢠Fare policy ⢠Education ⢠Employment ⢠Income ⢠Gender ⢠(Dis)ability ⢠Race/ethnicity Opportunities to Address Factors ⢠Increase presence and authority of agency staff ⢠Promote awareness of enforcement through marketing campaigns and messaging to increase perceived likelihood of being caught evading fare ⢠Increase customer satisfaction and quality of service to increase perceived value of service ⢠Promote fare-compliant culture through education and enforcement ⢠Increase the associated penalty for fare evasion ⢠Make fare payment as easy as possible ⢠Promote use of prepaid fare passes that are paid up front ⢠Install barriers and access controls ⢠Encourage front-door boarding ⢠Understand the demographics and underlying causes for fare evasion (e.g., inability to pay the fare, limited access to purchase fare) ⢠Engage with the community to identify and develop solutions ⢠Respond to underlying causes (e.g., conduct outreach/education, translate materials, increase access to fare media and reload locations, offer special fare programs for very low-income/no- income individuals, partner with organizations that serve persons who are experiencing homelessness) Table 3-1. Factors that influence fare evasion and opportunities to address them.

30 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion shown that passengersâ opinions of the transit system affect their likelihood to pay a fare. Dis- satisfaction with transit, whether it be longer headways, unreliable service, or other perceived faults of service, make a passenger less likely to pay the fare (Barabino et al. 2015; Cantillo et al. 2018; Fürst and Herold 2018; González et al. 2019; Guarda et al. 2015; Hansen et al. 2013; Sánchez-MartÃnez 2017; Smith and Clarke 2000). According to qualitative and quantitative research, transit agencies can increase the prob- ability that passengers will choose to pay their fare by increasing the presence and perceived authority of agency staff, whether they be bus drivers, station agents, or actual fare enforce- ment personnel (Eddy 2010; González et al. 2019; Guarda et al. 2015; Troncoso and de Grange 2017). These researchers have found that, while the actual rate of inspection is important, even a heightened presence of fare enforcement and other transit agency authority figures, no matter the inspection rate, can have a mitigating effect on fare evasion. Additionally, Delbosc and Currie (2016a, 2016b) have shown in their research that simply creating the perception of an increase in the likelihood of being caughtâfor instance, through messaging campaignsâcan deter some would-be fare evaders. When transit agencies cannot affect actual or perceived rates of inspection, they can change a fare evadersâ costâbenefit analysis by increasing fine amounts (Delbosc and Currie 2016b; Fürst and Herold 2018; González et al. 2019). Transit agencies may face trade-offs when deciding between psychological tools for lowering fare evasion described above. For instance, Guarda et al. (2015) caution against increasing fines as a means of fare evasion control if public perception of the transit system is already low, as higher fines could cause it to spiral even lower. They argue instead that improving the quality of the service could do more to reduce fare evasion while also improving customer perception. There are other psychological dimensions to fare evasion beyond an agencyâs control. A personâs social and cultural norms (González et al. 2019; Guarda et al. 2015), family values (González et al. 2019), thrill-seeking tendencies (Fürst and Herold 2018), honesty attributes (Delbosc and Currie 2016a; Currie and Delbosc 2017), and tendency toward permissive attitudes (Currie and Delbosc 2017) all affect their likelihood to evade fare. The people a passenger is traveling with also influence whether or not the passenger chooses to pay his or her fare. Passengers traveling in a group of people who they believe hold them to a higher ethical standard are less likely to evade paying the fare, whereas passengers traveling in a group of fare evaders or people naturally inclined to evade fare are more likely to evade the fare themselves (Bucciol et al. 2013; Cantillo et al. 2018; Fürst and Herold 2018). There are also chronic fare evaders who habitually evade fare and, if caught, provide false information or never pay the fine and who are unaffected by increased fines or inspection levels (Salis et al. 2017). 3.1.4.2 Structural Factors That Influence Fare Evasion The structure of a transit system, including its vehicles, operating characteristics, infrastructural design, and fare policies, has an impact on ridersâ abilities and likelihood to evade fares. In their study of the Transantiago transit system in Chile, Guarda et al. (2015) found that the design of a bus and operating conditions seemed to affect fare evasion rates. Specifically, buses with the option to enter by a rear door, a greater number of doors, a higher number of users boarding and alight- ing at the same time, and a higher occupancy rate were found to have higher rates of fare evasion. It is possible that these conditions make it easier for passengers to intentionally evade fares. In addition, factors such as overcrowding can prevent would-be fare payers from accessing validators or fareboxes (Cantillo et al. 2018; Guarda et al. 2015). The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) and TTC (2020a) found that the fare collection method and vehicle design affect passengersâ ability and willingness to evade fares. A comprehensive 6-week fare evasion study conducted by TTCâs Audit, Risk, and Compliance Department found that streetcars with proof of payment and all-door boarding experienced the highest rates of fare evasion, as compared

Findings and Applications 31  with buses with front-door boarding and fare payment at the farebox, and with gated rail, which had the lowest fare evasion rate. In addition, passengers who boarded through the streetcar doors located closer to the operator had a relatively higher rate of fare compliance than those who entered through the rear doors (TTC 2020a). This higher fare compliance at the front door mirrors the relative rates of fare evasion found at the front versus other doors on Transantiagoâs system. The TTC streetcar design was also a factor in the fare evasion observed. The newer low- floor light rail vehicles with the operator in a separate compartment experienced higher fare evasion, in part due to the diminished customer interaction with the operator (TTC 2020a). Fare policies can affect evasion by affecting the ease of use of the system. Complex fares that are difficult for passengers to understand make it more likely that they will accidentally evade paying a full and appropriate fare for their trip (Delbosc and Currie 2016a). Requiring passengers to purchase fares off board, to use smart cards, or to pay using exact change can also increase fare evasion rates, because these policies create barriers to payment. These barriers can then become acceptable excuses for fare evasion in the minds of passengers who would otherwise pay, but happen to be caught without the necessary cash or who must choose between paying their fare and catching the next vehicle (Delbosc and Currie 2016a). Increasing fares can also affect fare evasion rates. Troncoso and de Grange (2017) determined that a 10% increase in fares was correlated with a 2% rise in fare evasion rates. Promoting the use of passes and other fare media that are paid up front can mitigate revenue loss from fare evasion (Sánchez-MartÃnez 2017; Killias et al. 2009). The infrastructure at a stop or station can also have an impact on the ease of use of a system and, thus, fare evasion rates. If passengers encounter long ticket queues (Delbosc and Currie 2016a, 2016b) or have difficulty finding places to load value to their fare media (Cantillo et al. 2018; González et al. 2019; Salis et al. 2017), they may consider these to be valid circumstances for evading the fare. Other types of infrastructure are more directly related to fare enforcement. Infrastructure that restricts access, such as fare gates, turnstiles, and other physical barriers, provides a means for agencies to mitigate fare evasion (Barabino et al. 2014; González et al. 2019; TTC 2020a). While largely effective, infrastructure that restricts access does not prevent all fare evasion. Fare evaders will still use a number of techniques to evade fare when they encounter gates, turnstiles, and other physical barriers. Common techniques for evading fare include tail gating; jumping fare gates, turnstiles, railings, and fencing; crawling under the turnstile; opening the fare gate for others; forcing fare gates open; squeezing through the gap between fare gate panels; backcocking turnstiles so that the turnstile is rotated backwards to enable the evader to slip between bars; and using swing gates or emergency exits (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Reddy et al. 2011a). The location of a stop or station relative to a gated service can affect fare evasion rates. Cantillo et al. (2018) and Guarda et al. (2016) showed that when bus stops are located near gated or inter- modal stations, fare evasion tends to be lower. The authors of both studies believe this is likely due to the number of passengers who are transferring from one vehicle to another at these bus stops. Since transfers are free on Transantiago for passengers who transfer from the gated subway, it is more likely that these passengers have already paid their fare and thus see no need to evade their free transfer. 3.1.4.3 Demographic Factors That Influence Fare Evasion Numerous studies of fare evasion conclude that certain demographic characteristics are often associated with fare evasion. Male passengers are more likely to evade fare than female riders, as are younger passengers (Barabino et al. 2015; Bucciol et al. 2013; Eddy 2010; González et al. 2019; Sound Transit 2020a). Studies have also shown that passengers with lower education levels See Section 3.8.1, Fare Simplification, Passes, and Affordability. See Section 3.12, Capital Infrastructure to Reduce Fare Evasion, and Section 3.13, New Fare Collection Technologies and Fare Enforcement.

32 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion (Barabino et al. 2015; Cantillo et al. 2018), lower health levels (Cantillo et al. 2018), or with a disability (Sound Transit 2020a) are more likely to commit fare evasion. Being unemployed, a student, or employed part-time also appears to correlate with a higher propensity to evade fare (Barabino et al. 2015; González et al. 2019; Sound Transit 2020a). Similarly, passengers boarding in areas characterized by lower household incomes or who report being from a lower-income household (Cantillo et al. 2018; Guarda et al. 2015; Horizon Research Corp. 2002; King County Metro 2019; Reddy et al. 2011a; Sound Transit 2020a) or who are transit dependent (Barabino et al. 2015; Sound Transit 2020a) have been found more likely to evade fare payment. With regard to income, a passenger survey conducted by Sound Transit (2020a) provided three key findings: âHousehold income is the primary demographic characteristic that differ- entiates those surveyed who were able to provide proof of payment and those unable to do so. Furthermore, it shows that the threshold is a household income above or below $50,000.â Among those with a household income below $50,000, passengers from households who earned between $24,000 and $33,000 were the most likely to have proof of payment. It is suggested this higher fare compliance may be because passengers from these households are more aware of or may have more access to programs and services that help them pay their fares. This is interesting in the context of the economic theory of behavior when faced with varying potential fine amounts. Polinsky and Shavell (1979) theorized that higher-income individuals may be under-deterred by the amount of a fine, since the fine constitutes proportionally less of their income, whereas lower-income individuals may be over-deterred when evaluating whether or not to risk a fine on the basis of the rational probability of being caught and the amount of the fine compared to the cost of participation. However, they also theorize that very-low-income individuals who would be unable to pay the fine might also be under-deterred according to the logic of rational economic behavior. Some relationships have been found between race/ethnicity and fare evasion. There is limited research on this topic, but it is of growing interest, given concerns regarding racial/ ethnic profiling and discrimination. In Los Angeles, Horizon Research Corp. (2002) found a dis- proportionately higher number of evaders on the Metro Rail system among African Americans as compared with other ethnic groups, after income and age were controlled for. Similarly, in Seattle, Sound Transit (2020a) found that African American/Black and Hispanic/Latinx pas- sengers were more likely to be fare evaders during a recent onboard survey. Each of these studies reflects findings for a particular transit system. It is thus not advisable to use these results to profile passengers who are thought to be more likely to evade fares, for reasons associated with both the pitfalls of extrapolation and equity concerns. Some transit agencies assess whether there are psychological and structural factors that influ- ence fare evasion behavior. Some agencies conduct outreach with identified groups with higher fare evasion rates to identify and develop solutions to address underlying causes of fare eva- sion. Through this outreach, a transit agency may identify additional factors that influence fare evasion for specific groups, so that the agency may respond to the underlying causes. Several of the transit agencies surveyed (King County Metro, MBTA, Sound Transit, TTC) are increas- ing community engagement as they develop or review their fare enforcement programs. These engagements provide not only opportunities for communication and education but also for knowledge-sharing and development of effective solutions for addressing fare evasion. 3.2 Fare Enforcement Program Goals and Objectives Program goals and objectives are integral to the design, development, implementation, and execution of a successful fare enforcement program. The starting point for establishing the pro- gram may be an agencyâs strategic vision and plan, but, regardless of the impetus, the program See Section 3.10, Discrimination in Fare Enforcement. Public engagement opportunities are discussed in Section 3.8.2, Customer Education, and particularly in Section 3.8.2.1, Customer Education Through Public Engagement Efforts.

Findings and Applications 33  should be guided by clear program goals reinforced by measurable objectives. Program planning involves identifying fare enforcement needs and desired outcomes or goals; considering poten- tial solutions and assessing the resources that are available and needed for implementation; and documenting the proposals or actions recommended for implementation in a program plan. Once the program plan is approved, the program management life cycle moves into program implementation and execution. In those phases, goals and objectives provide a starting point for setting performance targets, allocating resources, and evaluating program success. Planning a fare enforcement program can be a multidisciplinary undertaking, and two transit agencies (King County Metro, Sound Transit) have formed work groups that included internal and external stakeholders to develop or revise their programs. Program planning, including design, development, and implementation planning, may involve functions that span most of a transit agency, including finance, security, law enforcement, operations, customer relations, technology, equipment maintenance, information systems, marketing and communications, civil rights, audit, and legal, as well as other functions specific to a particular transit agency. Establishing clear goals and objectives is especially important for creating a common vision and expectations for a multidisciplinary program. Sound Transit (2020d) undertook the development of a Fare Enforcement Action Plan in 2019. The work was led by an interdisciplinary work group charged with understanding âthe impacts of our current [fare enforcement] program and develop[ing] recommendations that provide an equitable and customer-focused experience, including safety for all riders and integ- rity of decision-making, while ensuring strong financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars.â Sound Transit also identified a vision, mission, and objectives for the action plan, which the work group translated into criteria that it used to guide information gathering, proposal development, and evaluation. These criteria include racial/ethnic equity (e.g., What are the racial/ethnic equity results sought? What are the possible unintended negative consequences?), customer-focused experience (e.g., Would all customers feel welcomed, respected, supported, and valued?), and safety for all passengers (e.g., Would the feeling of security be increased for all riders?). Effective program management benefits from setting and using goals and objectives and, subsequently, in measuring and evaluating performance. Table 3-2 includes examples of goals and objectives that are actionable and measurable. The goals are intended to provide examples of different aspects of fare enforcement. The objectives represent possible actions to implement a goal; some of the objectives listed here may be mutually exclusive. In addition to developing goals and objectives, it is also important to develop time frames and performance metrics to enable program oversight. Performance audits of fare enforcement programs for King County Metro, SFMTA, and TTC have all reinforced the need to clearly define program goals and objectives to guide program strategies. A performance audit of SFMTAâs proof-of-payment program by the San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) noted that the Security and Enforcement Division responsible for proof- of-payment inspections had not developed goals, and, therefore, SFMTA was unable to evaluate whether the proof-of-payment pilot program on buses was meeting program goals. The audit recommended that SFMTA develop fare inspection- and evasion-related goals and objectives specific to SFMTAâs proof-of-payment program. The audit recommended structuring a primary program goal (e.g., prevent fare evasion) as well as secondary goals (e.g., provide safety, security, and customer service) with short- and long-term actionable and quantifiable objectives (e.g., increase the programâs contact rate) and implementation strategies to meet those objectives. The audit also recommended establishing clear and quantifiable criteria for evaluating the programâs achievement of its goals and objectives. The King County Auditorâs Office (2018) analyzed the cost of fare enforcement for King County Metroâs RapidRide bus service, with the objective of determining to what extent Metro See Section 3.4, Fare Enforcement Program Management and Oversight.

34 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Fare Enforcement Goal Objectives Reduce fare evasion and revenue loss ⢠Collect data needed to measure the fare evasion rate by mode/line/key location. ⢠Establish targets for fare evasion and inspection rates. ⢠Determine fare enforcement staffing necessary to achieve fare evasion and inspection targets. ⢠Develop, test, and implement a methodology for estimating the amount of fare revenue lost as a result of fare evasion. ⢠Increase the probability of encountering fare enforcement personnel by X% by coordinating fare enforcement assignments with ridership levels by route and time of day. ⢠Schedule inspections so that that passengers may expect to be inspected anywhere, anytime. ⢠Right-size fare enforcement staffing and shift assignments to increase shift coverage during peak periods to X% of total fare enforcement hours. ⢠Reduce nonauthorized entry at secondary station entrances by X% by increasing uniformed staff at the stations with secondary entrances with the highest evasion rates. Increase fare compliance ⢠Build a culture of fare compliance by focusing on customer education. ⢠Encourage a positive customer culture and behavior to tap every time. ⢠Modify fare payment behavior and increase fare compliance by issuing warnings and citations. ⢠Implement zero-tolerance policy and require fare enforcement to cite all passengers who do not have proof of payment. Deploy fare enforcement efficiently and effectively ⢠Deploy fare enforcement personnel to locations experiencing recurring or high fare evasion rates. ⢠Maximize contacts by deploying fare enforcement personnel to high ridership routes. ⢠Optimize fare enforcement effectiveness by scheduling shifts to align with ridership patterns and peak times of fare evasion. ⢠Collect data needed to determine fare evasion rates and revenue loss and use them to make fare enforcement deployment decisions. ⢠Evaluate designation of rail and BRT platforms as fare-paid areas. ⢠Maximize time spent conducting fare inspections by developing a staffing deployment strategy. ⢠Minimize impacts of lunch breaks and shift changes on coverage during peak ridership periods. Avoid bias in conducting fare enforcement ⢠Develop and implement standard operating procedures for systematically inspecting every passenger on a vehicle. ⢠Mandate consistent use of standard operating procedures for conducting 100% inspections. ⢠Assess staffing and budgetary impacts of employing/contracting sufficient resources to conduct fare enforcement equitably. ⢠Develop deployment guidelines to deploy fare enforcement personnel equitably across all routes (e.g., difference in hours that fare enforcement personnel are deployed on routes with the highest and lowest rates of fare evasion is no more than X%). ⢠Distribute fare enforcement resources proportionately on the basis of ridership. ⢠Develop a methodology and conduct a racial/ethnic equity impact assessment. ⢠Determine the requirements and resources for implementing a methodology for measuring and characterizing instances of systemic racism. ⢠Review employment policies and practices and identify barriers to recruitment, hiring, and promotion of diverse employees. ⢠Develop awareness of bias through training for employees and leadership. Decriminalize fare evasion ⢠Eliminate the likelihood that a fare evasion citation results in court or collections actions for the offender. ⢠Assess authorities for decriminalizing fare evasion and implementing alternatives such as administrative resolution processes, in-house adjudication, or diversion programs. ⢠Identify and evaluate risks of decriminalizing fare evasion and issuing civil citations instead of criminal citations for fare evasion. ⢠Evaluate and develop an in-house adjudication process or diversion program. ⢠Define, develop, and implement a reduced penalty for violations that are resolved within a defined period of time. ⢠Define, develop, and implement nonmonetary options for resolving fare violations. Table 3-2. Sample actionable fare enforcement program goals and objectives.

Findings and Applications 35  was âensuring the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of RapidRideâs off-board fare payment system.â While the auditor was able to assess the costs of fare enforcement, the absence of a performance management system, with baseline data, performance targets, and measures for outputs and outcomes, precluded an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of fare enforcement. At the time of its 2019 audit, TTC defined the objective of its fare inspectors as âto provide customer service excellence while safely enforcing the TTC By-law No. 1 on all Proof-of-Payment lines and to reduce overall fare evasion through visual deterrence as well as the issuance of infraction notices,â but did not have program-specific goals or objectives for revenue protection (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). The audit noted the need to set âacceptable targets for its fare evasion rates (by mode and overall) and to develop short- and long-term strategies to reduce the fare evasion rates and the resulting revenue loss, while ensuring good customer serviceâ (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). TTCâs 2020 Revenue Protection Strategy defines mode-specific fare inspection deployment objectives with associated inspection tactics and strategy details (TTC 2020b). 3.3 Fare Enforcement Strategies and Practices How, where, and when personnel are deployed affect the effectiveness and efficiency of fare enforcement. Fare enforcement strategies and practices for deploying fare enforcement personnel must take into consideration: ⢠Fare enforcement program objectives and approaches for achieving them, ⢠Available fare enforcement resources and their authorities, ⢠Where and how to deploy fare enforcement personnel, ⢠How fare enforcement is conducted, and ⢠The size and composition of fare inspection teams. Fare Enforcement Goal Objectives Reduce ineligible use of reduced and concession fares ⢠Develop and implement an eligibility enforcement program to reduce lost fare revenue attributable to ineligible use of reduced and concession fares. ⢠Develop a methodology to estimate fare revenue lost due to ineligible use of reduced and concession fares. ⢠Implement a zero-tolerance policy for failure to provide proof of eligibility for reduced and concession fares. ⢠Use electronic fare media to manage eligibility and purchase of reduced and concession fare products. ⢠Use fare collection data to identify and rank routes and stops with high shares of reduced and concession fares, identify inconsistencies (e.g., a high share of child fares used late at night), and develop a plan to deploy resources accordingly. ⢠Develop an educational campaign about eligibility requirements, including the use of ambassadors to remind passengers about requirements for reduced and concession fares. Improve safety and security ⢠Deploy fare enforcement personnel in uniform to increase security presence. ⢠Identify and quantify incidence rates at locations with High customer complaints, High incidences of employee assaults or confrontations (including fare-related passenger conflicts with the operator), and High numbers of safety and security issues. ⢠Develop a plan for deploying fare enforcement to locations with the highest need for increased security. Table 3-2. (Continued).

36 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Successful enforcement strategies and practices depend on fare enforcement personnel under- standing a transit agencyâs policies and what is expected of them. In describing the results of research on best practices in fare inspection, a security assessment of Saint Louisâs MetroLink emphasized the importance of designing an operational approach that supports the agencyâs fare enforcement policy. Key elements, designed to reinforce the chosen strategy, include ensuring that fare enforcement is handled consistently and fairly, through the discretion that is given to fare inspectors, the use of warnings, and the ability to track and remove repeat offenders (WSP 2018). This section is divided into two subsections: ⢠Section 3.3.1, Fare Enforcement Personnelâfare enforcement staffing with discussion of civilian personnel versus sworn peace officers and agency versus contracted personnel; per- sonnel uniforms and equipment, including defensive or protective equipment; and hiring and training requirements. ⢠Section 3.3.2, Deployment Strategies and Locationsâdeployment strategies (e.g., system- wide patrols, focused deployments, and sweeps); fare enforcement location (e.g., onboard inspections, fare-paid area inspections, offboarding inspections, and fare line enforcement); standard operating procedures for fare enforcement (e.g., fare inspection processes, discre- tion policies); team composition and size for deployment; and considerations for scheduling and assigning fare enforcement personnel. 3.3.1 Fare Enforcement Personnel This subsection focuses primarily on the personnel who conduct fare enforcement and their authorities, responsibilities, and training. The types of personnel, their authorities, and their approach to fare enforcement are changing as a result of recent court cases challenging the con- stitutionality of using police for proof-of-payment inspections, and the increasing focus of fare enforcement programs on improving fare compliance by educating and helping passengers to pay the fare on an ongoing basis rather than assessing penalties for nonpayment. 3.3.1.1 Fare Enforcement Staffing Staffing for fare enforcement varies by agency. Fare enforcement may be performed by sworn law enforcement officers (e.g., police officers, peace officers, deputy sheriffs, special constables) or nonsworn, civilian personnel (e.g., fare inspectors, security officers). As shown in Table 3-3, some agencies employ a combination of sworn peace officers and civilian personnel to meet different security requirements, depending in part on the level of authority granted to different positions. Sworn officers at MBTA, NYCT, and WMATA do not conduct proof-of-payment inspections because those agencies do not operate as proof-of-payment systems. Even agencies that operate as proof-of-payment systems may choose not to have police conduct proof-of- payment inspections. In 2017, the BART Board of Directors adopted two ordinances imple- menting a proof of payment requirement within BART paid areas and trains (BART 2017). As part of the BART Police Officerâs Association contract negotiation, BART created its fare inspector job classification in 2018 and discontinued the use of community service officers, who are civilian, nonsworn employees, for proof-of-payment inspections. BART police officers can request proof of payment only when they have reasonable suspicion or if they have detained a passenger for another offense (e.g., creating a disturbance in the station) (TCRP A-45 phone survey of BART, 2020). Personnel involved in fare enforcement may be agency employees or contracted personnel. Contractual arrangements are most common with local law enforcement agencies or with pri- vate security firms. While some agencies have sworn peace officers, they may not have a role in fare enforcement, may have only a limited support role in fare enforcement, or may observe fare payment and only request proof of payment and cite an individual who is observed fare evading by the officer. See Section 3.7.4, Constitutionality of Fare Enforcement, and the discussion of fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

Findings and Applications 37  Table 3-3 identifies the personnel that are assigned to conduct fare enforcement for the transit agencies surveyed as part of TCRP A-45. In transit agencies that involve sworn peace officers in fare enforcement, these officers are divided into two categories: ⢠Those who must directly observe an individual evade fare and may only request proof of payment if they have a reasonable suspicion or during detention for another crime and ⢠Those who may conduct proof-of-payment inspections as part of an administrative search, which is an exception to the prohibition on suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amend- ment to the U.S. Constitution. In transit agencies that use civilian personnel for proof-of-payment inspections, these per- sonnel are divided into two categories: ⢠Those who have the authority to conduct proof-of-payment inspections and cite fare evaders and ⢠Those who have the authority to conduct proof-of-payment inspections but cannot cite. Of the 18 transit agencies surveyed, 15 use civilian personnel for proof-of-payment inspec- tions. In 14 of those agencies, civilian personnel have the authority to request proof of payment and cite fare evaders; the other agency (Metro Transit) has civilian personnel who can request proof of payment but cannot cite. Of the 14 agencies that use civilians who are able to cite for fare enforcement, five (BART, NYCT, RTD, TransLink, and TTC) also use sworn peace officers for fare enforcement. However, only three of these five agencies use peace officers for proof-of-payment inspections. Two of these agencies are Canadian (TransLink and TTC), and the other, RTD has the ability to use sworn Agency and Location Sworn Peace Officers Involved in Fare Enforcement Civilian Personnel Used for Proof-of-Payment Inspections Directly Observed (reasonable suspicion) Proof-of- Payment Inspections Able to Cite Unable to Cite BART (San Francisco Bay Area, CA) King County Metro (Seattle, WA) LA Metro (Los Angeles, CA) MBTA (Boston, MA) Metro Transit (MinneapolisâSaint Paul, MN) MTS (San Diego, CA) NYCT (New York City, NY) RTD (Denver, CO) SacRT (Sacramento, CA) SFMTA (San Francisco, CA) Sound Transit (Seattle, WA) Sun Metro (El Paso, TX) Not applicable (no proof-of-payment inspections; operators oversee fare collection as passengers board) The Rapid (Grand Rapids, MI) TransLink (Vancouver, BC) TriMet (Portland, OR) TTC (Toronto, ON) Valley Metro (Phoenix, AZ) WMATA (Washington, DC) Source: Compiled from transit agency survey results and websites, 2020. Table 3-3. Fare enforcement personnel and authorities for fare enforcement.

38 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion peace officers but primarily uses civilians for proof-of-payment inspections. Although BART is a proof-of-payment system, BART police officers do not conduct proof-of-payment inspections. In New York, police officers do not conduct proof-of-payment inspections on NYCT services that use proof of payment (e.g., SBS). There is increasing interest in the use of civilian personnel for fare enforcement. As MBTA prepares to introduce proof of payment as part of its Fare Transformation, the agency plans to hire a civilian fare verification team to conduct fare enforcement. Although MBTA had the authority to use civilian personnel, it recently received authority from the legislature to designate civilian employees for fare enforcement. The use of civilian personnel for fare enforcement also includes the authorization of civilian personnel who may have the authority to request proof of payment to also be able to cite. For example, Metro Transit has sought authority from the Minnesota legislature to issue administra- tive citations and use civilian personnel to issue citations for fare evasion; however, these measures were not included in the transportation bill passed by the Minnesota legislature in June 2021. In addition to the fare enforcement personnel in Table 3-3, other agency staff members may have roles in helping deter fare evasion. This is particularly true of security personnel, station agents, customer service agents, and ambassadors who provide a presence at stations or stops and throughout the system and who, by their presence, assist in deterring fare evasion. Some agencies have personnel who help deter fare evasion but do not have authority to request proof of payment or cite. For example, BART and SFMTA position customer service agents at station entrances in booths, while MBTA and TTC position them at the fare lines or near TVMs to increase their visibility. These personnel help influence fare payment behavior through their presence and by educating passengers about fare payment requirements. Transit agencies may also employ ambassadors, particularly at stations, to assist passengers with understanding fare policies (particularly proof-of-payment requirements), where fares are required, how to pur- chase valid fares from TVMs, and how to tag or swipe fare media at gates, and to assist during crowded conditions such as special events. Ambassadors can be extremely effective at helping passengers understand fare payment requirements as agencies introduce new services, payment methods, and fare enforcement policies. Ancillary personnel can also help in identifying locations with increased fare evasion. For example, TTC assigns uniformed supervisors to specific stations during rush hour to identify locations with high fare evasion. While there are advantages to using different types of personnel in fare enforcement and in deterring fare evasion, the various types of personnel and their uniforms can create confusion among passengers. To help address this concern, TriMet has all fare enforcement personnel wear identifying patches or name tags and has created a page on its website titled âTriMet Per- sonnel & Security Staffâ that lists the duties and authorities of different personnel and shows the uniforms of each group. Use of In-House Versus Contracted Employees for Fare Enforcement. The majority of the transit agencies surveyed (10 of 18 agencies) use in-house personnel for conducting fare enforce- ment, as shown in Table 3-4. Three agencies (King County Metro, Sound Transit, Valley Metro) solely use contracted security to conduct fare enforcement. Two agencies (MTS, TriMet) use contracted security to support agency personnel in conducting fare enforcement. Two agencies (NYCT, RTD) use slightly different mixes of agency and contracted security and/or law enforce- ment, and the remaining agency (Sun Metro) uses its bus and streetcar operators to verify fares at the farebox. Some transit agencies (e.g., LA Metro, Sound Transit) have conducted studies to evaluate the trade-offs of contracting for fare enforcement personnel. RCW 81.112.210 (2012) gives Sound

Findings and Applications 39  Transit the authority to designate and employ personnel to monitor fare payment or to contract for such services. Sound Transit considered using sworn peace officers, employing in-house fare enforcement personnel, or contracting for fare enforcement. The agency concluded that expanding its existing security contract and using contracted fare enforcement officers to con- duct fares inspections would be the most cost-effective option. Sound Transit developed selec- tion and training criteria to ensure staff would be consistently qualified over time, given staff turnover (Cummins et al. 2013). In an assessment of law and fare enforcement options conducted for LA Metro, BCA Watson Rice et al. (2015) observed that LA Metro may be able to exercise more control over contracted personnel than over its own employees. Under LA Metroâs contract with the Los Angeles County Sheriffâs Department (LASD), the agency was able to request the removal and reassignment of specific LASD personnel âwithout cause or discussion,â an action that would have been more difficult for LA Metro in the case of directly employed law enforcement personnel. That con- tract also required LASD to meet full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing requirements by providing contracted service units that were tracked and billed in minutes, which enabled a more con- sistent service level than would be possible using in-house agency personnel due to turnover or extended absences inherent in using an FTE-based staffing requirement (BCA Watson Rice et al. 2015). The use of agency versus contracted staff may also evolve over time. Following the BCA Watson Rice (2015) analysis, LA Metro brought fare enforcement in-house as the light rail network was expanded. The in-depth review of security and policing strategies examined alternatives to the agencyâs existing contracts with LASD for sworn peace officers and a security contractor for fare enforcement security officers. In 2017, LA Metro restructured its law enforcement staffing, entering into a multiagency contract for law enforcement services; hiring and training transit security officers to bring the fare enforcement function in-house; and contracting separately for security guards to provide security for buildings, facilities, and operations (LACMTA 2017; Scauzillo 2017). This restructuring enabled sworn peace officers to focus on safety, security, and policing of the system. Whether to develop an in-house police or transit enforcement department or contract for fare enforcement, or both, varies by agency. While LA Metro has contracted its law enforce- ment, other agencies (BART, MBTA, Metro Transit, NYCT, TransLink, TTC, WMATA) have their own police departments. âThis [in-house transit police] model is especially effective on Agencies Type of Employment Arrangement Number Percent Name Agency personnel 10 56 BART, LA Metro, MBTA, Metro Transit, SacRT, SFMTA, The Rapid, TransLink, TTC, WMATA Contracted security 3 17 King County Metro, Sound Transit, Valley Metro Agency personnel and contracted security 2 11 MTS, TriMet Contracted security, agency law enforcement, and contracted law enforcement 1 6 RTD Agency personnel and local law enforcement 1 6 NYCT Not applicable (discontinued proof-of-payment inspections) 1 6 Sun Metro Total 18 100a aActual total does not sum to 100% due to rounding. Table 3-4. Fare enforcement employment arrangements.

40 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion systems that transverse multiple jurisdictions as it allows for consistent policing across a system. The agency can define police policies and processes that completely fit the agencies goals and objectivesâ (WSP 2018). Meanwhile, for smaller transit agencies, contracting for fare enforce- ment and/or law enforcement may be more effective: âCosts for establishing and maintaining an in-house police or security group are high, as all salary, benefits, training, equipment, hiring costs and liability for the activities must be covered. Depending on the size of the group or unit, remaining competitive and allowing for career advancement can be challengingâ (WSP 2018). There may also be reasons to use teams of both agency and contracted personnel, especially when contracted security personnel provide security for agency personnel. For example, TriMet uses civilian, in-house fare inspectors to check passengersâ fares. Each fare inspector is accom- panied by a contracted customer safety officer whose role is to support and protect the fare inspector during the course of his or her duties. Customer safety officers cannot request proof of payment or issue citations. While it took time and effort to build a working relationship between these union and nonunion workers, in part because of a fear of lost union jobs, the pairing now works very well and fare inspectors feel safer with the customer safety officers present. Similarly, MTS deploys each of its code compliance inspectors with a security officer as part of each train team. Code compliance inspectors are civilian personnel who work for MTS, while security officers are contracted. Like TriMet customer safety officers, MTS security officers are able to request proof of payment; however, MTS security officers are not able to cite. In addition to assisting with fare inspections, MTSâs armed security officers provide security for code compli- ance inspectors and MTS facilities. When contracting, transit agencies have found that defining roles and responsibilities and establishing criteria, as well as expectations regarding specific performance indicators, are important to managing overall contract performance. When contracted personnel are used, unless clearly stated and agreed to in the contract, transit agencies may have limited control over some elements of day-to-day operations, such as hiring and specific deployment assignments. Fare Enforcement Responsibilities and Authorities. Among North American transit agencies, fare enforcement is conducted by both sworn peace officers and nonsworn civilian personnel. In some cases, agencies use both to meet different needs and to comply with limita- tions to the legal authorities of different positions. The authority to enforce fares and to designate who may enforce fares is established by codes and ordinances approved at the state/provincial, local municipal/county, or transit agency governing board level. In addition to fare enforcement, civilian personnel may have additional responsibilities including code of conduct compliance and security. For example, many civilian personnel involved in fare enforcement, such as LA Metro fare compliance officers, MTS code compliance officers, TriMet fare inspectors, TTC fare inspectors, and Valley Metro security officers, are responsible for enforcing code compliance, including fare enforcement. In addition, security personnel who participate in fare enforcement may also have security responsibilities (e.g., RTD transit security officers, MTS security officers). While civilian personnel may have the authority to issue citations for fare evasion and pos- sibly for other code violations, as civilian personnel, they have limited authority. Therefore, transit agencies may use law enforcement to support fare enforcement activities in the event that a passenger is uncooperative or an encounter escalates. Having sworn peace officers present can also help increase compliance during the inspection process. The audit of TTCâs revenue operations observed that many passengers who were approached by fare inspectors knew that if they walked away or escalated the situation, the fare inspector would be unable to issue them a citation for fare evasion. When fare inspectors were accompanied by special constables, how- ever, passengers found to be evading fare walked away less often and were less aggressive during See Section 3.4.2.6, Contract Management. See Section 3.7.1, Authority to Enforce Fares.

Findings and Applications 41  the citation process (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Therefore, transit agencies that do not use sworn peace officers during the fare enforcement process may find that evaders are less likely to cooperate and thereby inhibit an agencyâs ability to manage fare evasion, although law enforcement can also be called to respond in the event of a more serious infraction or crime. Deploying personnel with different authorities and responsibilities together can help address different needs. This is evident in the assignment of fare enforcement responsibilities at TTC, which employs a combination of fare inspectors and special constables who are deployed together for revenue protection. Fare inspectors are primarily responsible for conducting fare enforce- ment to mitigate fare evasion and revenue loss, while special constables have powers similar to those of peace officers and are primarily responsible for protecting the safety and security of TTC passengers and employees. As part of TTCâs revenue protection deployments, special constables conduct inspections, provide support in more complex investigations, and assist with noncompliant passengers, as they have more authority, including the ability to enforce certain sections of the criminal code and arrest, if necessary. MTS and TriMet use similar arrangements with their security contractors. The contracted security may be involved in fare enforcement (e.g., MTS security officers can request proof of payment and inspect fares) but they are also present for security. The advantages and disadvantages of using sworn peace officers or civilian personnel to pro- vide fare enforcement are summarized in Table 3-5 and discussed further below. An advantage of using civilians for fare enforcement is that civilian personnel can conduct fare enforcement at a lower cost as well as provide a more customer-focused approach (WSP 2018). Advantages Disadvantages Sworn Peace Officers ⢠Have authorities that civilians may not have (e.g., detain, arrest, request identification) ⢠Respected as law enforcement ⢠Compel increased cooperation as compared with civilian inspectors, since individuals are not required by law to produce ID to civilians ⢠Uniformed presence provides sense of security and safety ⢠Able to perform other policing duties and support complex investigations, in addition to fare enforcement ⢠Higher hiring qualifications and training requirements than civilian personnel ⢠Fare enforcement may not be their primary responsibility ⢠Higher cost than civilian personnel ⢠Potential to escalate a minor offense (fare evasion) to a criminal charge if an outstanding warrant is found during identification or National Crime Information Center check ⢠Potential constitutionality challenges for use of law enforcement for proof-of-payment inspections ⢠Mandated reporting requirements (e.g., demographics of individuals cited) Civilian Personnel ⢠Dedicated force focused on fare enforcement ⢠Deter fare evasion ⢠Lower cost than sworn peace officers ⢠Presence provides sense of security ⢠Opportunity for greater focus on customer service and education ⢠Lack of certain authorities (e.g., detain, arrest, require identification) ⢠Limited training compared with sworn peace officers; lower hiring requirements ⢠There may be restrictions on use of personnel in plain clothes ⢠May be unarmed or may not have defensive equipment (e.g., baton, pepper spray) ⢠Contacts who understand limitations of authority able to avoid citations by walking away or refusing to show ID Table 3-5. Use of sworn peace officers or civilian personnel in fare enforcement: Advantages and disadvantages.

42 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion TCRP Report 80 reached a similar conclusion in 2002 about the cost savings and customer service advantages of a dedicated fare enforcement force: âThe most cost-effective inspection personnel approach is to use uniformed agency staff for conducting fare inspection, as well as assisting in performing general customer service dutiesâ (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). The use of contracted civilian personnel may provide additional cost savings. TCRP Synthesis 96 found substantial cost savings associated with using contracted civilian inspectors, despite a limited data set (two of 24 agencies that responded to the question used contracted private employees) and recommended future research (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). In addition, interest in the use of civilian personnel instead of law enforcement for proof- of-payment inspections has increased because of concerns about the constitutionality of using sworn peace officers for proof-of-payment inspections in the United States. In addition to concerns about the constitutionality of fare enforcement, there are also con- cerns about the use of law enforcement because, as part of issuing a warning or citation, sworn officers must verify an individualâs identity. Verification of identity includes a National Crime Information Center check for outstanding warrants or missing person reports, which has raised concerns from advocacy groups for criminal justice reform. Further, changes in law may make the use of sworn peace officers for proof-of-payment inspections ineffective. For example, under the Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (California Assembly Bill 953, 2015), California law enforcement agencies employing peace officers must annually report demographic data for all contacts to the attorney general, which would make proof-of-payment inspections prohibi- tively difficult. However, there are also disadvantages to using civilians. Fare enforcement personnel have been subject to physical and verbal assaults linked to their fare enforcement duties. In the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) observed passengers refusing to pay or cooperate with fare inspectors and concluded that âthe risk to personal safety is high for Fare Inspectors.â Although fare inspectors are trained to de-escalate situations with aggressive passengers, they (unlike special constables) are not equipped with defensive tools such as handcuffs, pepper spray, or a baton. The auditor general recommended that TTC evaluate the adequacy of the level of authority, tools, and uniforms provided to fare inspectors (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Another considerable challenge to using civilian personnel is that legislative action may be required to authorize their use for fare enforcement. In some instances, transit agencies are authorized under current law to use civilian personnel to request proof of payment, but they may not have the authority to issue citations and, in particular, criminal citations. While Metro Transit has the authority to use civilian personnel to conduct proof-of-payment inspections, it has sought authorization for civilian personnel to issue citations for fare evasion. Other transit agencies have opted to increase compliance by either conducting proof-of-payment inspections without issuing citations or by discontinuing proof-of-payment inspections and returning to front-door boarding. When Sun Metro planned for the launch of its BRT system, it anticipated there would be a need for fare enforcement because of the barrier-free, honor system nature of BRT. When the system launched, it operated as proof of payment with onboard and off-board fare collection, but Sun Metro never implemented its fare enforcement policy because gain- ing the authority to issue civil citations to fare evaders would have required approval from the state legislature. Further, state law would have required Sun Metro to use sworn peace officers to issue criminal citations, which would not have been cost-effective. Instead, Sun Metro used light-duty operators assigned to transitional duty to perform fare inspections on BRT. In 2020, Sun Metro discontinued proof of payment on BRT and operators now verify fares at the farebox on all services, including BRT. See Section 3.7.4, Constitutionality of Fare Enforcement.

Findings and Applications 43  In general, because there are advantages to using civilians and disadvantages to using sworn peace officers for fare enforcement, many transit agencies primarily use civilian personnel who are authorized to inspect and cite. While transit agencies may have sworn peace officers, these sworn officers are primarily focused on the safety and security of the transit system; fare enforce- ment is a secondary responsibility. Furthermore, most transit agencies that use sworn peace officers for fare enforcement require that peace officers must observe someone evading fare and may only request proof of payment if they have a reasonable suspicion or during detention for another crime. For these reasons, peace officers assigned to fare enforcement often conduct fare line enforcement where they can observe fare payment by passengers entering or exiting the station through fare gates or turnstiles or other access points (e.g., emergency exits) to observe unauthorized entry and exit. Overall, transit agencies use several different types of enforcement personnel who may have different roles and are granted different levels of authority for conducting fare enforcement. Table 3-6 summarizes the authorities of the various positions that have a significant role in fare enforcement at the 18 transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45. If law enforcement is involved in fare enforcement, they are identified first in the list of personnel who have fare enforcement roles at each agency. Personnel primarily responsible for fare enforcement are shown in bold. The table also provides brief comments on each agencyâs fare enforcement staffing strategies and staff responsibilities. Although operators have a role in fare collection and enforcement, they are not included in the table. In general, as shown in Table 3-6, fare enforcement, including fare inspection, warnings and citations for nonpayment, and education about fares, fare payment, and fines, is most often conducted by civilian fare enforcement personnel who do not have police powers but are autho- rized to inspect and cite, although there are some exceptions. For example, on Metro Transit, state law requires that citations for fare evasion must be issued by sworn peace officers. Metro Transit police officers are responsible for issuing citations and also have broader safety and security responsibilities. Other civilian personnel, including the Transit Police Departmentâs community service officers and commuter rail conductors, are able to request proof of payment but cannot issue citations. Metro Transit has sought authority from the Minnesota legislature to issue administrative citations and use civilian personnel to issue citations for fare evasion; however, these measures were not included in the transportation bill passed by the Minnesota legislature in June 2021. Operatorsâ fare enforcement responsibilities range from observing fare payment, stating the fare, requesting proof of eligibility for concession and discount fares, advising nonpaying passengers of the fare, and, possibly, asking those passengers to either take a seat or deboard while prac- ticing conflict avoidance. In general, given the high percentage of operator assaults instigated by fare disputes, transit agencies do not practice a zero-tolerance approach to fare evasion. Instead, operators are instructed not to enforce fares, for their own safety and to avoid becoming involved in an altercation. In most cases, operators who are positioned next to the farebox (and not in a separate operator compartment) have at least a nominal role in fare collection, possibly only observing whether a fare is paid by passengers entering through the front door. To minimize potential conflict, transit agencies may limit the operatorâs role in fare enforce- ment. While many transit agencies require the operator to validate eligibility for a concession or discount fare by requesting proof of eligibility, TTCâs bus operators do not check for proof of eligibility for concession cards. Agencies also may give the operator discretion in whether to state the fare or fare requirements. They can also go a step further and eliminate the operatorâs role in fare collection and enforcement entirely. WMATAâs bus operators do not even state the fare. Instead, there is a programmed automated fare announcement as passengers board. Bus operators then use a farebox key to record instances when passengers board without payment. The locations where personnel conduct fare enforcement are discussed further in Section 3.3.2.2, Fare Enforcement Location.

Transit Agency and Fare Enforcement Rolea Police Powers Request Proof of Payment Cite for Fare Evasion Fare Enforcement Staffing Strategies and Responsibilities BART (San Francisco Bay Area, CA) BART transit police (rail) BART police officers provide fare enforcement at the fare line. They may not conduct proof-of-payment inspections and may only stop and cite individuals directly observed attempting to fare evade. Fare inspectors conduct proof-of- payment inspections in the fare-paid areas, including throughout the stations and on board trains. Station agents may instruct passengers who approach a swing gate to go pay their fare but cannot request proof of payment or cite and are instructed not to apprehend fare evaders. Fare inspectors (rail) Station agents King County Metro (Seattle, WA) Fare enforcement officers (rapid bus) Fare collection is off board at RapidRide stops with ORCA validators (also for regular bus routes sharing those stops along the 3rd Avenue transit corridor) and on board elsewhere and on most regular bus routes. Fare enforcement officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections on RapidRide and on regular bus routes operating in the 3rd Avenue transit corridor. LA Metro (Los Angeles, CA) Fare compliance officers (BRT, rail, select rapid bus) Fare compliance officers provide fare enforcement at the fare line at gated rail stations and conduct proof-of-payment inspections on rail services in fare-paid areas throughout the stations and on board trains. Fare compliance officers also conduct proof-of-payment inspections on BRT and select Rapid bus routes with proof of payment and all-door boarding when personnel are available. Sworn peace officers are also able to cite but they are not assigned to conduct fare enforcement and infrequently issue citations for fare evasion. MBTA (Boston, MA) MBTA transit police officers (subway) MBTA transit police officers provide fare enforcement at subway fare lines. They may not conduct proof-of-payment inspections and may only stop and cite individuals directly observed attempting to fare evade. For commuter rail, conductors collect fares and station staff may check for tickets before passengers board. For ferry, crew members collect fares as passengers board or once they are on board. Transit ambassadors are deployed at some subway stations to help passengers purchase fares and navigate the system but are not responsible for fare enforcement. They cannot request proof of payment or cite. As part of its Fare Transformation, MBTA plans to use civilians for proof-of-payment inspections. Conductors and station staff (commuter rail) Crew members (ferry) Transit ambassadors (subway) Metro Transit (MinneapolisâSaint Paul, MN) Metro Transit police officers (systemwide) Metro Transit police officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections on BRT, light rail, and commuter rail and may be assisted by community service officers. Metro Transit police officers may also ride on board buses to observe fare payment and may only cite individuals directly observed attempting to fare evade. Community service officers and commuter rail conductors can request proof of payment but cannot cite. Community service officers (BRT, rail) Conductors (commuter rail) MTS (San Diego, CA) Code compliance inspectors (rail) On Trolley (light rail), proof-of-payment inspections are conducted by train teams that consist of a code compliance inspector and a security officer. Both can request proof of payment, but only code compliance officers can issue citations. Security officers (rail) Table 3-6. Fare enforcement authorities and responsibilities, by agency.

NYCT (New York, NY) NYPD Transit Bureau police officers (rail) On the Select Bus Service (SBS), fare inspectors conduct proof-of-payment inspections. Fare enforcement on the regular bus service is conducted by fare inspectors and MTA Bridges and Tunnels peace officers. NYPD Transit Bureau police officers and MTA police officers provide fare enforcement at the fare line at gated rail stations. Officers may not conduct proof-of-payment inspections and may only stop and cite individuals directly observed attempting to fare evade. The same is true for fare inspectors deployed on the regular bus service. MTA police officers (rail) MTA Bridges and Tunnels peace officers (bus) Fare inspectors (bus, rapid bus) RTD (Denver, CO) RTD police officers (systemwide) Transit security officers (TSOs) conduct proof-of-payment inspections on light rail and commuter rail. On commuter rail, RTD has designated a TSO who is responsible for inspecting fares and acts as the second crew member. Transit police and contracted off-duty police officers can request proof of payment and cite for fare evasion on both bus and rail, but fare enforcement is not their primary responsibility. TSOs and police officers deployed on buses must directly observe an individual attempting to evade fare to cite the individual. Off-duty police officers (systemwide) Transit security officers (systemwide) SacRT (Sacramento, CA) Transit ambassadors (rail) Transit ambassadors conduct proof-of-payment inspections on light rail. Security guards at light rail stations can request proof of payment but cannot cite. Security guard (rail) SFMTA (San Francisco, CA) Transit fare inspectors (bus, rail, streetcar) Transit fare inspectors conduct proof-of-payment inspections on bus, light rail, and streetcar. At gated subway stations, passengers with paper proof of payment or mobile tickets must show them to a station agent and be admitted through the fare gate closest to the station agentâs booth. In addition to onboard inspections, at these gated stations, transit fare inspectors may also conduct proof-of-payment inspections in the fare-paid areas of the station and at the fare line. Station agents (subway) Sound Transit (Seattle, WA) Fare enforcement officers (rail) Fare enforcement officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections on light rail and commuter rail. On commuter rail, conductors can request proof of payment but cannot cite, and they generally do not conduct fare inspections. Conductors (commuter rail) Sun Metro (El Paso, TX) Not applicable (no proof-of-payment inspections; operators oversee fare collection as passengers board) No fare enforcement personnel. Fare payment is observed by operators at time of boarding on bus, BRT, and streetcar. The Rapid (Grand Rapids, MI) Fare enforcement officers (BRT) Fare enforcement officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections on BRT. (continued on next page)

Transit Agency and Fare Enforcement Rolea Police Powers Request Proof of Payment Cite for Fare Evasion Fare Enforcement Staffing Strategies and Responsibilities TransLink (Vancouver, BC) Transit police officers (systemwide) Any TransLink transit employee may enforce all provisions of the fare tariff and can request proof of payment but cannot cite. Fare enforcement, however, is conducted by transit police officers and transit security officers. Both police officers and transit security officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections in fare-paid zones throughout the system, including on board bus. Transit police officers typically focus fare enforcement efforts on rail and ferry, while transit security officers typically focus their fare enforcement efforts on bus and limited-stop rapid bus. Transit security officers (systemwide) All TransLink staff (e.g., station agents, station supervisors) TriMet (Portland, OR) Fare inspectors (systemwide) Fare inspectors conduct proof-of-payment inspections on light rail, commuter rail, and bus. Each fare inspector is accompanied by a customer safety officer whose role is to support and protect the fare inspector during the course of his or her duties. Customer safety officers cannot request proof of payment or cite. On commuter rail, the conductor can request proof of payment but cannot cite. While TriMet police officers can request proof of payment and issue citations, TriMet has reduced its role in fare inspection to focus instead on the general safety and security of the system. Transit security officers also patrol the system, providing a security presence. They cannot request proof of payment or cite but can verbally enforce TriMet code. Customer safety officers (systemwide) Conductors (commuter rail) Transit security officers (rail) TTC (Toronto, ON) Special constables (systemwide) Special constables and fare inspectors conduct proof-of-payment inspections on streetcar. In addition, special constables may provide fare enforcement at the fare line at rail stations and on board buses. Fare inspectors are deployed with special constables. Customer service agents have replaced fare collectors in subway stations and are available to answer passengersâ questions and sell PRESTO cards. Customer service agents can request proof of payment but cannot cite. Fare inspectors (streetcar) Customer service agents (rail stations) Valley Metro (Phoenix, AZ) Security officers (rail) Security officers conduct proof-of-payment inspections on light rail. Customer experience coordinators work at stations to educate passengers and answer questions, but they cannot request proof of payment or cite. Customer experience coordinators (rail stations) WMATA (Washington, DC) Transit police officers (systemwide) Transit police officers provide fare enforcement at the fare line and on board buses. They may not conduct proof-of-payment inspections and may only stop and cite individuals directly observed attempting to fare evade. Rail station managers are able to determine whether a card was tapped and the type of card used for each gate entry, which gives them a sense of who should be entering the system. However, they cannot request proof of payment or cite. Station managers aBoldface = personnel primarily responsible for fare enforcement. Table 3-6. (Continued).

Findings and Applications 47  Similarly, bus and light rail operators at SFMTA and TransLink are instructed to focus on driving the vehicle and not to engage with passengers about fares at all, except to answer questions. In agencies that operate BRT services, the operatorâs role depends on where fare collection occurs. MTAâs SBS does not have onboard fare collection, so operators have no role in fare col- lection or enforcement. On King County Metroâs RapidRide routes, passengers are able to pay off board where stops are equipped with ORCA smart card validators; other passengers enter through the front door where operators can observe fare payment. 3.3.1.2 Personnel Uniforms and Equipment North American transit agencies often use uniformed personnel for fare enforcement, some- times supplemented by plainclothes personnel. Whether to use uniformed or plainclothes per- sonnel for fare enforcement depends at least in part on an agencyâs fare enforcement goals. Uniformed personnel generally improve the perception that fares are enforced and result in reduced fare evasion. Because plainclothes personnel are less conspicuous and less predictable, using them to conduct inspections may be less likely to discourage intentional fare avoidance. However, inspections conducted by plainclothes personnel may result in higher apprehension rates and a more accurate assessment of fare evasion rates, which may be closer to actual experi- ence, because passengers are less likely to alight and avoid inspection than they are with uniformed personnel (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002; City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Among the 18 transit agencies surveyed, fare enforcement is conducted mostly by uniformed personnel. Only three of the agencies surveyed use plainclothes personnel. Among the agencies that use plainclothes personnel, MBTA and RTD deploy only peace officers in plain clothes. Only NYCT allows its civilian fare inspectors to be deployed in plain clothes. Transit agencies sur- veyed have decreased the use of plainclothes personnel. RTD previously used more plainclothes than uniformed police officers but has decreased the use of plainclothes police officers to provide more of a uniformed presence on the system, so as to increase the publicâs sense of security and deter fare evaders from boarding. Although plainclothes personnel are generally used only on buses, transit agencies may occasionally deploy plainclothes personnel and position them by fare gates (MBTA) or on proof-of-payment services (NYCT SBS, RTD). The use of uniformed fare enforcement can also provide a reassuring presenceâa sense of securityâfor all passengers and may also reassure passengers that fare payment is being enforced, particularly on proof-of-payment systems (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009; WSP 2018). Because the presence of uniformed fare inspectors deters fare evasion, some agencies allow other uniformed personnel (e.g., police, firefighters, armed services) to travel free (Dauby and Kovacs 2007). Deploying personnel in uniforms also helps make authority more visible and addresses con- cerns about individuals impersonating fare inspectors. In a study of fare evasion and ticket fraud in European countries, Fürst and Herold (2018) noted instances, although rare, of people impersonating fare inspectors, primarily on longer trains, on lines with a high proportion of tourists, and in urban areas, where they are less likely to be recognized. In developing a revenue control strategy to respond to audit recommendations, TTC reminded employees to carry their ID cards and produce them as proof of identity when requested, possibly in an effort to ensure that anyone claiming to be an employee actually is (TTC 2019c). Uniforms can also help distinguish transit agency personnel from other law enforcement personnel, including ICE agents. King County Metro, Sound Transit, and TriMet have developed web pages to help educate passengers on the types of personnel they may encounter. These education campaigns have been critical to reassuring passengers who have mistaken transit personnel as ICE agents, despite their distinctive uniforms. Changes in operatorsâ fare enforcement responsibilities, particularly as a result of operator assaults caused by fare disputes, are also discussed in Section 1.1.2, Fare Enforcement Personnel, and Section 1.1.3.1, Role of the Operator.

48 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Personnel may also be required to wear uniforms by state or local law, labor agreement, or contractual terms. DART fare enforcement personnel and those of other Texas transit authorities are required by the state to be in uniform, although they are not required to be sworn peace officers (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). While uniformed personnel can help deter fare evasion, plainclothes personnel are most effective for assessing rates of fare evasion. Because of their visibility, uniformed personnel increase the likelihood of collecting fares, resulting in an underestimation of fare evasion (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Metropolitan Council 2016). Uniform Appearance. While there is generally some consistency in the appearance of sworn officer uniforms, there is significant variability in the appearance of civilian uniforms, especially for civilian personnel who wear protective vests. On the basis of community sensi- tivity to law enforcement, some transit agencies have explored alternative uniform designs to make them appear less intimidating and militaristic. In some cases, the agencies have explored changing the civilian uniforms and decided not to. Sound Transit discussed the possibility of changing the uniforms of its fare enforcement officers to appear more approachable and conducted listening sessions and a community engagement survey that asked about uniforms in addition to other opportunities to enhance Sound Transitâs fare enforcement program. During the listening sessions, Sound Transit received feedback that âuniforms feel like policing, they are traumatic and triggeringâ (Sound Transit 2020a). However, the survey found only 33% of the 8,000 online respondents indicated that Sound Transit should change the fare enforcement officer uniforms; 51% indicated that they did not favor changing the uniforms, and 17% indicated they âdonât know.â Overall, the survey found that respondentsâ race/ethnicity was not a key factor for wanting to change the uniforms. Instead, respondents who did not always have proof of payment were more likely to indicate a preference for chang- ing the uniforms (Sound Transit 2020a). On the basis of community input and the role and responsibilities of fare enforcement officers to provide customer support and ensure safety, the current uniforms have been deemed an asset rather than a detriment and the decision was made not to change them. Conversely, SFMTA recently announced its new âless formalâ uniforms (TCRP A-45 phone survey of SFMTA, 2020) and TTC continues to explore alternative uniforms. Unlike many other civilian fare inspectors, TTCâs fare inspectors wear protective vests. As part of redesigning these uniforms, TTC is exploring options to help the protective vest blend into the rest of the uni- form to provide a less âmilitaristicâ look (TCRP A-45 phone survey of TTC, 2020). Examples of SFMTA and Sound Transit civilian uniforms are shown in Figure 3-2. Defensive, Protective, and Other Equipment. Some transit agencies issue defensive or protective equipment to civilian personnel along with their uniforms. In some instances (MTS, RTD), transit agencies use armed security personnel in fare enforcement. The most common defensive equipment offered is pepper spray. Security personnel may also carry handcuffs or flex cuffs in some instances. Batons are generally uncommon, although there are a few exceptions (LA Metro fare compliance officers carry batons, and TTC fare inspectors previously carried batons). For protection, civilian personnel may wear a protective vest. Whether protective vests are provided, optional, or not permitted varies dramatically. LA Metro and TTC personnel wear protective vests; BART permits its fare inspectors to wear vests, although not all do; TriMet per- mits its fare inspectors to wear concealed protective vests under their uniform, but the vests are not provided. While vests may be permitted, the cost for an individual to purchase a vest may pose a barrier.

Findings and Applications 49Â Â Overall, the type of defensive and protective equipment varies significantly and appears to be based on agency-specific decisions and the operating environment. Decisions about the protec- tive equipment issued influence how personnel are deployed and the type of training required or provided. Personnel with limited protective equipment are more likely to be deployed in teams of two or three (BART, King County Metro, NYCT SBS, SFMTA, Sound Transit light rail, Valley Metro) or may be paired with security personnel (MTS, TriMet) or sworn officers (TTC). Personnel who carry defensive equipment must undergo associated training to carry specific items (e.g., pepper spray). Further, for personnel without defensive equipment, there is an increased focus on de-escalation techniques, as personnel do not have the means to protect themselves if attacked. In addition to defensive and protective equipment, personnel carry radios and/or smart- phones for communication and handheld devices to validate electronic fare media. While some transit agencies (MTS, WMATA) issue handwritten citations, personnel at other transit agen- cies (Sound Transit, TriMet) may use a handheld device or smartphone attached to a Bluetooth printer or citation book to issue citations. Some agencies (TriMet) also have personnel carry life-saving equipment (e.g., tourniquet, Narcan). Transit agencies may also consider the use of body cameras. For example, MTS code compli- ance officers and accompanying security officers all wear body cameras to increase account- ability. All BART police officers and fare inspectors, as well as community service officers and ambassadors who are not involved in fare enforcement, wear body cameras in accordance with BART Police Department Policy 451 (BART Police Department 2020). BARTâs Independent Police Auditor conducts random spot checks of body cameras worn to ensure that fare inspectors are conducting systematic checks and are not singling out individual passengers. When evaluat- ing the implementation of body cameras, transit agencies review and consider the implications of any state laws regarding how to use, store, retain, transmit, download, or review body camera footage. (a) (b) Source: Burrus 2020 (left); Sound Transit 2020c (right). Figure 3-2. Examples of civilian fare inspector uniforms: (a) SFMTA and (b) Sound Transit.

50 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion 3.3.1.3 Hiring Requirements Hiring requirements for civilian personnel vary by agency. Requirements may be influenced by the responsibilities and authority of the personnel (e.g., MTS security officers and RTD transit security officers are armed): ⢠BART: Fare inspector applicants must have a high school diploma or have passed a General Educational Development (GED) test and have 2 years of verifiable experience in direct public contact that must have included interpreting and/or enforcing regulations or providing infor- mation and assistance to the public. ⢠LA Metro: Applicants for fare compliance officer must have a security guard card. No law enforcement or security training is required, as it is an entry-level position. ⢠MTS: Security officer applicants must have a security guard card. There are no specific require- ments for the position of code compliance inspector, although experience in customer service is viewed as an advantage. ⢠RTD: Applicants for transit security officer must have 2 years of civilian or military law enforcement experience or have graduated from a certified federal, state, county, or local law enforcement training academy or military police training program. In addition to meeting basic qualifications, applicants may be required to take a written test, an oral exam, a physical agility test, and a psychological test and to undergo a background check and medical examination. Transit agencies surveyed identified the importance of customer service experience and the ability to handle stressful situations. Transit agencies are also reviewing current hiring requirements and processes to minimize barriers for applicants and increase diversity. For example, TTC recently reviewed the position requirements for its fare inspectors and special constables. The agency evaluated what prior relevant experience was necessary for candidates and whether candidates would be able to gain that experience on the job. The review identified disconnects between requirements and respon- sibilities. For example, only a high school education was required of candidates for Toronto police and TTC special constable positions, while 2 years of law enforcement experience were required of candidates for fare inspector, which has fewer job responsibilities. TTC now requires fare inspector applicants only to have completed high school or a recognized equivalent and to have several years of customer service, hospitality, social services, or equivalent experience. TTC also reviewed potential financial barriers, including the fitness test that had been required of candidates for special constable, but did not guarantee an interview. TTC now pays for appli- cantsâ fitness tests. In addition to reviewing the applicant requirements, TTC has also reviewed the members of its hiring panel to increase gender and racial/ethnic diversity and has expanded its outreach process by communicating openings to diverse communities through advertising, newspapers, websites, job fairs, and community organizations. Transit agencies are also exploring the naming of personnel positions to encourage more appli- cants. TriMet is considering changing the title âfare inspectorâ to something that may be less negatively perceived. TriMet recently received pushback when it announced it was hiring addi- tional fare inspectors. The publicâs attention was drawn specifically to the term âfare inspector,â and this resulted in negative perceptions and feedback that delayed hiring. TriMet believes that a new name for the fare inspector position will help deepen the connection in the publicâs mind between enforcement and safety and reinforce the idea that greater TriMet presence on the system means that passengers will have a more pleasant, safer experience. 3.3.1.4 Fare Enforcement Training Training Requirements. Training requirements for fare enforcement depend on the type of personnel. Both the basic training requirements and the continuing, refresher, and recertifi- cation training requirements for sworn peace officers are different from those for civilian fare inspectors.

Findings and Applications 51Â Â Sworn peace officers must go through formal training at a certified academy followed by agency training. Training standards are defined by each state and are often referred to as âpeace officer standards and trainingâ (POST). Peace officers who serve multiple jurisdictions must complete training in compliance with each stateâs standards. For example, WMATA serves a tristate area. Since WMATA uses the Northern Virginia Criminal Justice Academy, probationary officers also must complete the Maryland Comparative Compliance basic officer training for out-of-state police academies and the District of Columbia basic officer training. Sworn peace officers must also complete mandatory in-service training in compliance with state standards. Unlike sworn peace officers, civilian personnel do not have set requirements for training. With a few exceptions, training for civilian fare inspectors is often done in-house. Several agencies that use civilian personnel for fare enforcement (LA Metro fare compliance officers, MTS secu- rity officers, NYCT fare inspectors, Valley Metro security officers) require personnel to have a state guard card. Personnel may also be required to complete specific POST-certified courses. MTS code compliance inspectors and security officers must complete a 40-hour course entitled 832 PC Laws of Arrest, which is one of the first courses for the minimum training standard for California peace officers, as specified in the Commission on POST Regulation. The training must be completed within 1Â year of employment and then repeated every 3Â years. Increasingly, transit agencies are formalizing their training programs for civilian personnel, including requirements for personnel who conduct field training and checklists for completing training. For example, MTS uses California POST-certified field training officers who prepare daily evaluations of their assigned trainee that are turned in at the end of each shift as well as an end-of-phase evaluation at the end of each of the three 2-week training periods. The field train- ing officers are responsible for ensuring every training objective and assignment in the train- ing manual is completed and for documenting progress and proficient performance before the trainee can be assigned to work independently (MTS 2017). There are several methods for training civilian personnel. These may include traditional classroom training such as lectures, videos, visual aid slides, and report-writing assignments. Some agencies also use role playing in training to act out different scenarios that personnel may encounter. TTC brings in paid actors to assist with scenario role-playing (e.g., acting out de-escalation techniques). Following classroom training, personnel complete in-the-field train- ing with experienced personnel who introduce them to the specifics of fare enforcement. The length of the in-the-field training varies by agency; often, there is a minimum training period with the option for field training personnel to extend training if necessary. At a minimum, new hire training of civilian personnel is usually 2Â weeks in the classroom and 2Â weeks in the field, although training programs, especially those with in-the-field training, tend to be longer. One of the longer programs is LA Metroâs program for fare compliance officers, which includes a Metro Academy program designed specifically for fare compliance officers that includes 350Â hours of classroom training. Fare compliance officers then spend about 8Â weeks with a field training officer who has at least 18Â months of experience as a fare compliance officer. The field training officer completes daily evaluations to assess how the trainee handles different situations and engages with the public before approving the individual for a 1-year probationary period. TTCâs Field Training Program can extend up to 3Â months, which is significantly longer than those of the other agencies surveyed. Transit agencies are also conducting more refresher training and conducting training in response to current events. Valley Metro conducts quarterly training with its contracted security officers to address issues and concerns and to build morale and teamwork. Several agencies have required annual training. This training can also help with cross-departmental coordination. TriMet has instituted cross-departmental quarterly in-service training for security staff focused on joint information sharing and learning.

52 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Most training for civilian personnel is conducted in-house, especially as fare enforcement programs mature. For new programs, transit agencies may use external training programs as the agency develops in-house expertise. Transit agencies with police departments may use the same instructors for civilian training. For example, BART uses the same instructors for both BART police officers and fare inspectors, but with abbreviated courses for fare inspectors. These courses are also tailored to the specific differences in the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the type of personnel. Training Curriculum. Training programs are fundamental to ensuring that personnel under- stand agency policies, procedures, and expectations with regard to fare payment and enforcement. In particular, training should provide a clear understanding of an agencyâs tolerances for fare evasion and the discretion given to fare enforcement to make decisions, such as whether to warn or cite a passenger for a fare violation. The focus of training is becoming much broader than just ensuring that personnel are familiar with standard operating procedures and policies. Training is evolving, particularly in recognition of some of the challenges that come with the job, including the need to diffuse escalating situ- ations and demonstrate empathy. Sound Transitâs fare enforcement officer training is designed to provide a thorough understanding of Sound Transitâs policies and expectations of its fare enforcement officers and to ensure they are familiar with the same information that passengers have (Cummins et al. 2013). In response to recent events, court decisions, and ordinance changes, some transit agencies have identified needs to revise training for new hires and current personnel, including refresher training. In some cases, refresher training is conducted on a regular basis (e.g., daily briefings at the beginning of each shift, weekly or monthly all-hands meetings, quarterly or annual refresher training), and the topics covered in refresher training may be added to basic training curricula for new hires. Training programs are increasingly providing a focus on antibias training to respond to con- cerns related to implicit bias and discrimination in fare enforcement. In implementing its new Confronting Anti-Black Racism training, TTC first focused on providing the training to special constables and fare inspectors. Moving forward, this training will be integrated into TTCâs Transit Special Constable and Fare Inspector Recruit Training Program as well as into ongoing annual training for all current TTC personnel. BART staff members also participate in a year- long training series by the Government Alliance on Race and Equity that provides participants with skill building, strategic development, and connections with affected community members in order to âadvance systematic racial equity and opportunities for allâ (BART 2020a). More broadly, transit agencies are introducing new training programs on how to work with diverse populations and assist vulnerable populations in an effort to change the fare inspection culture and improve fare enforcement interactions with passengers. King County Metro, for example, is working with its contractor to expand training for fare enforcement officers to incor- porate leading practices for working with different populations. These practices include requiring training on equity, social justice, and unconscious bias; best practices for inter acting with people of color and of limited means; and first aid for mental crises. Fare enforcement officers are also trained to ask different questions if these passengers lack proof of payment. Fare enforcement officers rephrase their questions to ask âWhat happened to your ORCA card? How can we get you a new one?â as opposed to âWhy didnât you pay your fare?â Civilian personnel generally receive de-escalation training and may receive self-defense train- ing. De-escalation training is important to provide personnel with tools for diffusing citations. De-escalation training also helps personnel better understand how their actions may escalate or de-escalate a situation. In addition to de-escalation methods, personnel may receive evasive or See the discussion of fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

Findings and Applications 53  defensive training. For example, BART fare inspectors receive training on evasive tactics (i.e., how to get away from someone if you are being attacked) because they are unarmed. Required training may also depend on the equipment fare enforcement personnel carry. Specific training (e.g., use of pepper spray, use of handcuffs) may be required before they can carry the equip- ment. BART fare inspectors, for example, may only carry pepper spray after they complete the training. Transit agencies may also work with outside organizations to conduct specialized training. For example, King County Metro and WMATA added training on interacting with youth pro- vided by Strategies for Youth. This policy and training organization is dedicated to improving interactions between police and youth through community engagement, police training, out- reach programs for youth, and proactive use of multidisciplinary approaches to problem solve and build relationships between police and youth. TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (Nakanishi and Fleming 2011) and other studies demonstrate the breadth of topics for which training is helpful, particularly among agencies that give fare enforcement more discretion in handling violators. Training topics identified by TCRP A-45 include, but are not limited to, the following: ⢠Fares and fare evasion: â Provincial, state, and local codes and ordinances applicable to fare enforcement; â Agency-specific goals, objectives, and strategies for fare enforcement programs; â Agency policies, rules, regulations, and field procedures for fare enforcement; â Agency fare policies, fare payment requirements, and fare collection options; â Agency fare enforcement policies and procedures; â Roles and responsibilities of fare enforcement personnel; â Problems likely to be encountered in fare enforcement; and â Educating diverse populations on fare payment. ⢠Antibias/implicit bias/discriminationârecognizing and avoiding bias. ⢠Equity and social justice. ⢠Hate and prejudice crimesârecognition (and investigation, for peace officers). ⢠De-escalation and conflict mitigationâde-escalating verbal conflicts. ⢠Verbal self-defense/verbal judoâusing words to diffuse confrontations and generate cooperation. ⢠Aggressive behavior management. ⢠Physical self-defense. ⢠Defensive tactics. ⢠Defensive tools, such as pepper spray and batons. ⢠Customer relations/service. ⢠Diversity and working with diverse populations (economic, social, cultural, ethnic). ⢠Professionalism, courtesy, and confidence. ⢠Encounters with vulnerable populations (e.g., persons with mental health disorders or who are experiencing homelessness, youth)âfor example, how personnel can identify and engage with someone experiencing a mental health crisis, how to interact with youth. ⢠Evidence, property, and case preparation. ⢠Introduction to court procedures. ⢠Introduction to criminal offenses. ⢠Introduction to law. ⢠Effective report writing. Boxes 3-2 through 3-4 provide more information on the training curricula for MTS, Sound Transit, and TriMet as well as how their curricula are evolving to address emerging needs and issues.

54 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Box 3-2. Hiring and Training of Enforcement Personnel: Metropolitan Transit System Hiring of code compliance inspectors is done in-house by the MTS Human Resources Department. The director and deputy director of Transit Enforcement participate in initial screenings, conduct final interviews, and make selections. There are no specific hiring qualifications for code compliance inspectors. However, as part of the hiring process, MTS reviews qualifications and work history for applicable backgrounds. Experience in customer service is considered an advantage. Several of MTSâs contracted security officers have applied to become code compliance inspectors. Code compliance inspectors complete 3 weeks of classroom training followed by 4 weeks of field training. The classroom training covers all MTS policies and procedures. MTS has added antibias and de-escalation training courses to new hire training. These courses were previously conducted as part of continuing training, but MTS concluded that it was important to include them in initial training. Field training for code compliance inspectors is conducted by a field training officer who has gone through the California POST program. The field training officer takes trainees into the field along with a security officer to teach them how to perform the job of code compliance inspector. A field training guide that evaluates the traineeâs performance must be completed. The length of field training can be extended up to 2 weeks, at the discretion of the field training officer. MTSâs contracted security officers must have a security guard card prior to hiring. They complete 160 hours of training in the field with optional 8-hour courses on topics such as the use of pepper spray and a baton. Code compliance inspectors and security officers must also complete a 40-hour course on laws of arrest (California Penal Code 832 Arrest and Firearms Course), which is one of the first courses for the minimum training standard for California peace officers as specified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. The training must be completed once within 1 year of employment and then repeated every 3 years. [See https://govt.westlaw.com/calregs/Document/I911816DDFC464FC6ADEFD780622C16CB?viewType=FullText &originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default) and https://post.ca.gov/California-Penal-Code-and-Government-Code.] All code compliance inspectors and code compliance supervisors attend continuing training throughout the year. A minimum of 16 hours is required per year. Two of the courses (8-hour antibias and 8-hour defensive tactics) are required. Other topics are based on current needs or trends. For the past 3 years, MTS has conducted de-escalation training. In 2019, continuing training included ⢠De-escalation training (taught by a licensed psychologist who is a former police captain), ⢠Cardiopulmonary resuscitation, ⢠Defensive tactics (taught by POST-certified instructors), ⢠Courtroom testimony, ⢠People with disabilities, ⢠Biased-based policing/cultural diversity, ⢠Homeless outreach (line-up training), and ⢠Veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (supervisors only). MTS also incorporates training into the 30-minute briefings at the beginning of each shift. There is a plan to have mini training sessions (e.g., handcuffing techniques) and to periodically bring someone in to talk about the services they provide (e.g., homeless outreach organizations) as part of the daily briefings. Source: MTS 2017; MTS 2020a; TCRP Project A-45 phone survey of MTS, 2020.

Findings and Applications 55  Box 3-3. Revisiting Training Needs: Sound Transit Sound Transit provides an example of basic training requirements that were updated as real-life experience demonstrated the need for more training and more training in specific areas, especially in-the-field training. The original training program provided 80 hours of initial training (40 hours provided by the contractor and 40 hours provided by Sound Transit) plus 10 hours of annual refresher training, largely modeled after peersâ programs. The original program relied heavily on classroom training and did not provide the practical on-the-job and field experience needed to learn how to work with passengers and determine whether fare enforcement was a good job fit. As a result, turnover was higher than expected. Further, much of the training relied on external sources, making the logistics difficult and creating inconsistencies and lack of uniformity in the program. Changes were made to lengthen the program considerably and to provide more training specific to Sound Transit fare enforcement, policies, and field work. While new trainees still spend 40 hours in the contractorâs pre-assignment training, the contractorâs training now includes management of aggressive behavior as well as courses in using defensive tools, such as handcuffs and batons, and first aid. Upon completion of the pre- assignment training, trainees report to Sound Transit for 80 hours of additional classroom training, including 40 hours in railroad safety, incident management, and security and 40 hours dedicated to fare enforcement, including customer service and the role of fare inspections in fare enforcement. Trainees are required to learn all Sound Transit policies, rules, and regulations related to fare enforcement and field procedures for performing fare inspections, including interacting with fare evaders, handling diverse populations, educating the public on fare payment, recognizing and avoiding bias, and de-escalating verbal conflicts. Trainees are required to read Sound Transitâs Fare Enforcement Standard Operating Procedures Manual and materials published by Sound Transit for its passengers or employees. A training supervisor ensures that trainees observe and learn key information needed to act as ambassadors and know where to find policy information. After the 80 hours of Sound Transit training, each trainee works with three different field training officers for 120 hours, on morning, afternoon, and night rotations, giving trainees opportunities to implement knowledge gained during classroom training, working in an observational role, and then applying skills by performing fare inspections under the guidance of a field training officer. During the last 24 hours of the program, the trainee spends 16 hours observing fare inspections on Sounder commuter rail. The final 8 hours are spent with a field training officer reviewing information and discussing field training evaluations, followed by a written exam and field evaluation. Trainees who pass all of the training and evaluations are certified as Sound Transit fare enforcement officers and assigned to a squad and team. The Sound Transit training program also provides ongoing training. The initial program provided 10 hours of continuing education, but Sound Transit found that 4â10 hours per month were needed to maintain a fare enforcement officerâs proficiency. Work schedules were revised to provide 1 day per week when fare enforcement squads overlap to provide a weekly training opportunity. All fare enforcement officers also receive continuous refresher and recertification training on use of force, safety, and policies, including monthly quizzes on the information included in the Fare Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure Manual. Fare enforcement officers are also evaluated in the field annually to ensure they remain competent and proficient in all aspects of officer safety, customer service, situational awareness, and contractor and Sound Transit policies and procedures. Source: Cummins et al. 2013; TCRP Project A-45 phone survey of Sound Transit, 2020.

56 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Box 3-4. Learning Objectives and Collaboration Efforts: TriMet TriMet (2019) published a revised Safety and Security Training Curriculum for its fare inspectors that was based on the following seven learning objectives: 1. Demonstrate knowledge of the TriMet comprehensive safety and security training curriculum. 2. Communicate TriMetâs core value of safety and commitment to customer service. 3. Provide the tools to assess and sensitively serve the needs of internal and external customers, including those from culturally diverse backgrounds. 4. Reduce negative and costly incidents through verbal de-escalation, situational awareness, and consistent application of policy and standard operating procedures. 5. Learn techniques for effectively managing workplace stress to improve productivity and personal well-being. 6. Ensure a clear understanding and application of TriMetâs code, administrative rules, and citation procedures. 7. Provide a basic understanding of the challenges related to providing security in a public transit environment. During follow-up with the agency, an additional objective was identified: assess and sensitively serve the needs of internal and external customers, including those from culturally diverse backgrounds, the elderly, and persons with access and functional needs and other vulnerable community groups. These objectives guide the content of the curriculum and make clear the priorities and responsibilities of fare inspectors. To ensure continued striving toward these objectives and the values that underlie them, TriMet has also instituted cross-departmental quarterly in-service training for security staff that focuses on joint information sharing and learning. These in-service training meetings involve a range of security staff, including transit police officers, contracted security, and TriMet staff. For certain training topics, TriMet brings in outside specialists or resources to provide their expertise. For example, to educate security staff on interactions with people experiencing mental illness, TriMet has brought in mental health experts and individuals who have previously dealt with mental illness to talk with security staff about what it is like to experience mental illness and what some of the triggers for an episode or breakdown might be. TriMet may also invite to the quarterly training meeting community members who can educate security staff on the local resources available to passengers who are experiencing mental illness, homelessness, or other issues so that information can be passed along during any encounters with individuals who may benefit from these resources. Overall, the goals of these quarterly in-service trainings are to move toward a blended security model that encourages cross-personnel collaboration and learning and to give security staff the tools and knowledge to enhance community trust and build legitimacy. Source: TriMet 2019; TCRP Project A-45 phone survey of TriMet, 2020. 3.3.2 Deployment Strategies and Locations The primary objective of deployment strategies is to provide effective fare enforcement based on the goal of deterring fare evasion. Effective fare enforcement strategies are driven by clearly defined objectives. Establishing performance objectives makes it possible to guide the deploy- ment of limited resources and to assess the effectiveness of the program. A deployment strategy has several components, including ⢠How resources are deployed (e.g., systemwide coverage, focused deployments, sweeps); ⢠Where fare enforcement occurs (e.g., on board the vehicle, on the platform, at gates or entry points); See Section 3.2, Fare Enforcement Program Goals and Objectives.

Findings and Applications 57  ⢠Standard operating procedures, including fare inspection processes, fare enforcement discre- tion, and inspection team composition and size; and ⢠Strategies for assigning and scheduling fare enforcement deployments. These are discussed below. 3.3.2.1 Deployment Strategies Several studies have described common deployment strategies, broadly characterizing them as providing systemwide coverage, focused deployments, or sweeps (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002; WSP 2018): ⢠Systemwide patrols deploy fare enforcement personnel to cover the entire system at all times of day and all days of the week to provide the same probability of inspection across the system. ⢠Focused deployments deploy fare enforcement personnel on the basis of peak periods, prob- lem areas, and ridership. ⢠Sweeps deploy special fare enforcement teams to address problem areas or randomly deploy teams to provide systemwide coverage using unpredictable inspection patterns (also referred to as âblitzes,â âsurges,â âmissions,â âsaturation inspections,â and âspecial enforcement detailsâ). Transit agencies may use a combination of deployment strategies. For example, MTS con- ducts systemwide patrols (each train team is assigned to a beat of three to five stations) and sweeps (multiple train teams are deployed for special enforcement details). SFMTA conducts systemwide patrols to ensure that every line is inspected in a 2-week period as well as more focused proof-of-payment inspections on lines with higher ridership. The strategies serve different objectives and have different advantages and disadvantages, as listed in Table 3-7. As transit agencies consider the appropriate deployment strategy, they evaluate the trade-offs between these strategies and how the strategies meet agency goals and objectives for a fare enforcement program and, more broadly, for the agency (e.g., equity, fair- ness, financial sustainability). During surveys completed as part of TCRP A-45, transit agencies expressed increasing atten- tion to equitable and fair fare enforcement and to balancing these objectives against effectiveness, efficiency, and productivity. In the context of fare enforcement, effectiveness can be understood as increasing the likelihood of achieving an agencyâs fare enforcement goals by increasing fare compliance and decreasing fare evasion. Efficiency is focused on maximizing both the time spent conducting inspections and the number of inspections while minimizing time required to travel to assignments and issue warnings or citations. The efficiency of fare enforcement is tied to the productivity of fare enforcement personnel. Productivity measures the share of a shift spent conducting inspections, the number of inspections per shift, and so forth. Productivity can be influenced by factors such as passenger volumes, travel times, fare evasion levels, the number of warnings or citations issued, and other responsibilities of personnel (e.g., security). Transit agencies are sensitive to the perception that they are targeting specific populations as part of focused deployments and sweeps. As a result, some transit agencies (King County Metro, TriMet) are transitioning away from deploying fare enforcement personnel to locations with high levels of fare evasion. To minimize the potential for bias, other transit agencies (TTC) are looking at ways to objectively assess where to deploy personnel on the basis of data rather than subjective observations. Establishing a policy to balance data-based inspections with equity concerns about focusing too narrowly on certain communities can help. Transit agencies are also looking at ways to randomize focused deployments or sweeps to minimize the likelihood of focusing enforcement at the same locations and/or on the same lines. Among the transit agencies surveyed, those with proof-of-payment inspections emphasized the importance of See the discussion of fare inspection processes in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

58 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion being able to conduct 100% inspections and systematically inspect all passengers encountered regardless of the deployment strategy used. Systemwide Patrols. To provide systemwide coverage, fare enforcement personnel are sched- uled to cover the entire system at all times of day, such that passengers boarding at any stop at any time of day have an equal chance of being inspected. Because fare enforcement resources are typically limited, patrols may be scheduled to cover different parts of the system from day to day, or to roam throughout the system over the course of a week or more. Assignments may be based on the routes or zones that fare enforcement personnel are tasked with patrolling. Randomly deployed fare enforcement also sends the message that anyone could be inspected anywhere and at any time (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Some agencies (MTS, RTD, Sound Transit, TTC) divide their service areas into zones and assign teams to the zones. Dividing service areas in this way can help provide coverage through- out the system. It can also make it possible for personnel in adjacent zones to assist, if needed, and for those resources to respond quickly. TCRP Synthesis 96 noted that when DART divided its light rail system into 10 geographic zones and assigned a team of DART transit police and Systemwide Patrols Focused Deployments Sweeps Objective ⢠Cover entire system so that passengers have equal probability of inspection ⢠Broaden presence of enforcement activities (anywhere, anytime) ⢠Minimize potential of targeting of or overenforcement against vulnerable groups ⢠Increase security ⢠Maximize efficiency and effectiveness (ridership- and evasion-based deployments) ⢠Maximize contacts and productivity (ridership-based deployments) ⢠Enable inspection of all passengers and minimize walkaways ⢠Increase visibility of fare enforcement activities ⢠More accurately assess fare evasion rates (randomized deployments) Variations ⢠Randomized ⢠Time-based ⢠Geographic ⢠Ridership- and/or time-based ⢠Evasion- and/or security-based ⢠Ridership-based ⢠Evasion-based ⢠Randomized Advantages ⢠Equitable deployment ⢠Increased fare compliance at all locations and on routes with lower ridership ⢠Increased security systemwide ⢠Increased effectiveness and productivity of enforcement ⢠Ability to directly respond to fare evasion issues (evasion-based deployment) ⢠Increased capacity to inspect all passengers and cite evaders ⢠Complements other deployment strategies Disadvantages ⢠Limited ability to address locations or routes with higher rates of fare evasion ⢠Reduced productivity due to deployment of resources to locations and routes with lower ridership ⢠More complicated to schedule shifts and determine assignments to ensure systemwide coverage ⢠Data required to identify peak ridership and evasion locations/routes ⢠Difficult to conduct inspections during peak periods due to crowding and volume of passengers ⢠Potential for increased evasion when or where enforcement is limited ⢠Potential for inequities and perception of targeting of specific groups ⢠Not a standalone deployment strategy ⢠Redeploying fare enforcement personnel to support sweeps reduces availability for regular duties ⢠Potential perception of crackdown enforcement and targeting of specific groups ⢠Potential to increase dwell times Table 3-7. Comparison of deployment strategies.

Findings and Applications 59  civilian fare enforcement officers to each zone, DART police were able to respond to calls for assistance within 5 to 7 minutes (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Two of the agencies surveyed (SFMTA, Valley Metro) discontinued the use of zones. SFMTA over the years has used zone, police district, and line deployments to cover its service area and recently reverted to a line-based deployment model. While deployments are partly based on ridership levels, the line-based deployment model enables fare inspectors to cover every line in the SFMTA system within a 2-week period. Within the defined limits for patrol (e.g., route, zone), fare enforcement personnel may have discretion on which vehicles and stations or platforms to inspect in a particular time period (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). While the personnel select these randomly, this approach does not constitute a statistically random inspection and thus is subject to bias. This approach precludes all passengers from having the same probability of being inspected. Further, coverage tends to be highest during peak periods, with little to no coverage at certain times of day. Nonetheless, by increasing the presence of fare enforcement personnel across the system, coverage strategies can reduce opportunistic fare evasion because passengers have a possibility of being inspected any place at any time. Conducting fare inspections systemwide can contribute to enforcement equity and effective- ness. Particularly if resources are limited, assigning inspectors to provide coverage by circulat- ing through different zones, sectors, or lines on a rotating basis can minimize the appearance of geographic discrimination (NACTO 2017; San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009). With the exten- sion of proof of payment to include bus as well as light rail services in San Francisco, SFMTA found that inspecting boarding and alighting passengers only at major stops was not effective. Instead, fare inspectors were assigned to rotate throughout the system according to a data- driven monthly deployment calendar and to conduct saturation inspections. This systemwide coverage approach enabled SFMTA to deploy its limited resources effectively while balancing two goals: (1) to increase the likelihood of passengers being inspected any place any time and (2) to improve fare compliance on routes and at times with substantial fare evasion issues (Lee 2011; SFMTA 2014). Focused Deployments. With focused deployments, fare enforcement personnel are deployed strategically during peak periods as well as to problem areas or locations with high ridership or evasion to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. For example, fare evasion data may be used to identify locations with high rates of fare evasion and determine when and where to deploy personnel most effectively to maximize the number of encounters with fare evaders. Agencies may also use ridership data based on volumes at different times and stations to identify âhigh- value deployment windowsâ (Gupta and Chen 2014). This ridership data can be used to deter- mine when and where to deploy personnel most efficiently in order to maximize the number of inspections. Targeting peak periods or high-volume stations for enforcement is more efficient because this approach can maximize the number of passengers inspected in a short period of time. However, that efficiency may be lost if crowded trains make it difficult to check fares and inspect all riders. Under those circumstances, giving fare enforcement the authority to inspect passengers on plat- forms before they board or as they alight the vehicle can help to maintain an efficient operation. Although deploying personnel at times when high levels of evasion are identified may be effective, TCRP Report 80 noted that it may require shifting resources from other deployment strategies, such as moving personnel to a night shift to target late-night evasion at the cost of reduced fare enforcement during the day (which may be challenging due to labor contract provi- sions) or by using other resources such as supervisors, security personnel, or contracted staff to supplement regular staff (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002).

60 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion While focused deployments may be a key component of an agencyâs fare enforcement strategy, they can make the agency more susceptible to allegations of profiling or targeting. Transit agencies surveyed have noted these concerns and have been modifying their fare enforcement deploy- ments to address them. Metrolink System-Wide Security Assessment: Best Practices Report noted similar concerns among the peer agencies included in that study and also that deployment strat- egies have been shifting away from deployments focused on fare evasion hot spots to avoid even the appearance of profiling or targeting (WSP 2018). Transit agencies have been accused of profiling in fare enforcement, and, in some cases, those accusations have been covered in local news media or resulted in legal action. Some transit agencies are responding to these allegations by reviewing their deployment strategies and inspection processes to remove the potential for bias, moving to more random deployment strategies, or establishing policies that result in more even distribution of fare enforcement systemwide. For example, King County Metro developed a deployment guideline that requires the difference in hours that fare enforcement personnel are deployed on routes with the highest and lowest rates of fare evasion to be no more than 10%. Sweeps. Transit agencies often deploy special fare enforcement teams to address problem areas or randomly deploy teams to conduct large-scale inspectionsâsweepsâin different parts of the system. They are conducted periodically and at selected times of day or locations to supple- ment systemwide and focused deployment strategies by inspecting every passenger in the defined time or location. If sweeps involve onboard inspections, the vehicle may be held, usually for a maximum length of time (e.g., maximum hold of 2Â minutes) to minimize service disruptions. Sweeps are often conducted by fare enforcement personnel that are redeployed from other assignments to support the high-visibility inspections. For example, NYCT undertakes inspec- tion âsurgesâ where a supervisor and six fare inspectors select a stop or several nearby stops and inspect all passengers on every passing vehicle for a specified period of time, typically 60Â minutes. Similarly, MTS randomly selects different sections of rail lines for its âspecial enforcement details.â Sweeps may be conducted on the basis of known fare evasion issues or to rotate throughout the service area. NYCT bases the choice of where to undertake a âsurgeâ enforcement activity on how high the level of fare evasion is known to be in a given area. Fare evasion data used to deter- mine surge locations are both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitatively, inspection and surge data are analyzed on a weekly basis to determine which routes, stops, and times of day exhibit the highest rates of fare evasion. Fare inspectors also speak with bus operators and dispatchers to understand qualitatively where they have concerns about fare evasion. Conversely, the MTS special enforcement details are intended to be conducted randomly, as MTS does not want to target a specific community. Therefore, the MTS Transit Enforcement Department tracks the locations of recent special enforcement details to try to spread them equally across the lines of its trolley network. In some instances, sweeps may be conducted with local police. For example, the Phoenix Transit Police Department provides support when necessary and may be onsite during sweeps, but the police officers do not conduct fare enforcement. A number of transit agencies surveyed noted that they typically no longer have sworn peace officers onsite during sweeps. However, the presence of sworn peace officers can help provide support in the event an individual refuses to provide identification, attempts to walk away, or a situation escalates. However, sweeps, in particular those that use sworn peace officers, can have unintended impacts on public perception. In 2010, SFMTA suspended âsaturation stingsâ that were con- ducted on buses by teams of fare inspectors and City of San Francisco Police Department officers after discussions with the Immigrantsâ Rights Commission and the Office of Civic Engagement and Immigrant Affairs about concerns among passengers that they were immigration raids.

Findings and Applications 61  They were also viewed as creating an intimidating atmosphere for SFMTAâs passengers, espe- cially those who do not speak English (Rhodes 2010). While SFMTA continues to conduct proof-of-payment inspections, the agency no longer conducts saturation stings using police. Effectiveness of Crackdowns. Focused deployments and sweeps in areas with high evasion can be effective in the short term for cracking down on fare evasion. In the long term, however, the effectiveness of crackdowns in creating a fare-compliant culture may be limited. It is impor- tant to note that not all focused deployments and sweeps are crackdowns. A subset of focused deployments and sweeps could be categorized as crackdowns because they focus specifically on locations with fare evasion or other security issues. While deterring fare evasion may be a primary objective of an effective fare evasion program, it is not clear how long the deterrent effects of crackdowns (e.g., sudden increases in police presence, sanctions, and threats of apprehension) last. A study of crackdowns conducted by municipal police forces that was not specific to or inclusive of transit fare enforcement, sug- gests that their deterrent effects may decay after a short time. However, in some instances the residual deterrent effects of police crackdowns continued well after the crackdowns ended; that is, residual deterrence may be more effective than initial deterrence (Sherman 1990). There are also concerns that the use of crackdowns can violate civil liberties. Crackdowns, especially geographically focused approaches, are vulnerable to allegations that police violate civil liberties or are targeting specific groups. This perception of targeting is further perpetuated because crackdowns result in unequal probabilities of apprehension for different offenses, or for the same offense, at different places or times. Rotating crackdown strategies can help equalize enforcement probabilities (Sherman 1990). Similarly, limiting the duration and location of any crackdown may also avoid wasting scarce resources on a decaying initial deterrent effect and reinforce equity in target selection. By changing the crackdown target, it may also be possible to reduce more crime through residual deterrence than through initial deterrence, as people make decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Sherman 1990). Crackdowns are also in conflict with transit agenciesâ increasing emphasis on community policing, which is distinct from the traditional enforcement-based policing approach to crime. Community policing is focused on developing and maintaining relationships to build mutual trust and respect between law enforcement and the community and thereby reduce crime by addressing underlying issues and changing negative behavior (WSP 2018). The shift in the focus of fare enforcement to educating and promoting fare-compliant behavior aligns with commu- nity policing. 3.3.2.2 Fare Enforcement Location Fare enforcement can occur at several locations, including on board vehicles, on platforms, and at gates or entry points. The fare enforcement location may vary on the basis of deployment strategy, time of day, or the configuration of the station or platform and barriers. It also depends on what is allowed by codes and ordinances and how fare-paid areas are defined. Common fare enforcement locations are compared in Table 3-8. Onboard Inspection. Onboard inspections are the most common type of proof-of-payment inspection. Onboard inspections, however, work well only when fare enforcement personnel are able to make their way through the vehicles, which can be difficult during peak periods and before or after events, when vehicles are crowded. Onboard inspections may be more effective during off-peak periods when ridership is lower, whereas fare-paid area (e.g., platform) inspec- tions or fare line enforcement may be more appropriate during peak periods. However, many of the transit agencies surveyed are unable to conduct inspections off board the vehicle because See Section 3.7.1, Authority to Enforce Fares.

62 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion they lack the authority to enforce fares in an off-board fare-paid area, the resources to conduct them effectively, and/or the ability to conduct them safely due to crowding on the platform. Off-board Fare Enforcement. Off-board fare enforcement with open platforms can make it difficult to inspect all fares consistently. Especially during high-volume periods, inspections of fare-paid areas require more personnel to inspect all passengers and prevent walkaways if the stations are ungated and porous. For example, Metro Transit generally does not conduct fare enforcement on platforms because of the personnel required to cover the open platform area and ensure that the inspection complies with the agencyâs policy of checking everyone on the platform. Nonetheless, platform inspections can be an effective method of conducting inspections when vehicles are too crowded during peak periods. The presence of fare enforcement personnel can be helpful not only in increasing fare compliance, but also in addressing other prohibited behavior such as loitering, trespassing, and vandalism, and thereby can help maintain a safe and secure environment (MTS 2017). There are two types of platform inspections. Fares may be inspected as passengers are waiting in or entering/exiting a fare-paid area or as passengers alight a vehicle (referred to sometimes as âoffboarding inspectionsâ). Inspections of passengers waiting on the platform require the platform to be considered and identified as a fare-paid area, whereas offboarding inspections do not because the vehicle is a fare-paid area. Onboard Inspection Platform Inspection Fare Line Enforcement Fare-Paid Area Offboarding ⢠Inspect passengers on board the vehicle ⢠Inspect passengers in the fare-paid area (e.g., waiting on the platform) ⢠Inspect passengers as they enter and exit the platform area (e.g., at top or bottom of escalators or stairs) ⢠Inspect passengers as they alight the vehicle ⢠Observe fare payment by passengers entering or exiting the station through the fare gates or turnstiles ⢠Position personnel at other access points (e.g., emergency exits) to observe unauthorized entry or exit ⢠Smaller teams of 2 to 3 personnel required ⢠Minimal disruption to passengers as they are inspected during their journey ⢠Effective way to maximize fare inspection contacts and minimize walkaways ⢠High visibility encourages fare compliance and helps deter other prohibited behavior (e.g., loitering) ⢠Ability to inspect a high volume of passengers ⢠Ability to observe fare payment by a large number of passengers and identify fare evasion and unauthorized entry ⢠Effective for peak periods and crowded conditions ⢠Difficult to inspect on board crowded vehicles ⢠Fare evaders may wait for next vehicle if they see enforcement on board ⢠Larger teams required to minimize walkaways, cover multiple entries/exits ⢠Difficult to conduct if platform crowded ⢠Authority to enforce in fare-paid area is required ⢠Disruption to passengers alighting ⢠Larger teams required to minimize walkaways ⢠Disruption to passengers alighting ⢠If systems are not gated at all stations, observing entry only at gated stations will result in missing some fare evaders who entered the system at an ungated station Table 3-8. Comparison of common fare enforcement locations.

Findings and Applications 63  RCW 81.112.220 (2012) gives Sound Transit the authority to inspect and enforce fares within designated areas of stations and on station platforms that have been clearly marked with signage identifying them as âProof of Payment Requiredâ zones. However, Sound Transit does not con- duct platform inspections. Sound Transit is considering more distinctive signage and visual cues to demarcate fare-paid areas. Passengers would then better understand when they were entering a fare-paid area, which would make inspection of fares on platforms more feasible. Offboarding inspections can also be an efficient method of inspecting a high volume of pas- sengers, because fare enforcement personnel do not spend time waiting to board a vehicle or need to skip vehicles that are too crowded to board or inspect. In addition, checking fares when passengers alight does not disrupt operations, as the vehicle does not need to be held while fares are checked. However, the effectiveness of offboarding inspections can be limited without suf- ficient personnel to check all alighting passengers. Although TTC has conducted offboarding inspections at seven subway stations on its street- car system, the agency has suspended them while it explores ways to institute more effective methods. Multiple fare inspection teams will likely be needed to inspect all alighting passengers and minimize walkaways. The operational challenge of being unable to inspect all passengers and prevent walkaways with two-person inspection teams was observed during an audit of TTCâs revenue operations. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019a) recommended that TTC improve the effectiveness of offboarding inspections by installing temporary or permanent physical barriers and assigning sufficient fare enforcement personnel. Transit agencies may also vary their inspection processes to address different issues. For example, SFMTA has some of the heaviest passenger loads in the country, with many routes exceeding 100 boardings per hour. While most inspections are conducted on board, in the past, transit fare inspectors have used a variety of techniques to inspect fares, including the following (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012): ⢠Positioning inspectors at doors and inspecting entering passengers, ⢠Proceeding through the vehicle as the crowd thins out, and ⢠Pretending to board the vehicle and then questioning exiting passengers. Sound Transitâs fare enforcement officers also watch for passengers who exit when they see fare enforcement board. Sound Transit refers to these passengers as âhoppers,â who exit a light rail vehicle upon observing fare enforcement boarding and well after other passengers have exited. When a hopper is observed, the fare enforcement team deboards and requests proof of payment. For consistency, unless deboarding would cause a safety concern or operational delay, fare enforcement officers contact all hoppers (Cummins et al. 2013). For gated systems, fare enforcement personnel are positioned near the fare line (e.g., fare gates, emergency exits) to observe fare payment and unauthorized entry. In most circumstances, fare enforcement personnel (often sworn peace officers) only have the authority to check fares if they have reasonable suspicion that an individual violated fare payment requirements (e.g., an individual is observed entering without paying) or if an individual is using a concession or discount fare and personnel must request proof of eligibility. In general, it is more efficient to observe passengers as they enter through the fare line. However, on systems that require the passenger to tap or swipe to exit, observing passengers exiting may also be worthwhile. Systems that require tap or swipe to exit are generally distance-based (BART, WMATA) or are partially gated systems. For example, GCRTA only has gates at the Tower City Station. The area inside of gates must be formally designated a fare-paid area to enable fare inspection inside of the fare line. For example, BARTâs proof-of-payment ordinance, which took effect in 2018, has enabled civilian fare inspectors to request proof of payment and issue citations in the See Section 3.12.2.3, Expanded Fare-Paid Areas.

64 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion fare-paid area inside the fare gates. (BART police officers are still unable to request proof of payment without reasonable suspicion that an individual evaded fare payment or detention of an individual for another crime.) While several of the transit agencies surveyed (BART, LA Metro, SFMTA, TransLink, TTC) have established the area inside the fare line as a proof-of-payment fare-paid area, the rail systems of two of the agencies (LA Metro, SFMTA) are only partially gated. Because passengers could board at other stations that are ungated, establishing the area inside the fare line as a fare-paid area is particularly important in this situation to enforce proof-of-payment fares. Crowding/Special Events. Working in crowds is a challenge for effective fare enforcement, whether it is crowding that occurs during peak travel periods or crowding associated with special events. Onboard crowding makes it difficult for fare enforcement personnel to move through vehicles to inspect fares. In some crowded situations, fare enforcement personnel do not try to inspect and either wait for the crowds to thin to resume fare enforcement or get off and wait for the next, less crowded bus or train. Fare inspectors on NYCTâs SBS routes have accommodated onboard crowding by remaining on the bus and traveling two or three stops away from the maxi- mum load point before restarting inspections after crowding diminishes. Another option is to exit a vehicle and check passengers as they alight (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Similarly, when crush loads on BART station platforms preclude proof-of-payment inspections, fare inspectors adjust their approach by switching to riding trains and performing onboard inspections or redeploying to a different station. TCRP Synthesis 96 found that, of the agencies surveyed, many conducted fare inspection for crush loads by positioning fare enforcement to inspect passengers as they board or by proceed- ing through the vehicle after crowds thinned (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Other means of conducting proof of payment inspections under crush load conditions included staffing tactics (using street supervisors to assist, positioning inspectors at platform entrances), inspection tactics (conducting surge inspections with sufficient personnel to check all passengers on board or alighting at a specific station, pretending to board and see whether fare evaders exit, and then citing them), and using portable turnstiles and temporary queuing barriers to direct passengers to the platform, or relaxing inspections. Transit agencies that serve major sporting venues also use special fare enforcement tech- niques, including additional personnel, temporary barriers, and turnstiles to manage crowds before events, as crowded trains arrive, or after events, when station entrances and platforms become especially crowded. After special events, Valley Metro stations security officers at each end of a light rail platform to inspect passengers as they enter the platform. Metro Transit installs removable gates for special events to support enforcement and minimize the need to enforce fares on platforms when vehicles are too crowded to inspect on board. Ticketing strategies also assist with crowd management. RTD provides special event bus service between park-and-ride lots and special events like Broncos games and has sold round- trip tickets for these buses at the park-and-ride lots. The tickets are sold prior to boarding and then not checked again on the return trip because crowds are too large. SFMTA and Valley Metro also have arrangements with special event venues to accept event tickets for travel to and from the venue on the day of the event at the Chase Center (SFMTA) and Talking Stick Resort Arena (Valley Metro). The transit agencies are then compensated by the event. For example, the reimbursement of the transit service fee to SFMTA is based on the estimated transit use to and from ticketed events at the Chase Center, the price of the round-trip fare, and the number of attendees for an event. The transit service fee is evaluated each year on the basis of actual estimates and addi- tional transportation studies. There can be some significant advantages to these agreements.

Findings and Applications 65  For example, SFMTA does not need to station transit fare inspectors at the Chase Center after events, which frees them up to focus on other fare enforcement assignments. 3.3.2.3 Standard Operating Procedures Standard operating procedures provide clear direction as to how the members of an organiza- tion must complete certain processes. As such, standard operating procedures for fare enforce- ment and inspection define processes for conducting inspections, processing fare evaders, and measuring performance and conformance to the procedures. In effect, they serve as a rule book for personnel to follow to correctly and consistently perform their duties (WSP 2018). It is important to be aware that standard operating procedures for fare enforcement have become subject to public scrutiny and have been used as evidence in court. Consequently, an agency should clearly define the purpose, expectations, and steps of a procedure to ensure that the pro- cesses defined by the standard operating procedure are executed as planned. Standard operating procedures can establish uniform and comprehensive guidelines when decision-making requires the use of discretion. These guidelines are critical to establishing con- sistency, providing transparency into the decision-making process, and minimizing the poten- tial abuse of discretion (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). Establishing consistency in how fare enforcement is conducted minimizes the appearance of discrimination and can also aid in identifying abuse of discretion or failure to follow procedures. In absence of such guidelines and oversight to identify potential abuse of discretion, agencies have opted for a standard process for issuing citations (e.g., zero-tolerance or warning-first policies). Discretion on the part of fare enforcement personnel is discussed further in the section on fare enforcement discretion below. Box 3-5 summarizes the standard operating procedures of MTS. Standard operating procedures are evolving to provide additional specificity and guidance. Sound Transitâs initial standard operating procedures were developed as part of a training manual and based on materials from other agencies. As Sound Transitâs fare enforcement pro- gram grew, it became clear that the standard operating procedures needed to be overhauled and made a stand-alone document separate from the training manual. The separation of the docu- ments also made updates and the revision process more manageable (Cummins et al. 2013). Sound Transit has 19 standard operating procedures related to fare enforcement. Although TTC developed its Transit Fare Inspection Policies and Procedures manual in 2018, the agency is in the process of reviewing and revising its fare enforcement procedures and plans to engage the community as part of the process (TCRP A-45 phone survey of TTC, 2020). The audit of TTCâs revenue operations by the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) recom- mended updating and enhancing the manual to ensure procedures are current and provide suf- ficient detail to facilitate consistent fare inspections, including detailed guidance on inspection activities and processes for handling concession or discount PRESTO cards: âFor instance, the manual lacks details on: the definition of a walk away and when to record it, better guidance on when a ticket versus a warning should be issued to ensure consistency, [and] the process when a concession PRESTO card appears to have been used inappropriately.â In developing standard operating procedures, it is also important to emphasize the impor- tance of customer service and treating people politely and with dignity. WSP (2018) notes that customers should receive a certain level of customer service when they are challenged on ticketless travel. At a minimum, customers should be spoken to politely and clearly and feel confident they will be given an opportunity to provide an explanation. Customers should also have the penalty fare process explained to them, their questions answered, the right to a receipt if they pay the penalty fare in full or in part, and a statement of information related to the penalty fare. They should not feel victimized by fare enforcement officers.

66 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Box 3-5. Summary of Metropolitan Transit System Standard Operations and Procedures Manual MTS provides employees with a manual detailing the professional discharge of all duties and procedures. The goal is to guide code compliance inspectors (CCIs) in providing a safe environment for transit customers. 1. General: Provides an overview of expectations and guidelines that generally apply to CCIs: a. Scope of authority and responsibility, protection from liability; b. Training requirements; c. Uniforms and equipment, appearance standards to maintain a professional on-duty image; d. Shift selection procedures; e. Access control management procedures for both emergency and nonemergency system failures; f. Operating and security protocols at San Diego State Universityâs trolley stop; g. Communication protocols, use of CCTV [closed-circuit television], and radio communications with dispatch; and h. Personal injury claims. 2. Passenger-related duties: Outlines expectations and procedures for interactions with passengers. This section covers the following topics: a. Onboard and fare-paid zone operations; b. Inspection of discounted fares; c. Enforcement of fare ordinance and specified state laws, including procedures for conducting special enforcement details; d. Use and maintenance of handheld fare check devices and body cameras; e. Issuance of citations and conduct concerning use of force (including chemical agents), juveniles and juvenile diversion program, warrant checks, searching, handcuffing, and fare inspections, as well as interactions with nonâU.S. citizens; f. Processing of property and/or evidence obtained during enforcement duties; g. Paramedic procedure and emergency treatment; h. Special events, crowd control, and management; and i. Operating procedures for MTSâs canine unit and Graffiti Tracker. 3. Automobile-related duties: Describes procedures for managing parking permits and vehicles that violate MTS conditions and enforcement protocols for permit parking. 4. Court-related duties: Identifies the requirements of CCIs in response to subpoenas, making court appearances, and trials by declaration. 5. Administrative duties: Outlines CCIsâ responsibilities in issuing, processing, or dismissing citations. Discusses protocols for writing official reports generated by MTS Transit Enforcement [and] watch commanderâs/supervisorâs daily log. 6. Rules of conduct: Details conduct expected of CCIs, scope of authority in processing citizen arrests, and policies on reporting to duty or use of leave. Source: MTS 2017.

Findings and Applications 67  Fare Inspection Processes. One of the critical components of standard operating procedures establishes how and where fare inspections should occur. Consistency in procedures reinforces equity and reduces the appearance of profiling or targeting. To avoid profiling, a strict protocol for inspecting passengers must be followed (e.g., in the area being inspected, check all passengers or check every third passenger) and inspectors must avoid singling out individuals. In general, transit agencies tend to instruct all fare enforcement personnel to inspect each passenger in a systematic manner (i.e., as they encounter individuals as they move from one end of a vehicle or platform to the other end) to minimize the perception that they are singling out individuals. Standard operating procedures often specify how fare enforcement personnel should move through the vehicle and check fares (e.g., whether officers start at opposite ends of a vehicle and meet in the middle or travel together). However, a transit agency may permit a variety of methods, as long as inspections are conducted systematically. For example, TriMetâs standard operating procedures provide three options for systematic inspections: â(1) starting at the outer ends of the vehicle and working toward the middle; (2) entering the middle doors and working towards the ends; or (3) inspecting those near to the doors working toward the middleâ (TriMet 2018a). Standard operating procedures can provide specific directions for fare enforcement personnel on what to do once a bus or rail car is inspected; whether they should proceed to other cars, switch vehicles, or do something else; and whether they have discretion about what they do next. For example, once fare inspections are complete on one car of the San Diego Trolley, the MTS train team can deboard at the next station and either board another car on the same train or move to a new train traveling in either direction (MTS 2017). Other agencies limit discretion as to when to get on and off a vehicle. Valley Metro instructs security officers to board at about the midpoint of the line and travel either east- or westbound in a loop, checking fares, returning to the origin station, and then boarding another train. Standard operating procedures may also establish how frequently personnel should switch vehicles or cars. SacRT expects its transit ambassadors to switch between cars at least once every three stations to help ensure that passengers regularly see transit ambassadors on board, thereby improving the perception of security. Standard operating procedures may also identify additional job responsibilities. For example, in addition to inspections, MTS code compliance inspectors are expected to provide public information and assistance upon request as well as to visually inspect transit centers and fare collection equipment (MTS 2017). 100% Inspections. Agencies are increasingly implementing 100% inspections to minimize the potential and perception of bias and profiling. With 100% inspections, every passenger in a vehicle, on a train, or at a location (e.g., a platform or a station) is asked to provide proof of payment. Many agencies refer to 100% inspections as âsweepsâ (discussed above). Because stan- dard operating procedures for systemwide patrols and focused deployments may also require inspection of all passengers encountered, this discussion refers to â100% inspectionsâ rather than âsweeps,â to minimize confusion. By inspecting every passenger, 100% inspections help minimize the potential for and perception of bias or profiling (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; Metropolitan Council 2016; TTC 2019c; WSP 2018). These inspections also minimize the potential for actual discrimination that can expose an agency to litigation or affect an agencyâs reputation (Cummins et al. 2013). The 100% inspections also help to alleviate concerns of fare-paying passengers that others are not paying their fares (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). The 100% inspections also serve a variety of other purposes, such as providing the data needed to estimate fare evasion rates. When scheduled to provide a valid random sample of passenger trips, 100% inspections can provide the data needed to assess and monitor fare evasion rates and trends (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; WSP 2018).

68 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion A common strategy for conducting 100% inspections is for fare enforcement personnel to enter through each door of the vehicle and then inspect the fares of everyone on board. Sound Transit uses this approach. Once passengers have entered or exited the train and before the doors close, fare enforcement officers working in pairs enter the train, announce âtickets or passes, please,â walk to opposite ends of the car, and then inspect as they walk back toward the middle, as illustrated in Figure 3-3. All passengers are checked and the process is followed every time, even if a potential evader is identified. To prevent singling out any passengers, fare enforcement officers are trained never to go directly or out of sequence to a person and request their proof of payment. Fare inspec- tors on NYCTâs SBS routes follow similar procedures in conducting fare inspections. The fare inspectors often work in groups of threeâone for each door on the longer articulated buses used for SBS service. A similar process for conducting 100% inspections can be implemented in fare-paid areas with signage that indicates that proof of payment is required. Ideally, any fare vending and validating equipment is located outside of the fare-paid area. Fare enforcement personnel start at one end of the fare-paid area, announce that they are inspecting tickets or passes, and then inspect the very first passenger the inspector approaches as he or she moves toward the opposite end of the fare-paid area, continuing to inspect every passenger in order. For larger platforms with larger fare-paid areas, the team may split up and inspect fares from the opposite ends of the zone, meeting in the middle. Alternatively, fare enforcement may conduct 100% inspections as passengers enter the plat- form if there are limited access points. For example, in some circumstances, BART positions its fare inspectors to check proof of payment at the bottom of escalators as passengers arrive at the train platform. This approach generally works only if fare collection is not conducted on the platform (i.e., passengers do not need to access TVMs or validators on the platform). Conversely, fare enforcement may conduct 100% inspections as passengers alight a vehicle (i.e., offboarding inspections) or as they exit a station. For example, SFMTA positions its fare inspectors on the mezzanine level at the top of the stairs or escalators in its subway stations, enabling them to monitor the gates as passengers enter and conduct proof-of-payment inspec- tions before passengers exit the station. Fare Enforcement Discretion. A critical component of fare enforcement policies and pro- cedures is the level of discretion that fare enforcement personnel have when they encounter an individual without either proof of payment or proof of eligibility, or an individual who has Source: Sound Transit 2019. Figure 3-3. Sound Transit inspection procedure.

Findings and Applications 69  illegally entered a station. Transit agencies have different tolerances for fare evasion (and dif- ferent tolerances for different types of fare evasion). Transit agencies with relatively complex fare structures may recognize that issues are likely to arise and direct fare enforcement to read the situation to determine how to respond to a passenger who boards without paying (Nakanishi and Fleming 2011). A key element of training is ensuring that personnel are knowledgeable about their agenciesâ expectations for fare enforcement and tolerances for fare evasion. Some studies have suggested that fare enforcement policies fall on a continuum between zero tolerance, where fare enforcement personnel are expected to enforce fare payment strictly so as not to create confusion about requirements and expectations and to minimize potential for discrimination, and a more lenient approach focused on customer education, where personnel are given discretion to handle the situation according to their best judgment and knowledge of the circumstances (Dauby and Kovacs 2007; Egu and Bonnel 2020; Nakanishi and Fleming 2011; New South Wales Audit Office 2000). This continuum is illustrated in Figure 3-4. TCRP Report 80 (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002) and TCRP Synthesis 96 (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012), which address self-service and proof-of-payment fare collection, respectively, recognize the role of discretion in fare enforcement. Many transit agencies give their fare enforcement per- sonnel some discretion in issuing citations and authorize them to issue warnings (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Issuing citations is more time-consuming and may be regarded by the public as overly punitive, so issuing warnings instead of citations may be more appropriate for transit agencies that approach fare enforcement from a customer education perspective. Overall, giving fare enforcement leeway in deciding whether to cite or warn, depending on the circumstances, may be a reasonable policy, but it requires training to ensure agency policies are enforced con- sistently and effectively (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). In addition to the importance of training fare enforcement personnel on agency expectations regarding the use of discretion, the New South Wales Audit Office reinforced the importance of providing guidelines and criteria to assist revenue protection officers in exercising their discre- tionary authority, since without guidelines, discretion is âless transparent and therefore open to abuseâ (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). TTC also recognizes the importance of discretion for its fare inspectors and special constables and stresses that discretion should be uniformly applied to minimize potential bias or discrimination. TTC is developing a formal discretion policy to improve consistency by providing guiding principles and more prescriptive steps for scenarios that personnel may encounter. In its standard operating procedure, TriMet provides some guidance to its fare enforcement personnel for issuing warnings, citations, and exclusions. The standard operating procedure instructs TriMet personnel to issue a warning in specific circumstances and notes warnings are only appropriate in special mitigating circumstances. These circumstances may include situ- ations where individuals do not understand how to use transit and/or are clearly unfamiliar with fare payment. These populations may include tourists and specific populations, such as Figure 3-4. Fare enforcement policy continuum.

70 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion children, seniors, people with disabilities, and people with limited English proficiency. However, if an individual has received a warning for the same or similar conduct, it may be inappropriate to issue another warning. Prior to issuing a warning, citation, or exclusion, TriMet personnel are instructed to perform a records check through their handheld device or by contacting the Operations Command Center. Of the 18 transit agencies surveyed for this report, seven have zero-tolerance or warning-first policies, which involve the least amount of discretion. While transit agencies have implemented zero-tolerance or warning-first policies for different reasons, the primary reason is to minimize discretion and the potential for bias. In 2015, Metro Transit implemented a warning-first prac- tice to increase consistency, eliminate potential bias and discrimination, and ensure fairness and consistency in how passengers without valid fare are treated (Metro Transit 2015). This change was made in response to a data request submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for 2014 and 2015 arrest and citation data, including demographic data, from the Metro Transit Police Department. Metro Transit conducted its own internal analysis of fare evasion citation data to understand whether there were differences in enforcement procedures by race/ ethnicity. While the data indicated differences by race/ethnicity in the likelihood of being cited versus being warned, the data indicated that there were no significant differences when a warn- first procedure was in effect for first-time fare evasion incidents. Some agencies adopt zero-tolerance or warning-first policies only for certain types of fare evasion, such as fraud. TTC, for example, has a zero-tolerance policy for fraudulent use of child concession smart cards, but allows discretion for other types of fare violations. Other transit agencies may adopt them in response to serious fare evasion behavior. Some agencies may dif- ferentiate their discretion policy on the basis of the type of personnel conducting inspections (e.g., sworn peace officer versus civilian personnel) or type of enforcement or situation. For example, while BART police officers have discretion to issue warnings or citations for fare eva- sion, a zero-tolerance policy applies to fare inspectors. The BART Board of Directors required this distinction as part of authorizing proof-of-payment inspections. It was important to the board that every individual who could not show proof of payment to a fare inspector receive a citation to minimize potential discrimination. Nonetheless, there are exceptions. During early morning inspections, individuals found without proof of payment are instructed to leave the station and re-enter after purchasing a valid fare. Fare evaders are not ticketed during these weekday morning inspections because of the impact that issuing citations would have on com- pleting the morning inspections and keeping trains on time. Implementing a warning-first policy does not preclude an emphasis on education. King County Metro and Sound Transit both have warning-first policies. These agencies stressed the importance of using warnings as an educational opportunity. There is also interest in providing additional educational opportunities. As part of the development of the Sound Transit Fare Enforcement Action Plan, a work group recommended increasing the number of warnings issued to an individual from one to two within a 12-month period before a fare evasion cita- tion would be issued, to increase fare compliance and reduce the number of citations (Sound Transit 2020d). One of the main reasons that some transit agencies have not implemented warning-first policies is that these policies require a database or records management system to determine whether an individual has received prior warnings or citations. Transit agencies with warning- first policies look up an individual either by using a handheld device in the field (RTD, Sound Transit) or contacting dispatch (Metro Transit, King County Metro, Valley Metro). Transit agencies that choose to give their fare enforcement personnel discretion commonly emphasize customer education over issuing citations. LA Metro, MTS, SacRT, SFMTA, and See Section 2.2.4, Fare Citation Practice. Section 3.10, Discrimination in Fare Enforcement, discusses identifying potential systemic bias and discrimination and baselining fare evasion demographic data to assess whether there are racial/ ethnic disparities in issuing warnings versus citations. Access to fare citation databases in the field using handheld devices is discussed further in Section 3.13.6, Fare Inspection Handheld Devices.

Findings and Applications 71  Valley Metro are among the agencies that focus on education to increase fare compliance and revenue recovery. Rather than citing and fining fare evaders, these transit agencies focus on fare recovery by educating the individual on how to pay and having the individual purchase a fare rather than citing them. Under MTSâs new diversion program, code compliance inspectors give passengers found without proof of payment an opportunity to purchase a fare before issuing them a citation. On the SacRT system, if a passenger cannot produce proof of pay- ment on light rail, transit ambassadors inform the passenger about the need to purchase a fare prior to boarding and educate the passenger on how to do so. They then ask the passenger to purchase a valid fare. Fare enforcement personnel only issue citations to passengers without proof of payment who refuse to purchase a fare or get off the train. Valley Metroâs security contract describes the role of security officers as âto educate customers on the proof-of-payment system and to take enforcement action against violators to gain com- pliance with Fare Enforcement Ordinancesâ (Valley Metro 2019). Security officers inform light rail passengers found riding without valid proof of payment of the need to have purchased a fare and options for securing valid fare. Most of the passengers that security officers encounter do want to understand the rules, and an education-first approach works well with these indi- viduals. In addition to educating passengers, security officers are encouraged to help recover the fare where possible, such as by helping the individual buy fare. Decreasing the focus on citing passengers can also help increase the number of contacts that fare enforcement personnel are able to make. A study found that on the light rail system in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, issuing warnings to passengers with an acceptable excuse for not having a ticket took about 10 minutes, while it took about 17 minutes to issue a citation to those without an acceptable excuse (Clarke et al. 2010). 3.3.2.4 Team Composition and Size Most agencies deploy fare enforcement personnel in teams sized to achieve specific objectives, most typically to provide sufficient coverage to meet the needs of specific enforcement strategies. Whatever the deployment strategy, Dauby and Kovacs (2007) concluded that proof-of-payment inspections are commonly conducted by teams of two to eight persons. According to Keuchel and Laurenz (2018), team size appears to have a statistically significant influence on fare evasion rates. The researchers analyzed data from Munster, Germany, and found positive coefficients that indicated teams of three fare inspectors more successfully controlled fare evasion than teams of two inspectors. The transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45 generally deploy inspec- tors in teams of two to four personnel. While two-person teams appear to be common, smaller or larger teams are sometimes justified. For example, on SBS routes, NYCT deploys fare enforcement teams of three fare inspectors for regular patrols. This provides one fare inspector for each door of the three-door articulated buses, enabling inspections of all passengers, including alighting passengers, usually in less than a minute. Of the transit agencies surveyed, very few deploy personnel alone. While Sound Transit deploys two-person teams to light rail, individual fare enforcement officers are deployed on commuter rail. RTD deploys its armed transit security officers in teams of two, but one transit security officer patrols the platform, station area, and park-and-ride facilities, while the other inspects fares on board. SacRT deploys its transit ambassadors alone at all times, and during peak periods, one transit ambassador is assigned to every train. Transit agencies generally combine multiple teams for special deployments, such as surge inspections. For example, NYCT deploys two âeagleâ teams (six fare inspectors) and a super- visor. MTS redeploys, on average, 10 train teams with one code compliance inspector supervisor for its special enforcement details. Each train team consists of one code compliance inspector and one security officer.

72 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Team size may also have a role in preventing violence onboard and possible economic losses. Because efforts to control fare evasion by increasing detection rates can exacerbate violent behavior onboard, damaging the image of the public transportation system, Barabino et al. (2013) concluded that inspection teams should include at least two people to help manage nega- tive behavioral responses to fare enforcement. BART deploys fare inspectors in teams of four or more, in part for efficiency (two fare inspectors inspect a car together), and also to ensure all passengers are asked for proof of payment. Deployment in teams also provides safety in num- bers, as fare inspectors are unarmed. To address safety concerns, transit agencies have also deployed personnel with different authorities together in teams. MTS deploys its code compliance inspectors with armed security officers who, in addition to assisting with proof-of-payment inspections, provide security. Simi- larly, TriMet deploys its fare inspectors with customer safety officers. TTC also deploys its fare inspectors with special constables. 3.3.2.5 Considerations for Scheduling and Assigning Fare Enforcement Scheduling and assigning fare enforcement is focused on deploying fare enforcement staff tem- porally and spatially. Thorlacius and Clausen (2010) explore how to maximize fare enforcement by understanding, âfor a given number of employees in the corps, how should the spot-checking be carried out both regarding the temporal (when), the spatial (where) and the methodological (how) dimension?â Fare enforcement scheduling decisions can affect not only the effectiveness but also the effi- ciency of fare enforcement activities. While a significant amount of research has been conducted on how to improve the effectiveness of fare enforcement, research and resources on improving the efficiency of when and where to schedule and deploy fare enforcement are limited. Deployment Effectiveness. Establishing a performance management system for fare enforce- ment can help improve and monitor effectiveness by establishing baselines, setting targets, and developing measures to make informed decisions on staffing (King County Auditorâs Office 2018). A risk management approach to deployment can improve the effectiveness of a fare inspection program by increasing the likelihood of achieving an agencyâs fare enforcement goals and by using data to evaluate fare evasion risk in different locations and at different times and deploying enforcement accordingly. Particularly in the transit environmentâwhere civilian fare enforcement can supplement police patrols to augment passenger security and safetyâridership and citation data (by line, station, and bus stop), customer and operator input, and crime sta- tistics can support risk mitigation strategies for deployment decisions (BCA Watson Rice et al. 2015; City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Schlosser 2012b). During the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) identified opportunities to improve the effectiveness and consistency of TTCâs scheduling prac- tices. TTCâs deployment provides risk-based coverage and is increasingly data-driven on all modes. TTC has additional plans to use technology to better inform fare enforcement deploy- ment, scheduling, and assignments. Effectiveness can also be influenced by sufficient staffing. Often, staff resources are constrained. As SFMTA extended proof of payment to its bus system, it was estimated that maintaining the inspection rate on light rail would require roughly 300% more inspectors. Although a 30% increase in full-time inspectors had been planned, funding shortfalls precluded even this level of increase. As a result, SFMTA developed a fare inspection deployment plan to maximize effectiveness given limited resources. The inspector deployment had to balance two competing goals (Lee 2011): ⢠Ensuring that all customers expect that a fare inspection might occur anywhere, anytime, and ⢠Increasing fare compliance on routes and at times with substantial fare evasion issues. See Section 3.3.1, Fare Enforcement Personnel. See Section 3.4, Fare Enforcement Program Management and Oversight.

Findings and Applications 73  SFMTA also implemented adjustments to shift schedules to increase effectiveness and efficiency. Conducting fare enforcement at strategic times may also have an impact on effectiveness by reducing fare evasion during other times. Killias et al. (2009) found a diffusion of benefits when fare enforcement was increased on evening trains to reduce the fear of crime. The authors contended that systematic, concentrated fare inspections during certain critical hours might encourage fare evaders to purchase passes as the most economical alternative (Killias et al. 2009). Deployment Efficiency. Efficiency of fare enforcement is tied to the productivity of the fare enforcement personnel. Assignment scheduling can have a significant impact on productivity. The time it takes to write citations and warnings, report to assigned locations, travel to and from assignments, and complete other administrative duties can interfere with efficiency (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009). During the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that fare inspectors spent a considerable amount of time writing tickets and warnings and documenting their notes. On average, fare inspectors spent 20â30 minutes to issue a ticket, including educating the passenger on fare payment, answering questions, and explaining the appeal process. Another component of fare enforcement time is court attendance for contested citations and summons. As a result, a significant share of a fare enforcement shift is not spent inspecting fares. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that in a 12-hour shift, fare inspectors spent 4.5â5.5 hours (38%â46% of their shift) issuing tickets, inputting inspection results in the office, and traveling. The San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) found similar limitations on inspection time and estimated that during an 8.5-hour shift, only 5.5 hours were spent actively conducting fare enforcement. Noninspection time, excluding the 30-minute unpaid lunch break, included team briefing and deployment at the start of the shift (30 minutes), paid breaks (two 15-minute breaks), and administrative paperwork, team debriefing, and dress down at the end of the shift (45â60 minutes). For agencies with fare citation databases that cannot be accessed in the field, the process of issuing citations and warnings can be more time consuming because inspectors need to contact dispatch or their office to look up past encounters. The King County Auditorâs Office (2018) found this process time-consuming and inefficient. King County Metro is procuring a new cloud-based system that will enable fare enforcement officers to look up fare enforcement his- tory in real time in the field. The new system will also print citations directly from a connected thermal printer. TTC is also preparing for a pilot of mobile bylaw ticketing to issue tickets. Auto- mation of manual processes will increase operational inspection time and provide the documen- tation and evidence required for contested tickets while minimizing errors and inaccuracies (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Assignments have a significant impact on efficiency. Fare enforcement personnel often spend a considerable amount of their shift time traveling between their reporting (start-of-shift) location, assigned inspection route, and lunch location. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that fare inspectors often spent 1 hour of a 12-hour shift traveling, primarily to get from reporting locations to assigned inspection routes. TTC is evaluating additional tempo- rary reporting locations and identifying long-term reporting locations to reduce travel between these locations and assignments. One method of measuring efficiency is based on the number of inspections conducted by fare enforcement personnel during a shift or set time period (e.g., hour, day, week, month). Barabino and Salis (2019) note significant variability in inspector productivity and attribute the difference to âtwo characteristics of routes: (i) the passenger volumes, which can be significantly different from the expected ones and, (ii) the level of security, to tackle violent behaviors of passengers inspected.â

74 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of a fare enforcement program depends, at least in part, on understanding the performance of an agencyâs fare inspection function. The San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) found significant variability in the productivity of SFMTAâs transit fare inspectors, who, on average, made 4,544 contacts per month and recorded 111 eva- sion citations and warnings. However, there was a wide range in the performance of transit fare inspectors. Average monthly contacts ranged from 1,866 to 7,608, with average monthly citations and warnings ranging from 12 to 253. When transit fare inspectors were ranked by the number of citations and warnings issued, the San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) also found that the top five transit fare inspectors issued more citations and warnings per month than the bottom 20 transit fare inspectors. There was also variability in the warning and citation rates per transit fare inspector (San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009). The variability in productivity (i.e., number of contacts, warnings, and citations) among transit fare inspectors may be due, in part, to a proof-of-payment program that emphasizes the conduct of the transit fare inspectors rather than their performance. The San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) found that while supervisors were provided guidance for preparing fare inspector performance reviews, only one item, citation counts per month, related to program performance and achievement. The other evaluation criteria emphasized a transit fare inspec- torâs conduct (e.g., attendance, court issues, report writing, uniform compliance, re-instruction, disciplinary actions, training), not performance and achievement measures that help to explain program-wide performance assessment measures. Further, the ability to monitor transit fare inspector performance was hampered by daily statistics that were not designed for easy access and detailed performance analysis and by data collection limitations, methods of aggregation, and concerns about data reliability (San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009). Given that the number of fares that can be inspected in an hour or shift can also depend on ridership levels, aligning increased fare enforcement with ridership patterns can maximize effi- ciency. However, this does not mean that fare enforcement should avoid inspections during off- peak periods. Passengers should have the expectation that they may be checked at any time. In addition to synchronizing deployment and ridership patterns, the San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) identified opportunities to improve fare inspection productivity by minimizing inspec- tor downtime, using data to target areas of high evasion and other safety and customer service needs, better synchronizing deployment with other strategic objectives, and ensuring coverage of the full length of each light rail line. In response to the findings of the San Francisco Budget Analyst study (2009), SFMTA moved the fare enforcement reporting location, centralizing it at SFMTAâs headquarters to minimize inspector downtime and improve fare enforcement efficiency. SFMTAâs headquarters is cen- trally located in SFMTAâs service area, adjacent to a central light rail subway station. This central location has helped increase inspection time by reducing travel time to assignments. SFMTA also rescheduled shifts to improve weekend coverage, so that all transit fare inspectors work either Saturday or Sunday instead of only Monday through Friday (SFMTA 2014). TTC has also modified its shifts for fare inspectors to increase coverage, and fare inspectors are now on 8-, 10-, or 12-hour shifts (TTC 2020b). Identification of Evasion Hot Spots. As part of determining how to deploy fare enforcement personnel, transit agencies may use fare evasion data to determine where and when to enforce. For focused deployments, the ability to accurately assess fare evasion rates and strategically deploy fare enforcement resources to high-risk routes and locations requires analysis of robust data. To deploy resources efficiently and effectively, these data must include information about fare evasion locations, frequencies, times, types, and so forth (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). Use of fare evasion audit or survey data that are refreshed regularly can provide a statistically See Section 3.3.2.1, Deployment Strategies.

Findings and Applications 75  valid sample of fare evasion systemwide that can help identify locations and times of day with higher incidences or rates of fare evasion. In the absence of these data, transit agencies may use other data sources, such as warning and citation data from fare inspections or fare collection data. Many agencies rely on these data to identify hot spots in the absence of fare evasion audit or survey data. However, these data pro- vide only a partial picture of fare evasion, because they are influenced by the deployment of fare enforcement, and reliance on anecdotal identification of hot spots can lead to bias. Crime statistics are another source of data that are more commonly used for fare enforce- ment conducted by police. WMATA uses a combination of crime statistics and data from bus operators and station agents to identify both high-crime and high-evasion areas to focus police and enforcement activities (WSP 2018). There is growing interest in the use of technology to help in identifying locations with higher incidences of fare evasion. Researchers have begun evaluating the use of automatic passenger counter (APC) and fare collection data to identify noninteraction rates, which include non- fare-paying passengers (i.e., fare evaders) and passengers with a valid transfer or pass who did not interact with the fare collection system (e.g., did not tap smart card) (Egu and Bonnel 2020; Sánchez-MartÃnez 2017). However, few agencies have put the use of these data into practice. This approach has not been more widely adopted because fare evasion is only one cause of the discrepancies between APC boardings and fare collection transactions. For example, the use of paper transfers and fare products and the proportion of passengers not required to pay a fare can result in discrepancies if not recorded by the operator. Transit agencies have also been exploring the use of gate sensors or video analytic software, or both, to record illegal entries. As noted by Egu and Bonnel (2020), âno single data source meets all needs . . . it may be necessary to com- bine a variety of data sources to improve the quality and reliability of fare evasion methods.â Nonetheless, as affirmed by SFMTAâs proof-of-payment study, âinvesting in a fare inspection program and gathering research data to deploy enforcement resources strategically can yield significant benefits and help build a culture of fare complianceâ (Lee 2011). Box 3-6 provides an overview of TTCâs use of data to identify hot spots and assist with sched- uling and assigning fare enforcement. Fare Evasion Data Trends. Fare evasion is opportunistic and dependent on fare enforce- ment levels, perceived inspection rates (i.e., the likelihood of being caught as perceived by a passenger), ridership characteristics, and fare products. As such, fare evasion varies by mode, route, and segment. It also varies by time of day and day of the week. All of these factors must be considered for the maximum effectiveness of fare enforcement. To that end, data can be analyzed to understand not only hot spots, as discussed in the section above, but also fare evasion trends on specific routes and modes and at times of the day or day of the week. As part of its fare compliance review of Metro Transitâs Blue and Green Lines, the Metro- politan Council (2016) divided the light rail lines into zones to analyze fare evasion by time of day and zone. Each line was segmented into five zones to understand fare evasion along the line. The Metropolitan Council found that fare evasion on Metro Transitâs Blue Line was highest during midday and on weekends, while on the Green Line, evasion was highest at night, during the PM peak, and on weekends. [Conversely, the audit by the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found more illegal entries into TTCâs subway in the morning as compared with the evening, with the highest instances during the early morning hours from 7 to 8 a.m.] The data on fare evasion incidents were also compared with Metro Transitâs previous (2014) fare compliance review to identify segments that experienced a statistically significant increase in fare evasion (Metropolitan Council 2016).

Box 3-6. Toronto Transit Commissionâs Use of Data to Assist in Fare Enforcement Deployment TTC uses data to strategically deploy fare enforcement and has plans to expand its use of data in identifying hot spots to assist in resource deployments. In 2019, TTC formed a Revenue Control and Ridership Analytics team that delivers dedicated revenue control and ridership data analytics within its finance department (TTC 2020b). On bus lines, TTC deploys its special constables on the basis of bus operator data. TTC bus operators are instructed to press the fare dispute button on their VISION console to report instances of fare evasion. Special constables are deployed to respond to bus operators reporting escalated safety concerns, including fare evasion, as part of the Bringing Uniform Support to Surface Operating Personnel (BUSSTOP) program. The special constables that ride along on those routes support the operator and provide a visible presence for passengers (TTC 2019c; TTC 2020a). For its bus and streetcar system, TTC is planning to overlay PRESTO smart card transaction data on automatic passenger count data to produce heat maps identifying locations of fare evasion (TTC 2019c; TTC 2020b). For its gated subway system, TTC has installed fare gate sensors to record illegal entry data. TTC is in the user- acceptance testing phase to ensure the completeness and reliability of the data and has long-term plans to develop fare gate event reports to identify high-risk subway entrances and determine how to strategically deploy and allocate fare enforcement (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Thus far, the use of automatic data has been focused on understanding travel behavior of different PRESTO passengers. TTC has been particularly interested in behavior related to the child concession PRESTO card, as the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) has identified significant fraud issues associated with the inappropriate use of these cards. TTC has been evaluating the distribution of use by time of day, mode, route, and location, and how use has changed over time (TTC 2019d; TTC 2019c). TTC has also been evaluating abnormal usage, as illustrated in Figure 3-5. Source: TTC (2019d). Figure 3-5. TTC evaluation of concession card fraud by time of day.

Findings and Applications 77  Box 3-6. (Continued). TTC has conducted observations of PRESTO-tapping behavior with and without uniformed fare inspectors present on two of its streetcar routes. On the basis of the data collected, TTC was able to evaluate the impact of fare inspectors in uniform on fare evasion, assess where fare evasion was higher by boarding location (e.g., downtown, outside of downtown, subway stations), develop heat maps to understand specifically where along the route fare evasion was occurring, and determine fare evasion rate by streetcar door (TTC 2019b). A sample heat map is shown in Figure 3-6. In the absence of data from fare gate sensors, TTC has relied on staff observations to identify fare evasion locations and high-risk stations, with different staff assigned to each station as shown in Figure 3-7. TTC has been deploying agency staff, including subway and station supervisors, at peak periods to observe fare gates to identify locations with high evasion. TTC is also installing fare deterrence cameras with public-facing TV screens at secondary station entrances at high-risk stations and conducting a pilot at Yonge/Bloor station to install 360-degree-view cameras that provide coverage of approximately 90% of the station (TTC 2020b). Source: TTC (2019b). Queen at Yonge Queen at Church Queen at Jarvis Queen at Parliament Queen at Ossington 37% 50% 44% 50% 38% Hotspot Location (West to East) Phase 1 Did Not Tap 13% 16% 8% 29% 16% Phase 2 Did Not Tap Figure 3-6. Heat map of TTC 501 Queen Streetcar. (continued on next page)

78 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Data can also identify what types of fare evasion (e.g., no proof of payment, expired fare) are occurring by time of day. To assess the revenue impacts, Isreal and Strathman (2002) examined fare evasion on TriMetâs Metropolitan Area Express (MAX) (light rail) and bus in Portlandâs Rose Quarter to understand how fare evasion rates and type of fare evasion varied throughout the day. Six categories of evasion were recorded (no proof of payment, unvalidated ticket, zone violation, expired time, >18 on youth fare/no youth ID, <65/no honored citizenâs ID). The study found that fare evasion varied by time of day and that the highest evasion rates on MAX were during the early morning, late evening, and on weekends, while the lowest rates were during the weekday AM peak from 6 to 9:30 a.m. Similarly, fare product usage by time of day can assist in scheduling and deploying enforce- ment personnel. For example, lower rates of fare evasion during weekday peak periods may be due in part to higher pass usage during those periods. As part of their audit of Metro Transitâs fare evasion, Gupta and Chen (2014) evaluated fare collection data to understand how fare prod- uct use varied by time of day. Analysis of the data found that few passengers used stored value or a ticket from a TVM and that passes were used the most during the AM and PM peak periods. Data can also be plotted on a map to better understand fare evasion spatially. In addition to calculating fare evasion by route, service type, and time period, SFMTA plots fare evasion to identify the percentage and absolute number of customers observed without valid proof of payment at each survey location (Lee 2011; SFMTA 2014). âCircle shading indicates the evasion rate, and circle size indicates the number of customers surveyed without proof of paymentâ (Lee 2011). This analysis can be used to help identify concentrations of fare evasion. For example, Lee (2011) found higher fare evasion in downtown San Francisco and the cityâs eastern edge, as shown in Figure 3-8. Interestingly, the location of fare evasion shifted between the 2009 Box 3-6. (Continued). Source: TTC (2020c). Figure 3-7. Post-AM peak coverage of TTC subway stations.

Findings and Applications 79  Source: Lee (2011). Figure 3-8. SFMTA customers observed with invalid fares (2009 Fare Survey). (Figure 3-8) and 2014 surveys (Figure 3-9), illustrating the importance of regularly monitoring changes in fare evasion locations. Assignments and Scheduling Deployments. Fare enforcement tends to occur where rider- ship levels are higher, as most passengers pass through, board, or alight in those zones. Focusing enforcement on locations where passengers begin or end their trips can help increase efficiency. However, outlying areas may not be inspected under this approach, and this approach may not deter fare evasion in these areas if there is no expectation of being inspected. For example, TTC (2020a) found that on one of its sampled streetcar routes, the highest number of observed eva- sion incidents occurred in remote locations along the route where inspections were infrequently conducted. This suggested that the presence of fare enforcement encourages fare compliance. This finding was corroborated by an earlier study of passenger tapping behavior. On the basis of

80 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Source: SFMTA (2014). Figure 3-9. SFMTA customers observed with invalid fares (2014 Fare Survey). these findings, TTC (2020a) recommended regular and increased fare inspections coupled with strategic deployment initiatives to increase presence and deter fare evasion on the streetcar. Assignments. Most agencies assign fare enforcement to zones or lines. Line assignments may be the entire length of the line or specific segments between pairs of stations or within a zone. For example, SFMTA assigns transit fare inspectors to ride the entire length of the line, whereas RTD segments lines into zones for assignments and assigns transit security officers to a specific zone. Sometimes, fare enforcement personnel are assigned an entire line but given discretion as to when to get on and off. Like RTD, MTS assigns train teams to beats that consist of three to five stations in one of four sectors, as shown in Figure 3-10. There are multiple train teams in each sector at the same time, so a passenger may encounter more than one train team over the course of a trip. MTS has given train teams discretion to decide how to move around their assigned beat and whether to inspect

Findings and Applications 81  Source: MTS (2020a). Figure 3-10. MTS San Diego Trolley sector and beat map. on board the vehicle or on the platform. However, they are expected to board trains regularly as well as inspect at stations. Like RTD and MTS, TTC has divided its streetcar lines into segments with varying inspection levels, as shown in Figure 3-11. The highest frequency of inspections is conducted in the down- town core (red segment) and inspection levels decrease further out (green and blue segments). Revenue control teams hop on and off after inspecting all passengers on the streetcar, staying within the assigned segment on the assigned streetcar line.

82 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion While fare enforcement for a given zone or line may be assigned consistently, fare enforce- ment personnel are instructed to vary their path. For example, on Sound Transitâs commuter rail, fare enforcement officers are given the flexibility to adjust their inspection patterns to ensure that every scheduled train is inspected at least once per week and that the inspection pattern is random (Cummins et al. 2013). Scheduling Deployments. Fare enforcement personnel are generally scheduled in 8-, 10-, or 12-hour shifts. Shifts may also vary on the basis of the type of personnel used (e.g., sworn peace officers versus civilian personnel) or additional responsibilities. Fare enforcement shifts are staggered and scheduled to maximize coverage during the peak periods when ridership is the highest. However, coverage is often lower during the morning peak, since shifts do not overlap. Shift coverage by day of week may also be complicated by overlapping schedules (e.g., the use of MondayâFriday, TuesdayâSaturday, and SundayâThursday schedules results in higher coverage on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays). However, there can be advantages to overlapping schedules. Increased staffing during the PM peak can help increase visibility during the PM commute. Overlapping days can also provide opportunities for training and meetings and can help fill in gaps that exist due to vacations, sick leave, or vacancies (Cummins et al. 2013). In 2009, SFMTA had six different teams working varying shift times and different days of the week. Transit fare inspectors were assigned 8.5-hour shifts, including a 30-minute unpaid lunch break. Due to the scheduling of the shifts, the San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) found two peaks in coverage between approximately 10:30 a.m. and 1:15 p.m. and between 3 p.m. and Source: TTC (2020c). Figure 3-11. TTC streetcar fare inspection coverage map.

Findings and Applications 83  5:45 p.m., with the highest coverage on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, when schedules overlapped. These peaks in coverage are illustrated in Figure 3-12. There can be coverage advantages to scheduling staff on 8-hour shifts or using a variety of shift lengths. Because fare enforcement personnel are generally on their feet all day, fare enforcement can be a physically demanding job. Shorter shifts may help minimize turnover and promote customer service. Given the length of a service day, shorter shifts or a variety of shift lengths can help increase scheduling efficiency. For example, TTC worked with the union representing its fare inspectors to make changes to scheduling practices. Previously, fare inspectors were scheduled on 12-hour shifts. Fare inspectors are now on 8-, 10-, or 12-hour shifts, which has increased the number of shifts by 29% compared to the previous year (TTC 2020b). For light rail, Sound Transit uses 10-hour shifts with three shift schedules (6 a.m. to 4 p.m., 1 p.m. to 11 p.m., and 2 p.m. to 1 a.m.), which provides 18 hours of coverage per day. Fare enforcement officers work four shifts per week (either Sunday through Wednesday or Wednesday through Saturday) with an overlap day on Wednesday. For commuter rail, Sound Transit uses 8-hour shifts between 5 a.m. and 7 p.m. Monday through Friday, with coverage during the peak hours on commuter rail in the morning between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m. and in the afternoon between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. During the midday, when there is no commuter rail service, the commuter rail Source: San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009). Figure 3-12. SFMTA transit fare inspector in-field staffing (excluding lunch breaks), by day of week (March 2009).

84 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion fare enforcement officers assist with fare enforcement on light rail to provide additional coverage or fill in any gaps due to vacations, sick leave, or vacancies (Cummins et al. 2013). Shifting fare enforcement schedules on the basis of fare evasion data can also help increase effectiveness. The 2009 study of SFMTAâs fare enforcement program found that the fare inspec- tion schedules did not align with times when fare evasion was most likely to occur, as shown in Figure 3-13 (Lee 2011). At the time, SFMTA fare evasion peaked between 1 p.m. and 7 p.m. On the basis of the results of the study, SFMTA moved shifts 1 to 3 hours later to align resources toward afternoons and evenings. In addition to coverage, transit agencies consider the safety of fare enforcement personnel when scheduling, especially at night. In addition to fare inspectors, TTC uses special constables, who have authorities similar to those of police officers to enforce certain sections of the criminal code and who wear uniforms that include defensive tools (e.g., handcuffs, pepper spray, baton), whereas fare inspectors have only a protective vest. On the basis of these authority and uni- form considerations, as well as low ridership and long wait times between streetcars, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) identified potential safety risks that would make it difficult for fare inspectors to carry out effective fare inspection overnight and recommended that TTC reassess the need for assigning fare inspectors overnight. Assignment Challenges. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019a) found little cov- erage on two of the TTC streetcar lines with the highest ridership at certain times of the day and unnecessary duplication of fare inspection teams in other areas due to assignment of teams to the Source: Lee (2011). Figure 3-13. SFMTA weekday staffing of transit fare inspectors versus estimated fare evaders, by time of day (2009 Fare Survey).

Findings and Applications 85Â Â same routes for the same time periods. The overlap occurred because there were multiple start- ing times and heavier coverage on certain routes. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that, in some instances, there were up to three teams on the same route and that commu- nications from supervisors on how to divide the route were not consistently clear. Furthermore, TTC (2020a) found that remote locations on streetcar lines were infrequently inspected, similar to the findings of the study of the SFMTA proof-of-payment program conducted by the San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009). Communication is critical if fare enforcement team assignments overlap. For example, in addition to RTDâs transit security officers who are assigned by zone, the agency deploys transit security officers as part of the fare task force team, which may be conducting fare inspections in another transit security officerâs zone. Since the transit security officers from the fare task force team do not have specific zone assignments, there is no formal assignment mechanism to prevent duplication. However, transit security officers are instructed to be visible, and all transit security officers are on the same radio channel, which facilitates communication. Determining assignments can also be difficult without sufficient data to inform the develop- ment of assignments and schedules. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that supervisors did not have sufficient tools or reports to help them determine how to deploy fare enforcement. Instead, supervisors deployed fare inspections primarily on the basis of the higher ridership on streetcar lines (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Shift lengths can have an impact on assignments and personnelâs effectiveness and efficiency. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) found that, although Sunday deployments were 8-hour shifts and other deployments were 12-hour shifts, fare enforcement was still assigned two lines on Sunday. Given the time spent on travel between assignments and administrative duties, the City of Toronto Auditor General noted that it might be more efficient to reduce the number of lines inspected on Sundays from two to one, to maximize inspection time. Maximizing Effectiveness and Efficiency of Deployment. Transit agencies have been striv- ing to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the ways they assign and schedule fare enforcement personnel. However, the tools used to determine optimal inspection levels and coverage are rudi- mentary. Academic researchers have explored theoretical applications to maximize efficiency and productivity by maximizing the number of inspections and minimizing nonproductive time and to increase effectiveness by improving coverage spatially and temporally. Additional advance- ments have resulted in theoretical applications for determining optimal enforcement levels and coverage. No commercial software solutions were identified during the extensive research and outreach conducted as part of this research project. The absence of software options may be due partly to lack of demand if agencies are satisfied with the ways they schedule and assign fare enforcement. It may also be attributable to the vari- ability among agencies, modes, and service characteristics, which makes it difficult to develop software that can meet varying requirements across agencies. However, the agency surveys con- ducted indicate a growing awareness of the importance of deploying fare enforcement equitably systemwide, which may necessitate the development of such software. While some transit agencies provide detailed route assignments that give fare enforcement personnel a specific path to follow, these are generally used for audits/surveys and not for fare enforcement deployments. For example, Gupta and Chen (2014) provide examples of survey block assignments for the Metro Transit fare survey conducted in 2013. The inspection guide provides the assigned path for completing the fare inspection survey on the basis of light rail timetables and identifies which trains to board for onboard inspections and at which stations to conduct platform inspections.

86 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Yin et al. (2012) note the difficulties in choosing times and locations for fare inspections. It is challenging for human schedulers to generate unpredictable schedules to minimize exploita- tion by fare evaders. Further, schedulers need to consider scheduling complexities, such as train schedules, switching between trains, and personnel shifts. Enumerating the trillions of potential patrols is infeasible. In real-world application, fare enforcement may need to deviate from the patrol schedule to address other issues (Yin et al. 2012). For these reasons, it is difficult to create and follow inspection guides or patrol assignments for daily fare enforcement and to conduct fare enforcement in an unpredictable way while comprehensively covering an entire system. Academic researchers have explored various methods for optimizing deployment scheduling and assignments, including the use of statistical and game theory models. The models could be informed by use of automatic passenger counter and fare collection data, along with inspection data. Avenhaus (2004) explored the applicability of various conceptual game theory models to find the optimum level of fare enforcement given fixed fares and fines. Since it is assumed that the illegal behavior (fare evasion) is strategic, detecting illegal behavior as soon as possible is important to deterring fare evasion. The author also notes challenges with determining the opti- mal level of enforcement, as not all fare evasion is intentional (e.g., forgot monthly pass), there are deviations in ridership levels by time of day, and the visible presence of fare enforcement personnel can influence passenger behavior. Thorlacius and Clausen (2010) focused on âhow should the spot checking be carried out both regarding the temporal (when), the spatial (where) and the methodological (how) dimen- sion?â The researchers were developing IT-based decision support tools for the Danish State Railways S-train in the Greater Copenhagen region to guide deployment schedules for proof- of-payment inspections and maximize income from penalty fares, given a fixed number of employees. Thorlacius and Clausen (2010) envisioned a spatial model that would serve as a statistical, real-time, tactical decision support model for dispatching fare enforcement by pro- ducing a map that would identify where fare evasion might be expected. Correa et al. (2014) studied the optimization of fare inspection strategies using a bilevel opti- mization problem (or Stackelberg game) for the Dutch railway and the Amsterdam subway net- work: âIn the first level, the leader (the network operator) determines probabilities for inspecting passengers at different locations, while in the second level, the followers (the fare-evading pas- sengers) respond by optimizing their routes given the inspection probabilities and travel times.â An operational application of a leaderâfollower Stackelberg game was tested on the LA Metro rail system by the LASD, which was responsible for fare enforcement at the time. The initial application, called TRUSTS (Tactical Randomization for Urban Security in Transit Systems), focused on developing fare inspection patrol strategies to efficiently use limited resources by choosing inspection times and locations to deter rational, adaptive fare evaders and to incentive passengers to pay instead of evading the fare. The optimization objective was for the leader to maximize total revenue (fares and fines) (Jiang et al. 2012; Yin et al. 2012). Subsequently, researchers developed the Multi-Operation Patrol Scheduling System (MOPSS) (Delle Fave et al. 2014). In addition to optimizing fare inspection patrols, MOPSS also had sepa- rate games to address illegal activities such as terrorism and other crimes. One of the significant advancements of MOPSS was that it enabled multioperation patrolling, whereas other applica- tions focused on a single mission. Specifically, MOPSS generated randomized schedules for different operations to address three threats (Delle Fave et al. 2014): ⢠Fare evasion patrols of both trains and stations, with the objective of capturing as many fare evaders as possible to increase the perception of fare enforcement. Patrols are focused on locations with high ridership, to capture a larger number of fare evaders.

Findings and Applications 87  ⢠Counter-terrorism patrols of stations to optimize security by focusing on different stations but favoring those with high passenger volumes and those in key economic and cultural areas of the city (e.g., tourist locations, business and financial districts). ⢠Crime patrols of stations to deter crime at each station but favoring patrols of crime hot spots. There have been subsequent studies of this game theory approach, but to date, it appears no agency has adopted such a system. 3.4 Fare Enforcement Program Management and Oversight This section discusses processes that are integral to effective program management and over- sight and tools that are valuable for evaluating and improving performance results. 3.4.1 Performance Management Overview The role of program management is to help an organization reach its overarching business goals through ongoing strategic initiatives, ensuring project objectives align with overall busi- ness goals, managing risk to improve the likelihood of success, and improving efficiency and effectiveness by streamlining processes and resources. Program management involves imple- menting and administering a program plan to achieve specific goals and objectives. It begins with structuring performance activities to implement the program plan. This step includes set- ting performance measuresâalso known as key performance indicators (KPIs)âand targets to use in defining and allocating resources and in measuring performance and assessing results. Following program implementation, management activities continue with: ⢠Collecting and verifying data and using them to calculate performance indicators for measur- ing performance against targets; ⢠Evaluating and verifying performance by using tools such as performance indicators; stan- dard operating procedures; customer feedback; best (or leading) practices; and benchmarks, audits, and contract management; and ⢠Reporting and explaining performance results, making them available to both internal and external stakeholders, including the general public, and using them to recommend program changes and modify performance targets. 3.4.1.1 Defining Performance Activities, Measures, and Targets In implementing a fare enforcement program, transit agencies identify specific activities they will undertake to achieve program goals and objectives identified in developing the program plan. These provide structure for specific fare enforcement actions and associated investments in resources and equipment. To assess the results of these investments in the fare enforcement program, transit agencies then define performance indicators. KPIs are critical performance measures that are tied to a strategic business objective. They are actionable and measurable criteria that are indicative of how well an organization or program is achieving a business objective. Organizations choose performance indicators that provide objective evidence of progress toward achieving a desired result and that are meaningful for evaluating performance and informing decision-making. Fare enforcement rates [(citations + warnings)/passengers inspected] and inspection rates (passengers inspected/total ridership) are KPIs that are specific to and commonly used in fare enforcement programs. Organizations establish realistic and clear performance expectations by setting targets for KPIs. These targets provide a starting point for estimating the resources needed to implement or See Section 3.2, Fare Enforcement Program Goals and Objectives, and Section 3.4.1.1, Defining Performance Activities, Measures, and Targets. See Section 3.2, Fare Enforcement Program Goals and Objectives.

88 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion maintain a program, as well as a means of measuring and assessing performance results. Perfor- mance data, including baseline performance results, make it possible to set realistic performance targets. Reviewing and redefining performance targets and allocating resources are often done in conjunction with budgeting for a fiscal year. 3.4.1.2 Collecting Data and Measuring Performance KPIs and targets provide a starting point for evaluating the efficacy of a program and deter- mining how well the allocated resources are achieving program objectives. Data for these indica- tors assist in determining whether the resources (e.g., fare enforcement personnel) are sufficient to meet program objectives, and whether the objectives and their targets are achievable or pos- sibly under- or overstated. For these reasons, performance indicators and targets need to be based on clearly defined data requirements and on data that are readily available, accurate, and verifiable (collected correctly and consistently), since performance results are affected by both the data and the formulas used to calculate them. The validity of fare evasion measurements is dependent on the accuracy of the data collected and using the correct data to calculate per- formance indicators (e.g., fare evasion rate). It is also necessary to review the data regularly to understand and recognize any inconsistencies in collection or calculations across report- ing periods, modes, or agencies. Public Transport Victoria (PTV) in Melbourne, for example, regularly reviews its revenue protection KPIs to understand trends in performance (PTV 2020). Tools such as standard operating procedures are valuable for this purpose if they are enforced to ensure that data are collected and performance indicators are calculated properly. Trainingâ and retraining, when necessaryâis an important part of ensuring accuracy and consistency across staff and over time. The audit of TTCâs revenue operations conducted by the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) recognized the importance of training bus operators in the proper use of the fare dispute key to ensure the accuracy of the data used to identify high-risk areas and routes for fare evasion and to allocate fare enforcement resources. The audit also rec- ommended training fare inspectors on data collection and why using the dispute key is impor- tant to TTC. Audits, such as those conducted specifically for the purpose of determining fare evasion and inspection rates, can also be an effective means of improving data accuracy and determining and verifying KPIs. 3.4.1.3 Evaluating Performance Results A primary objective of program management is to assure internal and external stakeholders that performance measures are accurate and understandable, or at least explainable. Trending performance over a period of time can help to identify anomalies, as can comparisons to perfor- mance targets and industry benchmarks and review of best (or leading) practices. Evaluating performance results can improve a transit agencyâs understanding of its fare enforcement program and thereby provide an opportunity to assess performance efficiency and effectiveness as well as identify needed changes to policies, procedures, and targets. In addition to performance trends, peer benchmarks, and industry best practices, stakeholder perspectives provided by customer feedback, including surveys and data on comments and complaints, can also provide a check on the results of efforts at performance improvement. Audits, often con- ducted by or at the behest of a third party, can provide independent, in-depth analyses of data and performance. All of these analytic approaches are among the tools that can assist in evaluat- ing performance results. 3.4.1.4 Reporting Performance Results Transit agencies commonly report fare enforcement performance results and trends to manage- ment and to policy boards, often as part of regular (e.g., monthly or annual) reporting practices See Section 3.5.2.1, Validity of Fare Evasion Data. See Section 3.4.2.1, Standard Operating Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis. See Section 3.5.2.2, Fare Evasion Audits/Surveys. See Section 3.4.2, Performance Management Tools.

Findings and Applications 89  or in conjunction with recommending program changes and updating resource requirements. Reports may also be provided to the public to improve community understanding and promote openness and transparency in the fare enforcement program. TCRP Synthesis 96 found that reporting on fare evasion was a normal part of performance reporting by most operators surveyed (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). The report recommended that agencies consider proactively developing a strategy for communicating with the public and the media on fare evasion, such as a regular report on data and trends in fare evasion and efforts to resolve related issues and concerns. In addition to reporting on the number of warnings and citations, transit agencies are also making increased efforts to collect and report data on the demographics of individuals who are warned or cited for fare evasion. For example, under a King County ordinance, King County Metro is required to report this information annually in order to monitor potential equity impacts of its fare enforcement programs. Reporting on fare enforcement and fare evasion has become increasingly common as a result of public information requests and recognition of the value of transparency in performance reporting to increase public awareness and understanding of fare evasion and its effects on transit revenues and services. TTC, for example, submits a monthly chief executive officerâs report to the board and posts it on TTCâs website. The report is focused primarily on performance and service standards and includes PRESTO tap data and the availability of PRESTO equipment, including validators, TVMs, single-ride vending machines, and fares and transfer machines. Data include current performance results and performance targets as well as ongoing trend indi- cators and a narrative discussion of each indicator, including performance analysis and action plans. Recognizing that customer awareness has an important role in reducing fare evasion and improving fare compliance, TTC is committed to reporting to the board and the public on fare evasion and the impact of strategies to reduce fare evasion by measuring changes in fare evasion trends. TTC anticipates that those trends could be used to inform future changes to customer communications, policies, and procedures (TTC 2020a). (Note: TTCâs reporting was delayed by the suspension of fare enforcement during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.) Performance results and trends are key to evaluating program effectiveness and making deci- sions about whether and how a program should proceed, including whether changes to resource allocations or performance targets are needed. In some cases, it may be appropriate to realign performance targets on the basis of reported performance results (e.g., performance targets may be unachievable because they are over- or understated), changing needs (e.g., a change in the fare inspection rate), emerging trends (e.g., introduction of new fare payment options), or changes in the agencyâs overall goals and objectives. PTV regularly reviews its revenue protection indi cators to understand trends in performance results, update KPIs and targets to ensure continued relevance as the fare compliance program evolves, and make changes when different metrics are needed (PTV 2020). Producing reports such as the PTV Network Revenue Protection Plan keeps the public informed about the program and how it can be expected to affect them. In addition to creating a record of performance results, reporting provides visibility into performance, thereby establishing accountability and transparency into the decision-making process. The need to report performance results publicly, as well as internally and to agenciesâ governing boards, has been reinforced by recent performance audit recommendations. 3.4.2 Performance Management Tools A number of tools are used to verify and evaluate performance results. As noted above, stan- dard operating procedures can be used to collect data and measure KPIs, which can then be used to make comparisons to agency past performance and performance targets, industry bench- marks, and leading practices. Customer and public feedback, including comments, surveys, and comments at public meetings, can also be important in assessing the accuracy of reported See Section 3.4.2.5, Audits. See Section 3.4.1.3, Evaluating Performance Results.

90 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion performance and understanding reasons for performance outcomes. Audits, including perfor- mance audits and fare evasion audits, are valuable both in data collection and in providing inde- pendent analyses and understanding of the reasons behind performance results. These tools and their relevance for performance management are discussed further in this section. Performance results should be verified to confirm that they are valid, reliable, and understandable before they are used to assess program efficiency and effectiveness and to explain program outcomes. 3.4.2.1 Standard Operating Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis One way to address the issue of obtaining complete, accurate, and consistent data is to estab- lish standardized procedures to assure quality control for data collection and management. Without clear guidance, each individual responsible for data collection may collect data dif- ferently. Standard operating procedures serve as a rule book for personnel to follow, in that they provide structure for correctly and consistently performing their duties (WSP 2018). For purposes of data collection, a standard operating procedure might provide data definitions; identify data sources; define what data are collected; and clarify when, where, how, and by whom. It might also detail how data are processed, how databases are maintained, and how data are used in performance reporting and analysis. Trainingâand retraining, as necessaryâ can ensure that procedures are understood and followed by individuals responsible for collect- ing and using data. Referring to information on data system practices for improving data accessibility and accu- racy discussed in the Office of Community Oriented Policing Law Enforcement Best Practices: Lessons Learned from the Field (U.S. DOJ 2019), Metro Transitâs 2020 audit stressed the need to define organizational policies and responsibilities for quality data collection through policy and training (Metropolitan Council 2020). In response, Metro Transit has committed to devel- oping âa standard operating procedure for all sworn personnel for fare enforcement, which will include the importance of data accuracy.â Similarly, Sound Transit uses standard operating procedures to govern the fare inspection process and uses training and supervision to ensure adherence to those procedures. Once collected, data should be verified to ensure that they have been collected correctly and consistently, to understand and explain any unexpected data anomalies and, if appropriate, to adjust or correct those anomalies. The data and the performance indicators that they are used to calculate should be comparable over time; any inconsistencies in either data or performance results or trends should be explained and reported. Sound Transit, for example, monitors data to track performance trends over time and to identify anomalies or problems proactively (Cummins et al. 2013). 3.4.2.2 Performance Trends Unexpected changes or fluctuations in performance indicators need to be examined to deter- mine whether they are being reported correctly before the resulting performance trends are considered. Comparing data and performance indicators with those of previous periods (e.g., the previous month/quarter, the same month/quarter during the previous year) and trending performance indicators over a period of months or years can assist in identifying changes by making them more readily apparent. Unexpected variations may be the results of a wide range of factors, such as seasonal fluctuations (e.g., lower ridership during the summer and higher rider- ship when school resumes in the fall), changes in data collection and reporting methodologies (e.g., transition from bus operators using farebox keys to record flash passes to data collected by tapping smart cards), and the impacts of fare enforcement practices or staffing levels that change performance (e.g., increased inspection rates to reduce fare evasion). Variations need to be researched and explained. If the issue is the data, the data then need to be adjusted or corrected so that performance trends are not adversely affected. Section 3.5.2.2, Fare Evasion Audits/Surveys, discusses surveying methods, as well as strategies for staffing audits/surveys, to help address challenges with data reliability.

Findings and Applications 91  As part of monitoring performance trends, transit agencies are beginning to develop dash- boards in addition to performance reports. For example, to increase the use of data to identify potential fare evasion risks and inform deployment, TTC uses an internal performance dash- board for fare inspection that is updated weekly and monthly. The data collected can help inform deployment of fare enforcement personnel by using a risk-based approach. 3.4.2.3 Performance Benchmarks, Best Practices Benchmarking allows agencies to compare their performance with similar agenciesâ perfor- mance results. Peer comparisons are likely to be more comparable if performance indicators are calculated for that purpose, rather than for trying to compare results reported by different sources, including the agencies themselves. Although organizations do not all collect and report data consistently among themselves, transit agencies do maintain and report considerable data to the FTA National Transit Database (NTD). FTA stipulates data definitions and reporting requirements that assist in improving data consistency across agencies, and the NTD can pro- vide useful data for constructing performance benchmarks. However, the NTD does not include the data needed to determine fare evasion and inspection rates. It is also important to recognize that factors such as differences in operations, funding, regu- latory environments, and policy goals can influence and make it difficult to explain differences in performance results between one agency and another. Using available (e.g., NTD) data to calculate performance results and augmenting that information with one-on-one conversa- tions via telephone surveys can help to provide insights into other agenciesâ performance goals, approaches, and results. Along with conferences and reports of industry forums such as APTA and TRB, peer surveys such as the case studies conducted for TCRP A-45 (see Appendix A) can provide opportunities to identify leading and relevant best practices among peers. Identifying best practices among industry peers and using them as a point of reference can also help in setting performance targets. For example, WSP (2018) prepared a report on best practices as part of a systemwide security assessment for the MetroLink service operated by Metro Transit in Saint Louis. The WSP report highlights best practices in fare enforcement among five peer agencies: Metro Transit (MinneapolisâSaint Paul), MTS, SacRT, TriMet, and WMATA. While the report does not explain how the five peers were chosen, it does explain that their fare enforcement practices are designated as best practices because they have achieved desired results, such as more efficient and effective fare inspection processes. 3.4.2.4 Customer and Stakeholder Feedback Customer feedback, whether in the form of customer comments or complaints or public engagement on ongoing initiatives, can be a valuable source of information for evaluating per- formance, identifying risks, and planning and deploying fare enforcement resources. Customer Complaints. Data from customer comments and complaints can help inform evidence-based deployment planning. Valley Metroâs Respect the Ride program evolved in response to passenger complaints about code of conduct violations and a lack of Valley Metro staff presence on board light rail vehicles. At that time, Valley Metro changed its fare enforce- ment deployment strategy to improve onboard coverage by uniformed personnel. Passengers responded positively to the increased onboard security presence and fare enforcement, and reports of incidents and disorderly conduct declined as the presence of security officers increased. The coverage strategy also aligns with Valley Metroâs focus on providing equal service and dis- tributing security officers evenly throughout the system. Complaint-handling programs should provide for independent, systematic, consistent, and appropriate reviews of complaints and comments (San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009). TTC is See Section 3.3.2.5, Considerations for Scheduling and Assigning Fare Enforcement.

92 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion working to improve its complaint investigation process and enhance public trust by strength- ening the independence of the review process and working to protect against racial/ethnic bias in its investigations. TTC has simplified its complaint process and revised its investigation pro- cedures to make it easier to submit complaints by phone, mail, or online. TTC also eliminated the distinction between a concern and a complaint. Now, all matters are treated as a complaint requiring a full investigation. TTC also created a Unit Complaints Office to investigate complaints related to fare inspectors and special constables. Investigators investigate each complaint, gathering evidence, ascertain- ing the facts, and documenting the resolution. Complaints that involve misconduct by a special constable are sent to the Toronto Police Service for review in accordance with the requirements under TTCâs Special Constable Agreement. TTCâs Human Resources and/or Human Rights and Investigations departments may also be involved in the review. For serious misconduct, includ- ing allegations of harassment, discrimination, use of force, and violence, TTC may involve an external investigator to investigate the complaint while TTC is building its in-house capabili- ties in the Unit Complaints Office. TTC has developed a specialized training plan for the Unit Complaints Office staff that includes Anti-Black Racism Training from the City of Torontoâs Confronting Anti-Black Racism (CABR) Unit and investigation training. The latter assists in identifying issues and facts in dispute; procedural fairness; and making and explaining factual findings by considering and weighing all relevant evidence, standards of proof, and effective communication. Public Engagement. As a program management tool, public engagement can provide infor- mation that is useful for evaluating the fare enforcement program and deciding whether, and what, changes are needed to address public needs. Public engagement is discussed here in that context. King County Metro recently engaged public and community partners as part of the revision of its Fare Enforcement Program and development of a Fare Violation Program. King County Metroâs outreach is an example of how the agency was able to use public engagement as a tool for program management. In response to the recommendations of a performance audit con- ducted by the King County Auditorâs Office in 2018, King County Metro undertook an effort to minimize negative, inequitable impacts of the fare enforcement program on the countyâs most vulnerable populations by balancing fare enforcement policies and procedures with King Countyâs equity and social justice goals. King County Metro (2019) tasked a work group of community partners with advising the agency as it undertook significant policy and procedure changes to the fare enforcement program. The work group recognized the need for King County Metro to obtain and use information to revise and improve the fare enforcement program, and build in ongoing review and evaluation of the program through data collection, focus groups, and surveys. A survey administered by King County Metroâs fare enforcement officers was designed to collect data to inform the development of the Fare Violation Program and a more robust per- formance management framework for the Fare Enforcement Program. For this purpose, fare enforcement officers operated in an âeducate and surveyâ mode on King County Metroâs proof- of-payment RapidRide lines. Fare enforcement officers checked for proof of payment following their standard operating procedures, but instead of issuing warnings or citations to passengers without valid proof of payment, they distributed surveys to collect data to help King County Metro better understand the barriers to fare payment among different passenger populations. Fare enforcement officers also used these contacts as an opportunity to educate passengers about the ORCA LIFT program and gave out tickets for free rides to passengers who indicated they could not afford the fare. The survey showed that 53% of the people who evaded the fare were below 200% of the federal poverty level and that 43% of the people who evaded the fare earned Section 3.8.2.1, Customer Education Through Public Engagement Efforts, provides a broader review of the strategies transit agencies use to engage internal and external stakeholders and educate them about fare evasion and enforcement while also obtaining their feedback.

Findings and Applications 93  less than $1,000 per month. These survey results supported the need for an income-based fare for individuals with very low or no income as well as a fare violation resolution program that considers the adverse impacts on these populations. In 2019, King County Metro implemented a new Fare Violation Program that makes nonfinancial alternative resolution options available for fare violations. The following year, King County Metro introduced a subsidized annual pass program for people with no income or very low income who cannot afford the reduced fares already available through other programs, such as ORCA LIFT, the Regional Reduced Fare Program, and the ORCA Youth fare. King County Metro (2019) also reported that the combined efforts of the work group and the survey helped King County Metro develop near-term efficiencies in Fare Enforcement Program operations, including changes to training requirements for fare enforcement officers, changes to the data used to measure the Fare Enforcement Programâs long-term effectiveness and impacts, and changes to the fare violation resolution processes to provide more equitable resolution options aimed at fostering sustained access to transit service. 3.4.2.5 Audits Useful audits provide an independent, objective review of a program and recommenda- tions tailored to address identified concerns about the program. According to the Government Auditing Standards, which presents the professional standards for audits of government enti- ties, audits provide âessential accountability and transparency over government programs . . . with the objective analysis and information needed to make decisions necessary to help create a better futureâ (U.S. GAO 2018). As TCRP Synthesis 96 observed, audits need to be structured to provide âpractical and constructive assistance, and not merely search for problemsâ (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Audits of several transit agenciesâ fare enforcement programs were reviewed in the course of this research effort and are cited throughout this report. Audits such as these provide useful information for program management about successes and challenges of existing programs, assessments of their effectiveness and efficiency in achieving program goals and objectives, and recommendations intended to improve the performance of fare enforcement programs. These audits provide independent third-party reviews of the programs and their performance that are measured against agency goals and objectives where possible. Some audits provide the con- text for their findings by incorporating comparisons with other agenciesâ performance results and industry leading practices. In several cases, the audits reviewed here have recommended improvements to help management systems for fare enforcement programs focus more clearly on performance outcomes. For purposes of this discussion, the audits referenced throughout this report are categorized as performance audits and fare evasion audits: ⢠Performance audits provide independent evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of fare enforcement programs and issues related to fare enforcement and program manage- ment. For this purpose, performance audits examine agency operations to determine whether and how well specific programs or functions (e.g., fare enforcement) are working to achieve stated goals. ⢠Fare evasion audits focus specifically on collecting the data required to determine fare evasion rates. These audits may also help in understanding the nature of fare evasion by determining evasion rates by mode, route, or time of day, as well as systemwide. Performance Audits. Several transit performance audits have focused specifically on fare enforcement programs, including four with the objective of assessing program effectiveness and efficiency (King County Metro, Metro Transit, SFMTA, and TTC). Each of these audits reviewed King County Metroâs public engagement efforts are discussed further in Section 3.8.2.1, Customer Education Through Public Engagement Efforts.

94 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion and provided recommendations on specific aspects of fare enforcement, as reflected in the topics covered by each audit. Those topics are summarized in Table 3-9. In reviewing specific aspects of fare enforcement programs, such as assessments of fare eva- sion rates, personnel deployments, and the programâs effectiveness, auditors often provide com- parisons with data reported by other agencies or with industry norms reported by earlier studies such as TCRP Synthesis 96 (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012) and TCRP Report 80 (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). These comparisons provide a frame of reference for assessing reported perfor- mance indicators, such as fare evasion rates, and starting points for understanding how other studies or audits have approached the evaluation of topics such as deployment and inspection coverage. These considerations and benchmarks are discussed elsewhere in this report, where applicable. However, it is worth noting that a common challenge with benchmarking, espe- cially for performance measures, is the difficulty in comparing performance with other agencies, owing to differences in how data are collected and calculated. Transit Agency and Auditor (year reported) Audit Topics King County Metro (Seattle, WA) Auditor: King County Auditorâs Office (2018) RapidRide fare enforcement: Efforts needed to ensure efficiency and address equity issues ⢠Performance management system ⢠Fare evasion data collection ⢠Alignment with county and agency goals and equity principles ⢠Monitoring equity impacts of fare enforcement ⢠Fare technology project implementation Metro Transit (MinneapolisâSaint Paul, MN) Auditor: Metropolitan Council (2020) Fare evasion on proof-of-payment transit systems; program evaluation and audit ⢠Performance management ⢠Data collection ⢠Data accessibility for decision-making and program evaluation ⢠Cost-effectiveness of fare enforcement activities ⢠Consistency in policies for conducting fare enforcement SFMTA (San Francisco, CA) Auditor: San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) Management audit of the SFMTA proof-of-payment program ⢠Performance management ⢠Staffing needs ⢠Inspector deployment ⢠Complaints and complaint handling ⢠Fare inspection safety ⢠Municipal Railway (Muni) response team and station agents ⢠Structure of fare evasion fines ⢠Citation processing and collection ⢠Extension of proof-of-payment system to buses TTC (Toronto, ON, Canada) Auditor: City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) Review of TTC revenue operations Phase I Audit: Fare evasion and fare inspection ⢠Estimated revenue loss and fare evasion rates (impact on revenue and overall fare evasion rate, accuracy of fare evasion rates, evasion rates by mode) ⢠Other factors (fare collection equipment, fare gates) affecting passenger fare revenue ⢠Fraudulent use of child concession smart cards ⢠Fare inspection program (optimal mix of transit fare inspectors versus transit enforcement officers, authorities of fare enforcement personnel, scheduling for more effective coverage, increase in actual inspection time) Phase II Audit: PRESTO/TTC fare equipment and PRESTO revenue ⢠Functionality of fare equipment ⢠TTCâs Metrolinx contract ⢠Capturing PRESTO revenue transactions on TTC Table 3-9. Topics of performance audits of fare enforcement programs.

Findings and Applications 95  The purpose of performance audits is to improve the performance of the fare enforcement program and identify opportunities to increase program efficiency and effectiveness. It is not unusual for a performance audit to include recommendations on an agencyâs or a programâs performance management practices. The four audits discussed here include recommendations on performance management systems, particularly with respect to establishing performance targets and methods for guiding program activities and measuring program outputs and out- comes. These recommendations are summarized in Table 3-10. The audit recommendations for King County Metro, Metro Transit, and SFMTA confirm that a performance management structure should establish clear, quantifiable implementation strategies for meeting goals, actionable criteria for evaluating progress toward achieving goals, and performance targets and measures for evaluating outputs and outcomes. The TTC audit focused more on strategies for reducing fare evasion rates by setting targets to guide actions, Performance Management Activity King County Metroa (Seattle, WA) Metro Transitb (Minneapolisâ Saint Paul, MN) SFMTAc (San Francisco, CA) TTCd (Toronto, ON) Program goals and objectives Clearly define and distinguish primary goal and secondary goals Implementation activities and strategies Need operational objectives for deployment strategies Need implementable strategies/actions for meeting objectives Develop strategies to reduce fare evasion rates and revenue loss KPIs Develop fare enforcement indicators linked to goals and objectives, so as to identify risks and allocate resources Set actionable, quantifiable criteria for evaluating performance KPI targets Set targets and measures for outputs and outcomes Establish baselines, targets, and measures for outputs and outcomes Set targets for fare evasion rates Collect and verify data Collect baseline data Ensure data are reliable and accessible for evaluating fare enforcement activities Obtain data needed to evaluate performance Calculate and verify KPIs Use performance indicators to measure outcomes and assess effectiveness Calculate performance results regularly Evaluate performance results Use performance indicators to measure outcomes and assess effectiveness Make data more accessible for decision-making and program evaluation Report and explain performance results Estimate the cost of fare enforcement Communicate performance results regularly Measure and publicly report the fare evasion rate annually aSource: King County Auditorâs Office 2018. bSource: Metropolitan Council 2020. cSource: San Francisco Budget Analyst 2009. dSource: City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b. Table 3-10. Audit recommendations on performance management of fare enforcement.

96 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion measuring fare evasion rates annually, and reporting the results to the public to reduce fare evasion by educating customers and building a fare-compliant culture. The audits of King County Metro, Metro Transit, and SFMTA found that the purposes of their fare enforcement programs were not clearly communicated, which hampered King County Metroâs and Metro Transitâs abilities to assess the effectiveness of their fare enforcement activi- ties and SFMTAâs ability to provide clear direction for its program. Notably, ⢠Although King County Metro had established operational objectives for deploying fare enforcement personnel, it lackedâand neededâa performance management system for fare enforcement, including baseline data, targets, and measures for outputs and outcomes. The audit recommended establishing performance indicators and using them to measure the out- comes and demonstrate the effectiveness of the fare enforcement program. In response to the auditorâs recommendations, King County Metro established a mission statement for the overall fare enforcement program and goals, objectives, and performance targets for 2020 for the new Fare Violation Program. Box 3-7 outlines the goals, objectives, and performance Box 3-7. King County Metro Fare Enforcement Program Objectives and Performance Targets Mission Statement: The mission of the Fare Enforcement Program is to promote an atmosphere of safety and equity for all by upholding King County Metroâs (âRide Rightâ) code of conduct while empowering riders to sustain their access to transit. Goal: The primary purpose of the Fare Violation Program is to help minimize the King County Metro Fare Enforcement Programâs contribution to negative outcomes for some of King County Metroâs most vulnerable riders. The Fare Violation Program aims to secure and protect a riderâs access to transit and increase opportunities for valid payment of fares, turning riders who cannot pay the fare into paying riders while acknowledging and addressing the barriers that affordability and enforcement actions can present to some, especially individuals experiencing poverty, housing instability, or crisis. Table 3-11 shows the objectives and performance targets that support the goal of the Fare Violation Program for 2020. Fare Violation Program Objectives 2020 Performance Target (%) Reduce Metroâs fare evasion rate on proof-of-payment routes 3â3.5 Increase Metroâs target rate for resolution of fare violations 20 Increase the resolution of fare violations via âOption C,â enrollment in a reduced fare program 30 Increase the resolution of fare violations via âOption B,â loading funds to an existing ORCA card 40 Increase the resolution rate of all violations issued to at-risk riders 50 Source: King County Metro 2020. Table 3-11. King County Metro Fare Violation Program objectives and performance targets.

Findings and Applications 97  targets of King County Metroâs 2020 Fare Enforcement Program. (Note: King County Metro suspended fare collection and fare enforcement between March and October 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.) ⢠The Metro Transit audit urged the development of a performance management system to monitor and manage risk. For example, as Metro Transit expands light rail and adds addi- tional BRT service, the need for a performance management system will become increas- ingly important to monitor the risks associated with off-board fare collection and to design fare enforcement activities and allocate resources to manage those risks. Without an effec- tive performance management system, the audit found, it cannot be clear how effective fare enforcement activ ities are, what resources are needed, or where and how fare enforcement efforts should be focused. ⢠SFMTA needed to create a performance management structure that clearly identified the primary goal of the program (e.g., to prevent fare evasion), secondary goals (e.g., to provide safety, security, and customer service), and quantifiable objectives to achieve those goals (e.g., increasing the contact rate with passengers in the short term; increasing the share of passengers who pay a valid fare in the long term). Subsequent steps would include â Establishing implementation strategies or actions for meeting the objectives; â Setting clear, quantifiable, actionable criteria for use in evaluating efforts to achieve short- and long-term objectives; â Obtaining the data required to evaluate performance (e.g., reliable passenger contact counts); and â Calculating and communicating performance (e.g., inspection and fare evasion rates) on a regular basis. Fare Evasion Audits. Fare evasion data are critical to understanding and structuring many aspects of a fare enforcement program, from estimating the impact of fare evasion on fare revenues to determining how to deploy fare enforcement, conduct inspections, and structure fare violation resolution programs. It is not uncommon for performance audits of fare enforce- ment programs to conclude that available fare inspection data are not sufficiently accurate to determine fare evasion rates and effectively monitor performance. Fare evasion audits provide a means of collecting the required data (e.g., number of contacts made, number of warnings and citations issued) and using them to calculate specific performance measures, such as fare evasion and fare inspection rates. If demographic data are also collected, the data can be useful for moni- toring performance of the program as well as identifying potential systemic bias or discrimina- tion by baselining fare evasion data to understand racial/ethnic disparities in fare enforcement outcomes. The performance audit of TTCâs revenue operations conducted by the City of Toronto Audi- tor General (2019a) measured the extent of TTCâs fare revenue losses attributable to fare eva- sion. As part of that performance audit, the auditor general conducted a fare evasion audit to estimate systemwide and mode-specific fare evasion rates. The resulting rates varied from fare evasion rates previously reported by TTC, and the audit findings and recommendations indicate the auditor generalâs concerns about the accuracy of the previously reported fare evasion rates and their usefulness in evaluating performance results for a fare enforcement program. Audit recommendations called on TTC to âaccurately measure and publicly report on the fare evasion rate every yearâ (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Auditors have made similar recom- mendations to King County Metro, Metro Transit, and SFMTA. Fare evasion audits provide the data needed to determine fare evasion rates systemwide and, in some cases, by mode, route, location, or time of day. Unlike performance audits, fare evasion audits may be conducted by transit agencies themselves. King County Metro, SFMTA, and TTC, for example, are each conducting their own fare evasion audits. In other cases, fare evasion audits See Section 3.10.4, Baselining Fare Evasion Rates by Race/Ethnicity.

98 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion are conducted or supported by other organizations to provide necessary skills and resources as well as an independent assessment. Metro Transit, for example, periodically conducts fare check surveys to measure fare evasion rates. Audits conducted in 2015 and 2016 used cluster sampling and were conducted by the Program Evaluation and Audit department of Metro Transitâs parent agency, the Metropolitan Council. Metro Transit has subsequently used the same methodology to estimate internal fare evasion. Metro Transit is considering whether future surveys should be conducted by the audit department, internal resources such as community service officers, or a survey firm. SFMTA has employed a consultant to assist with developing the sampling plan and to accompany transit fare inspectors for the audit in order to improve the objectivity of its analysis and ensure that the survey is defensible. Finally, as discussed earlier, fare evasion audits may be conducted as part of a broader performance audit, as in the case of the audit of TTCâs revenue operations conducted by the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019a). Subsequently, in November 2019, TTCâs Audit, Risk and Compliance Department conducted its fare evasion audit with the methodology the auditor general had employed earlier that year. While performance audits often recommend collecting data regularly to determine and report on fare evasion rates, there is no agreement on how frequently data should be collected. Since fare evasion audits represent a snapshot in time, conducting them regularly makes it possible to monitor and evaluate trends in fare evasion. TCRP Report 80 recommends conducting an audit or survey once every 2 years (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Recommendations for perfor- mance audits suggested that fare evasion audits be conducted annually for TTC and biennially for King County Metro. 3.4.2.6 Contract Management Because transit agencies may contract with private-sector companies or other public-sector organizations for fare enforcement personnel, contract management is also a consideration in performance management: âThe contract should have defined roles and responsibilities, clear metrics for determining performance, and allow for adequate oversight and supervisionâ (WSP 2018). With regard to contracted security, especially, the contract should also define hiring qualifications and training requirements. âNothing should be assumed and levels of training, physical qualifications, oversight and supervision expectations should be defined, along with metrics for performanceâ (WSP 2018). Sound Transitâs standard operating procedures are important in managing performance under contracts with a private security company for fare enforcement officers and with the King County Sheriffâs Office for peace officers. Defining the procedures and practices to be employed in fare enforcement and standards against which to measure performance provides a point of reference for evaluating performance and meeting contract requirements. Regularly scheduled meetings between Sound Transitâs Public Safety Operations Team and the contracted Security Management Team also reinforce the effectiveness of contract management. This weekly meet- ing provides an opportunity to review contractual and performance issues as they come up, as well as projected issues, desires, and needs, to ensure everyone is in agreement with respect to contractual and performance expectations (Cummins et al. 2013). BCA Watson Rice et al. (2015) also iterated the importance of communications between the transit agency and the contractor. In the assessment of law and fare enforcement options conducted for LA Metro, BCA Watson Rice et al. (2015) emphasized the importance of a col- laborative approach between agency and contractor to develop strategies that meet LA Metroâs priorities. While responsibility for directing law enforcement resources rests with the contractor, that direction should be consistent with the priorities and strategies established by transit agency management. To that end, the contract should âprovide specific guidance on how the contracted See Section 3.5.2.2, Fare Evasion Audits/Surveys, for additional information about the use and conduct of fare evasion audits.

Findings and Applications 99  law enforcement agency will use its resources to impact priority problems on the transit systemâ (BCA Watson Rice et al. 2015). Performance audits also provide a means of reinforcing contractual requirements. The per- formance requirements of Valley Metroâs contract with the security company that provides security officers to conduct fare enforcement on Valley Metro Rail specify that the contractor has the primary responsibility for fare inspections in a method consistent with a 15%â20% inspection rate of ridership, to keep within a 3%â6% evasion rate (i.e., a 94%â97% compliance rate). Using contractual requirements and inspection, ridership, and fare compliance reports provided by Valley Metro, a recent audit of fare compliance on Valley Metro Rail confirmed an inspection rate of 15% and a fare compliance rate of 93% (i.e., a 7% fare evasion rate). The audit also noted that Valley Metro Rail had recently increased the deployment of security officers to increase its presence on trains, with the objective of improving fare compliance (Phoenix City Auditor Department 2020). 3.5 Methods for Measuring Fare Evasion Transit agencies use various measures to understand the prevalence and impacts of fare eva- sion. Measuring and monitoring fare evasion can help assess the effectiveness and efficiency of a transit agencyâs inspections and enforcement program and identify adverse trends and problem areas both spatially (e.g., routes, locations) and temporally (e.g., time of day, day of the week). The two most common performance metrics used are fare evasion rates and fare revenue losses associated with fare evasion. Other metrics that are less commonly measured, tracked, and reported include inspection rates, fines paid, and cost of fare enforcement. While many agencies estimate fare evasion rates and fare revenue loss, the methodologies for calculating these metrics vary dramatically. This, in turn, can cause variability in results and limit the ability to compare rates across agencies. Dauby and Kovacs (2007) noted that while the fare evasion rate is commonly assumed to be approximately 5% for most systems, the fare evasion rates for the cities analyzed ranged from 1% to 25%. There were also significant discrepancies between estimated and measured fare evasion rates. Dauby and Kovacs (2007) contend that the lack of a âcredible measurement methodologyâ limits comparison between agencies. Similarly, during his literature review, Lee (2011) found five challenges in measuring fare eva- sion that make direct comparison of measurements with other agencies difficult: ⢠Small sample size of surveys; ⢠Not sampling all routes; ⢠Not sampling all times of day and days of the week; ⢠Differences in the type of system being measuredâmost studies are of rail systems with off- board fare collection rather than buses with onboard farebox equipment; and ⢠Inconsistent methodologies in the calculations. Consequently, the means of collecting data and the validity of these data also make compari- sons difficult. In addition to the lack of a consistent methodology for measuring and estimating fare eva- sion, the absence of a consistent definition of fare evasion poses a challenge to comparing fare evasion rates across agencies. TCRP Synthesis 96 defined fare evasion and inspection rates as follows (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012): ⢠Fare evasion rate: The percentage of passengers inspected who do not possess adequate proof of payment. Further, evasion is defined as the total number of violatorsâthat is, those receiv- ing warnings and citationsârather than those receiving citations alone.

100 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion ⢠Inspection rate: The percentage of the agencyâs total passengers [i.e., on the proof-of-payment service(s)] who have been approached by a fare inspector and requested to produce proof of payment. While TCRP Synthesis 96 established definitions for these metrics, agencies reported incon- sistent data. For example, not all agencies track warnings, so the fare evasion rates calculated for those agencies are underreported. Including warnings in addition to citations âcontrols for variations in how inspectors treat evadersâ and provides a more complete picture for agencies that regularly issue warnings (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). This section provides an overview of the different methodologies used by agencies to collect data to measure fare evasion. It is worth noting that, on the basis of the existing literature on measuring fare evasion, there appears to be no leading practice. Nonetheless, components of the approaches used provide insight into how an agency can best measure fare evasion, given the agencyâs financial and staff resources, and strategies to improve the accuracy of fare evasion metrics. Undoubtedly, one of the most significant takeaways of the literature review on measuring fare evasion is the importance of collecting a statistically representative sample to measure: âThe use of sound, statistically valid methods is essential for producing reliable estimates of both the current levels of evasion and the trends over succeeding quarters and yearsâ (MTA 2019b). 3.5.1 Collection of Fare Evasion Data In recent years, different ways have been used to collect data on fare evasion. TCRP Synthesis 96 found most agencies (65%) rely on inspection counts collected during the fare inspection process for purposes of measuring fare evasion (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Most agencies also reported using periodic samples or audits: periodic samples by agency staff (38%) or an internal agency audit function (31%), independent audits by contractors (7%), and periodic samples by another public entity (3%). Nearly a quarter (24%) reported using APCs. The ways agencies differentiate between a fare evasion audit and a fare enforcement survey vary. Generally, a fare evasion audit is focused on accurately measuring fare evasion rates and may record data to differentiate between types of fare evasion. A fare enforcement survey may be conducted for a similar purpose, but it may also include a rider survey component to understand passenger information such as the reason for fare evading and demographics. A fare survey may also be conducted, especially on proof-of-payment systems, to understand the distribution of ridership among the fare payment methods. Thus, fare surveys can provide an estimate of fare evasion rates by using data on the proportion of passengers without proof of payment. Statistical sampling of passengers through the use of fare enforcement surveys or performance of a fare evasion audit is the preferred methodology for measuring fare evasion for different lines and routes, time of day, and day of week. This approach reduces some of the variability that can result from using fare evasion data from fare enforcement or fare inspections. The variability in fare evasion data is a result of inconsistent inspection practices among fare enforcement person- nel that result in data that are not statistically reliable (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). Fare evasion audits and statistical surveys often provide evasion rates higher than those cal- culated with inspection data. TCRP Report 80 contends that audits/surveys are âpresumably more accurate,â in part because they are able to capture more evaders who may otherwise have avoided and escaped fare enforcement personnel and can improve consistency in how fare evasion is defined and tracked (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). TCRP Report 80 recommends supplementing regular inspection results with an audit or survey at least once every 2 years to

Findings and Applications 101  produce official evasion rates and to provide a means of identifying particular problem areas (e.g., station locations, times of day). While audits/surveys may be more accurate, the use of inspection data may be sufficient to meet a transit agencyâs needs. TCRP Synthesis 96 found that 86% of the agencies surveyed were satisfied with the accuracy of their estimates of fare evasion (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there have been significant increases in the publicâs scrutiny of the accuracy of the estimates, such that this level of satisfaction may have changed. In more recent years, there has been growing interest in using a variety of data sources to measure fare evasion and compare evasion rates. Sánchez-MartÃnez (2017) has used a stochastic model to explore the use of automatic fare collection data to estimate noninteraction and fare evasion. Egu and Bonnel (2020) compared fare evasion rates calculated from fare inspection data, surveys, and discrepancies between ridership counts from APCs and fare collection data. Egu and Bonnel (2020) noted the pros and cons of different data sources that can be used to estimate fare evasion. Survey data can provide behavioral and socioeconomic data and ensure that data are representative of the population, but surveys are costly and require surveyor train- ing. Fare inspection logs provide the opportunity to measure evasion continuously over time and potentially track different types of fare evasion; however, the results may not be random or representative of the population, and the presence of inspectors may alter the behavior of passengers. APCs and fare collection equipment provide systemwide, continuous data for eva- sion monitoring, but they cannot identify the types of evasion that are taking place. Further, transit agencies need to ensure the accuracy and calibration of the APCs to provide accurate counts for comparison with automatic fare collection data. Egu and Bonnel (2020) concluded that âno single data source meets all needs. Each source has advantages and disadvantages and does not measure the phenomenon with the same definition and in the same way. This can create significant discrepancies between indicators and sometimes contradictory results. This also confirms that fare evasion is a complex phenomenon that can be hard to measure precisely and continuously.â Despite the limitations of the different data collection methods, there are opportunities to improve the estimation of fare evasion rates by pooling data sources. In addition to improving the quality and reliability of fare evasion measures, combining these data can provide insight into the nature of fare evasion (Egu and Bonnel 2020). In particular, these data can help inform fare inspection scheduling and deployments. The integration of different data sources to better inform fare evasion estimates will likely evolve significantly in the coming years with the increased availability of disaggregated electronic fare collection and ridership data. 3.5.2 Calculating Fare Evasion Rates Fare evasion rates are most commonly calculated by dividing the number of fare evaders by the number of fares inspected. As noted above, the data for these calculations commonly come from fare inspection data, audits, or surveys. On bus services without proof of payment, where fares are enforced (or monitored) by the bus operator, these data may be recorded at the farebox by the bus operator pressing a key each time a passenger does not pay or pays a partial fare. To calculate systemwide fare evasion rates, especially when a transit agency operates a variety of modes, weights based on ridership are applied to fare evasion data. A simple average can result in a biased estimate, because just as ridership varies by mode and strata, fare evasion may also vary (Gupta and Chen 2014). Strata are elements with similar characteristics. For fare eva- sion audits/surveys, strata are commonly defined by time of day (e.g., weekday AM peak, week- day midday, weekday PM peak, weekday night, and weekend) as well as mode, route, station, See Section 3.3.2.5, Considerations for Scheduling and Assigning Fare Enforcement.

102 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion zone, and direction of travel. For audits/surveys, weights are often based on the ratio of the total ridership for a given stratum and applied to the surveys collected from that group (Schaller 2005). Once fare evasion rates by strata are calculated, a weighted mode and systemwide fare eva- sion rate can be calculated on the basis of the fare evasion rates by strata and share of annual boardings for a given stratum. However, it is important to incorporate only fare evasion rates that are based on a consistent method for measuring fare evasion. For example, while inspections for the audit of TTCâs revenue operations were conducted by a combination of plainclothes and uniformed fare enforcement personnel, the calculation of the weighted evasion rate excluded inspections by uniformed personnel and only used inspections conducted by plainclothes fare enforcement, to maintain methodological consistency (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). When the ridership for each stratum is being estimated, those that are not required to pay a fare or show proof of payment should be excluded. For example, the 2016 Metro Transit fare evasion audit noted that fare evasion rates did not include specific groups that ride free and are not required to provide proof of payment (e.g., children 5Â years old or younger, personal care attendants traveling with disabled passengers, and airport travelers traveling between terminal stations). Applying the fare evasion rates to total ridership would have resulted in overestimat- ing the number of fare evaders and the associated fare revenue loss (Metropolitan Council 2016). 3.5.2.1 Validity of Fare Evasion Data The validity of a fare evasion rate is dependent on the accuracy of the numerator (number of fare evaders) and the denominator (number of fares inspected), as well as the validity of the data sample. As noted above, Dauby and Kovacs (2007) found significant discrepancies between measured and estimated fare evasion rates and attributed the differences to a lack of a credible measurement methodology among all of the cities analyzed. Recording the Number of Fare Evaders. There can be challenges in obtaining an accurate count of fare evaders. While getting a statistically valid sample is important, there are other chal- lenges to determining the number of fare evaders. What is categorized as fare evasion as well as what data are tracked can vary by agency. Not all evaders are issued citations; formal or informal warnings may be given instead. Often agencies give inspectors some discretion in whether to issue a warning or citation. Egu and Bonnel (2020) noted that issuing a citation is at the discretion of the inspector and, as a result, the issuing of citations is not done systematically, which limits the ability to measure fare evasion accurately. They suggest that clearly codifying inspection strategies could help overcome some of these limitations. It is also important to note that the deployment of fare enforcement is not random and that fare enforcement is often deployed to areas with more observed fare evasion, which results in potential overreporting of fare evasion when fare evasion rates are being calculated (King County Auditorâs Office 2018). Agency policies that do not require recording and tracking warnings further complicate the ability to accurately measure fare evasion, because only those who receive a citation are included in the calculation, with the result that fare evasion is underreported. TCRP Synthesis 96 reports that of the 28 agencies that provided data on the number of annual citations and warnings issued, eight did not keep records of the number of warnings issued (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). During inspections, it is also difficult to identify some sources of fraud, such as stolen or trans- ferred tickets (Clarke 1993). Often audits/surveys do not check whether the passenger is eligible for a discount or concession fare. For example, the 2016 Metro Transit fare evasion audit âassumed someone with a discounted fare had paid the correct fare, and that people carrying prepaid passes were the authorized usersâ (Metropolitan Council 2016).

Findings and Applications 103  The use of handheld devices by fare inspectors to check and track fare enforcement activities can improve data accuracy and the data collected. These data help explain reasons for non- compliance, the number of warnings and citations, and the number of fares inspected. The data can also provide information on the time of day, day of the week, and the mode, route, and bus stops or stations where the inspector boarded and alighted. These data can be invaluable in proactively enforcing fares and also in assessing the effectiveness of inspection activities on fare compliance. The use of uniformed fare enforcement personnel may also result in inaccurate fare evasion data. The audit of TTCâs revenue operations found statistically significant differences in the fare evasion rates calculated with data collected by uniformed and plainclothes fare inspectors on the streetcar. On the basis of observations, the audit found that passengers proceeded to pay fares or stopped boarding streetcars when they saw uniformed fare inspectors on board, which suggests that plainclothes fare enforcement personnel would provide more effective and accurate fare evasion rates (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Similarly, Metro Transit does not consider the data collected by its police department to be statistically valid because the presence of uniformed Metro Transit police officers increases compliance rates, which results in an underestimation of fare evasion (Metropolitan Council 2016). The Ministry of Transport in Santiago uses incognito surveyors when measuring fare evasion to avoid inducing changes in the behavior of fare evaders (Troncoso and de Grange 2017). In collecting data on would-be evaders who would otherwise avoid or elude fare inspection, audits/surveys can improve data quality (Barabino et al. 2014; Barabino and Salis 2019; King County Auditorâs Office 2018; MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). To capture data on evaders, TCRP Report 80 suggests the use of sweeps, which require extra personnel to complete a 100% inspec- tion prior to opening the doors of the vehicle to ensure evaders do not depart (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). While sweeps can improve accuracy, it is unknown how much more accurate the data are. Given the operational impacts of conducting 100% sweeps, especially for audits/ surveys, the cost of data collection must be weighed against the value provided. In addition to would-be evaders who avoid or elude fare inspection, some passengers may refuse to provide proof of payment. Depending on who is requesting proof of payment, fare enforcement personnel may not be able to compel passengers to provide it. This can introduce bias in the data if these passengers are different from other passengers. Nonetheless, the 2016 Metro Transit fare evasion audit excluded refusals from the fare evasion analysis (Metropolitan Council 2016). Fare enforcement during peak periods can also be difficult. Often, crowded vehicles are not inspected. In the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the fare evasion rates calculated by the City of Toronto Auditor General did not cover peak rush hour traffic. Fare enforcement per- sonnel were unable to check fares because the TTC vehicles were very congested. The auditor general concluded that fare evasion rates might be higher than reported during peak periods because passengers might know they are unlikely to encounter fare enforcement on board at those times (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Another challenge is that the data collected provide only a snapshot in time, so audit and survey data may not reflect variability in fare evasion over time. Unlike inspector data, audit and survey data often represent a short period of time and are collected only periodically. TCRP Synthesis 96 found variation in fare evasion rates over a 12- to 14-month period (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). The report noted that deployment techniques influence fare evasion rates, and an increase in inspection activities may reduce evasion. The validity of fare evasion rates by time of day can also be affected by staffing schedules for inspections, audits, and surveys. As a result, data may not be collected for the entire service day.

104 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion For example, the 2016 Metro Transit fare evasion audit was conducted only between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Therefore, the rates may not represent fare evasion and compliance of passengers who ride very late at night or early in the morning (Metropolitan Council 2016). Recording the Number of Fares Inspected. Accurately tracking the number of fares inspected is important to calculate the fare evasion rate. It is particularly important to use the number of passengers inspected rather than the total number of passengers on the transit vehicle, because the latter will result in underestimating the fare evasion rate. The challenge in accurately capturing the number of fares inspected is a prevalent issue. During the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, there were some cases in which the fare enforcement estimate of the number of fares inspected was twice the auditorâs estimate, raising concerns that the fare evasion rates calculated from the fare inspection data were understated due to an inflated denominator (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). TTC rectified this concern fol- lowing the audit by providing counters to its revenue protection personnel to accurately tally the fares inspected. TTC also revised its methodology for calculating fare evasion by replacing the use of the number of passengers on the vehicle for the denominator with the number of pas- sengers inspected (TTC 2019c). BART also provides fare inspectors with counter rings to serve a similar purpose. In addition, it is planned that the new handheld smart card readers for the Clipper smart card system will also record the number of fares inspected, thereby eliminating the need for fare inspectors to keep count. In other instances, agencies may only include the number of passengers that are required to show proof of payment in the calculation of fare evasion rates and exclude free passengers from the denominator. For example, the methodology used by the Metropolitan Council (2016) to estimate fare evasion rates on Metro Transit light rail services excluded children 5 years old or younger, personal care attendants assisting an eligible passenger with a disability, and other free passengers, such as passengers traveling on the airport shuttle between terminals. Thus, the fare evasion rate only includes those required to show proof of payment and is not repre- sentative of overall ridership. Applying this evasion rate, therefore, to overall ridership would overstate the number of fare evaders. Box 3-8 provides an example of how the different data sources and issues with incomplete numbers of fare evaders and inaccurate numbers of fares inspected can influence fare evasion estimates. 3.5.2.2 Fare Evasion Audits/Surveys Statistical sampling of passengers through the use of audits/surveys and mathematical model- ing is the preferred methodology for measuring fare evasion for different lines/routes, times of day, and days of week (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). While there are many issues that can affect the validity of the data, such as the use of erroneous data, as described in the two pre- vious subsections, a significant factor that affects validity is whether the data collected provide a representative sample. The use of valid data is critical not only in measuring fare evasion but also in measuring it consistently to track how evasion changes over time and to inform changes to fare enforcement strategies and deployment of staff: âThe absence of statistically reliable estimates means there is no base to measure the achievements of identifying, controlling or reducing fare evasion; set objectives; and determine strategies to minimize [sic] fare evasionâ (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). The use of inspection data poses challenges because fare enforcement personnel are not deployed in a manner that yields a statistically valid sample and there is variability in how fare evasion is defined by fare enforcement personnel. The use of audits/surveys can significantly reduce some of these issues, despite providing only a snapshot of fare evasion at one point in time.

Findings and Applications 105  Box 3-8. Variability in Fare Evasion Rates on the Basis of Different Data Sources Gupta and Chen (2014) completed an external report on fare compliance on Metro Transitâs Blue Line. It compared evasion rates calculated on the basis of two data sources: ⢠Mobile phone validator (MPV) data from the mobile phone validators used by Metro Transit police officers to verify payments made by smart cards and ⢠Patrol activity log (PAL) data recorded by Metro Transit police officers, which contain the number of passengers checked, citations, and warnings. The evasion rates calculated on the basis of these two data sources were dramatically different. Gupta and Chen (2014) found fare evasion rates of 4.36%â5.52% with the MPV data and 0.55%â0.7% with the PAL data. The 2014 and 2016 Metro Transit fare evasion audits, which used a statistical sample from a survey rather than the inspection data used by Gupta and Chen (2014), estimated evasion at 3.4%â4.7% in 2014 and 8.3%â10.4% in 2016 (Metropolitan Council 2016). The audits also removed the variable of fare enforcement discretion when the number of fare evaders was determined, which resulted in estimated fare evasion rates more similar to those calculated with the MPV data. Gupta and Chen (2014) enumerated possible reasons for the differences in the fare evasions rates calculated with the MPV and PAL data. There are two primary differences in the ways that the number of evaders and the number of fares inspected were determined: ⢠For a number of evaders, the PAL data are based on citations and warnings issued by the Metro Transit police officer, which are subject to the discretion of the officer, while the MPV data are based on electronically established business rules. For example, if a passenger is 5 minutes outside of the transfer window, a police officer may not consider that to be fare evasion and choose not to issue a warning or citation. It is also possible that some officers do not record warnings in their logs. Meanwhile, when the fare is checked by the MPV, it is counted as noncompliant and included as an evaded fare in the calculation. MPV data thus remove officer discretion in determining the number of evaders. ⢠Unlike the MPV data, which electronically track the number of fares inspected, PAL data on the number of fares inspected are based on the officerâs recollections of how many fares he or she checked relative to the number of citations and warnings issued. Source: Gupta and Chen 2014; Metropolitan Council 2016. The use of audits/surveys can help address challenges to the reliability of the data, since survey teams can be deployed to provide a statistically valid sample. To provide statistically reliable fare evasion rates and address the variability of fare evasion, the data collection process needs to employ an approach to cover the entire system, including all modes and all routes, at all times of day and on all days of the week. As noted in TCRP Synthesis 96 (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012) and during the literature review and surveys conducted for TCRP A-45, there appears to be no standard industry approach.

106 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion A number of surveying methods, along with strategies for staffing audits/surveys, were found in the literature and during the phone surveys conducted as part of TCRP A-45: ⢠While bus surveys are often conducted onboard the vehicle for a specific run (Egu and Bonnel 2020), on rail there is more flexibility. Surveyors may select random cars and segments of cars to inspect on the same vehicle run or a randomized path (Egu and Bonnel 2020; Gupta and Chen 2014), they may check fares on platforms in fare-paid areas and on defined-interval travel to different stations (Horizon Research Corp. 2002), or they may observe fare payment at fare gates (Reddy et al. 2011a). ⢠Sample selection should take into account the routes and stations with the highest level of ridership but also ensure geographic coverage (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Over a 45-day period, including weekends, in 2009, SFMTA surveyed bus and rail routes at least once during each weekday time period (with the exception of low-volume routes that were not surveyed during evenings due to resource constraints). Most major routes were surveyed on at least 10 days to reflect varying ridership. In addition, to reflect passenger turn- over, surveys were conducted at multiple locations. For routes with limited turnover, such as express routes, surveyors boarded near peak-load points to maximize the sample collected. As a result, most routes were surveyed at least 20 times in total (Lee 2011). ⢠Development of sample plans and execution of samples may involve personnel outside the agency. In preparation for the 2019 fare evasion survey, SFMTA hired an external consultant to help the agency develop a statistically defensible sampling plan. The plan called for sam- pling each line so that the data could be used to estimate an evasion rate at a 95% confidence level systemwide, with each line weighted on the basis of ridership. Sampling was lower on lines with lighter ridership, such that they might achieve only a 90% confidence level; how- ever, a larger number of surveys on routes with higher ridership would increase the confi- dence level. Surveyors were given a daily sampling plan that identified the day of week, time of day, line, location on line, and vehicle to be surveyed. Once the survey was underway, periodic check-ins were conducted to ensure execution of the sampling plan. ⢠Unlike regular fare inspections, the focus of audits/surveys is on inspecting as many fares as possible, so warnings are often issued instead of citations, unless a citation is necessary (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). A nonpunitive process can also encourage participation and build a relationship of trust between surveyor and passenger (Egu and Bonnel 2020). ⢠A few audits/surveys were designed to obtain additional information, such as demographic information or reasons for fare evading. In Lyon, France, surveyors conducted face-to-face interviews with passengers that included recording demographics, and no incentive was given (Egu and Bonnel 2020). In Los Angeles, surveyors conducted face-to-face interviews with pas- sengers, and a $5 voucher was offered to non-fare-evaders to encourage participation (Horizon Research Corp. 2002). In Calgary, passengers who did not possess valid fares, transfers, or passes were recorded as fare evaders, asked to exit the vehicle, and given two options: (1) complete a 10-question survey or (2) pay the fare and continue on their journey. Those who completed the survey were given a 90-min transfer to continue their journey (Hansen et al. 2013). King County Metro administered a survey to better understand the barriers to fare payment among different passenger populations without proof of payment. Fare enforce- ment officers checked for proof of payment but, instead of issuing warnings or citations to passengers without valid proof of payment, they distributed surveys. In addition to data col- lection, these contacts provided opportunities to educate passengers about reduced fare pro- grams and to give free tickets to passengers who said they could not afford the fare (King County Metro 2020). ⢠Several agencies reported using plainclothes fare enforcement or a mix of uniformed and plainclothes fare enforcement to minimize changes in behavior (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Egu and Bonnel 2020; Troncoso and de Grange 2017). It is worth considering

Findings and Applications 107  whether to use personnel in uniform, as this can increase fare compliance and, consequently, understate the true fare evasion rate. ⢠In Toronto, during the 2019 audit of TTC revenue operations, in addition to having auditors observe fare inspectors and record the results of inspections, auditors also reviewed security camera footage for illegal entries at four automatic subway entrances (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). ⢠Agencies may seek to keep audit/survey costs low by combining audit/survey activities with fare enforcement activities. For its 2018 fare check survey, Metro Transit used internal, civilian community service officers to undertake the survey. To increase efficiency, survey samples were selected over a period of 3â4 weeks so that the surveys could be completed during the course of a community service officerâs regular shift; this strategy made it unnecessary to dedicate additional staff to conducting the survey. Care must be taken when utilizing this approach to ensure that sample completion is followed and statistical significance is main- tained. Prior to the use of community service officers to conduct fare check surveys, Metro Transit had used survey firms. ⢠In 2019, SacRT began employing transit ambassadors to conduct an annual fare survey for the first time. Transit ambassadors were instructed to try to survey every customer encoun- tered that week rather than focus on fare enforcement. The use of transit ambassadors helped reduce the amount of time that it took to complete the survey from about 2 months to only a week, because fare surveys could be conducted as part of their normal shifts. This approach led to the collection of data from approximately 25 times more trips, but the sam- pling was less random. Prior to 2019, SacRT would develop a randomized sample of trips and build surveyor schedules around the selected trips to maximize the sample size and efficient use of surveyor staffing. The scheduling supervisor would review recent surveys to determine whether it would be more beneficial to build the surveyor schedule to be more heavily weighted with trips before or after the randomly selected trip. With this approach, a few hundred trips were sampled over the 2-month period. Because audits/surveys are a snapshot in time, there are advantages to conducting them regu- larly to monitor fare evasion trends and identify the need for potential changes to a transit agencyâs fare enforcement program. While TCRP Report 80 recommends conducting an audit/survey once every 2 years (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002), there are some agencies, such as NYCT, that conduct them quarterly. When considering the frequency of audits/surveys, agencies con- sider the added costs and appropriate size for the survey. There may be value in combining the surveys with other agency efforts. For example, prior to the launch of its smart card, TransLink conducted fare evasion surveys in conjunction with surveys to estimate ridership. However, the sample size required for the ridership survey was considerably larger than what would have been required for estimating fare evasion (PwC 2007). When determining what time of year to conduct surveys, transit agencies often schedule surveys when ridership is most representative. For example, if a large share of ridership is students, the survey should be conducted during the school year. A general rule of thumb is also to avoid atypical times, such as holidays. The length of time for conducting surveys varies significantly, likely in part on the basis of agency goals, staff availability, and funding limitations. Often surveys are conducted over 4â6 weeks. In some instances, it may be determined during the surveying process that addi- tional surveys are necessary to gather additional data. For example, the initial Horizon Research Corp. (2002) fare check survey of LA Metro was conducted over a 2-week period. On the basis of survey results that suggested extraordinarily higher fare evasion rates after 9 p.m., the survey was extended by 1 week to better sample between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m. Alternative sampling strategies are discussed in Box 3-9.

108 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Box 3-9. Alternative Sampling Strategies On bus services, a transit agency can use the farebox to conduct a census instead of conducting a survey. It is worth noting that these data often do not account for fare evasion through the back door, as it is difficult for the operator to monitor the back door while passengers are boarding through the front door. In 2010, King County Metro completed a census by having bus operators key into the farebox the type of fare evader: A. Adults who paid no fare; B. Youth, seniors, and disabled passengers who paid no fare; and C. Partial payments from any customer. Each of the seven bus bases collected the data for one weekday and one weekend day, with the days rotated among the bases (King County Metro 2010). The use of distinct keys improved the estimates of revenue loss by distinguishing between adult and discount/concession passengers as well as short fares. To understand the revenue impacts of partial payments, the agency surveyed a random sample of 20 operators to obtain details about partial fare evasion to help estimate the dollar value of the partial payments (King County Metro 2010). While the keyed-in data can, in general, provide valuable information for deploying fare enforcement resources, it may not provide the best representation of fare evasion rates. While many agencies ask bus operators to key instances of fare evasion, including partial payments, into the farebox, agencies often report limited accuracy, as some operators may use the wrong key, some may overreport fare evasion to obtain additional police presence, and some may not understand the importance and choose not to key in observed instances of fare evasion. King County Metroâs experience suggests a concerted, limited-period effort may help minimize operator fatigue and improve data accuracy. Operator awareness campaigns and initial and refresher training can also be conducted to improve the accuracy of information gathered by fare dispute key. TTC recently relaunched a campaign to improve the fare evasion data entered by bus operators into their driver console (TTC 2019c). 3.5.2.3 Sampling There are two types of sampling methods: probability and nonprobability. In the probability sampling method, each individual in the population has a measurable chance of being selected during the survey process. Conversely, nonprobability sampling does not include the random selection of individuals, and it is possible that the population may not be well represented. Therefore, probability sampling is considered the more accurate and methodologically sound method (Baltes 2002). This subsection focuses on probability sampling. When determining the appropriate sample size, the level of precision, and method for sam- pling, agencies evaluate the operating characteristics of their service, ridership levels, variability in the demographics of ridership, and the level of precision required to support decision-making. The level of precision is also affected by current levels of fare evasion.

Findings and Applications 109  When developing the sampling plan for measuring fare evasion, transit agencies have found that it is important to consider and validate the methodology and the way that the surveys are conducted in practice. In 2019, the New York MTA Office of the Inspector General identified concerns related to the validity of the methodology and results of the NYCT quarterly fare eva- sion audits (MTA 2019b). NYCT has historically conducted a simple random stratified sample. The strata used were developed on the basis of initial pilots, which found correlation variables including the income levels of adjacent neighborhoods, the configuration of fare control equip- ment, time of day, day of week, and subway operating division. NYCT uses civilian traffic checkers to conduct quarterly audits. In response to the inspector generalâs concerns, NYCT updated the methodologies for subway and bus surveys to stratified cluster samples and increased resources to increase the sample completion rate. The subway survey saw a decrease in the number of strata, and the bus survey saw an increased focus on the weighting of borough-specific estimates. Both changes were undertaken to increase the reliability of evasion estimates. These concerns underscore the importance of validating the methodology thoroughly, addressing practical limitations, and ensuring sufficient resources are available when developing a sampling plan (MTA 2019b; Reddy et al. 2011a). There are three types of probability sampling for transit ridership surveying (Baltes 2002; Bucciarelli 1991): ⢠Simple random sampling of elements: There are no groups of elements, and each element has an equal probability of being selected from the entire population. ⢠Stratified random sampling of elements: Elements are grouped to improve the efficiency of sampling and reduce the sample size required for equal or higher precision due to less varia- tion between elements within a group. ⢠Cluster random sampling of elements: Clustering can reduce the cost of collecting data by selecting elements sequentially (e.g., elements in the same day). However, cluster sampling generally provides less precision than simple random sampling or stratified sampling. A significant drawback to simple random sampling is that it can increase costs, because sur- veyors spend an inordinate amount of time moving between assignments (Schaller 2005). Strati- fication and clustering can be combined to improve cost efficiencies. There are two methods for combining them: ⢠Stratify and then break the population into clusters or ⢠Break the population into clusters, randomly select clusters, then stratify the clusters selected. The second method is most suited when clusters contain multiple strata (Bucciarelli 1991). In addition to improving efficiency and reducing sample size by stratifying elements into similar groups, transit agencies can also stratify the population to improve the representation of key subgroups. Another method for sampling that is not commonly used is quota sampling. For example, Calgary Transit used a quota sample of a minimum of 25 checks per station both inbound and outbound during a specified time period (Hansen et al. 2013). Similarly, the London Under- ground in the 1980s used the quota sampling procedure to select cars for inspection (Clarke 1993). A significant disadvantage of quota sampling is that it is not random. Some agencies are starting to use stratified cluster sampling to minimize costs. Cluster sam- pling for conducting surveys generally reduces the costs for data collection because staffing can be deployed more efficiently. For example, surveyors can be deployed to survey a block of consecutive trips on the same route or a cluster of linked trips on different routes. Metro Transit uses a stratified cluster sample to survey fare evasion on its light rail system. A number of round-trip departures is randomly selected for each of the different time of day and day of week

110 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion strata (weekday AM peak, weekday midday, weekday PM peak, weekday night, and weekend) (Metropolitan Council 2016). Two round-trip departures were randomly selected for each of the five time strata and for the two light rail lines. A random section of a random car was selected for surveying passengers. In most cases, passengers were inspected immediately upon boarding of the train and on entering the selected section. Post-sampling weights were applied on the basis of ridership estimates by time stratum (Hanninen and Rothenberg 2017). A simple or stratified random sample can be cost-effective if surveying can be combined with other responsibilities. For example, a conductor on commuter rail may conduct a random sample. Because the conductor is already on board, there is often no additional associated cost to complete the random sample for an individual train segment unless additional staff are needed. Sample size is determined on the basis of the confidence level and sampling error. The con- fidence level (e.g., 95%) is based on how often the observed fare evasion rate would be within the margin of error of the true fare evasion rate if the survey were repeated numerous times. The sampling error is the degree of precision and reflects the spread of observed values (e.g., ±3%) that would be seen if repeated numerous times. The sample size for each stratified group is based on Table 3-12. The allocation of sampling is often proportionate to size, or level of ridership. However, in the TransLink fare evasion audit conducted by PwC (2007), sampling was allocated proportional to service hours. This is in part because the TransLink fare evasion and ridership surveys were conducted together in one survey. The precision level has a significant impact on the sample size needed. Gupta and Chen (2014) found that Metro Transitâs inspection protocol achieved 9% relative precision for weekdays and 12% for weekends. While their analysis found that the sample size for weekdays was larger than necessary to achieve a 10% level of precision, they found âgoing to a 5% precision would be prohibitively expensive, requiring almost tripling of the inspection effort on weekdays and more than quintupling of the inspection effort on weekendsâ (Gupta and Chen 2014). Determination of the appropriate level of statistical precision should take into consideration the precision level required to support decision-making, because increasing precision significantly affects the sample size (PwC 2007). An important consideration is determining âan amount, or range, above which the estimated lost revenue is likely to result in a decision or decisions regard- ing the way that fare evasion is managedâ (PwC 2007). When the precision level is being established, it is important to differentiate between relative and absolute precision. Goals for relative precision levels are more commonly used than absolute Population Sample Sizea by Sampling Error ±10% ±5% ±3% 200 65 132 169 400 78 196 291 1,000 88 278 517 6,000 95 361 906 20,000 96 377 1,013 1,000,000 96 384 1,066 aSample size needed for each sampling error for 96% confidence level; responses with frequency of 50%. Source: TCRP Synthesis 63 (Schaller 2005). Table 3-12. Sample sizes needed for various population sizes at various levels of precision.

Findings and Applications 111  precision. However, goals for an absolute precision level may help in reducing the sample size needed and may be more appropriate for measuring fare evasion (PwC 2007). Because relative precision level measures the percentage deviation from the sample estimate (e.g., fare evasion rate), as the fare evasion rate decreases, the sample size required to provide the same level of pre- cision increases. For example, at a 10% relative precision, the confidence interval is 4.5%â5.5% if the fare evasion rate is 5%; however, if the fare evasion rate decreases to 1% then the confi- dence interval is 0.9%â1.1% and requires a larger sample size to meet the goal of 10% relative precision. Meanwhile, an absolute precision level measures the level of error based on a range from the estimate measured in units. For example, these units could be percentage points from the estimated fare evasion rate (e.g., plus or minus a certain number of percentage points) or, alternatively, the number of dollars of fare revenue loss (e.g., ±$500,000) (PwC 2007). In addition to exploring the challenges associated with the use of relative precision goals for measuring fare evasion, as part of the TransLink fare evasion audit, PwC (2007) studied the impact of increasing the sample size for TransLink on the overall precision of measuring the loss of fare revenue due to fare evasion. PwC (2007) found limited increases in precision as the sample size increased, indicating that the sample size could be reduced without significantly affecting the estimated lost fare revenue if the TransLink surveyâs primary use was estimating fare evasion rates and lost revenue. For instance, reducing the number of SkyTrain surveys from 36,000 to 18,000 was expected to increase the sample error by $22,000. Further reducing the sample to 12,000 surveys would increase the sample error by $38,000 (PwC 2007). These examples are specific to TransLink. Other agencies would need to undertake similar analyses to understand the impact the sample size would have on the sampling error when lost fare revenue was being measured. Another consideration when the appropriate sample size is being determined is the cost to collect the sample and necessary survey team size. Depending on the desired confidence level and sampling error, a significant number of hours may be required to capture the necessary sample. Further, in determining the cost to collect the sample, the appropriate survey team size must be considered, such that the team has the ability to inspect all passengers and minimize walkaways. Keuchel and Laurenz (2018) found a statistically significant influence of the size of the survey team on the results for fare evasion rates. The London Underground in the 1980s used survey teams of three to five staff (Clarke 1993). Similarly, in the TransLink fare evasion audit, between two and eight staff were required for each hour of inspection (PwC 2007). 3.5.3 Calculating Fare Revenue Loss Fare revenue loss is fare revenue forgone due to fare evasion. In other terms, it is the unpaid ridership times the lost fare. For example, one of the risks that MTS (2020b) identified in plan- ning the Fare Evasion Diversion Program is the potential for lost fare due to higher fare evasion rates if there is a perception that the penalty for not having a valid fare would be low enough to chance never paying a fare and instead, only paying the diversion program penalty if caught. Using the budgeted fare revenue to support operations ($97.1 million) and the 2.87 fare evasion rate for the first 6 months of fiscal year 2020, MTS estimated that for every 1% increase in the fare evasion rate, MTS could lose $971,000 in fare revenue. MTS used that rate to estimate potential fare revenue losses for the diversion program on the basis of other agenciesâ experiences with fare evasion rates. However, there are many methods used to calculate fare revenue loss. Some are more elaborate than others. When determining fare revenue loss, agencies may distinguish between passenger types, as the fare that would have been paid varies. For example, the average fare paid by passengers who qualify for discount or concession fares, such as seniors and youth, is lower than the average

112 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion fare paid by adult passengers. Further, the average fare that would have been paid by fare evaders may vary from that of the general population. Barabino et al. (2014) contends that it is plau- sible to assume that fare-paying passengers are more likely to be passholders and that the fare revenue lost due to fare evasion may correspond to the single-ride fare rather than the average fare, which includes passholders, resulting in greater revenue loss than estimated by using the overall average fare. If a systemwide average fare is used for fare evaders and the average fare is not differenti- ated to account for different discounts and concessions, free rides should be excluded when the average paid fare is being determined. TTC (2020a) found that the use of a systemwide average fare per boarding may understate the revenue impact and is considering refining its uncollected revenue estimates to exclude free rides for children ages 12 years and younger from the average fare used. Further, when revenue loss is being calculated, fare evaders who would not generate addi- tional revenue should be excluded. For example, passholders who have forgotten their pass will not generate additional fare revenue (Keuchel and Laurenz 2018). The type of fare evasion may also influence the estimated revenue loss. For example, Isreal and Strathman (2002) differentiated the average lost fare by evasion category when they analyzed the effect of fare evasion on TriMetâs fare revenue following the extension of its âFareless Squareâ to the Lloyd District. For example, the revenue loss associated with no proof of payment was higher than for a zone violation or inappropriate payment of a discount or concession fare. The revenue loss was then calculated by applying the average lost fare for a given fare evasion category to the ridership and the associated fare evasion rate for that fare evasion category for a given day of service, time period, and mode. For example, if the average passenger load between 6:00 and 8:59 a.m. on weekdays is 1,152 on light rail with a measured fare evasion rate for no proof of payment of 7.13%, and the average fare for no proof of payment is $1.21, the estimated average revenue loss due to no proof of payment for that time period is approximately $99 per day. For fare systems with distance-based fares, the process of estimating the average fare loss per boarding is highly subjective. In the TransLink fare evasion audit, given that it was unknown whether the fare evader was traveling one, two, or three zones or was eligible for a discount or concession fare, PwC (2007) estimated a range of revenue loss for three scenarios by using different values for the average fare loss per boarding. The significant range in the estimated loss of fare revenue illustrates the challenges in estimating lost fare revenue, as small changes in average fare loss per boarding had a significant impact when applied to the number of fare evaders. Box 3-10 shows how Sound Transit calculates revenue losses due to fare evasion by using a standard loss prevention formula. Sound Transitâs approach is relatively simplistic compared with the methodology used by Isreal and Strathman (2002) since it does not account for variability in the average lost fare by evasion category, but it may be sufficient to meet a transit agencyâs need to estimate potential revenue loss due to fare evasion. Even with increased fare enforcement, fare evasion will persist, and a transit agency will be unable to recoup all of the fare revenue loss due to fare evasion. As fare enforcement increases, fare evaders will change their behavior. Some fare evaders may change modes or opt to no longer ride transit as fare enforcement increases. Other fare evaders may look more carefully for inspec- tors before evading. It is only those fare evaders who would continue to ride and pay the fare that would have an effect on the fare revenue collected (Keuchel and Laurenz 2018). A 2000 Pierce Transit study in Tacoma, Washington, found that when operators challenged passengers with

Findings and Applications 113  invalid passes or transfers, about 70% paid the fare while the other 30% chose not to ride (King County Metro 2010). In addition to estimating the revenue loss due to fare evasion, some transit agencies calculate the effectiveness of increased fare enforcement for generating fare revenue. SFMTA has conducted similar analyses to estimate the fare revenue that would be generated for each percentage point reduction in the fare evasion rate. This data point was derived by estimating the fare revenue that would be collected if the agency were able to achieve the unlikely scenario of 100% fare compliance. In addition, since SFMTA differentiated fare evasion by category (i.e., unable to display fare media, walked away) and type of fare media misuse (i.e., expired or otherwise invalid transfer or fare receipt, ineligible for a discount fare, counterfeit passes, and other invalid proof of payment), the agency was also able to identify the greatest sources of fare evasion and estimate the implications of its associated revenue loss (Lee 2011). 3.5.4 Other Performance Indicators To better monitor fare evasion, transit agencies have begun collecting additional data beyond the numbers of inspections, warnings, and citations. While additional data can provide more insight, the trade-offs of the cost of the data collection and the value of the data collected are factors to consider in deciding whether to collect additional data. While PwC (2007) noted that data on the trip length and whether the fare evader qualified for a discount or concession fare were not available to aid in estimating the fare revenue loss, auditors noted that it would be impractical to collect these data. Box 3-10. Sound Transit Expected Loss Per Transaction Sound Transit uses a combination of data available from its fare enforcement program and average fare data to estimate revenue losses and assess the effectiveness of its fare enforcement program. The agency tracks monthly and annual estimates of financial losses due to fare evasion by using a standard loss prevention formula to determine the expected loss per transaction, defined as expected loss per transaction = average fare per boarding â evasion rate For example, if the average fare per boarding is $1.50 and the evasion rate is 3% for light rail, then the formula would specify that the loss per transaction is $1.50 x 3% = $0.045 for light rail. Thus, it estimates that 4.5 cents per fare paid is lost to evasion. The average fare per boarding accounts for all fare categories (e.g., full-fare adult and reduced fares). When the loss per transaction is multiplied by total ridership, it provides an estimate of the total revenue loss due to fare evasion. To determine revenue loss from fare evasion for each mode, Sound Transit can use the formula by applying the particular average fare per boarding and evasion rate that applies to each mode multiplied by mode-specific ridership numbers. For example, if light rail ridership was 25 million passengers per year, then Sound Transit would multiply $0.045 (from above) by 25 million to get an estimated loss of $1,125,000 due to fare evasion on light rail for that year. Source: Cummins et al. 2013; Sound Transit Phone Survey 2020.

114 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion To address concerns about the cost-effectiveness of collecting additional data, some transit agencies have taken practical applications to simplify data collection. For example, to estimate the number of fare-evading children, NYCT surveyors differentiate between individuals who are under or over 44 inches tall, which corresponds to the turnstile height (Reddy et al. 2011a). Tracking fare evasion data by mode, route, time of day, and so forth can be helpful to agencies in understanding trends and identifying fare evasion hot spots. This includes not only audit/ survey data but also inspection data. Being able to disaggregate fare evasion data enables a transit agency to see variability in fare evasion, identify areas to target for additional enforcement, and identify locations that are underrepresented in fare enforcement. These data are integral to the ability to monitor program performance and can also help in determining effective and efficient deployment. Methodically categorizing the type of fare evasion (e.g., no valid fare, unvalidated fare, short fare, inappropriate use of discount or concession fare) can help identify specific challenges. During the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) distinguished fare evaders by the type of fare evasion. This approach enabled the identification of specific issues related to the use of discount and concession fares and other infrastructure and fare equipment issues. Depending on whether the data collected include demographic information, fare evasion data and data on the outcomes of fare enforcement (e.g., warning, citation) can help in identify- ing potential systemic bias and discrimination in fare enforcement. In the United States, there has been a growing interest in recording demographic data (e.g., age, race/ethnicity, gender) when conducting fare evasion audits/surveys or fare enforcement. This is partly due to concerns regarding racial/ethnic bias and profiling. While transit agencies that use civilian personnel are not required to collect demographic data, these data are collected by agencies that use sworn peace officers, because they are required to collect such data for all citations. Agencies that record demographic data often only track these data for fare evaders who are issued a citation and not for persons who were not found during inspection to be evading the fare or who were found to be evading but were not cited. However, demographic data for all inspections are crit- ical for baselining data to determine potential racial/ethnic disparities. A number of transit agencies are required to report performance data related to their fare enforcement programs. For example, in California, the Public Utilities Code (PUC) (Chapter 8 § 99580, 2017) requires transit agencies that implement administrative penalties for fare evasion violations to submit a report to the state Senate Committee on Transportation and Housing and the Assembly Committee on Transportation 2 years and 5 years after the agencyâs governing board enacts an ordinance establishing the administrative resolution process. Those reports include a description of the ordinance, the amount of the administrative penalties, the number and type of citations administered, a comparison of the number and type of offenses adminis- tered pursuant to the ordinance compared with the number and type of similar offenses admin- istered through the courts, a discussion of the effects of the ordinance on customer behavior, and the effect of the ordinance on the revenues of the transit agency and the cost savings to the county courts. In Washington State, the King County ordinance that created the alternative resolution pro- cess for fare enforcement requires King County Metro to report certain performance data, as listed in Box 3-11 (King County Code 2018). These measures, which are reported annually to the King County Council, beginning in 2019, enable King County Metro to monitor the progress and effectiveness of the Fare Enforcement and Fare Violation Programs and increase account- ability by demonstrating effectiveness and identifying potential equity impacts. See Section 3.4, Fare Enforcement Program Management and Oversight, and Section 3.3.2.5, Considerations for Scheduling and Assigning Fare Enforcement. See Section 3.10, Discrimination in Fare Enforcement, and Section 3.10.4, Baselining Fare Evasion Rates by Race/ Ethnicity. Section 3.10, Discrimination in Fare Enforcement, discusses demographic data collection and the use of data to assess racial/ ethnic disparities in fare enforcement outcomes.

Findings and Applications 115  3.6 Fare Inspection Levels Determining an appropriate level of fare inspection is an agency-specific decision and relies on a mix of agency targets and policies, operational characteristics, and agency constraints. Some factors that affect fare evasion rates remain largely outside agency control (e.g., socio- economic conditions around stations/stops, levels of regional unemployment). These factors cannot be directly influenced by the transit agency. However, they should be considered when an agency is developing a fare enforcement program and determining fare inspection levels. 3.6.1 Relationship Between Fare Inspection and Evasion Rates Fare inspection levels and the associated risk of being caught evading fare influence an indi- vidualâs decision on whether or not to pay the fare. A number of researchers have explored this relationship between fare inspection and evasion rates. While some researchers have found a direct relationship (Dauby and Kovacs 2007; LACMTA Inspector General 2010), others found no direct correlation between inspection and evasion rates (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; Multi Systems, Inc., et al. 2002). Dauby and Kovacs (2007) surveyed 18 cities, mostly in Europe, to understand factors influ- encing fare evasion. The level of fare evasion depends on the agencyâs attitude toward fare evasion (zero tolerance versus lenient), operating and legal environments, and the measure- ment methodology. Dauby and Kovacs (2007) noted a clear correlation between fare evasion and the share of passengers inspected and contend that to reach a fare evasion rate of approx- imately 5%, an inspection rate of approximately 8% is needed. Similarly, the LA Metro Office of Box 3-11. Performance Reporting of the King County Metro Fare Enforcement and Fare Violation Programs In accordance with King County Code, King County Metro tracks and reports a number of performance data in an annual report. King County Metro provides data on the following for each RapidRide bus route, all other regular bus routes, and for total bus service: 1. The number of warnings issued for fare evasion and the number of people that have received warnings, by bus route; 2. The number of fare evasion citations issued and the number of people that have received these citations, by bus route (this should include identifying the number of individuals that receive multiple citations during the reporting period and how many citations they received); 3. The number of citations resolved, showing the method used to resolve the citations; 4. The number of people suspended as a result of fare evasion; 5. The number of criminal trespass charges issued to individuals as a result of fare evasion violations; 6. The report should also include data showing the demographics of persons issued citations, including, but not limited to, race, age, gender, income, and housing status as available; and 7. The report should also include performance measures showing the activities and effectiveness of the [fare enforcement] program outreach manager. Source: King County Code 2018.

116 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion the Inspector General found a similar inverse relationship between the number of inspections and fare evasion rates over time (LACMTA Inspector General 2010). The inspector general calculated a saturation rate (number of fares checked) and fare evasion rate for each month in fiscal year 2009 (July 2008 through June 2009). As LA Metro increased inspections on its rail system and Orange BRT line, it found that evasion rates declined. Sound Transit has observed a sim ilar direct relation ship between the number of fare inspections performed and the level of fare evasion over the past decade. Generally, when fare inspection levels are decreased (e.g., due to staffing, illness, other events) evasion increases but with a lag time of approximately 6 weeks. A similar but opposite effect has been seen when inspection levels are increased, with evasion decreasing within a similar 6-week time frame. Conversely, other research has not found a relationship between fare inspection and evasion rates. TCRP Report 80 found no clear correlation when comparing the two (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). No correlation could be found between inspection and evasion rates or between inspection strategy and evasion rates. It is noted that other factors that are a part of the overall enforcement program have an impact on evasion rates, including âthe fine structure, the treat- ment of evaders, agency follow-up of citations issued (including working with the courts), and customer educationâ (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). TCRP Synthesis 96 (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012) analyzed the data from TCRP Report 80 and the data collected from its own survey and also found no direct correlation for the 25 agencies it surveyed. TCRP Synthesis 96 notes several reasons that the data for different agencies were not comparable, including inconsistent defini- tions of fare evasion, differences in policies regarding issuing, tracking, and including warnings in fare evasion rates, sampling technique, and recent changes of deployment techniques that influence evasion rates. The disconnect between fare inspection levels and fare evasion rates may also be a result of how passengers perceive the level of fare inspections and enforcement. Since behavior is based on the perceived risk of being caught and penalized, there may be a difference in perceived fare inspection levels and enforcement of penalties and actual fare inspection and enforcement levels. Unless changes in fare inspection and enforcement levels are substantial, the change may not be perceivedâand may not be sufficient to cause a change in evasion rates. Killias et al. (2009) likened fare enforcement to public health campaigns and noted that âcampaigns may affect behaviour only if the risks are perceived to increase very substantially.â If the change in fare inspection levels is not perceived, it may not have an impact on fare evasion levels. Clarke et al. (2010) conducted an analysis for Edmonton Transit as transit secu- rity was deployed to serve buses as well as light rail in 2005. This redeployment resulted in fewer fare inspections on light rail. Subsequently, in 2007, although not publicized, transit security personnel were instructed to issue more fines rather than warnings. Clarke et al. (2010) analyzed 163 weeks of data to determine the effects of the changes on fare evasion rates. The data set was divided into four periods on the basis of risk of being caught and risk of being fined. While the risk of being checked decreased by a factor of nearly four, the risk of being fined if caught with- out a valid ticket increased by a factor of 15. Despite the substantial changes, Clarke et al. (2010) did not find any clear trends in the weekly evasion rates and contended that the changes in levels of enforcement were not perceived by fare evaders. 3.6.2 Considerations in Developing a Fare Enforcement Program 3.6.2.1 Fare-to-Fine Ratio and Ability to Pay the Fare and Fine The fare-to-fine ratio affects the consequences of being caught. Barabino and Salis (2019) found that as the fine increases and the fare-to-fine ratio decreases, the optimal level of inspec- tion required also decreases. Conversely, a discounted fine increases the optimal level of inspection required. This supports earlier findings from Kooreman (1993).

Findings and Applications 117  However, increasing fines (and thus decreasing the fare-to-fine ratio) can result in a decline in payment of fines. While the New South Wales Audit Office (2006) found that an increase in the amount of the fine contributed to higher fare compliance on the rail system, it resulted in a decrease in fine payment. The ability to pay the fine is also an important factor in the payment of fines. Sasaki (2014) notes that a very high fine may not be effective in low-income countries because a passengerâs income may be too low to pay a high fine. Fares also affect the fare-to-fine ratio. Troncoso and de Grange (2017) developed an econo- metric model to evaluate the main variables that affect fare evasion. The analysis used data from the Santiago, Chile, bus system. The main variables were fares and inspection levels. The model estimated that a 10% increase in fares raised fare evasion by 2 percentage points, while a 10% decrease in inspection levels increased fare evasion by 0.8 percentage point. In addition to fine payment, income also influences fare evasion. Guarda et al. (2015, 2016) and Cantillo et al. (2018) found that bus stops in Santiago, Chile, located in higher-income municipalities have lower fare evasion than lower-income municipalities. Guarda et al. (2015) also found that when inspection rates in municipalities with higher incomes increase, fare eva- sion rates can be expected to decrease more than in other municipalities. Cantillo et al. (2018) also found a correlation between a âsocial priority indexâ and fare evasion. As economic condi- tions, education, and health increased, fare evasion decreased. Similarly, Buneder and Galilea (2017) conducted a statistical spatial analysis of socioeconomic factors and found a correlation between socioeconomic level and willingness to fare evade. The most vulnerable municipalities were found to have the highest evasion rates. 3.6.2.2 Costs of Fare Inspection and Diminishing Returns Inspection levels influence whether passengers decide to pay, and if inspection levels are dra- matically reduced, many passengers may go without paying (Avenhaus 2004). However, at some point, increasing fare inspection levels results in diminishing returns, in part because of limited marginal increases in perceived probability of detection. In Zurich, Killias et al. (2009) observed a ceiling effect for fare inspections, in which the increasing certainty of inspections no longer affected behavior. Between 2003 and early 2006, checks during evening hours (i.e., trains operat- ing after 9 p.m.) increased dramatically. While initially there was a significant reduction in the proportion of passengers traveling without a valid ticket, fare evasion rates began stabilizing around 1% (Killias et al. 2009). Since fare enforcement is focused on increasing fare compliance and not intended to generate citation revenue, as staffing increases, the net cost to conduct fare enforcement increases, even when revenue from increased fare compliance is factored in. As a result, budgetary constraints may limit fare enforcement levels. The San Francisco Budget Analyst (2009) confirmed a net revenue loss associated with increasing fare enforcement, assuming linear increases in expected citation revenue and salary and benefits for transit fare inspectors. The analysis did not consider increases in fare revenue due to fare compliance; a decrease in fare evasion and, consequently, revenue from citations; or diminishing returns as fare enforcement is increased beyond a certain point. Without understanding the relationship between inspection levels and fare compliance, along with diminishing returns, it is difficult to determine optimum staffing levels, including whether staffing is adequate or additional staffing is needed. A follow-up study done by SFMTA in 2009 found that a single percentage point reduction in fare evasion would equate to approximately $2 million in revenue based on 2009 fare rates. At the time of the study, the net cost for fare inspector salaries and benefits was approximately $3 million (less than 2% of the $188 million in fare revenue collected). On the basis of these amounts, SFMTA estimated that if the fare

118 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion enforcement program reduced fare evasion by just 2 percentage points, the fare revenue col- lected would offset the cost of the fare inspectors (Lee 2011). 3.6.2.3 Fare Inspection Cost-Effectiveness The budget available for fare enforcement influences staffing levels, which in turn dictate inspection rates. Determining optimal inspection levels requires understanding the marginal revenue and costs associated with increasing or decreasing the number of fare inspections. How- ever, the majority of the research has been theoretical and has not been used to derive specific inspection rate targets or staffing levels. The King County Auditorâs Office (2018) analyzed the cost of fare enforcement for King County Metroâs RapidRide. Direct costs were found to be about $1.7 million per year, including $300,000 in court costs to process evasion fines, the vast majority of which went unpaid. The audit calculated the unit costs per passenger ($6), per bus ($65), and per citation ($435), finding that the cost to check one passenger was twice as much as the most expensive RapidRide fare. While the auditor was able to assess the costs of fare enforcement, the absence of a performance management system with baseline data, performance targets, and measures for outputs and outcomes precluded analysis of the cost-effectiveness of fare enforcement. As a result, there were no findings or recommendations for right-sizing the number of fare enforcement officers. One of the biggest limitations is the lack of data on the cost of fare enforcement and on the marginal cost of increasing inspection levels. One reason for the limited ability to determine the costs of fare enforcement is that personnel involved in fare enforcement sometimes have additional responsibilities, especially in relation to safety and security. Some costs related to fare enforcement may not be incurred by the transit agency (e.g., court processing, collections), while they can be passed throughâalthough they rarely areâto the transit agency. Further, while fare collection infrastructure can help minimize fare evasion, its primary purpose is revenue collection, so such capital infrastructure costs are often not reflected in fare enforcement budgets. Similarly, off-board fare collection requires additional costs for infrastructure and mainte- nance of equipment that are not directly related to fare enforcement. Conversely, off-board fare collection and migration to proof of payment can have positive impacts on operations (e.g., reduced dwell times, increasing operating speeds and reliability, and reduced fare disputes and operator assaults as a result of fewer interactions with the operator). These benefits can be difficult to quantify. In general, the cost of fare enforcement may be greater than the revenue generated. An analysis of 18 light rail systems conducted by Dauby and Kovacs (2007) found that the recovery rate or âreturn on investmentsâ varied between 17% and 72%. Dauby and Kovacs (2007) contend that the extra revenue collected rarely covers the extra costs incurred. However, the authors do not account for the increase in fare evasion that may occur if fare inspection levels are decreased. Sound Transit attempts to account for the impact of fare inspection levels on fare evasion rates. The agency calculates the expected loss per transaction and then applies it to a range of fare evasion rates, including industry averages and extremes for comparison. When the expected loss per transaction is applied to a range of fare evasion rates and Sound Transitâs ridership, the agency is able to estimate and understand the fare revenue contribution of its proactive fare enforcement program (Cummins et al. 2013). Comparability of costs among agencies is also limited, particularly by differences in cost of living, personnel classification, and responsibilities. TCRP Report 80 identified a significant range in the cost of personnel (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). The average cost per inspector at that time was just under $60,000, but the cost per inspector ranged from just under $25,000 See Section 3.5.3, Calculating Fare Revenue Loss.

Findings and Applications 119  to over $100,000. TCRP Synthesis 96 compared the number of FTE inspectors on a financial basis and productivity basis (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). The average number of employees per $100,000 in annual inspection budget was 1.15 and the median 1.43. For two agencies that contracted fare enforcement, the average number of employees per $100,000 in annual inspec- tion budget was substantially higher, at a rate of 2.58. 3.6.2.4 System Design Factors Factors related to system design also affect fare evasion. Guarda et al. (2015, 2016) analyzed data from the Santiago, Chile, bus system to identify agency factors that affect fare evasion. The econometric modeling found that fare evasion increased when vehicles were more crowded. Fare evasion rates increased as â(i) more people board (or alight) at a given bus door, (ii) more passengers board by a rear door, (iii) buses have higher occupancy levels (and more doors) and (iv) passengers experience longer headwaysâ (Guarda et al. 2015). The proposed alternatives to decrease fare evasion instead of increasing inspection levels were â(i) increasing the bus fleet, (ii) improving the bus headway regularity, (iii) implementing off-board payment stations, (iv) changing the payment system on board and (v) changing the bus design (number of doors or capacity)â Guarda et al. (2015). In addition to findings consistent with other research (e.g., increased fare evasion on crowded vehicles and on services with lower frequency), Cantillo et al. (2018) also found that access to smart card reloading locations reduces evasion related to lack of sufficient balance on a smart card, especially during the morning peak. Fare evasion was also lower at bus stops with a nearby subway station where the passenger would be forced to pay to pass through a gate. 3.6.2.5 Efficiency of the Fare Inspector Barabino and Salis (2019) analyzed data from 2011 to 2016 for the major bus operator (CTM) in Cagliari, Italy. The data showed variability in the objective probability of having fare checked on the basis of the efficiency of a single inspector. In previous work, Barabino et al. (2013) noted factors that could influence the efficiency of an inspector, including adequate training and a preestablished inspection plan. Barabino et al. (2013) contend that increasing the average daily inspection rate of a single inspector can be achieved by â(1) using specialized external inspec- tors, (2) motivating internal inspectors with salary bonuses related to minimum targets for daily inspections, (3) training staff engaged in control activities, and (4) focusing inspections in periods and areas most critical for the network.â Productivity of fare inspectors is also affected by the number of stations, vehicle headways, passenger volumes, and inspection pattern and location (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). These factors had direct effects on inspector productivity by mode. TCRP Report 80 found that for light rail systems, inspector productivity ranged from 400 to 750 passengers per inspector per day, while for commuter and heavy rail systems, productivity ranged from 100 to 200 riders (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). As the number of inspectors increased, inspector productivity decreased. 3.6.3 Determining Inspection Rate Goals In practice, determining appropriate inspection levels depends on many factors. TCRP Report 80 (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002) identifies several considerations for determining optimal inspec- tion rates and number of personnel: ⢠System length and configuration, ⢠Daily passenger volumes, ⢠Inspection strategy,

120 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion ⢠Type and cost of inspection personnel, ⢠Available budget, ⢠Ancillary duties of fare enforcement personnel, and ⢠Use of inspection teams. TCRP Report 80 also identifies metrics that can help to inform these decisions, including inspection rates, the number of inspectors per 1,000 riders, the productivity of inspectors, and the relationship between inspection and evasion rates. On the basis of a survey of transit agencies, TCRP Report 80 found that the ratio of inspectors to passengers varied by mode, with the ratio on light rail systems generally ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 inspectors per 1,000 daily passengers and that on commuter and heavy rail systems generally ranging from 2 to 3 inspectors per 1,000 daily passengers. On the basis of survey responses, TCRP Synthesis 96 found similar ratios of FTE employees to passengers, ranging from 0.04 to 2.00 FTEs per 1,000 passengers, with an average and median of 0.51 and 0.39, respectively (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). TCRP Synthesis 96 also found that 38% of the agencies surveyed had a fare evasion goal and 28% had an inspection goal. The average goal for the rate of fare evasion was 3.8% (ranging from 2.15% to 15%), and the average goal for the inspection rate was 9.6% of passengers (ranging 3.5% to 25%). Instead of an inspection rate, one agency set a goal of 1,000 inspections per day. Among the agencies that had a fare evasion goal, only two adjusted their inspection rate on the basis of the measured evasion rate. One agency adjusted its inspection rate on a regular basis (at least monthly); adjustments made by the other agencies depended on the trend in the evasion rate. An additional consideration in determining inspection rates is the financial constraints that limit the ability to expand fare enforcement to new routes or modes or increase fare enforce- ment levels. For example, when Edmonton Transit expanded fare enforcement to its bus service, the redeployment of transit security to serve buses as well as light rail resulted in fewer fare inspections on light rail (Clarke et al. 2010). As SFMTA evaluated the expansion of fare enforce- ment to buses and historic streetcars, the agency found that maintaining the inspection rate on light rail would have required roughly 300% more inspectors. Meanwhile, the agency had planned only a 30% increase, and funding shortfalls precluded even this level of additional staffing (Lee 2011). 3.7 Legislating and Adjudicating Fare Evasion The legal basis for fare enforcement and penalties for fare evasion are established by a state/ provincial legislature, municipal or county legislative body, or transit agency governing board. As discussed in earlier sections, fare evasion is treated as a criminal violation in some states/ provinces, whereas in others fare evasion has been decriminalized and may be adjudicated out- side of the court system. Adjudication commonly falls to either a county/provincial or municipal court system, although some transit agencies have decriminalized fare evasion and established in-house adjudication processes (e.g., King County Metro, LA Metro, SFMTA). A few agencies (MTS, TriMet) continue to use the court system but have developed diversion programs that enable individuals to resolve their citations directly with the transit agency within a defined period of time before unresolved citations are transmitted to the court system. Among transit agencies that still handle fare evasion as a criminal violation, some are pursu- ing decriminalization with their state legislatures, with the objective of making the punishment better fit the crime and as part of authorizing civilians to conduct fare enforcement. Along with See the discussion of fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

Findings and Applications 121  decriminalizing fare evasion, there has been a shift toward a customer-oriented approach to fare enforcement that focuses on customer service and educating passengers to promote fare com- pliance rather than summarily citing and fining them for fare evasion. 3.7.1 Authority to Enforce Fares For fare enforcement systems, transit agencies must establish the who, what, when, where, and how of fare enforcement. That is, ⢠Who can perform fare enforcement? ⢠What constitutes fare evasion? ⢠What are the consequences of evading fare? ⢠When and where can fare enforcement occur? ⢠Where is a passenger required to have proof of payment? ⢠Where and how are fare evasion violations resolved and adjudicated? ⢠How do changes in law influence fare enforcement authorities? ⢠How do court cases influence fare enforcement policies and procedures? The answers to all of these questions must be established through legal authorization. As dis- cussed in TCRP Report 80, the authority to inspect and enforce fares may be established at the state/provincial level through statutory or administrative codes, through ordinances approved at the local municipal or county level, or by authorization under the powers of the transit agencyâs governing board (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Most often, the legal authorization comes from the state/provincial government. TCRP Report 80 also notes that transit agencies have some ability to choose how to establish the legal authority for fare enforcement: by using existing law, by modifying existing law, or by enacting new legislation. For agencies introducing or pursuing changes to fare enforce- ment programs, existing statutes need to be reviewed to determine whether existing laws are sufficient to meet the agencyâs fare enforcement needs and requirements or whether changes to existing laws would be necessary to implement the fare enforcement program. Limitations of existing laws may influence those decisions. For example, only Metro Transit police officers may issue citations on Metro Transit services. Civilian community service officers and con- ductors are able to request proof of payment, but they are unable to cite. Metro Transit has sought authority from the Minnesota legislature to issue administrative citations and use civilian personnel to issue citations for fare evasion; however, these measures were not included in the transportation bill passed by the Minnesota legislature in June 2021. Although many of the topics below have been discussed earlier in this report, the following sections explore the legislative considerations that affect these facets of fare enforcement. 3.7.1.1 Who Can Perform Fare Enforcement? Personnel who have the legal authority to request proof of payment or cite for fare evasion are established by codes or ordinances approved at the state/provincial, local municipal/county, or transit agency governing board level. A transit agencyâs legal authority may distinguish between the roles and authorities of different types or levels of personnel authorized to enforce fares, according to the hierarchy of powers or level of authority granted to them. The actions fare enforcement personnel are able to take in the course of their duties are influ- enced by whether they are sworn peace officers or civilian personnel and whether they are agency employees or contracted employees. There are limitations on the authorities given to civilian personnel. For example, the Texas Transportation Code § 452.0612 (2003) specifies that a fare enforcement officer (which is a civilian position), is able to request proof of payment and issue See Section 3.3.1, Fare Enforcement Personnel.

122 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion a citation, but âis not a peace officer and has no authority to enforce a criminal law other than the authority possessed by any other person who is not a peace officer.â In other cases, civilian personnel may be able to inspect fares but unable to cite. Metro Transitâs community service officers and conductors are able to request proof of payment, but only police officers are able to cite. Another example comes from LA Metro. During a review of options available to LA Metro for providing law enforcement and security, BCA Watson Rice et al. (2015) observed that exist- ing laws limited the feasibility of using civilian security officers for fare enforcement because, at that time, fare evasion by a youth was a criminal offense and only sworn peace officers had the authority to issue criminal citations to minors. Since that time, fare evasion has been decriminal- ized for youth, and fare compliance officers, who replaced civilian security officers, are now able to issue citations to all LA Metro passengers. Personnel deployed in teams for fare enforcement may also have different authorities. Fare enforcement for MTS is conducted by train teams that consist of an MTS code compliance inspector and a contracted, armed security officer. Security officers can request proof of pay- ment but cannot cite. Instead, citations are written by the code compliance inspectors, who are public officers with authority to request proof of payment and write citations. TTC deploys its fare inspectors with special constables. While both types of personnel have similar authorities to request proof of payment and issue citations, special constables provide support in more complex investigations and assist with noncompliant passengers. Special constables have greater authority to compel cooperation, since individuals are not required by law to produce ID for a fare inspector. As sworn peace officers, special constables also have arrest and release authority while conducting investigations and enforcement. Transit agencies may also need specific legal authority to contract fare enforcement personnel from private companies. In the Phoenix region, when Valley Metro Rail began service, each of the three cities along the line was responsible for fare enforcement within the cityâs boundaries. The cities of Tempe and Mesa updated local ordinances to enable each of them to use contracted civilian personnel to conduct fare enforcement on their portions of the line. In Tempe, the ordi- nance created a âtransit enforcement aideâ defined as âa paid employee of the police depart- ment or an employee of a private entity, which has entered into a contract with either the police department or a transit provider on behalf of the cityâ (City of Tempe Municipal Code as amended 2008). In Phoenix, fare enforcement was initially conducted by the Phoenix Police Department. When the decision was made that Phoenix police officers would only provide a support role in fare enforcement, the city worked with the state legislature to change the city charter to permit nonpolice entities overseen by the city manager to write citations on light rail, paving the way for Valley Metro to contract with the civilian security officers that now conduct fare enforcement on the entire light rail system. Codes and ordinances may also specify training or equipment requirements for fare enforce- ment personnel. Texas Transportation Code § 452.0612 (2003) requires that a person must complete 40 hours of training before starting work as a fare enforcement officer, must wear a distinctive uniform identifying the officer as a fare enforcement officer, and may not carry a weapon while performing fare enforcement duties. 3.7.1.2 What Constitutes Fare Evasion? Fare evasion is defined by state (King County Metro, MBTA, Metro Transit, NYCT, RTD, Sound Transit), local (The Rapid, Valley Metro, WMATA), or agency (BART, LA Metro, MTS, SacRT, SFMTA, TransLink, TriMet, TTC) codes or ordinances that establish the transit agenciesâ legal authorities. Definitions of fare evasion are often incorporated into an agencyâs code of conduct or fare tariff. King County Metroâs Ride Right, LA Metroâs Customer Code of Conduct, and Valley Metroâs Respect the Ride are all available on the transit agenciesâ websites. See Section 3.1.1, Defining Fare Evasion, for an overview of what may be defined as fare evasion.

Findings and Applications 123  While some codes and ordinances use generic references (e.g., âfailure to pay,â âfailure to show proof of paymentâ), others identify specific types of fare evasion. TTCâs fare payment require- ments may be summarized as illegal entry into a subway station from a street through a bus bay; entering a fare gate without paying or holding a gate open for others to enter; boarding a bus or streetcar without paying; using a fare type for which a passenger is not qualified; and misuse of or tampering with paper transfers, fare media, or identification. The specific types of fare evasion and associated fines for a given offense are then defined and set by TTC By-law No. 1 (2009). 3.7.1.3 What Are the Consequences of Evading Fare? State codes define fare evasion as a criminal infraction or misdemeanor or as a civil violation. Some state codes may also authorize transit agencies to choose whether to issue a civil citation as an alternative to a criminal citation, as in California. Most of the transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45 issue civil citations. Some agencies, including BART and Valley Metro, use both criminal and civil citations, issuing criminal cita- tions only to escalate the penalty for repeat offenders. An agencyâs ability to escalate to a crimi- nal citation depends on applicable statutes or ordinances in the jurisdiction where the evasion occurred, the authorities of the personnel issuing the citation, the transit agencyâs citation policy for specific types of fare evasion, and the discretion given to fare enforcement personnel to issue criminal or civil citations on the basis of the circumstances. State/provincial codes may specify the penalties for fare evasion or grant local governing bodies or transit agencies the authority to define penalties in their own ordinances. In Washington State, King County Metro and Sound Transit are authorized to establish schedules of fines and pen- alties and to resolve civil fare violations in-house rather than through the court system. King County Metro adjudicates fare evasion citations in-house, whereas Sound Transit is reevaluating its policies but uses the district courts. Parameters set by states and municipalities for fare enforcement programs, and fare evasion citations can vary, in some cases setting specific details, such as minimum or maximum fines, and in other cases giving the transit agency the authority to set the details of its fare enforce- ment programs. As a result, different agencies have different degrees of flexibility for setting the operational details of their fare enforcement programs (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). In most cases, state codes permit agencies to conduct fare enforcement, set their own fine structures, and issue citations, but do not specify the procedural details of fare enforcement, such as the circumstances under which to issue a warning or a citation. In addition to fines, there can be other consequences for fare evasion. Besides issuing warn- ings and citations, transit agencies may eject passengers if they refuse to pay the fare; suspend or exclude repeat offenders from using the service; or, in certain situations, arrest a passenger. The specific consequences that an agency can impose are, again, based on applicable codes and ordinances. 3.7.1.4 When and Where Can Fare Enforcement Occur? When fare enforcement can occur is influenced by whether applicable codes and ordinances require a passenger to present proof of payment after the journey has begun. On systems that do not issue or require proof of payment, fare enforcement can only occur when fares are paid (e.g., at time of boarding or when entering through a fare gate). On a number of gated rail systems that do not have proof of payment (MBTA, NYCT Subway, WMATA), fare enforcement can occur only at time of entry through the fare gate and personnel are able to cite only if they observe someone entering without paying. Most traditional bus systems with onboard fare collection and front-door boarding also do not require passengers to carry proof of payment. Transit agencies Penalties are discussed further in Section 3.7.2, Fare Evasion Penalties, and Section 3.7.3.4, Administrative Penalties and Appeal Processes for Fare Citations.

124 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion may deploy fare enforcement personnel to observe fare payment at the farebox, but personnel are unable to cite unless they observe someone entering or boarding without paying. Conversely, on ungated, open systems, as well as some partially gated systems, passengers may be required to carry and present proof of payment upon request. Passengers on these systems generally do not need to interact with the operator for fare payment as part of the boarding process. These systems may include those with off-board fare collection, all-door boarding, or operators who are located in an enclosed compartment. Some transit agencies (TransLink, TriMet) with front doorâonly bus boarding choose to minimize the role of the bus operator in fare enforcement and may require passengers to carry and present proof of payment to fare enforcement personnel. The location of fare enforcement may also vary according to the type of personnel used. For example, BART police officers may be stationed at the fare line to observe fare payment as pas- sengers enter and exit through the fare gates. They may also be stationed at emergency exits. BART police officers may only request proof of payment when they have reasonable suspicion or during a detention for another crime. BART also employs fare inspectors to check passengers for proof of payment inside of the gated paid-fare area and on trains. 3.7.1.5 Where Is a Passenger Required to Have Proof of Payment? In addition to defining whether passengers must carry and present proof of payment, codes and ordinances define fare-paid areas where passengers may be required to present proof of pay- ment and, consequently, where fare enforcement can occur. At a minimum, proof-of-payment systems consider individuals on board a vehicle to be in a fare-paid area. Fare-paid areas may also include off-board areas on platforms and/or in stations. Transit agencies with the appro- priate legal authority may conduct proof-of-payment inspections in any designated fare-paid area. Only a limited number of transit agencies surveyed have the authority to enforce fares off board in designated off-board fare-paid areas. As part of the legal authorization, there may be specific requirements to clearly delineate and identify the fare-paid area. While Sound Transit does not conduct off-board fare enforcement, the RCW gives Sound Transit the authority to enforce an off-board, fare-paid area, and it stipu- lates that signage must be conspicuously posted at the place of boarding or within ten feet of the nearest entrance to a transit facility that clearly indicates: (a) The locations where tickets or fare media may be purchased; and (b) that a person using an electronic fare payment card must present the card to an electronic card reader before entering a transit vehicle or before entering a restricted fare paid area. (RCW 81.112.220, 2012) 3.7.1.6 Where and How Are Fare Evasion Violations Resolved and Adjudicated? Codes and ordinances specify the court of jurisdiction where citations for fare evasion will be processed (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002; WSP 2018). Although legal authority for fare enforce- ment often comes from the state/provincial level, fare evaders can be processed in state/provincial, county, or municipal courts, but most frequently in county or municipal courts. A growing number of transit agencies are bringing the process for resolving civil violations in-house, which gives them more control over the process and outcomes for individuals cited for fare evasion. It may also be effective for transit agencies that serve more than one jurisdic- tion. The ability to bring the violation resolution process in-house must be granted by the state/ provincial code and incorporated into the applicable local ordinance. For example, while the RCW gives King County Metro the authority to resolve violations administratively in-house, the King County Council also needed to amend the King County Code.

Findings and Applications 125  Transit agencies may also create diversion programs to resolve citations in-house within a set time period before unresolved citations are transmitted to the court system. 3.7.1.7 How Do Changes in Law Influence Fare Enforcement Authorities? Codes and/or ordinances may also change over time as a consequence of actions taken by legislative or governing bodies. For example, when the Colorado Revised Statutes, which define fare evasion on RTD services, were revised to decriminalize fare evasion, the language was revised to replace âfare-paid zonesâ with âpublic transit vehicles.â This change in language required RTD to modify its inspection and enforcement processes and discontinue off-board fare inspections. Making changes that require legislative action can take significant time and effort and may necessitate educating legislators about the effects of fare evasion and the purpose of fare enforce- ment. TTC is in the process of updating its By-law No. 1 to clarify the intent of provisions pertain- ing to fare payment and to tighten the language. These revisions will require extensive internal review, board action, and approval by the Ontario Court of Justice to modify existing codes. As TTC initiated the update, it was estimated the revision would take upwards of a year (TTC 2019c). 3.7.1.8 How Do Court Cases Influence Fare Enforcement Policies and Procedures? A transit agency developing a fare enforcement program must consider the conditions under which it is constitutional to conduct fare inspections. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Con- stitution and similar provisions in some state constitutions protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant or probable cause. Warrantless stops are permitted as long as law enforcement has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation occurred, such as an observed fare evasion. Administrative searches are an exception and are permissible under the Fourth Amendment without probable cause and individualized suspicion require- ments. Nonetheless, the characteristics of administrative searches should be considered when developing a fare enforcement program. In the United States, there have been a number of court cases regarding the constitutionality of fare enforcement and whether fare enforcement meets an administrative need to justify a search and satisfies the conditions for a valid administrative search. For both City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams and State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama, the court decisions did not result in binding precedent for subsequent cases. Therefore, they did not require the transit agencies (GCRTA and TriMet, respectively) to change the type of personnel used and their fare enforcement procedures, policies, and ordinances. Nonetheless, both GCRTA and TriMet updated their policies or procedures in response to the rulings. 3.7.2 Fare Evasion Penalties As noted above, the parameters for fare enforcement practices and fare evasion penalties are established by codes and/or ordinances approved at the state/provincial, local municipal/ county, or transit agency governing board level. In addition to differences in state/provincial codes, some of the variability in penalties is attributable to the power state/provincial legislatures have given to local municipal/county government bodies and transit agency governing boards to establish their own ordinances and set their own penalties. As a result, there can be variability in penalties across both jurisdictions and transit agencies, and both criminal and civil penalties can be used as deterrents to fare evasion and other code of conduct violations. Discussed below are the key differences in penalties, which include whether they are treated as criminal or civil violations as well as the specific penalties that are applied, and the judicial and administrative procedures used to adjudicate citations. In-house administrative resolution processes are discussed further in Section 3.7.3.2, Administrative Resolution Processes for Handling Fare Citations. Section 3.7.4, Constitutionality of Fare Enforcement, reviews a number of recent court cases.

126 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion 3.7.2.1 Criminal Versus Civil Penalties Depending on applicable codes and ordinances, fare evasion is a criminal violation for some transit agencies (most commonly either an infraction or a misdemeanor). For other transit agencies, fare evasion has been decriminalized and is a civil violation, without the potential negative consequences of criminal citations such as jail time, a criminal record, and the impacts of a criminal record on an individualâs credit rating. While criminal and civil citations are often handled through the court system, some agencies have adopted administrative processes that allow them to handle civil citations in-house instead of through the courts. Among the agencies surveyed, King County Metro and three California agencies (BART, LA Metro, and SFMTA) have adopted administrative procedures to process civil citations, assess fines, offer alternative resolution options, and handle appeals internally. Other agencies that issue civil citations (RTD, Sound Transit, Valley Metro) continue to rely on the courts to adjudicate civil citations for fare evasion. Agencies may also use diversion programs to enable individuals to resolve certain criminal and civil citations for fare evasion directly with the transit agency before unresolved citations are transmitted to the court system. MTS and TriMet both have diversion programs. MTS issues criminal citations, while TriMet issues civil citations. When charged as a criminal violation, fare evasion may be classified as a misdemeanor, which can result in the offense becoming part of a criminal record and, possibly, imprisonment, or an infraction, which is less severe (similar to traffic stops for minor moving violations and other low-level misconduct) and usually only requires payment of a fine. Where fare evasion is a civil violation, it is noncriminal, punishable by an administrative penalty, and may be handled out- side of the court system, typically through the transit agency (e.g., LA Metroâs Transit Court). Agencies are increasingly transitioning to issuing civil citations while retaining the ability to escalate to a criminal citation as necessary. In a 2012 study of 29 transit agencies, TCRP Syn- thesis 96 found that 59% of the agencies treated fare evasion as a civil violation, 27% treated it as a criminal infraction, and 14% treated it as a criminal misdemeanor (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Of the transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45, nine agencies (50%) issue exclusively civil citations for all fare evasion violations, five agencies (27%) issue both civil and criminal citations, three agencies (17%) issue criminal citations, and one agency (6%) does not have the authority to issue citations. The transit agencies that issue both criminal and civil citations generally issue criminal citations only as a form of escalation for repeat offenses. The decision to issue a criminal citation is based on the jurisdiction where the evasion occurred or the personnel issuing the citation, or both; agency policies on handling specific types of fare eva- sion (e.g., fraud); or the discretion of fare enforcement personnel who are authorized to issue criminal or civil citations depending on the circumstances. In California, transit agencies may choose whether to make the penalty for a fare violation either criminal or civil. While the California Penal Code makes fare evasion a criminal infrac- tion, it authorizes transit agencies to adopt an ordinance making fare evasion a civil violation and affording a person cited for fare evasion âan opportunity to complete an administrative process that imposes only an administrative penalty enforced in a civil proceedingâ (California Penal Code 640, 2017). It should be noted that the California Penal Code also stipulates that a minor may not be charged with a criminal infraction or misdemeanor for fare evasion. Minors may be charged only with civil violations. Whether an offense is criminal or civil also affects what happens if an individual is not respon- sive to a citation and the court process. Civil cases are often passed to collection agencies for recovery of the fine amounts. In the case of a criminal infraction, a warrant may be issued for the arrest of a nonresponsive individual (Cummins et al. 2013).

Findings and Applications 127  Bijleveld (2007) studied the relative effectiveness of civil and criminal penalties for getting fare evaders on the Dutch national railway to pay fines at a time when the payment rate was about 30%. The study compared results for individuals facing more certain and higher criminal penalties with those for individuals facing the standard civil process, which consisted of buying a ticket, including a penalty fee, from the fare inspector or providing proof of identity and being billed at home. Chronic fare evaders were excluded from the study, which focused primarily on accidental fare evaders. Unexpectedly, the civil penalties appeared to be more effective. One of the reasons for this was that in the Netherlands, for defendants to be prosecuted, they must sign their writs in person. As such, the majority of fare evasion cases that had been registered with prosecution had not yet been dispositioned after a year. Bijleveld also hypothesized that there may be a subset of nonchronic fare evaders who do not understand the implications of the pen- alties and thus are nonresponsive. Fare evaders who receive civil citations may also find a civil debt collection agencyâs letters and procedures easier to understand, which may explain higher payment rates for these citations. 3.7.2.2 Fare Evasion Fines Fine schedules for code of conduct violations are usually set by local ordinances or by transit agencies. Fines can also be set by the state/provincial code. For example, RTDâs fine is set by the Colorado Revised Statutes. Maximum and minimum penalty fines are often set in state codes. For California transit agencies, provisions in the California Penal Code set maximum penalties for criminal citations for fare evasion. The California PUC governs administrative processes and associated civil penalties for fare evasion. Provisions in the PUC set maximum penalties for civil citations. At the local level, the fine schedule may be set by a transit agencyâs governing body (LA Metro sets its own fine schedule for fare evasion and other code of conduct violations) or by a local municipal/county government body (SFMTAâs fare enforcement penalties are set by the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors). King County Metro and Sound Transit set their own fine schedules and penalties for fare evasion. Provisions in the RCW authorize regional transit authorities, such as Sound Transit, and public transportation systems, such as King County Metro, to set fines and penalties for civil infractions, stipulating that such fines may not exceed those set for Class 1 infractions. In Massachusetts, legislation approved in January 2021 (Massachusetts Bill H.5248), authorizes MBTA to issue regulations to set fines of not less than $10 or greater than $250 for noncriminal citations issued for fare evasion. Monetary fines are the most common penalties for citations of both civil and criminal fare evasion. When an effective penalty is being determined, there are several factors to consider, including the amount of the fine, the effectiveness of the fine in deterring fare evasion, the likeli- hood that the fine will be paid, and the cost-effectiveness of collecting the fine. TCRP Report 80 observed that the combination of the size of the fine and expectations of the likelihood of being caught are the major deterrents to fare evasion (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Given the limited inspection rates of most proof-of-payment systems, individuals may evade several times before being caught, which suggests that fines should be set with a goal of discouraging both a single violation and a series of violations. This may tempt transit agencies to set fines high relative to the fare, to strengthen the deterrent effect of the fine on fare evasion. However, high fines may not be the best solution. A study from Australia showed that the higher the fine, the less likely it was to be paid (New South Wales Audit Office 2006). A high initial fine may also have a negative impact on a transit agencyâs image. If a penalty is seen as disproportionate to the crime, the agency may be perceived as unreasonably punitive and decrease passengersâ willingness to participate in what they see as an unfair system. Further,

128 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion TCRP Report 80 observed that fare enforcement personnel may be reluctant to issue a citation if the fine is particularly high, because of the lack of proportionality to the fare (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Courts may also be unwilling to assess high fines. Fines should also be considered from a social justice perspective. In identifying how best to further an equitable transit system, King County Metro (2019) identified affordability as one of the underlying issues affecting the mobility of people with very low or no income. Those indi- viduals are disproportionately affected by fines and should be considered when the fare structure and programs to provide access to transit to those who most need it are being reviewed. Additionally, as Clarke et al. (2010) noted, deterrence theories and studies indicate âpotential offenders pay more attention to the certainty of being caught than to the severity of the punish- ment if caught,â suggesting that high fine amounts are less effective when inspection rates are insufficient. Clarke et al. suggest that public awareness of changes in enforcement levels and the likelihood of being fined might be expected to explain passengersâ responses to these changes. However, no clear trends were apparent in evasion rates, despite substantial changes in enforce- ment levels. This might have been because potential fare evaders did not perceive the changes in the levels of fare enforcement. As mentioned, fines may affect passengers differently on the basis of their relative incomes. Since fine amounts rarely change on the basis of income, passengers from wealthier households are less likely to be discouraged by the threat of a fine, at any amount, than passengers from households with less income. The argument is also made that people of very low incomes who know they will be unable to pay the fine may also be âunder-deterredâ by any fine amount (Polinsky and Shavell 1979). Thus, it is possible that fare evasion citations resulting in fines are only effective in deterring fare evasion within a specific income bracket, and not in deterring all riders. Other transportation-related fine structures already in place in a jurisdiction, such as those for parking violations, may limit the maximum fine an agency can levy for fare evasion citations (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Further, if fines for fare evasion are higher than fines for other violations (e.g., parking violations), they may seem overly punitive. Penalty payment policies can also have an impact on fine payment rates. In a discussion of the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authorityâs (NFTAâs) transit adjudication function, TCRP Synthesis 96 noted that NFTAâs Transit Adjudications Bureau allows fare evaders to pay their fines in monthly installments by making payments as low as $5 per month until the fine is paid in full (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). This option increased the number of tickets that were paid. When setting fines, it is also important to reassess the fines over time. Even when a transit agency is able to set higher fine thresholds, if these amounts are not tied to the Consumer Price Index or some other measure of inflation, the fines will become less effective as a deterrent over time (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). Fine levels may also influence passengersâ perceptions of financial risk for traveling without a valid fare. In considering the potential fiscal impacts of implementing its planned Fare Enforce- ment Diversion Program, MTS identified risks to fare revenue and the budget if passengers perceived that the penalties for not having a valid fare were low enough to risk traveling without a fare and paying the diversion program penalty if they were caught. There is also the question of whether levying and collecting fines is a cost-effective form of fare enforcement. Barabino et al. (2013) concluded that both the amount of the fine and the way the fine is collected affect the cost-effectiveness of fare enforcement. In its review of U.S. transit agencies, TCRP Synthesis 96 concluded that â[t]he revenue resulting from payment of fines is not expected to make up for the fare revenue loss due to evasion,â in large part because fine

Findings and Applications 129  revenues frequently are not returned to the transit agency when fines are handled by the courts (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). This is especially true in cases in which an agency must send multiple notices and reminders to a fare evader, particularly in the case of frequent fare evaders (Barabino and Salis 2019; New South Wales Audit Office 2006). In lieu of focusing on imposing fines, some transit agencies have worked to promote a culture of fare compliance, including efforts to recapture fare revenue at the time an individual is found to have evaded fare payment. A primary objective of SFMTAâs approach to fare enforcement is to keep fare evasion rates low by improving fare-compliant behavior, not to recover the costs of fare enforcement by collecting fines for fare evasion citations. SacRT has taken a similar approach. SacRTâs transit ambassadors focus on education and only issue citations to passengers who do not provide proof of payment and refuse to purchase a fare or leave the train. In response to considerations like these, Guarda et al. (2016) performed an econometric analysis to determine whether an agency could decrease fare evasion without using fines as a compliance measure. They concluded that âinspection strategies can be cost-effective even when evaders are not finedâ and encouraged agencies to perform costâbenefit analyses on their fare enforcement approach to increase cost-effectiveness and to include fine issuance and recovery as part of the analysis. Escalation of Penalties for Repeat Fare Evaders and Unpaid Fines. There are times, how- ever, when transit agencies find they must strengthen penalties to deter fare evasion behavior. Fürst and Herold (2018) and PwC (2007) recommend discouraging repeat fare evaders by esca- lating penalties, such that repeat offenses result in higher fines. For some transit agencies, the amount of the fine may be higher for some types of evasion than for others. Transit agencies have also increased the consequences for repeat fare evaders or individuals with unpaid fines by escalating penalties from civil to criminal, excluding individuals from the transit system, or link- ing penalties to other governmental functions, such as driverâs license renewal or motor vehicle registration. An agencyâs legal authorities dictate the available penalty options and the ability to implement escalating penalties. Of the transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45, several escalate fines for repeat fare evaders or individuals with unpaid fines. The Rapid and MBTA escalate their fines on the basis of the number of offenses. The Rapidâs fines are $65 for the first offense, $130 for the second, and $250 for any subsequent offenses. MBTA charges $100 for the first offense, $200 for the second, and $600 for each offense after that. As part of being authorized to set fine levels on the basis of a new law in Massachusetts, MBTA will be updating its fine schedule under its Fare Transformation program. Under the new law, MBTA retains the authority to escalate fines but is not required to escalate fines for repeat fare evaders. TransLinkâs unpaid fines escalate over time, with the first citation for fare evasion carrying a fine of $173 Canadian dollars (CAD). The fine is increased by $40 CAD for fines that are not paid within 6 months (to $213 CAD) and by an additional $60 CAD for fines not paid within a year (to $273 CAD). Warning-first discretion policies are also a form of escalation. A number of transit agencies (King County Metro, Metro Transit, RTD, Sound Transit, The Rapid) have a warning-first policy. Policies establish the number of warnings a passenger may be given in a set time period (e.g., rolling 12 months) before they are issued a citation. With warning-first policies, fare evaders are issued a warning at least the first time they are contacted and citations on subsequent contacts. Some agenciesâ fines distinguish between intentional and accidental fare evasion and the severity of the violation. For example, TTCâs penalty for traveling with an altered ID or fare media or an invalid fare is greater ($345 CAD) than the penalty for refusing to pay or improper

130 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion use of a transfer ($195 CAD). Further, individuals determined to intentionally evade fare pay- ment through fraudulent means may be charged with fraud or âfraud transportationâ under the Criminal Code of Canada. The discretion given to fare enforcement personnel regarding whether to issue a citation or a warning and the resolution process for a citation may also depend on the evaderâs intent, spe- cifically, whether an individual intended to evade fare payment. For TTC, enforcement actions range progressively from education to warnings, tickets, and court summons. The appropriate action is subject to the discretion of fare inspectors and special constables. However, TTC has a zero-tolerance (no warning) approach for passengers fraudulently using a concession card for which they do not qualify (e.g., Child PRESTO card). On MTS, reduced fare media used without proof of eligibility are confiscated. Confiscated passes are returned and the citations are voided for individuals who are able to provide valid proof of eligibility to MTS Security within 72 hours of being cited. Unlike other types of fare evasion violations, the misuse of a reduced fare is not eligible for diversion, and all citations are transmitted to the court for adjudication. Transit agencies may also assess different fines on the basis of the revenue impacts of fare evasion on the agency. Fines may be higher for fare evasion that results in a loss of revenue for the transit agency (e.g., an ineligible purchase of a reduced fare ticket) than for fare evasion that does not result in a loss of revenue (e.g., not tapping a monthly pass on a validator). For example, in Lyon, France, fines are lower for fare evasion that does not result in loss of fare revenue than for fare evasion that does result in revenue loss (â¬5 compared to â¬60) (Egu and Bonnel 2020). Other methods of escalating penalties used by transit agencies include conversion to a criminal misdemeanor offense, linking penalties to other government functions, and exclusion from the system (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012; MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002; PwC 2007). Escalating penalties from civil to criminal may occur on the basis of the number of citations incurred or the amount of accrued unpaid fines. BART escalates fare evasion citations from civil to criminal after a third citation is issued to a passenger within a rolling 12-month period. At Valley Metro, if an individual accrues $500 or more in unpaid fines, whether from fare eva- sion or other violations of the agencyâs code of conduct, any subsequent citations can become a criminal violation. These violations do not result in arrest warrants being issued, but they can affect the individualâs credit rating. Whether a criminal or a civil citation is issued can also affect the fine. BART police officers issue criminal citations and fare inspectors issue civil citations. Criminal citations, including those for a third citation in a rolling 12-month period, go through the court system, and fines are set by the superior courts in each county that BART serves. Those fines can go up to $250. In comparison, the maximum fine for civil citations is $60 for juveniles and $120 for adults. Current fines are set at $55 for juveniles and $75 for adults. Some transit agencies may exclude or suspend fare evaders from the transit system. Both terms refer to a penalty that prohibits an individual with citations for code of conduct viola- tions, including fare evasion, from being on transit property. Transit agencies define the prop- erty where passengers with citations may be excluded (e.g., in a station, on a platform, and/or on a vehicle). In some cases, the length of the exclusion is based on the number of fare evasion violations an individual has received, and repeat offenders may be excluded for longer periods of time. On some systems, an evader caught using transit during the period of exclusion can be cited for trespassing, which is often a criminal misdemeanor (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). RTD uses suspensions for repeat offenders as part of its escalation process. A warning is issued for the first instance without a fare. A second instance results in a citation, and a third instance results in a citation plus a 30-day suspension from RTD services. For subsequent instances, the

Findings and Applications 131  suspensions from service increase to 90 days then 180 days and then 1 year. These suspension levels apply to all passengers, including minors. A suspension may be nullified or modified under defined circumstances (i.e., a transit-dependent person shall not be issued a complete exclusion except in special circumstances). TriMet has defined situations when it may be appropriate to issue suspensions in its stan- dard operating procedure for issuing warnings, citations, and exclusions. For example, TriMetâs standard operating procedure states that exclusions may be appropriate for repeat fare evaders, who it defines as individuals having three or more citations for fare evasion (TCRP A-45 open records request from TriMet, 2020). Exclusions may also be appropriate on the basis of an indi- vidualâs conduct, such that removing the individual from the system would benefit the safety and welfare of other passengers and TriMet employees. For certain offenses, TriMet may choose to issue a citation or exclusion or both, while for offenses that pose risk to transit system security and order, TriMet personnel must issue both a citation and an exclusion. King County Metro and LA Metro both have provisions for excluding or suspending violators who do not resolve their fare evasion citations through those agenciesâ in-house administrative resolution processes. King County Metro has an outreach program that works with violators to resolve outstanding fines within 90 days to avoid the possibility of expulsion from the service for at least 12 hours. If a violation is not resolved within 90 days, the individualâs name is added to a list of âPending Expulsionsâ for 1 year, or until resolved. During that time, an individual caught riding a bus without acceptable proof of payment will be issued a 12-hour expulsion. Riding a King County Metro bus during an expulsion period may result in a charge of criminal trespass, administered by King County Metro Transit Police or local law enforcement. LA Metroâs exclusion provision applies to any person who violates the Metro Customer Code of Conduct or a law in a Metro facility or vehicle. Individuals who have failed to resolve out- standing citations by the time any fines or fees are due are subject to exclusion. Any person who has received a citation or written warning for the same violation at least three times in the past 12 months is subject to exclusion under LA Metroâs escalating penalty schedule. An individual cited for a third offense in the past 12 months may be excluded from the system for 30 days. The exclusion penalty increases to 60 days on the fourth offense and 90 days on the fifth and sub- sequent offenses. Although violators of an exclusion order may be cited for criminal trespass, LA Metroâs preference and practice is to work with passengers to change their behavior and encourage them to pay fares, not to initiate court proceedings or send unpaid fines to collec- tions. LA Metro also allows passengers to serve exclusions during nonwork or nonschool hours. In a fare evasion audit for TransLink, PwC (2007) observed that nonmonetary consequences to fare evasion, such as exclusions, are likely to be more inconvenient for violators and, there- fore, possibly more impactful, than fines for fare evasion. However, exclusions are only effective to the extent that they can be enforced. If fare enforcement personnel are unable to enforce a passengerâs removal immediately following the incident, or if enforcement is not sufficiently ubiquitous to catch a trespassing passenger, this escalation method may have little practical deterrent effect. One of the penalty escalation methods viewed as effective is the ability to link a fare evasion citation to access to other governmental functions (e.g., driverâs license renewal). PwC (2007) suggests that tying fines to governmental functions may have significant consequences for cited fare evaders and are likely to have greater consequences for fare evaders than the fines assessed for fare evasion. For example, transit agencies may have the ability to block renewal of a personâs driverâs license if fare evasion fines are unpaid. In some cases, wages may be garnished or liens may be placed on income tax refunds or lottery winnings. In British Columbia, Canada, where the government is the only provider of vehicle insurance, TransLink has the option of preventing

132 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion an individual with unpaid fines from reinsuring their personal vehicle. In Oregon, if a citation issued by TriMet can be linked to an individual that files a state tax return, unpaid citations may be withheld from a future state tax refund. Collection of Fine Revenue and Unpaid Fines. Another important consideration related to fines is how collections are handled. The processing of criminal citations, including collection of fines, is handled through the court system. Fines for civil citations may be collected through the court system or by the transit agency. For a transit agency to collect fines, the agency must have the authority and ability to administratively process citations and collect fines in-house or through the use of a citation processing company. For example, while Valley Metro issues both civil and criminal citations for fare evasion, all fare evasion citations are transmitted to the courts when they are issued, and the courts are responsible for all citation handling and follow-up, including collections, and retain any fine revenue collected. Conversely, BART administratively handles civil citations by using a citation processing company, while the court system processes criminal citations. BART retains the fine revenue collected from paid civil citations, while the county superior court where the violation occurred retains the fine revenue from paid criminal citations. Transit agencies whose citations are handled through a court system often receive no rev- enue from the fines collected for fare evasion citations or receive only a percentage of what is collected (Barabino and Salis 2019). The courts often retain the fine revenue collected to help offset the costs of processing the citations and collecting the fines, although the revenue from the fines collected does not cover the costs. In addition to retaining fine revenue, the King County District Court started charging King County Metro for the costs of processing citations that were not offset by fine revenue (King County Auditorâs Office 2018). TCRP Report 80 found that 37% of the agencies surveyed did not receive a share of the revenue collected by the courts (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Those that did receive a share of the fine revenue typically received between 50% and 100% of the revenue collected, but the dollar amount in 2002 was less than $50,000 per year for most North American transit agencies. Of the transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45, most reported that the courts retain all of the fine revenue collected, although the courts return some of the fine revenue to The Rapid. If a transit agency wishes to recoup some of this revenue, laws or codes must specify that the agency has the right to fare evasion fine collections (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). In California, state law (California Assembly Bill 426, 2011) amended the California PUC to require revenues from administrative fines and fees to be paid to the transit agency instead of the courts, thereby encouraging transit agencies to adopt administrative instead of criminal penalties for fare violations. Processing of citations administratively by the transit agency can be more cost-effective than processing them through the courts, albeit at an increase in agency administrative costs, since fine revenue does not offset the costs associated with processing citations and collecting fines. LACMTA (2018a) reported that, by handling fare evasion citations administratively, LA Metroâs administrative resolution process reduced the Los Angeles County Superior Courtâs caseload significantly. The report concluded that while administrative resolution of fare evasion citations outside of the court system had not resulted in significant revenue for LA Metro, it had reduced the courtâs caseload by an estimated 171,282 cases and 2,900 Level 1 hearings over 4 years, at an estimated savings of $2 million for the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The court or transit agency may use a collection agency or other governmental department or agency to assist in collecting fines. As noted above, in addition to sending unpaid fines to collections, wages may sometimes be garnished or liens placed on tax refunds or lottery win- nings. California government agencies, for example, are able to collect outstanding debts from

Findings and Applications 133  members of the public by intercepting tax refunds through the Franchise Tax Board, which collects state personal and corporate income taxes in California. However, a transit agency may first attempt to collect unpaid fines before transmitting a claim to the Franchise Tax Board. To that end, SFMTA forwards citations that are not paid in a timely manner to the Bureau of Delin- quent Revenue in the City and County of San Franciscoâs Treasurerâs Office for collection. If the Bureau of Delinquent Revenue can associate an unpaid citation with an individual, a claim may be submitted to the Franchise Tax Board for the unpaid fine. Alternatively, the BART Board of Directors has instructed BART to forward all unpaid fines directly to the Franchise Tax Board rather than have its citation processing company try to collect them. The process for garnishing wages is more complex than the collections process. In California, individuals must be notified and given 30 days to respond and request a hearing prior to initiat- ing a garnishment. Taking funds in this way also requires correctly identifying the individual by name, address, social security number, and driverâs license number. Since individuals cited for fare evasion may not provide ID and civilian personnel cannot compel them to, transit agencies often do not have the necessary information to forward a claim to the Franchise Tax Board. Part of the reason that LA Metro has chosen not to send unpaid citations to collections or to the Franchise Tax Board for garnishments is the difficulty of linking those citations with the individual who was cited. The vast majority of citations, including those sent to collections, go unpaid. In 2019, only a quarter of the court-ordered fines for fare evasion on Sound Transit had been paid for the prior 4 years; the rest of the fines have gone to collection agencies (Groover 2019). Sound Transit observed that although the courts receive 100% of any fine revenue from its fare evasion cita- tions, the agency receives 100% of fare revenues. As such, Sound Transit prefers to use citations as a tool to work with fare evaders to modify its fare payment behavior and to focus its efforts on improving fare collection rather than fine collection. This choice was intentional for Sound Transit, as it also avoids any perception that fare evasion citations serve as a source of revenue for the agency. In BARTâs experience, only a portion of proof-of-payment citations are paid, and few indi- viduals choose to complete community service. If, after 28 days of being cited, an individual has not paid the fine, requested a community service waiver, or requested an administrative hearing, BART adds a $20 late fee to the fine and 28 more days to pay the fine and late fee or perform community service instead. At that point, after 56 days, BART may submit unpaid fines to the Franchise Tax Board. While citation payment rates may have some influence on how transit agencies set and collect fines, they need to be weighed against considerations of the effectiveness of citations and fines as a means of encouraging fare-compliant behavior. 3.7.3 Decriminalization of Fare Evasion Decriminalization of fare evasion makes it possible for transit agencies to adjudicate fare evasion citations outside of the criminal court system by establishing civil instead of criminal penalties for fare violations. Just as establishing the authority to enforce fare payment and set pen- alties for fare evasion requires legislation, so too does decriminalization. State/provincial legislatures, municipal or county legislative bodies, and transit agency gov- erning boards are taking steps to minimize interactions with court systems for individuals cited for fare evasion. This section discusses three approaches that have been taken to minimize court interactions by transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45: ⢠Decriminalize fare evasion, issue civil instead of criminal citations, and process citations through civil instead of criminal courts (RTD, Sound Transit, WMATA).

134 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion ⢠Decriminalize fare evasion and adjudicate it through an administrative review and resolution process rather than through the court system and make fare evasion subject only to an admin- istrative penalty (BART, King County Metro, LA Metro, MBTA, SFMTA). ⢠Implement a diversion program, which may or may not involve decriminalizing fare evasion, to give cited fare evaders the option of resolving a citation directly with the transit agency within a defined period before the citation is transmitted to the courts (MTS, TriMet). Decriminalization can also have an impact on who has the authority to issue citations. Issuing civil citations can present opportunities to use civilians for fare enforcement but may require legislative authorization. This section discusses how some of the transit agencies included in this study have decrimi- nalized fare evasion (or minimized court interactions for individuals cited for fare evasion) and how fare enforcement and adjudication of fare evasion have changed as a result. 3.7.3.1 Civil Penalties for Fare Evasion Where fare evasion has been decriminalized, the effect is to eliminate criminal penalties and the possibility of a criminal conviction, shift adjudication out of the criminal court system, and reduce the fine. In Washington, DC, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the Fare Evasion Decriminalization Amendment Act in 2018. The law, which decriminalized fare evasion and made it a civil offense, became effective in 2019 after congressional review. Prior to the approval of the Fare Evasion Decriminalization Act in 2019, the criminal penalty for fare evasion on WMATAâs bus and rail services in the District was a fine of up to $300 and/or imprisonment for up to 10 days, and a criminal conviction. With approval of the Fare Evasion Decriminalization Act by the District Council, fare evasion became a civil offense punishable by a $50 fine, and the prospect of jail time was eliminated for fare evasion violations that occur in the District. As of mid-2020, the Metro Transit Police Department was updating the procedures for handling fare evasion incidents in the District. For fare evasion violations that occur outside the District, the type of citation (civil versus criminal) and associated penalties vary by jurisdiction, as shown in Table 3-13. The fare evasion penalties on WMATA services that operate outside the District, in jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland, were not affected by the District Councilâs action. While there are advantages to decriminalizing fare evasion for the individuals caught fare evading, it may have undesirable effects on an agencyâs ability to promote a culture of fare com- pliance and enforce fine payment. Therefore, transit agencies and their governing boards may be hesitant to decriminalize fare evasion. The discussion of fare enforcement responsibilities and authorities in Section 3.3.1.1, Fare Enforcement Staffing, addresses the advantages and disadvantages of using sworn peace officers versus civilian personnel to conduct fare enforcement. District of Columbia State of Maryland Commonwealth of Virginia Effective May 3, 2019 ⢠Civil ⢠â¤$50 fine ⢠No consequences or further proceedings for failure to pay or attend hearing Montgomery County ⢠Civil and criminal ⢠1st: $50 if paid; up to 10 daysâ jail if not paid ⢠2nd and subsequent: $75 if paid; up to 10 daysâ jail if not paid Prince Georgeâs County ⢠Criminal ⢠1st: $10â$50 ⢠2nd and subsequent: $50â$100 if paid; up to 10 daysâ jail if not paid City of Alexandria ⢠Civil ⢠$100 Arlington County ⢠Civil and criminal ⢠1st: $10â$50 ⢠2nd and subsequent: $50â$100 and/or up to 10 daysâ jail Fairfax County ⢠Criminal ⢠$100 fine Source: WMATA 2019. Table 3-13. WMATA fare evasion citation penalty, by jurisdiction.

Findings and Applications 135  Another concern is whether decriminalization can successfully address the criminalization of fare evasion among vulnerable populations. One of the goals for the MTS Fare Enforcement Diversion Program is to identify feasible alternatives for vulnerable individuals to resolve fare evasion citations, since one of the challenges is repeat offenders who do not resolve their cita- tions and do not show up for court hearings, thereby defeating attempts to help them avoid criminal penalties. 3.7.3.2 Administrative Resolution Processes for Handling Fare Citations In some cases, legislation decriminalizing fare evasion has enabled transit agencies to establish processes of administrative review and resolution for handling fare evasion citations in-house instead of adjudicating civil citations through the civil court system. These administrative reviews impose administrative penalties for fare evasion and other code of conduct violations that are managed by the transit agency instead of the courts. In California, Washington, and Oregon, state codes and local ordinances have enabled transit agencies in those states to establish administrative processes for handling fare evasion cita- tions internally. King County Metro, LA Metro, and SFMTA have developed and implemented administrative processes that are handled entirely in-house, without involving the courts. BART has developed an administrative process for its civil citations using a citations processing com- pany. MTS and TriMet have also established administrative processes for handling fare evasion citations. However, while MTS and TriMet offer individuals opportunities to resolve citations directly with the transit agency, they ultimately transmit the citations to the courts if they are not resolved internally within defined time frames. In California, the state legislature (California Senate Bill 1749, enacted 2006) amended the California Penal Code to give transit agencies the option to enact and enforce ordinances providing for adjudication of fare evasion and other minor transit viola- tions through an administrative review process, rather than through the court system, and subject only to an administrative penalty imposed and reinforced in a civil proceeding. In 2011, Assembly Bill 426 encouraged transit agencies to implement administrative penalties for fare violations by requiring fines and fees to be deposited with the transit agency instead of the county general fund. Transit agenciesâ ordinances pertaining to administrative civil penalties are governed by the California PUC § 99580 et seq. (2017). The governing boards of both LA Metro and SFMTA approved the requisite ordinances to define and establish each agencyâs administrative process and penalties. In 2008, SFMTA decriminalized fare evasion for adults. Handling fare citations administra- tively in-house has enabled SFMTA to minimize encounters of fare violators with the courts, offer a reduced penalty for early payment, and implement a lower effective fine, since it does not include court fees. Prior to decriminalization of fare evasion, the adult fine totaled $124 and the bulk of the fine was kept by the court. With the implementation of an administrative process for adjudicating fare evasion, the civil penalty for fare evasion on Muni was reduced to a $50 administrative fine for adults and, as a consequence of Assembly Bill 426, all citation revenue goes to SFMTA. In 2012, LA Metro created its own Transit Adjudications Bureau (also known as the Metro Transit Court), implemented an administrative process, and began processing citations and conducting hearings on appeals for fare evasion and other code of conduct violations in-house, through the Metro Transit Court. The fine for fare evasion was reduced from $250 to $75. The Metro Transit Court, which is composed of the Citation Processing Administration Unit and See Section 3.11.3, Financial Resolutions for Assisting Vulnerable Populations.

136 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion the Hearing Unit, provides due process for resolving citations through appeals, payment of fines, inability-to-pay waivers, and diversion programs. The decriminalization of fare evasion for minors lagged the action to decriminalize fare eva- sion for adults. In California, fare violations remained criminal penalties for minors and were handled by juvenile courts until 2016, when California Senate Bill 413 (enacted 2015) authorized transit agencies to apply administrative penalties to minors. That same year, LA Metro and SFMTA decriminalized fare evasion for minors. A year later, California Senate Bill 882 (enacted 2016) prohibited minors from being charged with criminal infractions or misdemeanors for fare evasion. On the basis of these changes, the California Penal Code does not allow a minor to be charged with an infraction or misdemeanor for fare evasion violations. California Penal Code 640(g) (2017) and California PUC 99580 (2017) both stipulate that administrative penalties for youth may not exceed $125 for the first or second violation and $200 for a third or subsequent violation. The PUC sets maximum administrative penalties for adults at the same levels as for minors: up to $125 for the first and second violations and $200 for the third and subsequent violations. The Penal Code sets maximum criminal penalties for adults, such as those issued by MTS, at $250 for the first and second violations. For the third and subsequent violations, the maximum criminal penalty is $400 or up to 90 days in jail or both. In 1987, the Washington State legislature decriminalized some misdemeanors and created a system of civil infractions, with the objective of creating a more expeditious and less expensive way of disposing of minor offenses. The RCW makes fare evasion a civil infraction, and the penalty is limited to a fine not to exceed $250. The RCW also authorizes transit agencies to enforce fares and set fines and penalties for fare evasion. In 2018, when the King County Auditorâs Office (2018) conducted a performance audit of fare enforcement on King County Metroâs RapidRide lines, the fare enforcement model provided for escalating penalties beginning with a verbal warning for a first offense, followed by a civil citation with a $124 fine that increased to $250 after 30Â days and escalated to a misdemeanor citation referral to the Metro Transit Police for a third offense. The district court then processed and attempted to collect fines and, along with the prosecuting attorneyâs office, made decisions on whether to charge an individual with a mis- demeanor. The performance audit concluded that this enforcement model was creating debt and interactions with the criminal justice system for people experiencing homelessness or housing instability. In 2018, King County Metro initiated efforts to reform the fare enforcement model. King County Ordinance 18789 (2018) amended the King County Code to allow King County Metro to use an alternative process to resolve fare evasion violations and to administer that process in-house, thereby separating fare-related violations from the courts. King County Metro introduced its new Fare Violation Program and updated fare enforcement program in late 2018âearly 2019. The violation resolution process now administered by King County Metro is designed to eliminate the chance that violators will become repeat offenders facing collections and cycling through the court system by offering payment alternatives, time, and nonmonetary options to resolve violations. 3.7.3.3 Fare Citation Diversion Programs Similar to the administrative processes discussed above, diversion programs give individuals cited for fare evasion the ability to resolve their citation directly with the transit agency, rather than through the court system. Opportunities to resolve violations administratively may include reduced fines and nonmonetary options such as community service and enrollment in reduced- fare programs. Diversion programs do not necessarily require fare violations to be decriminalized, but do provide administrative options for individuals to minimize interactions with the courts and avoid the potentially negative consequences of those encounters.

Findings and Applications 137  Unlike programs in which a transit agency handles administrative citations exclusively in-house, with no court involvement, the MTS and TriMet diversion programs transmit cita- tions that are not resolved administratively within a defined time frame to the court of juris- diction for the agencyâs fare evasion violations. While these programs incorporate some of the administrative processes discussed previously, there is a substantive difference in the ultimate resolution of the violation if the citation is not resolved and voided. The MTS and TriMet diver- sion programs stay the filing of a citation, extending the time that the agency has to submit the citation to the court, meaning these programs provide an opportunity to void a citation if it is resolved before it is transmitted. MTS and TriMet fare enforcement personnel explain resolution options to an individual when handing them a citation; TriMet inserts citations into an envelope or wrapper that also explains all of the options available for resolving citations directly with the agency. The 1-year pilot of the Fare Enforcement Diversion Program that MTS initiated on September 1, 2020, is authorized by California law and regulations discussed previously (MTS 2020b). The goal of the MTS diversion program is to provide opportunities for individuals to avoid court and pay a lower fine or perform community service to resolve a citation directly with MTS within 120 days. In addition, under the diversion program, code compliance inspectors give passengers without proof of payment an opportunity to purchase a fare before they are issued a citation. This approach also provides an opportunity for code compliance inspectors to educate passen- gers about available options for fine payment. Unlike many other transit agencies in California, however, MTS has not decriminalized fare evasion, but instead has retained criminal penalties for adults found evading fares. Violations by adults that are not resolved with MTS are forwarded to and handled by criminal courts. Because minors cannot be charged with criminal infractions or misdemeanors in California, MTS cita- tions issued to minors must be handled in civil courts if they are not resolved with MTS. An optional Juvenile Fare Diversion Program is available for first-time juvenile offenders cited for fare violations on MTS. The Juvenile Fare Diversion Program allows parents or guardians of cited juveniles to resolve the citation by paying a reduced fine ($25) within 120 days of issuance of the citation. TriMetâs diversion program is authorized under Oregon State Statute (ORS 267.153, amended 2017), which enables mass transit districts to resolve citations and adjudicate ordinance viola- tions through an in-house administrative process. ORS 267.153 specifically provides that a mass transit district enforcing a violation that is subject to the administrative process shall stay the filing of the complaint with a court for 90 days from the date of issuance of the citation. The diversion program was the result of a year-long study of TriMetâs citation process con- ducted in 2016 (TCRP A-45 phone survey of TriMet, 2020). Prior to the study, TriMet came to an agreement with local prosecutors that an individual evading fare would no longer be charged with criminal trespass or interference with public transportation if he or she failed to cooperate or provide ID or information for the issuance of a citation. The study engaged com- munity stakeholders and a dozen other transit agencies in shaping changes to citation practices. Community partners helped determine alternative resolution options and timelines and, as an outcome of this process, ORS 267.153 was amended to enable transit agencies in Oregon to implement administrative resolution processes for handling fare evasion citations. TriMet also implemented technology improvements, including enhancements to electronic devices and analytics needed to support the new citation resolution process, which took effect July 1, 2018 (TCRP A-45 phone survey of TriMet, 2020). TriMetâs diversion program provides a process for adult passengers (age 18 or over) to administratively resolve fare citations directly with TriMet. Unlike MTS, TriMet does not issue

138 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion criminal citations; instead, it issues civil citations for fare evasion, as codified in TriMet Ordi- nance 351 (TriMet 2018c). While overall payment of fare evasion citation fines is generally low, in particular for civil and administrative citations, diversion programs can prove effective. In 2019, TriMet issued 15,570 fare evasion citations (TCRP A-45 phone survey of TriMet, 2020). Of those citations, 23% were resolved using one of TriMetâs in-house administrative options. Most of the citations resolved administratively (56%) were resolved by paying the reduced fine. As part of resolving citations in-house, TriMetâs fines under its fare evasion citation resolu- tion program have increased the agencyâs fine revenues. Whereas TriMet receives only a portion of the revenue from citations handled by the courts, the agency receives all of the revenue from the fines paid through the diversion program. 3.7.3.4 Administrative Penalties and Appeal Processes for Fare Citations The administrative fines and penalties that have been adopted by King County Metro, LA Metro, MTS, SFMTA, and TriMet include both financial and nonfinancial ways for violators to resolve their citations, as well as provisions to appeal citations. Specific provisions for each of these agen- ciesâ reduced fines and community service options are summarized in Table 3-14 and discussed further below. The following subsections provide a summary of the reduced fines, community service options, other resolution options, and appeal processes for King County Metro, LA Metro, MTS, SFMTA, and TriMet. They also discuss the consequences of citations not resolved directly with MTS and TriMet through their diversion programs within the defined time frames. Reduced Fines. Through their administrative resolution processes, King County Metro, LA Metro, MTS, SFMTA, and TriMet each provide a process for paying reduced fines (i.e., fines that are lower than the fines for criminal fare evasion), but there are differences in pricing, escala- tion penalties, and payment time frames. ⢠Reduced fine amount: The reduced fine amounts range from $25 to $175, depending on whether the individual pays the fine early and the number of previous citations an individual has. In most cases, the reduced fine is notably lower than the fine would be if the citation were to be processed through the courts. ⢠Escalation of reduced fines: TriMet reduces fines from $175 to $75 for the first offense, but has escalating fines for subsequent offenses: $100 for the second offense, $150 for the third offense, and $175 for the fourth offense. The latter provides no discount, but avoids a court hearing. TriMet fare evasion citations that make it to the court system are subject to the pre- sumptive fine of $175 up to the maximum fine of $250. ⢠Reduced fines for minors: A transit agency may have different fines for minors and adults. While King County Metro, MTS, and TriMet assess the same fines for minors and adults, LA Metro and SFMTA assess a lower fine for minors than for adults. LA Metro and SFMTA have set their adult fines at $75 and $125, respectively, and their fines for minors at $45 and $64. ⢠Payment time frame: The time frames for paying fines vary between 21 and 120 days. Often, transit agencies set payment deadlines to give individuals sufficient time to appeal a citation and pay the fine if the appeal is denied. This is particularly important for the diversion pro- grams that transmit unresolved citations to the court system after a set time period (MTS, TriMet). ⢠Reduced fine for early payment: King County Metro provides ways to further reduce the fine by halving the fine from $50 to $25 if it is paid within 30 days instead of 90 days. Community Service. Some state codes establish requirements for community service. In California, the PUC governs administrative penalties, and PUC 99580 requires that community

Findings and Applications 139  service must be an option for civil fare evasion citations issued to minors or to individuals who provide satisfactory evidence of an inability to pay the penalty in full. For criminal citations, such as those issued by MTS, the California Penal Code requires transit agencies to offer an option of up to 48 hours of community service over 30 days during times that the individual is not in school or working. For both civil and criminal penalties, the issuing agency may require the performance of community service at transit facilities. Laws enabling administrative penalties in Oregon allow, but do not require, mass transit dis- tricts to provide a community service option in lieu of paying a fine. In Washington State, state codes authorize transit agencies to establish their own schedules of fines and penalties for civil infractions. King County Metroâs options for resolving fare violations include community service. King County Metro, LA Metro, MTS, SFMTA, and TriMet all make arrangements for passengers cited for fare evasion to perform community service in lieu of paying a fine. Stipulations vary with respect to number of hours, volunteer organizations, and enrollment requirements: ⢠Enrollment requirements: Transit agencies may restrict who can apply to complete com- munity service and the number of times an individual can complete community service in lieu of a fine in a set time period. For LA Metro, an individual must submit a Declaration of Agency and Location Reduced Fine Community Service Other Resolution Options Appeal Process King County Metro (Seattle, WA) $50 within 90 days $25 within 30 days 2 hours within 90 days Within 90 days: ⢠Enroll in reduced fare program and load $5 on card, or ⢠Add $25 to existing ORCA card, or $10 to an existing reduced fare card Appeal citation within 45 days LA Metro (Los Angeles, CA) Adults: $75 Minors: $45 5 hours ⢠Transit School to receive $15 reduction on fine ⢠Payment Plan for transit violations May request: ⢠Initial review within 21 days of citation ⢠Administrative hearing within 21 days of initial review decision ⢠Court appeal within 30 days of administrative hearing decision MTS (San Diego, CA) $25 within 120 days 3 hours within 120 days Juvenile Fare Diversion program Appeal citation within 15 days SFMTA (San Francisco CA) Adults: $125 Minors: $64 Varies (service hours based on citation amount divided by the San Francisco minimum wage) ⢠Payment plan for unpaid transit fines ⢠Waive enrollment and late payment fees for low-income and homeless individuals May request: ⢠Administrative review within 21 days of citation ⢠Administrative hearing within 21 days of administrative review decision ⢠Court appeal within 30 days of administrative hearing decision TriMet (Portland, OR) $75 within 90 days 2nd offense: $100 3rd offense: $150 4th and subsequent offenses: $175 (no reduction) 1st offense: 4 hours within 90 days 2nd offense: 7 hours 3rd offense: 12 hours 4th and subsequent offenses: 15 hours Enroll in reduced fare program and load $10 on card within 90 days Appeal citation within 45 days Table 3-14. Administrative penalties.

140 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Inability to Pay Waiver to the transit court within 90 days of violation issuance. Further, for LA Metro, community service may only be completed once in any 12-month period and upon order of a Metro hearing officer. ⢠Community service hours: The required number of hours of community service varies. It is sometimes determined on the basis of the local minimum wage and the dollar value of the citation. Both LA Metro and SFMTA determine the number of community service hours by equating an hour of service with the minimum wage rate. For example, the number of com- munity service hours for a $75 LA Metro citation works out to 5 hours. ⢠Escalation of community service requirements: For TriMet, community service require- ments escalate with each offense. The service requirements are 4 hours for the first offense, 7 hours for the second offense, 12 hours for the third offense, and 15 hours for the fourth and subsequent offenses. ⢠Time frame for completion: Individuals are often required to complete their community service hours within the same time frame as for payment of a fine. For LA Metro, payment of the fine is due within 21 days. Late fees and penalty assessments are waived upon enrollment in community service but may be reinstated if the community service deadline is defaulted. For SFMTA, community service program hours must be completed within defined timelines on the basis of the amount of the citation. Failure to complete the community service plan in the time allotted results in plan cancellation. ⢠Volunteer locations: Locations where individuals are able to complete their community ser- vice are often determined by the agency. For TriMet, individuals may perform community service at one of TriMetâs selected institutions (Oregon Food Bank, Rebuilding Center, Free Geek, or Oregon Humane Society). SFMTA requires that half of the community service hours must be completed with SFMTA or the San Francisco Department of Public Works. The rest of the hours can be completed with an approved San Francisco nonprofit agency. For King County Metro, community service may be performed at any nonprofit organization. ⢠Expanded volunteer locations: Transit agencies may partner with other organizations to expand volunteer locations. In addition to the San Diego Food Bank, MTS has partnered with the Homeless Court for the purpose of expanding the community organizations where com- munity service can be performed. The Homeless Court in San Diego was created to provide options for resolving fines for individuals experiencing homelessness; it does not administer MTSâs community service program. MTS is utilizing the Homeless Courtâs list of providers to expand the community service options for fare evaders. A coordinator for the Homeless Court puts individuals in touch with organizations throughout the county that are convenient for them to access instead of limiting community service to San Diego Food Bank locations. Upon completion, the San Diego Food Bank/Homeless Court emails proof of an individualâs participation directly to MTS. ⢠Third-party administration: LA Metro and SFMTA contract with third-party administra- tors to manage their community service programs. The SFMTA administratorâs responsibili- ties include setting requirements for organizations participating in the program and enrolling participants. LA Metroâs program is administered through an outside agency that maintains a list of entities throughout the county that enable people to perform community service, oversees them, and verifies the number of hours completed. The agency that administers LA Metroâs program performs the same service for the Los Angeles County Superior Court. ⢠Community service enrollment: Transit agencies may charge an enrollment fee to par- ticipate in a community service program. The agency LA Metro uses charges individuals a registration fee of $35 for up to 20 hours of community service. The fee, which is not set by LA Metro, includes costs of office operations, staffing, and insurance to protect participating entities from claims such as workers compensation claims. SFMTAâs enrollment fee and timeline for completing community service hours depend on the dollar amount of the cita- tions enrolled in the program, as shown in Table 3-15.

Findings and Applications 141  Recent changes to SFMTAâs community service program reduced the processing fees for all participants and increased the allowable time for completing the largest citation amounts enrolled. In addition, low-income individuals with a gross annual income at or below 200% of the federal poverty level are granted one waiver of the enrollment fee per calendar year. Alternative Resolution Process Options. In addition to reduced fines and community ser- vice options, transit agencies with an in-house resolution process may offer other options for resolving fare evasion penalties administratively. Transit School. One of LA Metroâs options for resolving a fare evasion citation adminis- tratively is Transit School, an online interactive program to educate the public about passenger safety and conduct, fare requirements, and how to pay the fare and use LA Metroâs smart card. The course takes 20â30 minutes to complete, and individuals who take and pass the course receive a $15 credit toward the $75 fare evasion fine. The course may be completed on any per- sonal computer, and a computer is available in the transit court lobby. Reduced Fare Program Enrollment. For King County Metro and TriMet, one of the alter- natives to paying a fine encourages fare compliance by allowing eligible individuals to enroll in a reduced fare program and load value to their new reduced fare smart card in lieu of paying a fine. For King County Metro, individuals who are eligible for a reduced fare program but are not already enrolled may enroll and add a minimum of $5 to their new smart card. King County Metro reduced fare programs include ORCA LIFT (available to low-income adults on the basis of household income), Youth (available to youth ages 6â18), or Regional Reduced Fare Permit (available to seniors age 65 or older, individuals with a disability, and Medicare cardholders). Similarly, TriMet passengers who are eligible for a reduced fare program may enroll in TriMetâs Low-Income Fare or Honored Citizen program within 90 days and load $10 on the personalized Honored Citizen Hop card in lieu of paying a $75 fine. King County Metro also enables individuals who already have a smart card or are enrolled in a reduced fare program to load value to their smart card in lieu of paying a fine. The individual must add a minimum of $25 to his or her adult ORCA card or a minimum of $10 to that personâs reduced fare card within 90 days. Payment Plans. LA Metro and SFMTA offer payment plans to individuals who would other- wise have trouble paying the fine in full. In California, PUC 99580 requires the transit agency issuing a citation to allow payment in installments or deferred payment if the total amount of fines is $200 or more and the individual provides evidence of inability to pay the fine or to pay the fine in full. LA Metroâs payment plan requires a Declaration of Inability to Pay Waiver. For individuals who meet financial criteria, fines may be resolved through an installment payment plan that Citation Amount Enrolled ($) Timeline for Completion (weeks) Enrollment Fee ($) 50â300 10 26 301â600 14 52 601â1,000 18 77 Source: San Francisco Transportation Code §311, 2020 Table 3-15. SFMTA community service timelines and fees.

142 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion allows unpaid transit fines and fees to be paid in three monthly installments: 30% for the first payment, 35% for the second payment after 30 days, and remaining 35% for the third payment after 60 days. Under SFMTAâs monthly payments plan, individuals with outstanding transit and parking citations may enroll in a plan that allows them to make minimum monthly payments on the basis of the total amount of the citations enrolled in the payment plan. The timeline for comple- tion is also based on the amount enrolled. There is a $25 enrollment fee, and a current plan must be completed before an individual can enter into a new one. Citations enrolled in a payment plan are not eligible for an administrative review or hearing. Table 3-16 provides the details of SFMTAâs payment plan options and amounts. As a result of recommendations by the San Francisco Fines and Fees Task Force to alleviate the burden of fines, fees, and tickets on low-income San Franciscans, SFMTA added a low- income payment plan in 2018. That plan reduced the enrollment fee to $5 for individuals whose gross household incomes are at or below 200% of the federal poverty level. There is no limit to the number of payment plans or total fine amounts for low-income payment plans. Customers must pay the $5 enrollment fee for each contract and cannot add citations to already established contracts. Late penalties are removed at time of enrollment but will be reinstated if the plan is not completed by the assigned due date. Failure to complete the payment plan by the completion date or missing monthly payments may result in the addition of penalties to past-due citations and may be reported to the Department of Motor Vehicles or the Franchise Tax Board. Appeal Processes. Transit agencies with administrative citations and diversion programs offer appeal processes. There might be multiple levels of appeals. For example, for administrative penalties citations, state law under California PUC § 99581 (2017) and § 99582 (2017) provides for a three-level appeal process that includes a Level 1 initial review conducted by agency staff, a Level 2 administrative hearing conducted by independent hearing officers, and a Level 3 appeal to be heard by the superior court. Time frames for appealing at each level are set by the PUC, which provides 21 days from citation issuance to request a Level 1 review and, if the appeal is denied, another 21 days to request a Level 2 hearing. After the administrative hearing decision, an individual can file an appeal to be heard by the superior court within 30 days. Level 1 and Level 2 requests may be made by telephone, in person, or by mail; Level 2 hear- ing requests require the individual to deposit the amount due under the notice of the violation. Amount Owed ($) Timeline for Completion Minimum Monthly Payment Due ($) Standard Plan ($25 enrollment fee) 50â500 12 weeks 25 â¥501 16 weeks 50 Low-Income Plan ($5 enrollment fee) â¤500 Up to 24 months 25 â¥501 Up to 24 months 50 Note: Proof of eligibility for the Low-Income Plan includes current Lifeline, Medi-Cal, or EBT card, WIC benefits app on mobile phone, unemployment benefits, a benefits letter from the Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing, or certification of annual income requirements (may require submission of recent tax returns or other documentation). Source: San Francisco Transportation Code § 311, amended 2020. Table 3-16. SFMTA payment plan timelines and monthly payment amounts.

Findings and Applications 143  The Level 3 appeal to the superior court is a trial de novo; that is, it is conducted without regard to the findings made at the previous reviews, although a copy of the notice of fare evasion or passenger conduct violation is received in evidence. Appealing the decision of an administra- tive hearing requires an individual to do so in person at the superior court. A $25 filing fee must be submitted to the superior court for each violation that the individual is appealing. TriMet passengers may request an appeal hearing on a citation within 45 days. If the citation is not dismissed as a result of the appeal, the individual still can pay the reduced fine, perform community service, or enroll in a reduced fare program before unresolved citations are trans- mitted to the courts 90 days after issuance. Similarly, King County Metro requires that appeals be initiated within 45 days of the date of violation. Appeals are administered in-house by the Fare Violation Program manager. If an appeal is denied, the violation must be resolved within 90 days of the issuance of the violation, using one of King County Metroâs other resolution options, to avoid a possible suspension from service. For diversion programs that enable individuals to resolve citations directly with the transit agency before unresolved citations are forwarded to the courts, the resolution time period should provide sufficient time to accommodate the appeal process. For example, MTS fare violations may be appealed in writing within 15 days of the citation if the individual can demonstrate, with proof of either valid fare or malfunctioning of the TVM, that he or she was wrongly cited. If an appeal is granted, the citation is voided and not sent to court. If the citation is denied, the individual is notified and MTS holds the citation until 120 days from its issuance, giving the individual time to pay the reduced fine or complete community service. Unresolved Citations. Individuals who do not resolve their citations through an in-house administrative process, including available appeals options, may be suspended or excluded from service, as discussed earlier. For diversion programs, there may be added penalties if fines are not resolved directly with the transit agency before unresolved citations are transmitted to the courts. ⢠TriMetâs fare evasion citations carry civil penalties. Any citations that are not resolved directly with TriMet within 90 days of issuance are automatically sent by TriMetâs citation system to the applicable county circuit court. Fare evasion citations sent to the courts are subject to the presumptive fine of $175 and up to the maximum fine of $250. ⢠MTS citations that are not resolved within 120 days are forwarded to the San Diego County Superior Court, where they are handled as criminal infractions by the traffic court. At that point, the presumptive fine is $177.50, including court fees. Additional fines may be assessed for failure to appear or to pay by the required date. 3.7.4 Constitutionality of Fare Enforcement As noted in the beginning of Section 3.7, a transit agency developing a fare enforcement pro- gram must consider the conditions under which it is constitutional to conduct fare inspections. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and similar provisions in some state con- stitutions, protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant and/or probable cause. Warrantless stops are permitted as long as law enforcement has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation occurred, such as an observed fare evasion. When crafting a fare enforcement policy and evaluating the type of personnel (e.g., sworn peace officers versus civilian personnel) that will be used for fare enforcement, transit agencies must carefully consider the applicable legal framework for search and seizure and the authority needed to conduct fare enforcement. The constitutionality of fare enforcement is a particularly important consideration for proof-of-payment inspections, which are conducted randomly and without reason to believe that someone committed a fare violation.

144 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion In the course of the research on fare evasion, two U.S. court decisions were identified that ruled the use of transit police to conduct proof-of-payment inspections violated passengersâ con- stitutional rights: City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams (2017) and State of Maryland v. Kennard Carter (2018). 3.7.4.1 City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams In City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams (2017), a judge for the Cleveland Municipal Court issued an opinion that GCRTAâs policy of using transit police officers to conduct fare enforce- ment was unconstitutional since the defendant was stopped by transit police officers without âreasonable articulable suspicion of fare evasion.â The fourth-degree misdemeanor for fare eva- sion that had been issued to the defendant was dismissed. Besides ruling that the fare inspection violated the defendantâs constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by subjecting him to unlawful search and seizure, the judge noted in her opinion that the âmere presence on the bus, or having been a passenger, is insufficient evi- dence to stop all passengers on a particular bus or rapid train for investigation of fare evasion.â The judge went on to specify, âif RTA utilized non-law enforcement officers, a constitutional analysis would be unnecessary. The utilization of police officers inappropriately removes the âmiddlemanâ or buffer between police and passengers. There must be an intermediary between police and passengers to prevent arbitrary and abusive police encounters. Passengers should only encounter police once reasonable articulable suspicion is established.â The City of Cleveland filed a discretionary appeal from the judgment of the Cleveland Munic- ipal Court. The city sought to appeal the trial courtâs determination that GCRTAâs fare enforce- ment policy is unconstitutional. After a thorough review of the record and law, the Court of Appeals of Ohio dismissed the cityâs appeal (City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams 2018). Neither the city nor Williams raised the issue of constitutionality in the original trial. Further, there were minimal facts and evidence in the trial record regarding the constitutionality of GCRTAâs fare enforcement policy. Given these two points, the court of appeals declined to exercise its dis- cretionary authority to review the trial courtâs substantive legal ruling in this case and dismissed the case. 3.7.4.2 State of Maryland v. Kennard Carter In State of Maryland v. Kennard Carter (2018), the defendant filed a motion to suppress physi- cal evidence found during an arrest following a proof-of-payment inspection by MTA police officers on MTA light rail on the basis of the fact that the defendantâs Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. The judge for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the defendantâs motion for suppression of evidence, and the defendant was convicted of firearms offenses, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. The defendant then filed an appeal with the court of special appeals, which held that the appellant was illegally seized and that the appellantâs motion for suppression of evidence should have been granted, reversing the appellantâs convictions. The State of Maryland then submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals proceedings occurred in September 2020, and at the time of writing this report, the court had not issued a ruling. The two issues identified for the petition are (Maryland Court of Appeals 2020): 1. Does the Maryland Transit Administrationâs practice of fare inspection on light rail comply with the Fourth Amendment? 2. If fare inspection does not comply with the Fourth Amendment, did the discovery of an open warrant for respondentâs arrest nevertheless attenuate the violation under Utah v. Strieff, 136Â S. Ct. 2056 (2016), where any unconstitutionality of the Maryland Transit Administra- tionâs fare inspection practice was not previously established?

Findings and Applications 145  While the decision in City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams does not hold precedent, depend- ing on the outcome of the State of Maryland v. Kennard Carter, the appeal may have precedent on lower courts. In another court case, State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama (2018), a judge for the Multnomah County Circuit Court issued an opinion that the proof-of-payment inspection con- ducted by a civilian TriMet supervisor in the presence of a police officer was a search under the Oregon Constitution and that it did not meet all of the requirements for a valid administrative search. Therefore, the court ruled the stop of the defendant was unlawful under Article 1, Sec- tion 9 of the Oregon Constitution, which protects against âunreasonable search, or seizure,â and the violation was dismissed. The judge examined two legal issues: 1. Whether the proof-of-payment inspection was considered a stop (and therefore a seizure) under the Oregon Constitution and whether there was reasonable suspicion and, even if it was a stop, and 2. Whether a proof-of-payment inspection could be considered an administrative search, which is an exception to the prohibition on suspicionless searches. Administrative searches are an exception and are permissible under the Fourth Amendment without probable cause and individualized suspicion requirements. Waite (2005) found that [c]ertain characteristics of administrative searches are likely to be considered by a court in assessing the reasonableness of a search policy, whether or not the court engages in an actual administrative search analysis. Those characteristics are: furthering administrative rather than criminal purposes; creating an established procedure that limits discretion and sets the parameters for the searches; and limiting the intrusiveness of the search consistent with meeting the administrative need that justifies the search. In Oregon, Weber v. Oakridge School District (2002) established four conditions that must be met for valid administrative search: 1. The search must be ânoncriminalâ in nature, 2. The search must be properly authorized by a âpolitically accountable lawmaking body,â 3. The search must be âdesigned and systematically administered so that it involves no exercise of discretion by the law enforcement person directing the search,â and 4. The scope of the search must be âreasonable in relation to its purpose.â Based on this precedent, the judge in State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama con- cluded that TriMetâs procedures satisfied Conditions 3 and 4 but did not satisfy Conditions 1 and 2. For the first condition, the judge concluded that since an individual could be charged with a crime such as theft, fare inspection was not noncriminal. For the second condition, the judge concluded that the stateâs position that the legislative assembly authorized the search was attenuated and unpersuasive. Like the decision in City of Cleveland v. Ronnie Williams, which did not require GCRTA to discontinue the use of transit police for proof-of-payment inspections, the decision in State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama did not result in binding precedent or prohibit TriMet from having police present during fare enforcement or use civilian personnel for fare inspec- tions. Nonetheless, both GCRTA and TriMet updated their policies or procedures in response to the rulings: ⢠GCRTA modified its fare enforcement procedures and discontinued proof-of-payment inspections. Transit police officers can still observe fare payment at TVMs at ungated rail and BRT stations and at the fare gates at the Tower City Station and cite individuals observed fare evading. On BRT, while passengers can purchase fares off board at TVMs and board through any door, they must proceed to the front of the bus to have their fare inspected by the bus operator when transit police officers are not present at the stop (Allard 2017; Schmitt 2017).

146 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion ⢠TriMet revised TriMet Ordinance 351 to address the first two conditions of the test for a valid administrative search. The revisions clarified that the fare evasion is noncriminal and that the only penalties will be a warning, civil citation, or exclusion. The revisions also clarified that TriMet is properly authorized by a politically accountable lawmaking body in accordance with Oregon Revised Statutes (TriMet 2018c). Further, prior to the court ruling, TriMet had already reduced the presence of police during fare enforcement activities. Moving forward, U.S. transit agencies need to be sensitive to the use of sworn peace officers for proof-of-payment inspections. Of the transit agencies surveyed for TCRP A-45, only Metro Transit uses sworn peace officers to regularly conduct proof-of-payment inspections. While RTD transit police officers have authority to inspect fares, they do not generally conduct fare enforcement. 3.8 Fare Policy and Customer Education In addition to providing direct deterrents to fare evasion, such as fare inspections and penal- ties for violations, fare policies can work to reduce and prevent both intentional and uninten- tional fare evasion, particularly when combined with customer education campaigns. Policies that simplify a fare structure to make it easier for passengers to understand and use the system, offer accessible and affordable fare options, and facilitate and encourage fare prepayment can effectively reduce fare evasion when combined with educating the public about how to pay, the importance of paying fares, and the impacts of fare evasion on fare revenue. Educational cam- paigns provide opportunities to inform both the general public and transit passengers about the overall system design and specific features of the fare system, including the consequences of nonpayment for both passengers (e.g., the penalties for fare evasion, including the possibility of a criminal citation) and the transit agency (e.g., the impacts of lost fare revenue on the ability to sustain service and the costs of handling fare evasion). 3.8.1 Fare Simplification, Passes, and Affordability One challenge in designing a fare structure is to consider how to use fare policy in combina- tion with fare collection technology to help passengers avoid either inadvertent or intentional misuse of the fare system. This implies a clear concept of the fare collection system that can be effectively enforced and reinforced by clear and easy-to-understand fare policies. Fare simplifi- cation has been suggested as one way to reduce fare evasion by making it easier to understand fares, where and how to purchase them, and how they are collected. Prepaid passes, transfers, and affordable fares can also assist in enabling and facilitating proof-of-payment fare collection and reducing fare evasion. Passengers with inaccurate knowledge of a transit system and its fares are more likely to violate fare payment requirements, whether intentionally or not. Many transit agencies have published rider guides to provide information about how to use the transit system, including information on fare product options and usage rules, how to pay the fare, where to purchase a fare, and any proof-of-payment requirements, along with route maps and schedules (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). That information is also commonly available on agency websites, often in a downloadable or printable format. In any format, fare information can be difficult to under- stand, especially for people who are unfamiliar with transit and how fare payment works and for those with limited proficiency in English. While passenger guides are often published in accordance with a transit agencyâs language assistance plan (typically English and the next- most-common language in the service area, which is often Spanish) they are of limited use for individuals who cannot read those languages. See Section 3.8.2, Customer Education.

Findings and Applications 147  3.8.1.1 Fare Simplification Audits and studies of fare enforcement and revenue protection procedures have made the case that complex fare structures are more difficult to understand and use and that simplifying them may reduce fare evasion (Horizon Research Corp. 2002; Fürst and Herold 2018; King County Auditorâs Office 2009; City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; Dauby and Kovacs 2007). A Horizon Research Corp. (2002) study of the fare evasion rate on LA Metroâs rail system and factors that affect fare evasion concluded that simplifying fares and increasing understand- ing of fare payment on the rail system was part of the solution to reducing fare evasion. Using a survey to understand factors that influence fare evasion (knowledge of the fare system, TVM access, and passenger characteristics), the study found that fare evaders were likely to be passen- gers who did not understand the system, infrequent transit users, and passengers who used but had difficulty accessing a working TVM, in addition to younger passengers and lower-income passengers. The studyâs regression model predicted that improving the knowledge of the system and making it easier to obtain tickets could reduce the evasion rate by 30%. This could be accom- plished by improving signage about LA Metro rules and fares, improving accessibility to fare media (e.g., through signage about how to access fare media when TVMs are out of order), and reducing the variety of fare products offered and the rules for fare usage and inspection. While controlling fare evasion may best be accomplished through decisions made during system design and through enforcement practices and penalties, fares that are easy for passengers to understand and use are more likely to minimize the possibility of misinterpretation and reduce evasion. Dauby and Kovacs (2007) contend that while distance-based fares are more equitable, they facilitate overriding when they are difficult to understand, which is a problem that simpler flat fares do not present. Public transportation experts at 30 European transit agencies surveyed by Fürst and Herold (2018) generally agreed that simple and understandable fare tariffs, along with more intensive fare inspections, escalating fines, and expanding electronic ticketing, are most effective for reducing fare evasion. However, fare simplification can be challenging for market-based fare structures, which are developed to more narrowly define and price fare products to specific market segments on the basis of customer characteristics. Common pricing strategies, such as distance-based fares and peak surcharges or off-peak discounts, leverage customersâ travel patterns to set higher fares for more expensive, longer trips and for trips during more crowded peak hours, when capacity is lower. King County Metro simplified the fare structure over several years following a 2009 perfor- mance audit that recommended simplifying fares and eliminating the downtown Seattle Ride Free Area to reduce fare evasion and underpayment (King County Auditorâs Office 2009). Sub- sequently, King County Metro simplified the fare structure by eliminating the Ride Free Area in 2012, following an assessment of its costs and benefits and the fare evasion implications of pay-on-exit fare policies for trips outbound from the Ride Free Area. The fare structure, which was differentiated by passenger category and discount qualifications, time of day, and zone boundaries, was further simplified in 2018 by eliminating off-peak and zoned fares. Regional fare coordination and integration can also help simplify fare payment, especially in regions with multiple transit agencies. With the 2009 implementation of the ORCA fare pay- ment system, the Seattle regionâs operators achieved a level of fare coordination that is unique in the United States. The agencies agreed to set their cash fares in $0.25 increments, create a regional Puget Pass that is accepted by all participating agencies, set monthly Puget Pass prices by using a multiple of 36, and share revenues from Puget Pass sales on the basis of use. Pas- sengers who need to use a more expensive service can purchase a higher-priced pass or pay an upgrade charge.

148 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion While the regional Puget Pass and interagency transfer agreements enable passengers to more seamlessly transfer between transit agencies, the agenciesâ differing fare policies and enforcement programs remain a source of customer confusion. King County Metro (2020) noted in Annual Report on King County Metro Fare Enforcement and Fare Violation Programs that, despite the fare coordination achieved through ORCA, adjudication of fare violations issued on proof-of- payment services operated in King County by Metro and Sound Transit is neither coordinated nor consistent. Customers contact King County Metro about citations that they have received on Sound Transitâs light rail or commuter rail services, expecting that King County Metro should be able to help resolve those violations. The differences in the two agenciesâ adjudication programs are also difficult to explain (King County Metro has an in-house adjudication process, while Sound Transit uses the court system). King County Metroâs 2020 report on Fare Enforcement and Fare Violation Programs notes that better alignment of reduced fare programs, transfer processes, and fare enforcement models could reduce fare violations and improve outcomes for passengers affected by fare enforcement. 3.8.1.2 Prepaid Passes Prepaid passes valid for a defined time period (e.g., a fixed calendar month or a rolling 31-day pass) can encourage passengers to purchase fares prior to boarding, making it possible to collect fare revenue in advance. Prepaid passes provide convenience for passengers and are typically priced to provide an incentive to prepay but require a means of selling paper passes or adding passes to a smart card or a mobile device and collecting revenue off-board through TVMs, retail outlets, online, or electronically. Overall, prepaid passes increase the likelihood that passengers will have purchased a fare prior to boarding and reduce the chances of fare evasion. Even passengers who inadvertently forget their prepaid pass or neglect to tap will have paid the fare, which the agency will likely have collected in advance. Data from Zurichâs suburban transport system suggest that fare enforcement, combined with prepaid passes, resulted in a significant reduction in rates of fare evasion. The transport system introduced attendants on late evening trains with the intent of reducing fear of crime and concerns about passenger safety. These personnel were also tasked with checking fares. In an analysis of the resulting fare inspection data, Killias et al. (2009) observed that there was a significant reduction in evasion rates during the day as well as on the evening trains. Fare evaders purchased passes, recognizing that it would be âfar more rational (in economic terms) to buy a [prepaid] season [pass] and have full access to the public transport system than to buy (relatively expensive) tickets for single trips during the evening and to continue traveling without a ticket during the day.â In addition to prepaid passes, corporate and institutional universal pass programs can also help increase fare compliance by giving all participants a pass. In some cases, however, pricing or billing for these programs is based on utilization, necessitating that participants tap their card for each boarding. This can be difficult to enforce on proof-of-payment services. In addition to educating employers and students, clear policies on tapping requirements are necessary to educate customers and to assist in fare enforcement effectiveness. Transfers can also minimize fare evasion on proof-of-payment systems that connect with gated systems. Fare evasion tends to be lower when bus stops are located near gated or inter- modal stations, where passengers transferring at these locations are more likely to have already paid their fare on the gated system. In Santiago, Chile, where transfers on the Transantiago system are free, passengers transferring from the gated subway to buses at a nearby bus stop are likely to have already paid and have no need to avoid tapping to âevadeâ an additional fare (Guarda et al. 2016; Cantillo et al. 2018). See Section 3.1.4.2, Structural Factors That Influence Fare Evasion.

Findings and Applications 149  3.8.1.3 Affordability Affordability is a key factor in fare evasion. The Horizon Research Corp. (2002) found that on LA Metroâs rail system, not having enough money was the reason most frequently given for not having a valid fare. While surveys may indicate that transit passengers rate the cost of fares as relatively less important than service quality (e.g., frequency, crowding, safety, and reliability), Higashidem and Buchanan (2019) found that priority rankings vary by income and that fare costs are a more important issue to lower-income bus riders. On the basis of an online survey of individuals in seven large U.S. cities who use transit at least once a week, the study concluded that bus passengers, regardless of income, rated the cost of fares as less important than service quality. Nevertheless, lower-income bus passengers were more likely than higher-income bus passengers to name fares as a more important issue. Among survey respondents who are bus passengers, 16% from households making more than $75,000 identified fares as an important issue to be addressed, while 25% from households making less than $25,000 did. Among rail pas- sengers, there was no difference. The study hypothesized that this might possibly be because the rail services are expensive enough that even high-income passengers find them costly. Overall, while frequency of service, crowding, safety, and reliability are more important issues than fares, even for low-income bus passengers, offering discounted fares to low-income passengers may have merit, making it possible to minimize service impacts while offering subsidies (Higashidem and Buchanan 2019). In efforts to address the affordability of transit fares and the impacts of penalties for fare vio- lations on low-income passengers, transit agencies in several cities have developed and imple- mented income-based reduced fare programs. Transit agencies operating in King County in Washington implemented ORCA LIFT, one of the first largeâscale low-income fare programs in the United States. Several agencies have since implemented similar programs, including Metro Transit, NYCT, RTD, and TriMet. These programs offer discounted fares, and some offer dis- counted passes. These programs require means-testing to determine eligibility. Most programs peg income eligibility to the federal poverty level. Predecessors to these low-income fare pro- grams, many of which are still in operation (LA Metro), offer discounts on passes. In addition to reduced fares for low-income passengers, some transit agencies offer free fares for very-low-income or no-income passengers: ⢠Transit agencies in King County (King County Metro, Sound Transit, City of Seattle Depart- ment of Transportation) offer a fully subsidized annual pass for individuals with incomes at 80% or less of the federal poverty level. Eligibility for this program depends on enrollment in one of six state benefit programs. Eligible customers can enroll through designated agencies (Department of Social and Health Services, Public HealthâSeattle and King County, Catholic Community Services). ⢠Valley Transportation Authorityâs UPLIFT (Universal Pass for Life Improvement from Transportation) program is a partnership of, and subsidized by, Santa Clara County, the City of San Jose, and Valley Transportation Authority that makes quarterly transit passes avail- able to clients receiving case management services and who are experiencing homelessness or are at risk of homelessness, in order to help them get housing or employment by improv- ing access to transit. ⢠Also in the Bay Area, SFMTAâs program Free Muni for Youth, Seniors, and Persons with Dis- abilities provides free fares for individuals who self-certify that they are eligible for one of the programs. Eligibility is based on 100% of the Bay Area median income. ⢠LA Metroâs LIFE (Low-Income Fare is Easy) Regional Rides provides 20 free regional transit rides per month on services operated by LA Metro and 12 of the municipal transit agencies in Los Angeles County. The benefit is available to individuals with incomes at or less than 100% of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Poverty Guidelines for

150 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Los Angeles County and requires an application and proof of income. Alternatively, LIFE transportation assistance may be applied toward the purchase of a pass on one of the partici- pating transit agencies. To increase affordability, transit agencies may offer free transfers, and some are eliminating distance-based fares and implementing fare capping. Free transfers can eliminate the financial burden associated with less-convenient trips that necessitate transfers. In addition to making fares easier to understand, eliminating distance-based fares can help address challenges with the suburbanization of poverty and implications of distance-based pricing as lower-income house- holds are pushed to the outer parts of a region. King County Metro eliminated its zone-based fare structure in 2018, removing the fare boundary between Seattle and all areas outside of the city, including substantial parts of King County as well as two adjacent counties that King County Metro serves. There has also been increasing interest in fare capping, which addresses some of the up-front financial burden associated with purchasing a pass. Fare capping can also introduce oppor- tunities to expand the retail network, improving access to electronic fare media especially in underserved communities. Fare capping has been implemented by TriMet, The Rapid, and Transport for London, among others. With fare capping, a fare is deducted for each boarding, and fares are accumulated until the fare cap is reached. After that point, the passenger travels at no additional cost for the rest of the period (e.g., day, week, month). While fare capping eliminates the prepayment that characterizes prepaid pass products, it provides an affordable option, particularly for individuals who are unable to afford the one-time up-front cost of a monthly or weekly pass or are sufficiently uncertain of their travel needs to commit to purchas- ing a pass for a defined period. 3.8.1.4 Free Fares Several transit agencies are exploring free fares as a means of attracting additional ridership, particularly where ridership has dropped. Offering free fares eliminates inequities in afford- ability and expands opportunities for low-income passengers by eliminating financial barriers. In addition, free fares can encourage new passengers to use transit and existing passengers to increase their use of transit. Significant perceived benefits also include eliminating the costs of fare collection and enforcement and associated fare disputes and conflicts between passengers and operators. Free fares may also result in operational improvements such as faster boarding, reduced dwell times, improved service speeds and schedule adherence, and reduced green- house gas emissions (Center for Economic Information 2020; Houston Metro 2020; Perone and Volinski 2003). Nonetheless, free fares pose challenges, most significantly from the consequences of increases in ridership and their potential impact on service quality, lost fare revenues, and potential increases in operating and capital costs. Lost fare revenues affect an agencyâs financial sustain- ability and, therefore, must be replaced, necessitating an increase in transit subsidies from other sources (Egu and Bonnel 2020; Fürst and Herold 2018; Sanderson 2020). Significant ridership gains can cause overcrowding and service reliability issues, leading to increased operating and maintenance costs and capital investments to maintain service standards and provide additional service and capacity to meet demand (Houston Metro 2020; Sharon Greene & Associates et al. 2008). Overcrowding and its impacts on service quality may also affect the agencyâs public image, and instead of decreasing boarding times by eliminating fare collection, increased ridership may increase boarding times and negatively affect schedule adherence (Perone and Volinski 2003). In the United States, in order to comply with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), implementing free fares on fixed-route services also requires free fares on ADA paratransit services, since ADA service pricing is based on comparable fixed-route fares.

Findings and Applications 151  Another concern with free fares is their potential to harm the public image of a transit agency. Perone (2002) discussed free fare demonstrations on Capital Metro, RTD, and Mercer Metro systems (a New Jersey bus system now called NJ Transit Mercer, Inc.), focusing primarily on Capital Metroâs 15-month demonstration in 1989â1990. While free fares can eliminate a barrier to using transit, fares do pose a âbarrier to problem riders.â Without fares, transit agencies attract passengers without destinations, who use transit vehicles and facilities primarily for shelter, âcausing a deterioration in the service, image, and comfort of a given transit systemâ (Perone 2002). While the data indicate that Capital Metroâs free-fare experiment increased rider ship by about 10% (after adjustments for normal ridership growth and service expansion), there were significant concerns that the passengers who were attracted included individuals who made other passengers uncomfortable and created negative perceptions of the transit system that drove away both regular passengers and the âchoiceâ riders (i.e., passengers with other travel options) that the agency was seeking to attract. Passengers complained about safety and service quality, and those who left the system were not quick to return after Capital Metro invested in security or after free fares were discontinued. On the basis of Capital Metroâs and Mercer Metroâs experiences, Perone and Volinski (2003) concluded that âriders do not immedi- ately return to the system once theyâve been driven out. . . . [T]he system must prove itself over time to disenfranchised riders.â As a way of achieving fare policy goals, several studies have suggested that free fares are best suited to policy goals that seek to increase ridership and less suited to policies that are not directly tied to fares, such as congestion management and air quality. There is little evidence that free fares have made significant contributions to shifting mode choice to transit from autos. Instead, ridership shifts primarily from walk/bicycle or is induced (trips that would not otherwise have been made) (Fearnley 2013; Perone 2002; Perone and Volinski 2003). Cats et al. (2016), how- ever, found that following the introduction of free fares in Tallinn, Estonia, the shares of both walk trips and auto trips decreased and that the average length of a walk trip was unchanged, but the average auto trip length increased, resulting in an increase in total car miles traveled. Importantly, most passengers, including low-income passengers, prefer service improvements to fare reductions and are more sensitive to changes in travel time and service improvements and relatively insensitive to changes in price or payment systems (Nguyen 2019b; Perone and Volinski 2003; Higashidem and Buchanan 2019). Overall, free fares may be better suited to smaller transit systems in smaller communities, where there is less fare revenue to recover, or transit systems where the cost of fare collection and enforcement exceeds fare revenue (Perone 2002; Fearnley 2013). Ongoing research for TCRP Project J-11/Task 39, âEvaluation Framework for Fare-Free Public Transportation,â is considering the merits and trade-offs of free fare programs. 3.8.2 Customer Education The goal of educating passengers about fares, fare enforcement, and the consequences of fare evasion is to reduce evasion by helping passengers understand fare requirements and the impacts of fare evasion on transit services in order to promote a more fare-compliant culture. In an audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) observed that TTC should educate passengers about the impact of fare evasion on the overall well-being of the transit system because raising customer awareness of the impact of fare evasion benefits all passengers by reducing revenue losses and alleviating the need to raise fares. Transit agencies use a variety of techniques to educate passengers and promote fare-compliant behavior. Key elements of the customer education process include engaging the public in plan- ning for changes in the fare system and delivering effective fare campaigns.

152 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion 3.8.2.1 Customer Education Through Public Engagement Efforts Public engagement provides opportunities for transit agencies to involve passengers, com- munities, stakeholders, and the general public in the process of considering changes, for example, to the fare enforcement program. This process is bidirectional, providing opportunities for agencies to educate stakeholders about the opportunities and challenges associated with fare evasion and fare enforcement and for stakeholders to educate transit agency staff by sharing their perspectives and feedback. Transit agencies are engaging the public and community stakeholders to better understand the diversity of public perceptions on particular issues related to fare evasion and fare enforce- ment. King County Metro, Sound Transit, TriMet, and TTC are among transit agencies that have engaged community organizations and other external stakeholders in discussions about their fare enforcement programs, including the equity of fare enforcement penalties and how fare enforcement is performed, particularly for low-income and other vulnerable populations. In some cases, agencies have employed innovative approaches (e.g., listening sessions in iden- tified communities, surveys administered by fare enforcement personnel, work groups with representative organizations or individuals) to secure participation from populations that might not otherwise have provided input into the discussions or had an opportunity to inform decision-making. King County Metro has established working relationships with a variety of community orga- nizations that provide feedback on initiatives undertaken by the agency. When King County Metro undertook revisions to its fare enforcement model, the agency established a work group of community organizations and transportation advocacy groups, including those that repre- sent vulnerable populations. The work group provided information and perspectives on how alternative resolution options might affect the populations that they represent. King County Metro continues to work with these community organizations and others and has involved them recently in developing a public education campaign aimed at countering misperceptions about the role of uniformed fare enforcement officers on King County Metro vehicles in a community that is sensitive to ICE agents. Partnering organizations helped ensure that translations for the nine most widely spoken languages in the county were provided, both in printed materials and during outreach events. These efforts have helped riding communities know what fare enforce- ment is and what they can expect to see and experience when fare enforcement personnel board a vehicle. See Box 3-12 for an overview of issues identified by the King County Metro work group on Fare Enforcement Policies and Procedures. As TriMet undertook the development of a new fare violation resolution process, TriMetâs Director of Legal Services emphasized the importance of conducting meaningful outreach and engagement with community stakeholders. These partners helped shape changes to the exist- ing citation process as well as decisions about resolution timelines and alternative resolution options. With the involvement of community stakeholders and partners, TriMet implemented a process to administratively resolve citations directly with TriMet before unresolved citations are sent to the courts. TriMet has also integrated community participation as the agency reimagines public safety. Engagement has included community-wide listening sessions to gather feedback from passengers, frontline employees, and community members on how to provide security that is free from bias. TTCâs Community Engagement Unit in the Special Constable Service Department con- ducts community outreach and public awareness efforts with city agencies, partners, and other community stakeholders. In addition to educating the community on TTCâs fare enforce- ment approach, the Community Engagement Unit has been involved in recruiting candidates from diverse communities. Public consultations are planned to collect input on TTCâs fare Public engagement is also discussed in Section 3.4.2.4, Customer and Stakeholder Feedback, but in the context of program management and identification of opportunities to improve the performance of fare enforcement programs. See the discussion of public engagement in Section 3.4.2.4, Customer and Stakeholder Feedback.

Findings and Applications 153  Box 3-12. King County Metro Work Group on Fare Enforcement Policies and Procedures The work groupâs collective, overarching goal was to increase access to public transportation for underserved communities and address disparate impact on low-income and minority passengers. To achieve this goal, King County Metro and its partners needed to reimagine a fair and just fare enforcement model that accomplishes the following: ⢠Secures access to transit and payment of fares while acknowledging and addressing the barriers that affordability and enforcement can present to some; ⢠Ensures that low-income residents can use public transit without fear of being criminally penalized because of their level of resources; ⢠Significantly reduces disproportionate negative impacts and experiences for people of color, immigrants and refugees, and those with low or no income; and ⢠Builds a transit system where all feel safe, comfortable, and have easy access to help when needed. Work Group partners also identified underlying issues that King County Metro could commit to addressing to further the implementation of an equitable fare enforcement system: ⢠Information and outreach. Because many passengers may not know what payment options, subsidies, benefits, and programs are available to them, King County Metro should leverage the face-to-face time that fare enforcement officers have with customers and create more opportunities for fare enforcement officers to act as ambassadors. For example, fare enforcement officers can provide passengers with information on how to pay and on reduced fare options such as ORCA LIFT. ⢠Capital infrastructure. Because many people may not be accustomed to using off-board payment systems or may not have adequate opportunity to pay or load their cards when trying to catch a bus or train, King County Metro should expand and enhance opportunities for passengers to pay. For example, install ORCA card readers near the back of buses and add additional places to load funds on ORCA cards. ⢠Affordability. Because people with very low or no income cannot afford the fare but still have ongoing mobility needs (and are disproportionately affected by fines), King County Metro should continue to review fare structure and programs to find ways to give access to public transportation to those needing it most. ⢠Decreasing bias. Because people of color, people with limited English proficiency, and those with mental health conditions may feel disproportionately unsafe interacting with fare enforcement officers (and are likely to experience bias in interactions), King County Metro should consider increasing race and social justice training for fare enforcement officers, improving hiring practices, demilitarizing uniforms of officers, and looking for opportunities to help decrease escalation and potentially dangerous situations in protocol. ⢠Data collection. Because King County Metro does not have adequate information on who does not pay and why, on whether there are disproportionate impacts by race, and on the full extent of experiences with enforcement, King County Metro should move to âeducation modeâ quickly, work with paid focus groupsâ both before and after implementation of the Fare Violation Programâand leverage the planned fare evasion study to include questions on enforcement. ⢠Ongoing improvement of customer experience in enforcement. Because it is in the best interest of King County Metro and its passengers to move quickly to decriminalize the fare enforcement program and revise and improve the program as more information is obtained, King County Metro should build in ongoing review and evaluation of the fare enforcement program through data, focus groups, and surveys. ⢠Cross-agency coordination. Because King County Metro strives to provide a seamless transit service with its partner agencies, enforcement procedures should be consistentâregardless of where you ride. King County Metro should work with Sound Transit and Community Transit and any other agencies that use fare enforcement to ensure a consistent experience for all passengers. Source: King County Metro 2019.

154 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion enforcement policies, systems, and practices, including TTCâs discretion policy, uniform design ideas, body-worn camera pilot, complaint procedures, and anti-racism policy. TTC has also commissioned a third-party Racial Equity Impact Assessment of the policies and procedures that are in place to govern the enforcement, training, collection, retention, access, sharing, and destruction of personal information collected as part of the fare inspection program. In addition to analyzing historical enforcement data, experts from the University of Toronto will be conducting information sessions, focus groups, public town halls, and surveys to enable the public and community groups to share their experiences with special constables and fare inspectors. This will be an opportunity to obtain input with respect to collection of race- and ethnicity-based data and ideas to eliminate bias and improve community relations. Transit agencies are also increasing communication by using a variety of outreach methods to engage passengers and the public. As part of the ongoing evaluation of Sound Transitâs fare enforcement policies, the agency conducted a survey of onboard riders on light rail and com- muter rail services, a region-wide online survey, and listening sessions in locations meant to facilitate attendance from marginalized community members who might not respond to the survey efforts. By partnering with local community groups to reach communities of color and individuals in proximity to poverty, the listening sessions and surveys identified differences in attitudes or preferences toward fare enforcement across socioeconomic groups. The informa- tion gathered is helping guide internal work group conversations about future fare enforcement policies at Sound Transit. Transit agencies are also formalizing public engagement processes and forming committees to provide input on their transit and fare enforcement programs. Many transit agencies have long had citizen advisory committees and accessibility advisory committees that provide valu- able insights and feedback to agency staff. Some agencies are creating special committees to engage with representatives of the public on an ongoing basis. TriMetâs Director of Service Equity and Inclusion meets with community stakeholders and advocacy groups quarterly to foster ongoing communication and opportunities to openly address community concerns. In June 2020, LA Metroâs Board established a Transit Public Safety Advisory Committee to develop a community-based approach to public safety on the transit system. 3.8.2.2 Educational Campaigns and Strategies Transit agencies are implementing strategies to reduce fare evasion by focusing on customer service and education to promote fare-compliant behavior instead of relying exclusively on issuing citations and assessing fines to penalize fare evasion. As TTC (2020a) has recognized, building a fare-compliant culture will, in turn, require resetting social norms âto disrupt nega- tive customer behaviorâ such as fare evasion, and will require continuing to educate customers and âemphasize the importance of tapping and paying proper fares while maintaining equity and respecting the dignity of our diverse customersâ (TTC 2020a). Accommodating the diver- sity of transit passengers in planning and delivering educational campaigns is part of the strategy for achieving the necessary culture shift. Educational campaigns can help passengers and the public understand the importance of paying fares as well as how to pay them and provide information on changes in fare enforce- ment programs. Transit agencies may conduct these campaigns as part of launching new fare enforcement initiatives, new fare collection systems, and new transit services as well as changes in fare payment requirements. Transit agencies are using a variety of methods to communicate with passengers and the public. Some of these tactics include deploying ambassadors to stops or stations, broadening public outreach by using the news and social media, enhancing signage, and translating materials into languages spoken in the community. See the discussion of fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

Findings and Applications 155  As part of changing social norms to create a fare-compliant culture, personnel responsible for planning customer education campaigns should understand fare evasion behavior and the motivations for them. González et al. (2019) observed that behavior in both fare payment and nonpayment reflects values, attitudes, and social norms and suggested that undifferentiated public education campaigns that do not clearly address specific issues are likely to be unsuccess- ful because they are ârarely relevant to those whose behaviors we want to change.â Factors that influence fare evasion include misunderstanding fare options and requirements. On Metro Transit and LA Metro, for example, passengers who do not accurately understand the fare system are more likely not to pay, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Especially in the case of infrequent riders, such as those traveling to a special event, passengers may not understand where or how to pay. For example, some Metro Transit passengers traveling to spe- cial events used park-and-ride lots to ride the proof-of-payment light rail system, but they did not have tickets because they thought they needed to pay on board (Metropolitan Council 2015). LA Metroâs fare evasion study found that some rail passengers did not understand the system well and that lack of knowledge contributed to nonpayment. Passengers who used a TVM rather than a prepaid pass were more likely to evade fare because it was difficult to determine what ticket to buy or what to do if the TVMs were out of order or because passengers were unable to find a TVM to buy a ticket. The study recommended fare simplification and improved signage, including information about what to do when TVMs were not working, to reduce fare evasion (Horizon Research Corp. 2002). As transit agencies introduce changes to operational and fare policies that may affect pas- sengersâ fare payment decisions, customer education is integral to explaining the changes and helping customers understand their options. In hindsight, transit agencies have also recognized the need to educate customers about existing fare payment and fare enforcement policies and practices. The Port Authority of Allegheny County, for example, designed a campaign to educate people who did not ride regularly and did not know when or where to pay, to make sure that they knew how to pay fares when boarding light rail (Blazina 2018). Significant opportunities for education occur during interactions between fare evaders and fare enforcement personnel (including station agents and ambassadors as well as fare inspec- tors). Several transit agencies are asking fare enforcement personnel to focus on customer edu- cation instead of issuing citations. Rather than making up for losses in fare revenue by writing citations and collecting fines, these agencies focus on fare recovery by educating potential fare evaders on how to pay and helping the individual purchase a fare. The materials distributed to individuals caught fare evading, whether as part of a warning or a citation, provide an opportunity to educate passengers on options for fare payment and resolution. TriMet places citations in envelopes printed with information about the options for resolving citations directly with TriMet. When handing the citation to an individual, fare inspectors explain the options for resolution, using the opportunity as an effective de-escalation tool. MTS has implemented a similar approach for its Fare Enforcement Diversion Program and has created special envelopes explaining resolution options in English and Spanish. The envelopes ensure that individuals receiving a citation are aware of community service options as well as other in-house options for citation resolution. For diversion programs that enable individuals to resolve citations directly with the transit agency before unresolved citations are transmitted to the courts, the envelope information about alternative resolution options is important, since the citation issued is a standard, legal uniform citation to be transmitted to the court if not resolved and voided. As part of the materials developed for King County Metroâs Fare Enforcement and Fare Vio- lation Programs, a Fare Violation Warning was developed that is given to passengers found not See the discussion of fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

156 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion to have valid proof of bus fare payment. The warning states that â[p]assengers riding on Metro are required to pay the fare prior to or upon boarding the bus per RCW 35.58.580(2)(a)â and asks the recipient to â[p]lease use this warning as an opportunity to become familiar with how to pay your bus fare and what represents a valid proof of paymentâ (King County Metro 2020). Parts of the warning are in languages that are commonly spoken in the region. The warning is shown in Figure 3-14. Along with the warning, the passenger is given a flyer that illustrates how to board and pay on both front-door-boarding regular King County Metro buses and all-door- boarding RapidRide buses (Figure 3-15). Transit agencies, particularly when they launch new fare enforcement initiatives, new fare collection systems, or new transit services, as well as changes in fare payment requirements, often conduct educational campaigns. Prior to beginning service on its first two SBS routes, NYCT conducted public information campaigns to inform passengers of the off-board proof- of-payment fare collection system for those routes and the fines for evading fare payment. Fare inspection and enforcement personnel and customer ambassadors were assigned during the first Source: King County Metro (2020). Figure 3-14. King County Metro fare violation warning.

Findings and Applications 157  2 weeks of service to introduce the proof-of-payment concept and explain the benefits of SBS service. Ambassadors also provided coverage when school opened to help students understand the new payment requirements. Signage in several languages was added on and in buses and on fare collector machines to remind passengers to âGet Ticket Here Before You Board Bus,â to keep the ticket with them for fare inspection, and to use all doors for boarding. In addition to signage at SBS stops, information on the MTA website explains how to obtain an SBS ticket using a MetroCard at a MetroCard fare collector or using exact change in coins at a coin fare collector. The coin fare collector in place today on the Q44 SBS route is shown in Figure 3-16. On buses with OMNY (One Metro New York smart card) readers, passengers with a contactless card or digital wallet do not need to obtain a ticket prior to boarding and may pay the fare by tapping the onboard OMNY reader. TTC has customer service agents located at its primary station entrances. The agency is in the process of having the customer service agents actively engaged at the fare line rather than in the booth. Positioning the customer service agents near the fare line helps them deter evasion and educate customers on fare compliance on an ongoing basis. There are also plans to leverage the TTC Special Constable Serviceâs Community Engagement Unit to collaborate with school authorities to address fare evasion by youth and students (TTC 2020a). Source: King County Metro (2020). Figure 3-15. King County Metro fare violation warning attachment.

158 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion A number of transit agencies surveyed deploy personnel to serve as ambassadors in addi- tion to their fare enforcement personnel. Valley Metro has permanent customer experience coordinators who work at stations to educate and answer questions but do not participate in fare enforcement. The MTA has used a combination of fare inspectors and transit ambassadors to make sure people know how to use the system, and exercises like fare sweeps to demonstrate that MTA is taking fare evasion seriously (Hoffman 2015). As SFMTA reintroduced fare collection and fare enforcement in fall 2020, following its suspension due to COVID-19, fare inspectors were deployed with ambassadors to explain fare programs to passengers who had not paid and engage with operators and passengers about safety and well-being. Multilingual communication, part of several agency campaigns mentioned above, is vital to the success of customer education campaigns. SFMTA, for example, has worked to broaden public awareness of its fare enforcement programs by conducting outreach in multiple languages, in accordance with its Language Assistance Plan, to educate passengers about the need to carry valid proof of payment at all times. SFMTA also uses multilingual automated bus announce- ments to notify passengers of these requirements. In addition to efforts to communicate in the languages of nine local communities, King County Metro has recognized the importance of transcreating materials into other languages to maintain the original tone, intent, style, and context of the message (King County Metro 2019). The Internet and transit agency websites can also be important sources of information about fares and fare requirements, including where and how to purchase fares and use smart cards and mobile ticketing apps. At one time, transit agencies regularly updated and printed ride guides that contained fare and schedule information. Today that information is available on agency websites, often in a downloadable and printable format. In addition to making information that was previously in ride guides more accessible, websites provide an opportunity to provide detailed instructions on how to pay the fare. For example, LA Metroâs website provides step-by- step illustrated instructions for performing a variety of fare-purchasing activities, such as buying Figure 3-16. NYCT SBS coin fare collectorââGet Ticket Here.â

Findings and Applications 159  single/multiple TAP cards, loading stored value, transferring stored value, and reloading senior reduced-fare TAP cards. Some transit agencies have taken these instructions a step further and posted tutorials and videos on their websites to help passengers understand how to pay the fare and other fare requirements. Metro Transitâs website includes a YouTube video that shows fare payment options and how to use them. One click connects customers with âmymetrotransit,â which provides a series of instructional videos about using Metro Transit. TriMetâs website reminds Hop customers to tap on every boarding and provides links to brief videos showing how to tap with different media. While websites and online materials help educate passengers in advance about how to pay and fare payment options, signage on vehicles, in stations, and at stops assists in meeting immediate information needs for passengers arriving to use transit, such as how to pay fares and to identify fare-paid areas and tapping requirements. Signage at these places may also provide information about the consequences of not paying and state all of that information in multiple languages. This signage is especially important for off-board fare-paid areas. 3.8.2.3 Unintended Consequences of Educational Campaigns In some cases, education campaigns have had unintended consequences, thus reinforcing the need to be sensitive to the message and its delivery and to understand and be prepared for possible consequences. The campaigns to change fare evasion behavior discussed here incurred unanticipated responses from the public and, in particular, accusations that the campaigns were insensitive to passengers who are unable to afford the fare. In Portland, following the introduction of the Hop Fastpass card and just prior to announcing that the number of fare inspectors would be quadrupled, TriMet initiated a âpay your share, pay your fareâ campaign that was intended to be a friendly reminder to passengers to pay fares and tap before boarding. TriMet pulled the advertising in response to complaints about the tone of the messaging, which some felt suggested that TriMet was insensitive to the passengers who could not afford fares. One board member noted that ââI also want us to be cautious about who weâre otheringâ and that there is a ââculture of fearâ among people who donât have documenta- tion of legal citizenship or who might be experiencing homelessness, that they might be singled out on transitâ (Theen 2019). In New York City, as part of an effort to reduce fare evasion and improve safety on NYCT services, MTA announced a plan in 2018 to deploy additional uniformed police officers, way- finders, and fare inspectors, enhance exit gates, add monitors and CCTV cameras, and add video technology at specific subway stations and bus routes. MTA also initiated an antiâfare evasion advertising campaign, with signage and audio announcements in buses, rail cars, and subway stations, that was intended to reduce fare evasion by deterring, not arresting, fare evaders with messages like âWeâd rather your $2.75 fare than your $100 fine.â In response, â#SwipeItForwardâ ads appeared using the MTA logo and mimicking the MTAâs âTogether, we can make a better systemâ with messages like âTogether, we can make a better world,â listing reasons someone might evade the fare and encouraging passengers to use their MetroCards to swipe others into the system. Overall, the pushback to MTAâs advertising campaign brought into question esti- mates of fare revenue losses, increased staffing expenditures, and additional surveillance tactics. Responses linked fare evasion to poverty and the inconvenience of limited and broken fare col- lection equipment, suggested bias in fare enforcement practices and procedures, and projected that the advertising campaign would cost more than the anticipated losses of fare revenue (Guse 2019; Stolper 2020). See Section 3.12.2.3, Expanded Fare-Paid Areas.

160 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion In Toronto, TTC experienced a similar reaction to campaigns intended to encourage passengers to pay fares and promote fare-compliant âtap every timeâ behavior by making the public aware of the impacts of fare evasion. TTC ran three campaigns: âFare is fair,â âPay your fare, pay your share,â and âThere is no excuse not to pay your fare.â The campaign strategies included digital and print advertising via ads in vehicles, decals above card readers, wrapped streetcars and light rail vehicles (see Figure 3-17), and messaging in TTCâs ride guides. Public responses to the campaigns questioned TTCâs lack of sensitivity to people who cannot afford the fare, objected to the punitive tone of the âThere is no excuse not to pay your fareâ advertising, and suggested that the money spent on the ads could be put to better use. 3.9 Public Perception of Fare Evasion and Passenger Security Fare payment requirements and fare enforcement practices influence how a transit system is perceived by the general public and transit passengers. If customers perceive that other passengers are not paying their fare or that a transit agencyâs service is subpar, they may be more likely not to pay their own fare. For some passengers, the presence of fare enforcement personnel may be reassuring, providing the sense that other passengers are being required to pay their fares and, possibly, a greater sense of security overall. The perception of security may also influence the perception of the management and performance of the transit system in general. These perceptions may be influenced by direct experiences as well as by the news media and social media. The following discussion considers the impact of fare evasion and fare enforcement on public and customer perceptions of security and public trust in transit agencies. Source: TTC 2020b. Figure 3-17. TTCâs customer communication campaign to promote positive âtap every timeâ culture.

Findings and Applications 161  3.9.1 Public Perception of Fare Evasion The act of using public transit places passengers in a social contract with a transit agency. This social contract has two key terms: 1. Passengers are expected to comply with the transit agencyâs rules and ordinances governing passenger behavior, including paying the fare for the service consumed. 2. The transit agency is expected to provide good and useful service. Each of these contract terms influences the other, as adherence to them by either party improves or declines. Some transit agencies have developed codes of conduct and made them available in formats designed to be shared with the public. These codes of conduct provide a list of rules to âcontrol the safety, security, and quality of life of people while utilizing the transit systemâ (WSP 2018). In Los Angeles, the Metro Customer Code of Conduct compiles the ordinances adopted by the Metro Board of Directors to define violations, including fare evasion, that are subject to citation and LA Metroâs administrative resolution process, as well as the penalties and appeal process. Compliance with the code of conduct is a condition of use of an LA Metro vehicle, facility, or property. The Metro Customer Code of Conduct is available on LA Metroâs website (LACMTA 2018b). Similarly, the King County Council passed an ordinance that regulates passenger con- duct on King County Metro property. The ordinance identifies actions that are subject to civil or criminal (misdemeanor) penalties or an internal administrative process for managing fare evasion. The ordinance has been compiled in Ride Right, King County Metroâs code of conduct, which is available on the agencyâs website and confirms the social contract between the agency and its passengers: âEveryone benefits when you ride right. Transit passengers enjoy a safe, secure, comfortable and inviting atmosphere, and the overall efficiency of the transportation system improvesâ (King County Metro n.d.) LA Metro and King County also reiterate required compliance with the agencyâs code of conduct and fare payment requirements on their smart cards. LA Metroâs TAP card says âUse and possession is conditioned on compliance with transit agenciesâ agreements and policies, and laws, ordinances, regulations and tariffs.â The ORCA card stipulates âUse of this card is gov- erned by fare policies and other terms of use established by participating ORCA transit agencies. Current policies and terms are available at www.orcacard or from the ORCA transit agencies.â Some studies have made the case that when passengers have a negative perception of transit quality, they are more likely to evade fare payment because they feel that they should not need to pay for bad service. In an analysis of factors that affect fare evasion rates on Santiago, Chileâs, transit service, Guarda et al. (2015) suggest that such factors include dissatisfaction with the system and observing others evading, especially others in oneâs social group. They also note that equity issues related to the affordability of transit fares can increase fare evasion. Solutions to reduce crowding and make fare payment easier, such as additional buses, reduced headways, off- board payment stations, and back door smart card validators, can help to reduce fare evasion. Bus operators may also deter fare evasion by proximity or eye contact. Concerns about dissatisfaction with service are particularly relevant to the fare evasion chal- lenges experienced with the introduction of Transantiago in 2007, which was created to replace bus services provided by 3,800 private operators who often owned their buses and accepted fares directly from passengers (Global Mass Transit Report 2017). A government authority was created to oversee the implementation and operation of Transantiago, which included a BRT network and feeder bus lines operated by 16 large companies as well as Santiagoâs metro and commuter rail systems. The rollout of the new system created major route changes, the service See Section 3.1.4, Factors That Influence Fare Evasion, and Section 3.6.2.4, System Design Factors.

162 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion design required transfers that involved long wait times, and the fare system no longer accepted cash but relied instead on smart cards for fare payment on all modes throughout the system. Some key elements of system design were not in place at rollout, which resulted in service quality and coverage issues, crowding, and fare evasion. The changes were not communicated well, so that passengers were left confused and alienated. In response, some senior government officials proposed that passengers should not be asked to pay the fare until the system performed well. Guarda et al. (2015) observed that, in Santiago, fare evaders were still arguing in 2015 that they should not be required to pay since they still perceived the system as working less than well. Perceptions of fare evasion can also influence public perception of the competence of an agencyâs management and its corporate image. On proof-of-payment services, passengers with prepaid fares such as monthly passes do not need to stop at a TVM to purchase or validate a ticket, giving the erroneous impression that they have not paid. For passengers who regularly purchase a ticket, visible fare enforcement may influence their respect for the transit system and their trust that public funds are well-managed. Lee (2011), in a study of fare evasion in SFMTAâs proof-of-payment system, concluded that, although the vast majority of passengers pay the appropriate fare, those who do not pay frustrate other passengers, who understand that this reduces the revenue available to support transit oper- ations. Public perception that fare evasion was widespread had a negative impact on SFMTA, making it difficult to gain the political and financial resources necessary to improve service, whether through outside governmental funding sources or fare increases. Lee (2011) concludes that readily visible forms of fare evasion, such as entering through a back door without paying, âcan shape public impressions of a transit system and its management. In contrast, creating the expectation that one might encounter a transit fare inspector anywhere, anytime, can lower perceived and actual fare evasion and increase public respect for the system.â Transparency about rates of fare evasion and education of passengers on how to use the system and what constitutes fare evasion can help respond to public perception of high levels of fare evasion. In 2015, WBAL-TV in Baltimore, reported that, although the Maryland Transit Administrationâs fare evasion rate was half the national average, the agency still faced percep- tions that people were not paying their fares. Part of this was likely because 74% of passengers used some form of fare prepayment, so passengers who purchased a single fare might have been concerned that others were fare evading when they boarded a train without first going to a TVM (Hoffman 2015). To address this perception, the Maryland Transit Administration used transit ambassadors as well as fare enforcement personnel to increase both fare enforcement and efforts to educate the public on the proper use of the system. The agencyâs administrator observed that âthis initiative is as much about educating riders on how to use our system, (as) it is about the small percentage of people who try and ride for freeâ (Hoffman 2015). In addition to education, establishing policies to promote consistency in fare payment can also help address the perception that passengers with prepaid fares, such as passes, are fare evading. A number of transit agencies (King County Metro, TransLink, TriMet, TTC, Sound Transit) require smart card passengers, including passholders, to âtap every time.â While agencies may implement âtap every timeâ policies for a variety of reasons, including ridership data (TransLink) and revenue allocation (King County Metro, TriMet, Sound Transit), these policies also help dispel misperceptions that passengers with prepaid passes or valid transfers are fare evading and thus improve the perception of fare compliance. Transit agencies are also focusing on developing âfare-compliant culturesâ to combat âevasion contagionâ and decrease fare evasion and the perception of fare evasion. Establishing a fare- compliant culture can attract the broad public support needed to operate an effective transit system.

Findings and Applications 163  Fare evasion is a major concern for TTC, as revenue losses contribute to the need for fare increases and create inequities for paying passengers. To protect itself from revenue loss due to fare evasion, TTC is focused on promoting a fare-compliant culture characterized by social norms that reinforce fare compliance and discourage negative customer behavior. TTC is reinforcing this culture, both internally and externally, through a combination of public outreach and improvements to internal procedures. Agency representatives are leading education efforts on fare policy and the consequences of noncompliance. TTC is also developing standard operating procedures for fare enforcement personnel to ensure equity and dignity for TTCâs diverse riding public (TTC 2020a). Increased presence can also increase perception of increased fare compliance. BART has found that, since proof-of-payment inspections in fare-paid areas were initiated in 2018, the increased uniformed presence that fare inspectors provide on trains and in stations has sent the message that all must pay their fair share, thereby deterring fare evasion, encouraging compli- ance, and promoting equity. While the perception of low-quality service and high fare evasion can influence fare evasion, and although the public generally views fare evasion negatively, the public may not view fare evasion as a serious offense. Fürst and Herold (2018) surveyed a number of experts in public transportation in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland on their impressions of public percep- tions of fare evasion and enforcement. Those experts believed that, while passengers who pay their fares âregard ticket controls as legitimate measures,â passengers may regard fare evasion as âsomewhat immoral, but do not see it as a major crime.â Further, the experts believed that some passengers do not understand that it is against the law. They also believed that fare evaders âdisregard the fact that more free riding results in higher ticket prices and, hence, the other passengers have to pay for the services they consume.â Due to the perception that fare evasion may not be a serious offense, increased fare enforce- ment can have a negative impact on public perception. Increased fare enforcement can also exacerbate public feelings about fare increases, sensitivities to over-policing, and concerns about criminalizing poverty. For instance, when NYCTâs president led an effort to increase fare enforcement following a fare increase starting in 2019, the public reacted negatively. To justify increased fare enforcement, NYCT advertised that it would lose about $300 million from fare evasion that year, and NYCTâs president tried to sway public opinion by arguing that â[e]very dollar that doesnât come to us, in terms of fares that should be paid, is a dollar that we canât improve in service.â However, activists and local residents saw heightened enforcement as dis- proportionately affecting low-income passengers and communities of color and questioned the use of funds to augment fare enforcement instead of to improve service (Nguyen 2019a). While the public may perceive failure to enforce fares negatively, some may feel empathy for the reasons that some passengers must evade fare. Local advocates in New York City organized movements/campaigns, including â#SwipeItForwardâ in response to a pass price increase in 2017, and âDonât Snitch. Swipe.â The â#SwipeItForwardâ movement asks people to help reduce fare evasion by using their MetroCard to âswipeâ potential fare evaders through a turnstile. As the movement notes, the practice is legal as long as the cardholder does not sell the swipe. Due to passback restrictions, passholders must wait 18 minutes between swipes, so most passengers swipe a person through a turnstile as they exit the station. More recently, a guerrilla campaign posted âDonât Snitch. Swipeâ fliers and signage in subway stations, encouraging passengers not to âsnitchâ when they see people not paying a fare. Instead they are asked to âswipeâ people who may not be able to pay the fare into the subway system, like the â#SwipeItForwardâ campaign. The âDonât Snitch. Swipe.â campaign plays on NYCTâs âTogether, we can make a better systemâ and encourages empathy for less fortunate riders, reading: âTogether, we can make a better world. See someone evading the fare? There could be a reason: Maybe they donât have $2.75. See the discussion of unintended consequences of educational campaigns in Section 3.8.2.2, Educational Campaigns and Strategies.

164 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Maybe they were laid off. Maybe thereâs an emergency and no time to refill. Maybe the Ticket machines are broken. Donât snitch. Swipeâ (Johnson 2019). Empathy for people who are unable to pay the fare can affect the opinions of fare-paying pas- sengers about how agencies should conduct enforcement and the associated penalties. In the fall of 2019, Sound Transit conducted an online survey of residents in the Sound Transit service area to learn about their experience with and understanding of fare enforcement practices and policies. Survey respondents self-selected to take the survey, which was promoted online. The majority of respondents said Sound Transit should consider changes to the fare enforcement program that would make penalties for fare evasion less onerous and focus more on creating fare-compliant behavior by educating fare violators first and penalizing them only as a last resort (Sound Transit 2020a). Survey responses indicated that Sound Transit should consider imple- menting changes similar to those being introduced by another Seattle-area transit agency, King County Metro. Specifically, Sound Transit (2020a) noted that participants in the online survey responded that the agency should ⢠Help passengers who cannot afford to pay (85%), ⢠Reduce fines from the current $124 for fare evasion citations (82%), ⢠Expand education outreach on the fare enforcement program to hard-to-reach communities (76%), ⢠Have fare enforcement officers offer on-the-spot information about reduced fare programs (75%), ⢠Forgive fines if the passenger enrolls in the regional reduced fare program for low-income riders (72%), and ⢠Increase the number of warnings (57%). A majority of online survey respondents also said fare enforcement should be suspended under certain conditions [e.g., for severe weather (90%), for the first day of school (77%), during major construction/service disruption (67%), and for homeless individuals who need to get out of the cold (60%)] (Sound Transit 2020a). 3.9.2 Media Influence It is not uncommon for media outlets to report on transit fare evasion, especially on systems with proof-of-payment services, and those reports can influence the publicâs perception of the severity of fare evasion. TCRP Synthesis 96 notes that media interest in the subject is legitimate because fare evasion is a form of fraud that results in loss of revenue for an agency, and any sub- sidy that makes up for this loss in revenue comes from taxpayer sources (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). The report goes on to say that transit agency management has an obligation to understand and publicly report information on fare compliance, through public performance reports and independent audits, for example. Social media has also changed the landscape in which fare evasion and fare inspection activ- ities occur. The prevalence of mobile phones and social media provide sources and outlets for passengers to share photos, videos, and testimonials of fare evasion or fare enforcement activities. This increased visibility can help hold fare enforcement personnel to a high standard of professionalism. In a videotape of an altercation on the TTC system between a passenger and fare inspectors, who were joined by Toronto Police Service officers who came to assist, a bystander captured the passenger saying âI didnât do anything, thoughâ and âyouâre hurting meâ (Ombudsman Toronto 2019). Local media picked up the story, publicizing the incident and leading to an investigation by TTC on the use of unnecessary force and anti-Black racism, which was followed by an Ombudsman Toronto review of TTCâs investigation. In its report,

Findings and Applications 165  Ombudsman Toronto (2019) observed that those accountability measures may not have been taken if witnesses had not had access to social media. Transit agencies may also have a self-interest in publishing fare compliance reports. Media reports showcasing fare evasion activities can make fare evasion seem more pervasive than it is, thereby angering taxpayers and potentially encouraging other passengers to evade fare pay- ment. When fare compliance rates are actually high, though, publicizing those statistics helps counter this narrative (PwC 2007). These reports can also influence public opinion of fare dodging by addressing the importance of fare compliance and the consequences of fare evasion. PTV in Melbourne, in response to public apathy toward fare evasion, rebranded fare evasion as âfreeloadingâ to impart a stronger negative connotation to the practice and advertised that the agency was increasing undercover fare inspection efforts (Hernández and Villanueva 2016). Following this effort, fare evasion rates fell from 11.6% to 7.3%. In other cases, though, testimonials spread through social media may incorrectly represent a fare enforcement situation and cause misplaced backlash against a transit agency. For example, fare enforcement officers were videotaped pinning a passenger in an incident at a Sound Transit light rail station. Although the video drew widespread criticism from the local community, Sound Transitâs director of public safety said the act was justified and actually helped to protect the people that the passenger had been harassing and threatening preceding the video. The use of force occurred only after the fare enforcement officers tried a number of de-escalation tech- niques that were ultimately unsuccessful. The director of public safety also explained that, in many cases, uses of force or restraint occur to protect a passenger from hurting him- or herself, for example, in attempts to jump in front of a moving train or other vehicle (Johnson 2018). Without context, social media reports of fare enforcement activities can turn public opin- ion against a transit agency. To counteract this, agencies monitor reports of fare enforcement events and respond quickly and effectively, by taking appropriate action against a fare enforce- ment employee when warranted or by educating the public on the justification for the enforce- ment tactic. Passengers have also begun using social media to alert other passengers about inspection practices and the location of enforcement personnel to help others successfully evade fare. In their review of expert opinions, Fürst and Herold (2018) found a consensus among public trans- portation experts that âthe use of social networks where groups inform people about places, lines and vehicles where controls are ongoing should be prohibited by law.â 3.9.3 Public Perception of Passenger Security TCRP Synthesis 96 surveyed transit agencies with proof-of-payment fare collection systems about passengersâ perceptions of security on their systems and found that 77% believed pas- sengers were at least moderately comfortable on their systems (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Recent studies have found that the uniformed presence provided by fare enforcement person- nel gives both passengers and the general public a sense of security about using transit systems, in some cases stemming from knowing that someone is available to respond to an emergency (Fürst and Herold 2018; King County Metro 2019). Several transit agencies have noted anecdotally that there are correlations between fare enforce- ment and perceptions of security. Metrolink System-Wide Security Assessment: Best Practices Report notes that âfare enforcement operations can help improve the perception of law and order in a systemâ (WSP 2018). Muniâs fare enforcement deployment strategy creates the impression that fare inspections occur randomly, anywhere and anytime on the system, thereby increasing security by providing a uniformed presence throughout the system (SFMTA 2014). DART has

166 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion also found a link between fare enforcement presence and an increased sense of security. Follow- ing an incident at a DART station in 2012 that left one passenger dead and injured another passenger and a DART police officer, DART increased its security efforts and redeployed police and fare enforcement officers to provide a uniformed presence on every train. DART also conducted sweeps at stations, added more police and fare enforcement officers at busy stations, increased sec urity guards on rail platforms and bus/rail transfer locations, and deployed another officer to a train if the assigned officer left to assist a passenger or respond to an incident (Schlosser 2012a). While passengers may perceive that fare enforcement personnel have the authority to respond to security-related incidents, the authority of personnel may be limited. In a report prepared for the LA Metro Inspector General in 2015, a team led by BCA Watson Rice LLP et al. (2015) cautioned against relying on security personnel responsible for fare enforcement responsibilities to provide a perception of security. The study examined options for providing additional law enforcement and security services in anticipation of extending Metroâs proof-of-payment light rail services. At that time, LA Metro contracted with the sheriffâs department (LASD) to provide sworn peace officers and civilian security officers. The study observed that LASD security assis- tants, who were largely responsible for fare enforcement, did not have the authority to detain or arrest and could not be responsible for responding to incidents requiring law enforcement. The report cautioned that while security officers appear to the public to have the authority to respond to crimes in progress, they do not have the authority to provide that response and doing so could expose both the officers and Metro to liabilities (BCA Watson Rice LLP et al. 2015). The influence of fare enforcement actions on public perceptions of security is evolving. In the past, some transit agencies viewed arrests related to fare enforcement actions as a net com- munity benefit. While these arrests may not have resulted directly from fare evasion, the arrests were believed to have enhanced the safety of the transit system, employees, and passengers. Today, many transit agencies, the public, and advocacy groups are concerned with the potential that stops and administrative searches for low-level offenses (e.g., fare evasion) may escalate into more serious offenses or arrests. The perception of the role of fare enforcement in passenger security has evolved in alignment with the evolution of policing from the âbroken windowâ theory of traditional enforcement- based policing (Kelling and Wilson 1982) to an emphasis on community policing. In 2000, Smith and Clarke contended that fare evasion could be reduced by maintaining order and minimizing conditions favorable to crimes targeting the transit system (e.g., fare evasion), its employees (e.g., assaults on fare inspectors or bus drivers), or its passengers (e.g., pickpocketing). Crime must be understood in the context of the environment in which it occurs, particularly in finan- cially constrained transit systems where it can be difficult to minimize operational conditions that are favorable to crime, such as overcrowding during peak periods and lack of staff super- vision in vehicles and stations. âWell-run systems that regulate fare payment, provide adequate staffing, have easy transfers, and supply frequent and regular serviceâ are less likely to provide conditions favorable to crime (Smith and Clarke 2000). Although this âbroken windowsâ theory of enforcement, a criminological theory that states that visible signs of crime, antisocial behavior, and civil disorder in urban areas create an environment that encourages further crime and dis- order, has generally been discredited, Bijleveld (2007) commented that it has been claimed that implementing these measures to combat fare evasion and other low-level crimes on the NYCT subway was associated with reduced incidents of more serious crimes. Today, leading practices for policing transit systems emphasize community policing rather than a traditional enforcement-based approach to policing. Community policing is focused more on developing and maintaining relationships to increase collaboration between officers and passengers, prevent crime and address underlying issues, and change negative behavior

Findings and Applications 167  (WSP 2018). The transition to community policing aligns with transit agenciesâ increasing emphasis on customer education as part of fare enforcement. Transit agencies are also transitioning the focus of fare enforcement from enforcement to customer service. SacRT has posited that focusing first on customer service will better serve the agency and its passengers than focusing on enforcing fares. As part of a 3-year pilot program structured to curb evasion on light rail, SacRT instructed transit agents to enforce a zero-tolerance fare enforcement protocol. The transit agents were hired specifically to fight fare evasion and to provide security by their presence on trains. Passengers responded, reporting that they liked the additional presence of SacRT staff on board light rail but not the zero-tolerance policy. On the basis of lessons learned from the pilot program, SacRT shifted to a fare enforcement program that employs transit ambassadors who focus first and foremost on customer service and educa- tion. Since transit ambassadors are instructed to move systematically through the train to help ensure that passengers regularly see transit ambassadors on board, their presence also helps improve the perception of security. While the presence of fare enforcement personnel may give many passengers a greater sense of security, their presence, especially if they are sworn peace officers, can actually make some passengers feel unsafe, often due to experiences with over-policing. In response to calls for racial/ ethnic justice in policing, TriMet began âreimagining public safety and security on transitâ in July 2020. As part of this effort, the agency is engaging the community in reimagining TriMetâs approach to safety so that all passengers feel welcome. 3.10 Discrimination in Fare Enforcement The possibility of experiencing discrimination in fare enforcement may be a significant con- cern for some communities and potentially affect perceptions about the safety and security of using public transit. It is equally a concern for transit agencies. As awareness of the potential for systemic bias and discrimination in fare enforcement has risen in the public conscious- ness, transit agenciesâ policies, procedures, and outcomes in fare enforcement have come under increasing scrutiny from passengers, advocacy groups, media outlets, and oversight bodies as well as transit agencies and their governing bodies. There are also significant concerns regarding the consequences of fare evasion for persons of color, in particular Black passengers, and for passengers experiencing homelessness or poverty. As part of this increasing awareness of detrimental and potential long-term consequences of criminal penalties for fare evasion, transit agencies are increasingly working to decriminalize it. The long-term implications of criminal citations cannot be understated. In The Crime of Being Short $2.75: Policing Communities of Color at the Turnstile, Stolper and Jones (2017) question the severity of the penalty for fare evasion in New York City. Using data on fare evasion arrests in Brooklyn, they examined the relationship between fare evasion arrest rates and poverty and found a statistically significant relationship for neighborhoods with high levels of Black poverty. Fare evaders who are arrested and convicted on theft of service charges can receive up to 1 year of jail time, but even in the more common case where those arrested plead to a lesser charge and only get time served or community service, they are still left with court costs that far exceed the original shortfall of $2.75, and may still be saddled with a criminal record that can limit opportunities for gainful employment, renting an apartment, and college admissions. (Stolper and Jones 2017) The report concluded that these outcomes will continue in the absence of institutional changes to NYPDâs fare enforcement policies, supported by funding sources to make transit afford- able for economically disadvantaged New Yorkers. Stolper and Jones (2017) cite as an example See Section 3.7.3, Decriminalization of Fare Evasion.

168 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion the mayorâs proposal to increase the âmillionaireâsâ tax on city residents to make transit more affordable for those who need assistance by funding New York Cityâs Fair Fares program, which provides a 50% discount on pay-per-ride and unlimited MetroCards to New Yorkers whose annual income is below the federal poverty level. There have also been calls to address the underlying causes of fare evasion, such as poverty and homelessness, instead of increasing fare enforcement. In New York City, community response to a fare increase combined with increased fare enforcement efforts by NYCT made headlines in 2019 when transit advocates and civil rights groups alleged that the diversion of limited resources into fare enforcement would have a disproportionate impact on passengers of color, low-income riders, and passengers experiencing homelessness, and that these funds would be better used to address the underlying causes of poverty and homelessness (Barone 2019; Nguyen 2019a). 3.10.1 Identifying Discrimination In some cities, advocacy and community organizations have led the push for fairer and more transparent fare enforcement by using transit agency data on fare enforcement to show that low- income and minority passengers are more likely than other groups of passengers to be cited for fare evasion. Beyond requests for public records, transit agencies and law enforcement agencies around the country have in recent years also been the targets of lawsuits and civil rights com- plaints from advocacy organizations, such as the ACLU and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), whose aim is to force more transparency regard- ing fare enforcement and its outcomes. These efforts, along with media coverage, have brought potential issues of discrimination in fare enforcement to light for the broader public, drawing attention to the concerns of disadvantaged groups and the challenges they may encounter when using public transit. In response, transit agencies are taking actions to better monitor the outcomes of fare enforce- ment by collecting race- and ethnicity-based data, conducting racial/ethnic equity impact assess- ments, reporting data to increase transparency, and investigating formal complaints. While some transit agencies may conduct these analyses in-house, a few (BART, TriMet, TTC) have contracted with external organizations to provide independent analyses. For example, the BART Police Department collects demographic data on contacts and citations for quality-of-life vio- lations, which are defined as violations affecting ridership and customer experience, including disturbing the peace, vagrancy, public urination, fare evasion, loud music/radios, smoking, eat- ing/drinking, and expectorating (BART 2020e). The BART Police Department has asked the Center for Policing Equity to analyze the data for potential racial disparities. The Center for Policing Equity describes itself as partnering with police departments and demonstrating âthe transformative impact of data-driven interventions.â While some analyses and investigations have uncovered disparate outcomes, not all identify disparities, systemic bias, or discrimination. For example, in Los Angeles, the Labor Commu- nity Strategy Center submitted a civil rights complaint to the U.S. DOT in 2016, claiming that LA Metroâs fare enforcement practices amounted to a âstop-and-friskâ form of enforcement resulting in citations and arrests that disproportionately affected Black passengers and dem- onstrate a âpattern and practice of systemic criminalizationâ (Loc 2017). However, the U.S. DOT made no findings following its investigation of the complaint. Even for analyses and investigations that do not result in any findings, there are often oppor- tunities to review and revise fare enforcement procedures, policies, and penalties. Ongoing discussions of the effects and outcomes of fare enforcement are key to proactively addressing potential issues. In a review of TriMetâs fare enforcement data to determine whether racial/ ethnic disparities exist in TriMet fare enforcement outcomes, Renauer (2018) noted that âeven if Approaches transit agencies are taking to address underlying issues are discussed further in Section 3.8.1.3, Affordability, and Section 3.11, Transitâs Role in Assisting Vulnerable Populations.

Findings and Applications 169  results are not indicative of a pattern of systemic bias, it does not mean a transit agency should be any less vigilant in ensuring its enforcement practices are fair and unbiased through continued training, data monitoring, and policy reflection.â It is also important for transit agencies to be sensitive to the perception of systemic bias and discrimination. Community perceptions of agency behavior affect public trust in transit agen- cies, whether or not those perceptions are valid. In 2019, Ombudsman Toronto (2019) reviewed TTCâs approach to the investigation of a fare enforcement encounter involving a passenger who alleged that the interaction was motivated by racial/ethnic profiling. In addition to recommen- dations for conducting more transparent, fair investigations, the ombudsman spoke to broader themes about how public transit agencies address community concerns, saying, âa public per- ception that racial profiling exists in an organization, even if unfounded, is deeply harmful to that organization and to the publicâs trust in it.â 3.10.2 Addressing Discrimination Many transit agencies are transforming their fare enforcement programs to respond to con- cerns about the potential for systemic bias and discrimination. They are establishing and revis- ing standard operating procedures to ensure that inspections are conducted consistently and system atically, as discussed in the subsection on fare inspection processes in Section 3.3.2.3. They are reviewing discretion policies to minimize the potential for discrimination and, for agencies that give their personnel discretion, providing guidance on when to issue a warning versus a citation, also discussed in the subsection on fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3. They are increasing focus on antibias training and promoting awareness of implicit bias, as discussed in the subsection on training curricula in Section 3.3.1.4. They are implementing changes to their fare enforcement programs to align the penalty for fare evasion with the severity of the violation and minimize the long-term negative consequences of being cited, particularly for vulnerable populations, as discussed in Section 3.7.2. They are minimizing interactions with the court system for individuals cited for fare evasion by developing in-house resolution options and diversion programs, as discussed in Section 3.7.3. They are improving the collection and analysis of data needed to define, monitor, and address equity issues. They are promoting trans- parency through ongoing communication and reporting and community engagement. In MinneapolisâSaint Paul, Metro Transit revised its fare citation practice to minimize dis- cretion by implementing a warning-first policy. Metro Transit (2015) performed an internal statistical analysis of police incident data provided by the Metro Transit Police Department. This analysis was prompted by a public data request by the ACLU for police incidents that resulted in arrests, citations, or warnings for low-level offenses for both juveniles and adults. The objec- tive of Metro Transitâs internal analysis was to understand differences in police incident rates by race/ethnicity, including differences in the application of enforcement of the fare evasion policy across racial/ethnic groups. While Metro Transit was unable to establish a baseline for fare evasion rates by racial/ethnic group, the agency did compare rates of warnings, citations, and arrests across racial/ethnic groups. Analysis of the results of systemwide first-time fare evasion encounters (i.e., situations where individuals were found to be evading fare for the first time) showed that, compared with White adults, Black adults were 26% more likely to be cited rather than warned, and Native American adults were 152% more likely to be cited rather than warned. For second-time fare evasion encounters, there were no significant differences across racial/ethnic groups for adults. Metro Transit also compared the results of first-time fare evasion encounters on its Green Line for the 10 months after it first opened, at a time when police officers conducting fare enforce- ment were instructed to warn, not cite, for first-time fare evasion offenses. When police officers

170 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion were directed explicitly to warn, not cite, first-time offenders, no significant differences in the likelihood of being cited rather than warned were found for Black adults as compared with White adults. As a result of this analysis, Metro Transit issued an administrative announcement implementing a warning first practice to ensure fairness and consistency in how first-time fare evaders are treated and eliminate potential bias and discrimination. In Washington, DC, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the Metro Fare Evasion Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2018. The main focus of the discussion of whether to decriminalize fare evasion in the District was centered around race/ethnicity and class and the severe consequences of criminal citations on job, housing, and loan prospects for violators who are cited (Siddiqui 2018). Proponents of the bill referenced a report for the Washington Lawyersâ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs completed by Banks and Gunston (2018) that evaluated disparities in citation rates for fare evasion. The data for this report included loca- tions where enforcement occurred as well as the age, race/ethnicity, and gender of those issued a warning or citation. The resulting report found that 91% of citations/summonses were issued to Black passengersâin a city where approximately half of the residents are Blackâand 46% of all citations/summonses were given to Black youth under the age of 25. In addition, the report found that Metro Police targeted stations heavily used by Black youth, with nearly 30% of all stops being made in or around two Metrorail stations (Banks and Gunston 2018). In New York City, the New York State Attorney General launched an investigation in 2020 into the escalation of fare enforcement activities on NYCT subways and whether people of color were unfairly targeted. As part of the investigation, the attorney general requested fare evasion data to analyze whether systemic bias exists. According to the attorney general, current and former NYPD officers have testified under oath that, through at least 2015, NYPD officers operated under an unofficial policy of targeting Black and Hispanic people for fare evasion and other low-level violations in the cityâs subway system. The attorney general intends to use NYPD data on the number of officers assigned to each subway station; data on notices, summonses, and arrests by race/ethnicity and age; and policy and training directives to determine whether this unofficial policy may still be in operation (Greene and Sanders 2020). In Toronto, TTC has been revising its fare enforcement program in response to an audit of TTCâs revenue operations by the City of Toronto Auditor General and a recent Ombudsman Toronto Enquiry Report into a TTC investigation of a fare enforcement encounter involving a passenger who alleged that the interaction was motivated by racial profiling. As part of TTCâs work to implement a systemwide anti-racism strategy, TTC partnered with the City of Torontoâs CABR Unit to review TTCâs special constable and revenue protection policies and practices with an anti-Black racism analysis tool. Experts from the University of Toronto are also conducting a Racial Equity Impact Assessment of revenue protection and special constable activities to obtain input with respect to race- and ethnicity-based data collection and ideas to eliminate bias and improve community relations. This work includes reviewing historical enforcement data and developing a framework for data collection, retention, and use of disaggregated race/ethnicity data. Experts from the University of Toronto will be conducting information sessions, focus groups, public town halls, and surveys to enable the public and community groups to share their experiences with special constables and fare inspectorsâproviding input on collecting race- and ethnicity-based data and ideas to eliminate bias and improve community relations (TTC 2020d). Public engagement can provide information that is useful for evaluating the fare enforcement program and deciding whether, and what, changes are needed to address public needs. Some agencies have formed work groups to help guide the reviews of their fare enforcement programs. Box 3-13 provides an overview of how King County Metro and Sound Transit used work groups and public engagement to help review their fare enforcement programs. See the discussion of public engagement in Section 3.4.2.4, Customer and Stakeholder Feedback.

Findings and Applications 171  Box 3-13. Work Groups to Review Fare Enforcement Programs King County Metro and Sound Transit both formed work groups to review their fare enforcement programs and provide recommendations to improve the programs with a specific focus on promoting equity. By creating work groups, transit agencies are able to get a diverse set of perspectives on the direct and indirect implications of their fare enforcement program. While King County Metroâs work group included transit and community-based advocates and stakeholders, Sound Transitâs work group included representatives from agency departments whose responsibilities intersect with fares and fare enforcement. (See Box 3-12, King County Metro Work Group on Fare Enforcement Policies and Procedures, in Section 3.8.2.1.) In 2018, King County Metro formed its work group to address issues raised by the performance audit of its fare enforcement program conducted by the King County Auditorâs Office (2018). The performance audit examined fare enforcement data for 2014 to 2017 on King County Metroâs RapidRide service and found that passengers experiencing homelessness or housing instability made up disproportionate shares of all warnings, citations, and misdemeanors. The audit noted that fare evasion citations tend to escalate for vulnerable passengers and can have cascading impacts that lead to a cycle of debt and court interactions. The audit recommended developing better and more equitable fare enforcement practices by better aligning them with King Countyâs Equity and Social Justice Strategic Plan and improving data collection and reporting on demographics. In addition to the data analyzed by the King County Auditorâs Office, King County Metro undertook a survey of RapidRide passengers without proof of payment that focused on the auditâs concerns about the equity impacts of the existing fare enforcement program (King County Metro 2019). On the basis of recommendations from the audit and work group, King County Metro implemented changes to its fare enforcement program, including the launch of its Fare Violation Program, which created an in-house resolution process that offered reduced fines and nonmonetary options. King County Metro also introduced additional de-escalation and implicit bias training for fare enforcement officers to reduce the likelihood of bias and discrimination in fare inspections. In addition, the agency now reports annually on the number of warnings and violations issued, demographics of fare evaders, and the number of fare violations resolved and by which option (King County Metro 2019, 2020). King County Metro also has a policy that ensures only a 10% difference in the hours that enforcement personnel are deployed on routes with the highest and lowest rates of fare evasion, to minimize concerns about equity in deployment. In 2019, Sound Transit initiated an internal interdisciplinary work group to review its fare enforcement program and access to transit for the most vulnerable passengers. As part of the process, Sound Transit obtained passenger feedback on its fare enforcement experiences through an onboard survey, an online survey, and community listening sessions. The listening sessions, conducted in underrepresented parts of the service area, allowed conversations with people âwho will be most adversely impacted by changes in the fare enforcement program and those who are most often marginalized in these conversationsâ (Sound Transit 2020a). The listening sessions brought to light perceptions that Sound Transit fare enforcement officers were involved in racial profiling. According to the onboard survey, people of color were less likely than non-Hispanic Whites to âstrongly agreeâ that fare enforcement officers contacted every passenger near them, by a margin of 84% to 92%, despite Sound Transitâs requirement that fare enforcement officers systematically check proof of payment for every passenger on a vehicle (Sound Transit 2020a). On the basis of its findings, the interdisciplinary work group for Sound Transit developed a Fare Enforcement Action Plan containing evaluation criteria to guide prioritization of policy and program proposals. The first evaluation criterion was racial equity. Many of the recommendations in the action plan promoted reducing demographic disparity in access to and use of valid fare media (e.g., income-based and youth programs) and the demographic disparity in the impact on passengers caught fare evading (e.g., increasing the number of warnings from one to two in 12 months, reducing the fine, reviewing training) (Sound Transit 2020d).

172 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion 3.10.3 Data Challenges in Assessing and Addressing Discrimination Recent efforts to analyze fare enforcement data underscore the need for more data on enforce- ment activities. This includes data on all passenger stops and inspections, in order to identify whether systemic bias or discrimination could be affecting enforcement outcomes. The ability to assess the existence and characteristics of discrimination in fare enforcement is highly dependent on data that link demographic attributes to individual incidences of fare evasion (e.g., warnings, citations). One limitation of many of the studies to assess racial/ethnic disparities is the underlying assumption that the demographics of fare evaders are proportional to the demographics of transit ridership and the areas served. This problem is what scholars who analyze discrimination, such as Renauer (2018), call the âbaseline problem.â Racial/ethnic dis- parity studies commonly propose that âthe percentage of warnings, citations, and exclusions for each racial/ethnic group should be equal to their percentage of the local population, if enforce- ment is conducted in a random fashion.â Renauer (2018) concludes that this proposition has four logical faults: 1. Certain racial/ethnic groups may use public transportation at higher rates than their percentage of the general population, thus putting them at greater risk for fare enforcement activity. 2. Certain racial/ethnic groups may commit fare enforcement violations at higher rates than their percentage of the general population, thus putting them at greater risk for fare enforce- ment activity. 3. Local census population figures cannot accurately measure racial/ethnic populations using transit because an unknown percentage of transit passengers come from counties or states outside the transit area. 4. Deployment of enforcement personnel may tend toward a transit line or stop that happens to be frequented by higher proportions of certain racial/ethnic groups, increasing their likeli- hood of an enforcement incident. To better understand the baseline against which warning, citation, and exclusion rates should be compared, researchers must somehow identify or otherwise know the true incident rates of fare evasion within different demographic sets of passengers (Renauer 2018). However, few transit agencies maintain sufficiently robust data on the demographics of individuals who are cited, and even fewer collect this information for all individuals inspected either in the course of operations or as part of a specific survey effort. Without this information, it can be difficult to prove discrimination is occurring, as some may argue that there are underlying causes of higher fare evasion among specific passenger segments, such as affordability of fares or access to fare media. Without the data needed to analyze whether their fare enforcement practices are inequitable or discriminatory, transit agencies may be unaware of, and therefore unable to manage, negative equity outcomes. 3.10.4 Baselining Fare Evasion Rates by Race/Ethnicity To determine whether there are racial/ethnic disparities in fare evasion, fare evasion rates by race/ethnicity must be baselined for comparison with warning and citation rates instead of compared with the demographics of the general population served. Baseline data provide true incident rates by racial/ethnic group of the relevant populationâin this case, a transit agencyâs passengers. The true incident rates are the proportion of the agencyâs passengers of each race/ ethnicity who are actually evading fare payment. Agencies typically determine these data by conducting a fare evasion audit or survey. In response to community claims of racial bias in fare enforcement, TriMet contracted with Portland State Universityâs Criminal Justice Policy Research Institute in 2016 and 2018 to determine whether there was evidence of systemic racial bias in TriMetâs fare enforcement efforts and fare

Findings and Applications 173Â Â inspections. As part of the 2018 study, Renauer (2018) developed a novel approach to estimate actual rates of fare evasion by demographic group. This approach was developed to more accu- rately analyze enforcement data for indications of discrimination and enable more conclusive findings. From 2016 to 2018, contractors followed TriMet fare inspectors and noted the number of pas- sengers with valid fare, invalid fare, or no fare, and recorded the perceived race/ethnicity of those with invalid or no fare. The contractors shadowed 33,834 inspections. For those inspections, no citations or exclusions were given. From this data set, Renauer (2018) estimated the actual rates of fare evasion by perceived race/ethnicity and compared these actual rates with data on enforcement activity for the same period, including rates of warnings, citations, and exclusions. On the basis of a literature review of law enforcement racial profiling literature, Renauer (2018) established a threshold of a 5% difference or above from the baseline as noteworthy and indicating disparity/overrepresentation. The results found that the differences between the per- centages from the fare evasion survey and the enforcement outcome percentages were within this threshold, indicating little to no disparity in enforcement outcomes by race/ethnicity. Renauer (2018) noted, however, a substantial increase in the number of individuals marked as being of âunknownâ race/ethnicity when compared with the previous 2014â2016 evasion study. Further analysis showed that a small number of inspectors was responsible for this statis- tically significant increase in passengers categorized as âunknown.â Although they were unable to determine the cause of the increase, Renauer (2018) speculated that it could perhaps be a result of increased sensitivity to guessing at a personâs race/ethnicity and seeing âunknownâ as a safer option. In addition to the work conducted by Renauer (2018) on baselining fare evasion rates, Ayres (2002) and Simoiu and colleagues (2017) explored additional methods of identifying bias and discrimination in policing, including benchmarking, outcome tests, and thresholds tests and the limitations of those methods. 3.10.5 Reporting on Demographic Data for Fare Enforcement Activities Transit agencies are also making increased efforts to improve transparency by collecting and reporting data on the demographics of individuals who are warned or cited for fare evasion. For example, as mentioned earlier, under a King County ordinance, King County Metro is required to report this information annually to monitor potential equity impacts of its fare enforcement programs. As MBTA implements proof-of-payment inspections as part of its Fare Transforma- tion, the agency plans to include demographic data in its annual report on fare evasion warnings and citations. The King County ordinance that created the alternative resolution process for fare enforce- ment requires King County Metro to report certain performance data annually, including demographic data on individuals warned or cited for fare evasion. The reporting requirements include data on race/ethnicity, age, gender, income, and housing status, as available, and perfor- mance measures showing the activities and effectiveness of the fare enforcement program out- reach manager. This information, which King County Metro began reporting in 2019, assists the agency in monitoring the progress and effectiveness of the Fare Enforcement and Fare Violation programs, thus increasing accountability by demonstrating effectiveness and identifying poten- tial equity impacts. As a result of a recent Massachusetts law, MBTA is required to report annually on warnings and citations issued for fare evasion. MBTA also plans to report annually on the demographics

174 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion of individuals to whom fare evasion warnings and citations are issued. This reporting is part of MBTAâs effort to ensure that fare enforcement is unbiased. As part of its Fare Transformation, MBTA is working to improve data collection by designing fields for demographic data collec- tion into the handheld devices used in conducting fare inspections and in issuing warnings and citations. MBTA plans to collect demographic data only when warnings or citations are issued, and not for all inspections. Although law enforcement data are not directly applicable to data on fare enforcement con- ducted by civilian personnel, it is worth noting that Law enforcement agencies in some states are also increasing data collection to provide more visibility into potential systemic bias or discrimi- nation. In California, under the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (California Assembly Bill 953, 2015), law enforcement agencies began collection of demographic data for all stops by sworn peace officers, starting in 2018 with the eight largest police agencies. These data, which help estab- lish a baseline for comparison, must be reported annually to the California Department of Justice. However, the requirement applies only to sworn peace officers and not to civilian fare enforce- ment personnel. Collecting data for all stops would pose significant challenges to completing proof-of-payment inspections of all passengers and conducting them efficiently. 3.11 Transitâs Role in Assisting Vulnerable Populations In the course of daily operations, and particularly in the context of fare enforcement, transit personnel come into contact with individuals who are having difficulty finding shelter and/or food and meeting their mobility needs on a daily basis for a variety of reasons. In this transit context, vulnerable populations encountered on transit vehicles or in transit facilities may be described as individuals experiencing health problems (including mental illness and drug addic- tion) that intersect with social problems such as poverty, homelessness, housing instability, illit- eracy, and unemployment. The term âhomeless,â as used here, also refers to those experiencing housing instability or who may be underhoused. TCRP Synthesis 121 recognized that many passengers are uncomfortable around people expe- riencing homelessness and that transit agencies try to maintain the quality of the transit environ- ment by managing this population and its impacts (Boyle 2016). TCRP Synthesis 121 compiled information on practices, approaches, and outcomes of interactions between transit agencies and people experiencing homelessness. The study, conducted in 2016, surveyed 49 transit agen- cies and confirmed that most of those agencies (91%) perceived that homelessness is a problem for them. The majority (73%) believe that homelessness affects their ridership by deterring other passengers by making them feel unsafe or uncomfortable while also increasing nondestination ridership because some homeless individuals may be riding transit for shelter. Most of the agencies (68%) believe that transit agencies should play a role in addressing homelessness, but very few (5%) have resources allocated to address homelessness. An APTA report on the results of research into the causes of recent declines in transit rider- ship suggested that shifts in mental health policy and shortages in housing are putting more people experiencing mental illness and homelessness on the streets (APTA 2018). As a result, these individuals are using transit as an alternative to shelter and riding end-to-end, without a destination, thereby leading to a public perception that transit is unsafe or unpleasant. Later that year, a Leadership APTA study explored the role of transit agencies pertaining to social responsibility, specifically with respect to homelessness (Bell et al. 2018). The findings of both TCRP Synthesis 121 (Boyle 2016) and Bell and colleagues (2018) recognize that individuals experiencing homelessness and riding transit or congregating at transit facili- ties affect the willingness of other passengers to use transit. Some agencies (e.g., LA Metro) have developed initiatives to address homelessness, moving away from enforcing fares and removing

Findings and Applications 175  individuals who are disruptive or evading fare payment to instead providing ways to help them connect to available resources. TCRP Synthesis 121 observes that successful initiatives target specific behavior by using formal or informal policies to define prohibited behavior (e.g., engaging in loud or disruptive behavior) in order to provide a safe, clean, pleasant environment (Boyle 2016). Conversely, successful initiatives do not differentiate between the various groups or individuals (e.g., youth, veterans, older persons, families) that the population of persons experiencing homelessness includes. While establishing clear expectations and penalties as well as enforcing policies or a code of conduct may be important early steps, enforcement alone does not solve the problem. Inducements to change behavior (e.g., getting help for underlying problems) are needed. Transit agencies have moved toward partnerships with social service and nonprofit agencies to provide this help. Transit agencies are using a variety of approaches as they initiate interventions for indi- viduals who may be experiencing homelessness, drug addiction, and mental health disorders. These approaches include fare assistance for individuals with very low or no income, outreach to individuals who appear to be in need of basic services such as food and shelter, and crisis intervention teams of mental health professionals and case workers. Programs have different approaches and goals, but many have leveraged partnerships with organizations with relevant related responsibilities, including social service agencies, that make it possible to extend the reach of any one organizationâs capabilities by sharing resources, funding, and expertise. Case workers and other staff at these organizations have a better understanding of and sensitivity to the issues surrounding people who are experiencing homelessness, and they may be better able to persuade these individuals to accept the services that they offer. 3.11.1 Transit Initiatives to Assist Vulnerable Populations The role of a transit agency in addressing social issues is evolving and varies according to the needs of a region and the communities it serves and to the capabilities and financial capacity of the transit agency and partner organizations to assist. In addition to training fare enforcement personnel to improve interactions with vulnerable populations, transit agencies are actively working to improve fare compliance by addressing underlying reasons for fare evasion. Recent initiatives that have been implemented or planned by several transit agencies are described in the remainder of this section. They are characterized by different approaches to addressing these issues, including ⢠Regional and multidisciplinary approaches, including participation in regional work groups involving agencies and organizations with different roles in developing potential solutions and the use of multidisciplinary outreach teams to connect vulnerable individuals to resources; ⢠Financial strategies that are intended to avoid criminalization of homelessness by providing alternatives for resolving citations and fines for fare evasion and other code-of-conduct viola- tions (these strategies may also provide access to subsidized fares); and ⢠Policy changes, such as suspension of fare enforcement for individuals seeking shelter from severe weather conditions. 3.11.2 Regional and Multidisciplinary Approaches to Assisting Vulnerable Populations One of the ways transit agencies become involved in initiatives to assist vulnerable popula- tions is by participating in regional work groups that work collectively to address underlying issues. In some cases, these efforts include exploration of the advantages of using a case manage- ment approach to connect vulnerable populations with needed resources. See the discussion of training curricula for fare enforcement personnel in Section 3.3.1.4, Fare Enforcement Training.

176 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion As a result of the growing number of individuals experiencing homelessness in Los Angeles, there has been a notable increase in the number of individuals and families seeking shelter on LA Metro vehicles and at LA Metro facilities. Recognizing this, several organizations con- tacted LA Metro, seeking to provide outreach at transportation hubs with the objective of getting people off the street and into programs. In 2016, LA Metro launched a strategic planning pro- cess to address homelessness aimed at enhancing the customer experience, maintaining a safe and secure system, and providing coordinated outreach to individuals on the LA Metro system who are experiencing homelessness. The resulting Transit Homeless Action Plan acknowledged that LA Metroâs response to individuals experiencing homelessness would require increased coordination with the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Home- less Services Authority, and organizations that serve people experiencing homelessness or pro- vide related services such as health and mental health services (Communities in Motion 2017). The action plan called for hiring interdisciplinary city, county, and community (C3) teams of health and mental health practitioners and outreach staff to connect homeless individuals with housing options. LA Metro contracts with the County Department of Health Services and its subcontractor, People Assisting the Homeless (PATH), to staff the C3 teams. The PATH subcontract provides mental health technicians and caseworkers for these teams. The C3 teams work with LA Metro fare compliance officers, who identify passengers who may be experienc- ing homelessness or a mental health crisis. They also coordinate with outreach teams from the three police departments that are contracted to provide LA Metroâs policing services: the Los Angeles Police Departmentâs Homeless Outreach and Protective Engagement (HOPE) Teams, the Los Angeles County Sheriff Departmentâs Mental Evaluation Teams (MET), and the Long Beach Police Department. From implementation in May 2017 through March 2019, the C3 teams contacted 4,798 indi- viduals experiencing homelessness and linked 1,137 to housing solutions, 88 of them perma- nently. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, from April through July 2020, the program helped shelter 495 people. With the success of the C3 program, LA Metro has increased the number of C3 teams to nine and entered into memoranda of agreement with additional organizations with proven programs, including Shelter the Unsheltered, Dream Center, Project Roomkey, and LA Door. LA Metro is also working to identify locations on excess Metro properties that might be used for temporary bridge housing. In New York City, the Subway Diversion Project was piloted in 2019 as an interagency effort to offer shelter and services to individuals experiencing homelessness in the transit system in lieu of contact with the criminal justice system as a result of summonses for violations such as fare evasion (Wanek-Libman 2019). The New York Police Department, in partnership with the Mayorâs Office of Criminal Justice, the cityâs Department of Homeless Services, the Manhattan District Attorneyâs Office, and NYCT, coordinated with Homeless Outreach & Mobile Engage- ment Street Action Teams (HOME-STAT) that were charged with working to transition New Yorkers experiencing homelessness to appropriate services and, ultimately, to permanent housing. The intent of the Subway Diversion Project was to divert individuals encountered in the transit system from formal court proceedings by allowing them to vacate summonses in exchange for agreeing to meet with outreach workers. Despite the goal of helping individuals access shelter, advocates for people experiencing homelessness have expressed concerns that the program could require court appearances by using summonses to coerce people into accept- ing services that are not well suited to their needs and thereby undermine the efforts of the out- reach teams (Routhier and Goldfein 2020). In July 2020, the mayor halted the program, saying that social service agencies would handle the task instead of NYPD officers. The interest in the use of multidisciplinary outreach teams has increased with discussions of police reform and the role of police on transit. The use of outreach teams may assist in

Findings and Applications 177  de-escalating encounters by persuading individuals in crisis to accept help and connect them to resources. TriMet is exploring opportunities to deploy mental health professionals with the expertise to interact with and meet these needs. BART has also committed to a more progres- sive approach to policing, including a plan to increase the number of crisis intervention teams instead of hiring more transit police officers. In 2020, BART created a Bureau of Progressive Policing; starting in 2021, it will hire civilian social workers to respond with transit police officers to social problems involving homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction (Moench 2021). The plan is an outcome of engagement with the police department, union leadership, frontline workers, outside advisors, and passengers. In Pennsylvania, during a Philadelphia City Council committee hearing in 2019, the SEPTA police chief questioned the use of transit police officers for responding to issues that are not police issues and that require expertise the police do not have. As a result, in November 2020, SEPTA contracted with a social services organization, Merakey, to pilot a program that pairs experts in substance-abuse and mental health with transit police to extend treatment and community-based resources to those who need them. The executive director of Merakey commented that arresting and jailing vulnerable individuals does not address the underlying issue (Madej 2020). Transit agencies are also exploring ways to bring a case management approach to how they manage repeat fare evaders. MTS is considering ways to develop effective means of interven- tion for repeat, chronic fare evaders who may be experiencing homelessness, drug addiction, or a mental health disorder. As part of this effort, MTS is actively engaging with the Regional Task Force on the Homeless for the San Diego region to develop strategies to address overarch- ing issues. SacRT is also planning to use a case management approach to address the needs of especially vulnerable passengers. SacRT plans to hire a candidate with a masterâs degree in social work to assist the agencyâs most chronic fare evaders. Since the agency does not have an in-house administrative resolution process for handling fare violations, the new position will use SacRTâs citation database to identify chronic fare evaders and help them to obtain fares and find other resources to improve their access and mobility. SacRT is exploring options to fund the position, including the possibility of reallocating some financial resources currently used for staffing police officer positions. 3.11.3 Financial Resolutions for Assisting Vulnerable Populations Providing alternative resolution options and access to reduced or fully subsidized fares can help vulnerable individuals avoid falling into a fare evasion spiral that could result in court appearances and criminal records. With that goal, BART, King County Metro, LA Metro, NYCT, and SFMTA have developed administrative resolution processes that provide opportunities for fare evaders to resolve their citations with the transit agency outside the court system. MTS and TriMet have also created diversion programs that enable individuals to resolve citations administratively with the agencies before unresolved citations are transmitted to the courts. These transit agencies offer options such as reduced fines and community service. Options at King County Metro and TriMet include enrolling in low-income fare programs in lieu of paying a fine. These administrative resolution processes can minimize vulnerable individualsâ interactions with the court system and long-term consequences of being cited for fare evasion. One of the goals of MTSâs diversion program is to identify feasible alternatives for vulnerable individuals to resolve fines for fare evasion. The handling of repeat offenders is of particular interest because, even with the alternative resolution process, many repeat offenders do not resolve citations and do not show up for court hearings. Further, while fare evasion is considered a criminal infrac- tion under the California Penal Code, adults who receive a third or subsequent violation may be Reduced fines and community service are discussed in Section 3.7.3.4, Administrative Penalties and Appeal Processes for Fare Citations.

178 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $400 instead of $250 and/or imprison- ment for up to 90 days [California Penal Code 640(a) 2018], thus resulting in the criminalization of fare violations despite MTSâs best efforts to avoid those outcomes by creating the diversion program. Transit agencies are also helping passengers with limited means access reduced or fully sub- sidized fares to prevent fare evasion by proactively addressing financial barriers to riding transit. King County Metro, LA Metro, SFMTA, and Sound Transit offer free fare programs for vul- nerable individuals with very low or no income. In some cases, free fare programs provide opportunities to connect vulnerable individuals with social service programs. King County Metroâs subsidized annual pass program is available to individuals with incomes at or below 80% of the federal poverty level who are enrolled in one of six state benefit programs. In addition to simplifying determination of eligibility, this approach provides opportunities for case workers to help individuals enroll in other assistance programs and access other resources. In structuring the program, King County Metroâs goal was to help move people out of poverty by improving access to services such as school, jobs, recreation, health care, and social connections. 3.11.4 Policies to Assist Vulnerable Populations in Severe Weather TCRP Synthesis 121 noted that severe weather conditions can be an inducement for collabora- tion between transit agencies and social service providers (Boyle 2016). Common approaches include providing transportation to shelters for persons experiencing homelessness or serving as warming stations. In Madison, Wisconsin, Metro Transit provides transportation between overnight and daytime shelters when the wind chill factor drops below 35oF. In extreme winter weather conditions, WMATA partners with the Districtâs Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency to provide designated âwarming busesâ around the city with food and water available and portable restrooms located nearby. Transit agencies may also suspend fare enforcement in inclement weather. King County Metro suspends fare enforcement during snow emergencies. The King County Council amended the county code in 2019 after snow emergencies that stranded vulnerable individuals, some of whom died of exposure despite the availability of increased space in shelters. Sound Transit is also taking steps to define parameters for suspending citations and warnings for fare evasion during extreme weather conditions. 3.12 Capital Infrastructure to Reduce Fare Evasion Transit agencies have looked to leverage capital infrastructure as a means of reducing fare evasion. The techniques an agency employs can vary greatly by mode, station design, and fare collection technology. For capital infrastructure, there are trade-offs between reducing fare evasion and considerations such as cost, customer friendliness, accessibility, and space and other physical constraints. 3.12.1 Station Hardening and Fare Gates Station hardening makes closed, gated transit stations more difficult to access by would-be fare evaders through changes in station infrastructure. Station hardening is most often char- acterized by more restrictive fare gates (e.g., taller gates that are harder to jump over, software changes that close gates faster to prevent illegal tailgating) but can also include enhanced station barriers and restricted entry by bringing elevators into the paid area and by controlling access via access gates and emergency exits. Access controls may include locking unnecessary access See Section 3.8.1.3, Affordability.

Findings and Applications 179  gates or emergency exits, electronically locked access gates, or use of cameras and alarms at emergency exit gates. Gating stations does not prevent all types of fare evasion, and not all transit systems and sta- tions can or should be gated. As described by Fürst and Herold (2018), barriers such as fare gates require a completely closed system and huge investments; are space consuming; slow down passenger flows; can be a barrier for persons with reduced mobility; and can even be dangerous and fatal in case of emergencies when a station needs to be evacuated quickly. Additionally, staff needs to be present at the stations to handle breakdowns and malfunctions and to monitor the proper use of the devices. Additionally, gated systems âare not immune to theft of cash, fraud and fare evasionâ and several closed systems have undertaken station-hardening projects to further reduce revenue leakage as a result of fare evasion (Clarke et al. 2010). In New York, efforts to harden NYCT stations in the 1980s and 1990s focused on increasing the effort required to evade, thereby changing a passengerâs costâbenefit calculation of evading rather than focusing on increasing the likelihood of detecting a fare evader (e.g., by increas- ing inspection rates). At New Yorkâs 110th Street and Lexington Avenue station, an âextreme version of target-hardeningâ was undertaken to address easy forms of fare evasion such as entry through slam gates (also known as swing gates), backcocking (slipping through a turnstile after turning back the arms), turnstile hopping, and use of slugs in older turnstiles. NYCT installed jump-proof floor-to-ceiling railings as well as floor-to-ceiling (or high-wheel) turnstiles that reduced the likelihood of most forms of fare evasion. Although evasion at the station decreased and did not appear to be displaced to other nearby stations, some questioned whether installing the new turnstiles was worth it. Those installed at 110th and Lexington had a black matte finish and, according to a passenger survey, made some passengers feel âimprisonedâ (Weidner 1996). Terrorist attacks on urban transit systems, like that on the London Underground in 2005, led to revised fire codes improving the ability to evacuate a station in case of an emergency but undermining station-hardening efforts to reduce fare evasion. The updated fire codes required panic bars to be installed on emergency exit gates that enabled gates to be opened from the paid side to expedite emergency evacuations. Despite alarms, passengers began using the emergency exit gates, especially at unstaffed locations, leading to potential fare evasion, as passengers could enter through the gates when opened by exiting passengers (Reddy et al. 2011a). While many emergency gate entries are legitimate (e.g., school groups with authorization letters), evasions by entry through unlocked emergency exit gates occur at double the rate of eva- sions by entry through locked emergency exit gates. In recent years, NYCT has made significant efforts to harden emergency exit gates, including improving gate mechanics and maintenance to ensure proper closing, enhancing half-height gates, installing hardware to discourage opening of gates in nonemergency situations, piloting a project to reactivate alarms at targeted stations, and improving station wayfinding to direct passengers to exit through proper channels so that gates are not opened for evaders attempting to enter the station (MTA 2019a). BART is in the process of hardening its station infrastructure to prevent and respond to fare evasion. Over the past few years, BART has researched, analyzed, and piloted a variety of station-hardening efforts, including raising the height of barriers around paid areas and moving elevators into paid areas. BART also analyzed egress locations across the system and evaluated the amount of egress necessary. Working with local fire departments, BART was able to identify service gates that could be closed completely or redesignated as emergency exits. For emergency exits, cameras, alarms, and signage have been installed to help deter passengers from misusing these gates (see Figure 3-18). BART also increased the number of side access gates with electronic locks that prevent the gates from swinging open freely. Now these gates can be kept in a locked position but can be opened by a station agent or centrally, from dispatch, in case

180 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion of an evacuation safety issue. BART has also relocated some gates to more conspicuous loca- tions, such as next to station agent booths, to help deter evaders by putting them in the line of sight of BART staff. In 2018, BART retrofitted existing fare gates at three stations to increase the air pressure used to cinch the fare gate closed, thereby increasing the effort required to force the barrier open (BART 2020d). This pilot reduced forced openings of the fare gates up to 38%, and BART is now working to implement the retrofit systemwide (BART 2019a; BART 2020d). At the same time as the agency began retrofitting existing gates, it began exploring other possible gate modi- fications as well as options for full gate replacement. As part of the process, an in-house team at BART designed multiple potential fare gate prototypes that have been piloted at different stations throughout the system. At Richmond Station, for instance, BART piloted a stacked configuration fare gate that added an upper set of paddles to the existing fare gate paddles. BART also piloted a higher barrier concept to reduce push-throughs and jumping at Fruitvale Station. Later, BART piloted a prototype pneumatic swing-style gate. In September 2019, the BART Board of Directors unanimously voted to adopt the swing-style barrier gate design shown in Figure 3-19 as the standard design for its new fare gates (BART 2019a). These swing gates âare first-of-its-kind pneumatic swing style barriers (which) are operated with air pressure instead of a motor. There are fewer moving parts and the gates can apply as much pressure as necessary to discourage someone pushing the barriers openâ (BART 2020c). This specific style of swing gate meets BARTâs requirement to process at least 30 passengers per minute and has âreduced the cost estimate for replacing fare gates across the system from $150 to $90 million, a 40% savingsâ (BART 2020c). For future station modernizations and extension stations, BART has also revised its facili- ties standards to incorporate design criteria to reduce fare evasion. Much of BARTâs existing infrastructure was designed in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of making system access easy in order to draw people away from driving. Until recently, fare evasion was not a consideration in BARTâs station design. TTC has also been making changes to further harden station infrastructure, particularly with changes to the fare gates in its subway stations. A two-phase audit of TTCâs revenue operations conducted by the City of Toronto Auditor General identified opportunities for TTC to harden Source: BART. Figure 3-18. BART emergency exit gate.

Findings and Applications 181  station infrastructure to better protect revenue. In 2019, TTC updated settings on fare gates to reduce the default time that they remain open after a passenger taps their fare media to reduce opportunities for fare evaders to tailgate (TTC 2019c). Another issue identified in the audit was that fare gates frequently become stuck in the open position, increasing the risk of fare evasion. The auditor general ânoted over 40 instances of the TTC fare gates malfunctioning at 14 of the 15 subway stationsâ that were observed during the audit (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). TTC has since updated settings on the fare gates so that the paddles remain closed, worked to automate and improve reporting on malfunctioning fare gates to help bring them back into service faster, and instructed staff at attended stations to barricade malfunctioning fare gates that are stuck open (TTC 2019c). In addition to making changes to its electronic fare gates, TTC has also installed âfare line barriersâ at more than 50 stations to eliminate the gap between the collector booth and the first fare gate (TTC 2019c). TTC is also considering converting some gates at high-risk stations to higher physical gates (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Finally, TTC has provided additional training for station staff on crash gate policies to ensure the gates are not left open and unattended, such as during staff breaks (TTC 2019c). In 2017, WMATA undertook a pilot to test two different designs for securing or limiting movement through swing gates. These included gates with a magnetic securing device and gates with gate stops. Gate stops limited the movement of the gate in the direction of egress. At other locations with clearance to ADA standards, WMATA tested gates with magnetic secur- ing devices with a push-to-open bar, alarm, and card swipe. The gates with magnetic securing devices were found to be more effective than gates with a gate stop once passengers realized they could open the latter in the opposite direction (WMATA 2017). In evaluating station-hardening options, transit agencies must balance how and to what degree to harden stations and other strategies to reduce fare evasion, taking into consideration impacts on the passenger experience. As noted by Weidner (1996), certain NYCT fare gate installations were seen as threatening and made customers feel âimprisoned.â TTC has received criticism for fare gates that are too accommodating, with the audit of TTCâs revenue operations noting that, while the new paddle-style gates âare known for their improved customer friendly appearance and experience,â these gates âmore readily allow fare evasion tactics such as tail- gatingâ (TTC 2020a). Source: BART. Figure 3-19. Prototype of BART swing-style fare gate.

182 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion As noted, transit agencies must consider how their fare gates (among other station elements) affect accessibility. When Translink gated the SkyTrain system in 2016 to help prevent fare evasion, passengers had to tap their Compass Card to prompt the fare gates to open (Saltman 2018). However some passengers with mobility restrictions were unable to tap their cards and had to rely on an attendant to assist them by opening the gate, a major step back as compared with the open system that these passengers previously could access without assistance (Saltman 2018). Since then, Translink has launched its Universal Fare Gate Access Program, which is installing radio-frequency identification (RFID) sensors above accessible fare gates so that they open automatically for persons with limited or no use of their arms (Saltman 2018). This instal- lation allows passengers to access the system independently while assuring swing gates are not left open for fare evaders. Agencies also note that for open systems that are at grade, gates can present an unacceptable safety risk if they encourage passengers to reach the platform by walking on the tracks. 3.12.2 Additional Capital Changes to Support Enforcement Transit agencies have also explored other capital investments to support fare enforcement. In some instances, these investments may be part of a broader security program including cameras in stations, on platforms, and on board vehicles; video analytic software; public address systems; and security operations centers. In other instances, these investments are intended to make it easier to conduct fare enforcement on proof-of-payment systems, including designating a fare- paid area, gating strategic stations, and using temporary barriers. 3.12.2.1 Cameras and Public Address Systems A number of transit agencies have introduced cameras on vehicles and in stations to monitor their systems, including for fare evasion behavior. Transit agencies note that they use video from CCTV cameras at stations, audiovisual cameras onboard vehicles, and body cameras to assist in conducting investigations of complaints. At BART, in addition to investigations, the Office of the Independent Police Auditor regularly monitors body camera recordings to identify any issues. Other agencies have augmented cameras with additional surveillance or communication equipment, including alarms to call police at Metro Transit stations and a public address system to communicate with passengers at SacRT stations. SacRTâs public address system at its stations enables staff in the security operations center to address situations in real time, thus possibly eliminating the need to dispatch staff. Public address systems on board vehicles can also be used to instruct passengers to pay their fare. On MBTA, an operator who sees someone board through a rear door uses the public address system to tell the passenger to come to the front to pay his or her fare. In addition to using cameras in stations, NYCT and TTC are installing video monitors that show passengers as they approach and pass through fare gates/turnstiles to discourage fare evasion and encourage fare-compliant behavior. In 2019, NYCT installed cameras and video monitors at turnstiles. Initially, the video monitors displayed tracking boxes around passengers moving through the turnstiles, which raised concerns that facial recognition software was being used. The agency has been challenged in court regarding the presumed use of facial recognition software. NYCT removed the tracking boxes and has publicly clarified that no facial recogni- tion software has been used at any point in time. Similarly, TTC has installed cameras and monitors at secondary entrances to stations as part of a proof of concept that also includes public-facing screens to show live videos of passengers entering stations. TTC is also adding new camera views to station booth monitors.

Findings and Applications 183  Given that a transit agency cannot monitor all video feeds, a number of transit agencies sur- veyed are exploring options for video analytic software to do that job. It is important to note that the software used or being considered by transit agencies does not include facial recognition. NYCT, for example, has selected software for initial testing. The software is meant to count pas- sengers jumping over or crawling under turnstiles or entering the station through the exit gate. In the fall of 2020, the software was operational in five subway stations on the system. BART, on the other hand, previously used similar software and discontinued use in response to the board of directorsâ 2018 Surveillance Technology Ordinance, concerns about facial recognition soft- ware (which was not part of the BART software), and the softwareâs ineffectiveness. 3.12.2.2 Security Operations Center A security operations center can help increase communications and deployment of security personnel. To monitor its light rail system, SacRT has a security operations center that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and is the conduit for addressing security concerns throughout the system. SacRTâs security operations center is located at the police department, but SacRT is in the process of moving forward with a project to make a single, centralized control center that would include both security operations and bus and light rail operator dispatch. This planned move to relocate the security operations center to SacRT facilities will increase communication and efficiency between security operations and operator dispatch. Under this centralized control center model, operator dispatch will be in the same room as dispatch for security operations. Under the current arrangement, an operator who needs assistance from law enforcement must radio operator dispatch, which then must radio security operations, which then radios police to provide assistance. Colocation will save time and simplify this process. The relocation project was scheduled to be completed in early 2021. 3.12.2.3 Expanded Fare-Paid Areas Fare-paid areas may include areas both on board and off board vehicles, including platforms or the area inside fare gates. These areas are established by codes or ordinances approved at the state/provincial, local municipal/county, or transit agency governing board level. In these areas, passengers are required to carry proof of payment with them for the entirety of their journey and fare enforcement personnel are authorized to request proof of payment and may be authorized to issue citations for unauthorized entry. At a minimum, open proof-of-payment systems require that the area on board the vehicle is considered a fare-paid area to enable proof-of-payment inspections. The fare-paid area may be expanded to include the platform or station to assist with fare enforcement by enabling off- board fare inspections. Of the transit agencies surveyed as part of TCRP A-45, eight (BART, LA Metro, MTS, SacRT, SFMTA, TransLink, TriMet, and Valley Metro) conduct fare enforcement off board on a portion of their system. BART and TransLink are the only agencies with fully gated systems that conduct proof-of-payment inspections within the fare-paid area. In 2017, the BART Board of Directors adopted a proof-of-payment ordinance (BART 2017) that requires passengers to be prepared to show proof of payment inside the fare-gated area or risk being cited for fare evasion. The ordinance also authorizes BART fare inspectors to perform proof-of-payment inspections inside the station within the fare gates and on board vehicles. BART has added signage inside the fare-paid area to indicate that proof of payment is required (Figure 3-20). Ungated systems with open platforms, such as SacRT, TriMet, and Valley Metro, have also designated off-board station areas as fare-paid areas, which makes it possible to conduct fare

184 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion enforcement in those areas. SacRT has painted red lines on the pavement at station edges to better define station boundaries and, coupled with additional station signage, to help create âvirtual closureâ of stations (Bizjak 2016). TriMet recently revised its codes to clarify that fare is required on rail platforms and that passengers are required to show proof of payment if asked to do so (Altstadt 2018). These low-cost efforts can enable off-board fare inspection while dis- couraging loitering and other nuisance behavior in the station area. While the RCW authorizes Sound Transit to conduct proof-of-payment inspections off board in a fare-paid area, Sound Transit does not conduct off-board inspections. To enforce fares in an expanded fare-paid area, RCW 81.112.220 (2012) stipulates that signage must be conspicuously posted at the place of boarding or within ten feet of the nearest entrance to a transit facility that clearly indicates: (a) The locations where tickets or fare media may be purchased; and (b) that a person using an electronic fare payment card must present the card to an electronic card reader before entering a transit vehicle or before entering a restricted fare paid area. Sound Transit is considering more distinctive indicators and better signage, such as visual barriers, that makes it clearer when a passenger is entering the fare-paid area, along with more strategically placed ORCA readers and TVMs (Figure 3-21). In addition to enabling proof-of-payment inspections, off-board fare-paid areas can help improve perceptions of passenger security. According to TCRP Report 80, â[d]efining station platforms as paid areas . . . can increase perceived passenger security on platforms and opens up opportunities for supplementary (off-vehicle) fare enforcementâ (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Source: BART. Figure 3-20. BART fare-paid area signage. Source: Sound Transit. Figure 3-21. Sound Transit proposed design for enhanced fare-paid area.

Findings and Applications 185  3.12.2.4 Gating Strategic Stations Given the high capital costs to gate an entire system, some transit agencies gate specific sta- tions, such as those with high volumes of passengers and terminal stations. This can be a strategic way to minimize fare evasion costs effectively without gating an entire system. For example, the London Underground initially installed fare gates at 63 of its 277 stations. All of the gated stations are in the central zone. At the time, it was estimated that 80% of trips began or ended at these stations. By gating the central stations, the London Underground was able to cut fare evasion by two-thirds (Clarke 1993). Similarly, GCRTA has installed fare gates at the Tower City Station in downtown Cleveland, where all rail lines converge. Passengers are required to swipe their fare media to enter and exit the station. The concept of gating terminal and downtown stations is also being adopted by commuter rail systems. SEPTA recently gated the five Center City Philadelphia stations for its Regional Rail service as part of implementing tap-on/tap-off fare collection, leaving outlying stations with platform validators. Most Regional Rail trips originate or end in Center City, and lost fare revenue due to fare evasion is minimal for outer station trips. MBTA has also made the decision to gate its commuter rail terminal stations to increase fare compliance on commuter rail services. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a percep- tion that fare evasion and revenue loss were high on MBTA commuter rail. With the gating of terminal stations, in case someone does not have a fare and therefore cannot tap to exit, MBTA will staff these gates with employees who can sell tickets until the new fare collection system is implemented. 3.12.2.5 Temporary Barriers Not all capital infrastructure changes need to be permanent. Many cities employ temporary barriers or turnstiles for crowd control and fare inspection during special events. TCRP Syn- thesis 96 notes that Metro Transit, SFMTA, and Valley Metro all âserve major sporting venues and rely on special techniques for managing crowds, especially post-game. Use of temporary barriers and turnstiles also help with POP [proof-of-payment] fare inspection, which can be done off-board rather than on crowded trainsâ (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). Notably, Metro Transit installs removable gates for special events to support enforcement and minimize the need to enforce fares on the platform when vehicles are too crowded to inspect on board. TTC is also con- sidering the use of temporary barriers to help prevent passengers from walking away from fare enforcement personnel during off-board inspections (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). 3.12.3 Capital Investments to Improve Ease of Payment Capital investments to make it easier to pay may help decrease fare evasion by improving the convenience of paying. For this reason, transit agencies take into consideration the ease of pay- ment as they make decisions regarding TVM and validator quantities, placement, functionality, and reliability. 3.12.3.1 Quantity of Fare Collection Equipment Insufficient quantities of necessary fare collection equipment, such as TVMs and validators for expected passenger volumes at stations, may result in queues, and queues to purchase or validate tickets may cause some passengers to skip paying and board without payment to avoid missing their train (Delbosc and Currie 2016a, 2016b). TCRP Report 80 provides a methodology for calculating the number of TVMs required in a given proof-of-payment station by looking at the throughput of a given TVM on the basis of the average transaction time compared with the peak period demand at the station (MultiSystems,

186 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion Inc., et al. 2002). TCRP Report 80 notes that average transaction times can vary significantly according to the transaction type and the ease of use of the TVM and that there may be âcomplex peaking effects in the arriving passenger flow or space constraints that could cause extreme queuing at certain TVMs and temporarily limit access to others.â This same type of approach can be used to estimate fare validator quantities. 3.12.3.2 Placement of Fare Collection Equipment Fare collection equipment must also be conveniently placed for passengers and be sufficiently convenient for operational and maintenance needs. This includes onboard and off-board fare collection equipment, including TVMs and validators. TVMs, in particular, with their larger footprint, require space for the equipment as well as space for passengers using or waiting to use them so that they do not impede circulation (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Transit agencies must also consider where it is most convenient to place fare validators both on board and off board vehicles. Transit agencies may choose to put off-board fare validators for proof-of-payment systems at the ends of the platforms where passengers enter the station or on the platform near where passengers wait. TriMet for example, has installed its platform validators on each end of the platform so passengers can tap as they enter the fare-paid area. This minimizes the potential that passengers wait to tap when they see a fare inspector. Fare validators can also be installed on the platform. For its new electronic fare collection system, Edmonton Transit plans to install its off-board fare validators so that they align with locations where the doors open at each light rail station, so that passengers can tap easily as they board and alight the train. One drawback of this approach, however, is that the validators are located on the platform, which makes it difficult to enforce an off-board fare-paid area. While Sound Transit has generally installed fare validators where passengers enter light rail stations (e.g., in a mezzanine at the top of stairs, escalators, and elevators), at smaller stations that have only a shelter, validators are installed outside of the shelter and the shelter is considered a fare paid zone. In the Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel, fare validators were installed on the plat- forms, since the tunnel was used by both bus and light rail. Until buses stopped using the tunnel in March 2019, the platform fare validators were necessary to accommodate passengers who may have decided at the last minute to take light rail instead of a bus. While placement of TVMs or validators within the fare-paid area may be the most convenient for passenger flows, placement of this equipment in the fare-paid area may affect an agencyâs ability to perform fare inspections in the off-board fare-paid area. This is because passengers may be in the zone intending to buy a fare or use a validator closer to their intended departure time to maximize their transfer validity. In cases where a limited number of TVMs or validators are available, passengers may find placement of equipment at one end of a platform inconvenient (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Further, passengers are sensitive to issues of perceived safety and exposure to the elements when handling cash, credit cards, or other payment instruments, which suggests that TVMs should be placed in well-lit and protected areas to the extent possible (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). In addition to considering passenger flows, safety, and comfort, transit agencies must con- sider their own needs when installing TVMs and validators. This equipment generally requires power and data connectivity as well as the space to be easily accessed for maintenance and rev- enue collection (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). For gated systems with distance-based fares, it is also important to install TVMs or add- value machines inside the fare-paid area in case a passenger does not have sufficient funds to

Findings and Applications 187  exit. For BART, which is gated and has distance-based fares, a passenger is only required to have sufficient stored value funds to pay the minimum fare to enter a station; BART does not require a passenger to have the maximum fare. Therefore, BART has installed add-value machines inside the gated area in case a passenger needs to add value to exit. Before add-value machines were installed at all BART stations, passengers were able to go negative on their smart cards. Although off-board fare collection presents some challenges with regard to fare evasion, so does placing all validators on board. Onboard validators may be challenging to reach when the vehicle is carrying crush loads, and some passengers may not validate their fares (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Additionally, the presence of onboard validators may encourage some pas- sengers to remain near a validator and use it only if an inspector boards (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). 3.12.3.3 Convenient Functionality Ensuring that TVMs provide sufficient functionality for passengers to be able to complete their payments is also key. Most basic TVMs have traditionally accepted bills and coins. Many TVMs available today also offer change, accept credit/debit cards, or use stored value for pur- chasing tickets. While agencies may consider deploying TVMs with fewer capabilities (e.g., not accepting cash) to reduce capital costs, visitors or other passengers accustomed to having payment options upon arrival at a station may find that they cannot make their purchases as planned (MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). This suggests a need to communicate clearly to pas- sengers what payment options are available at stations or boarding locations and to ensure that sufficient alternatives exist so that passengers can purchase their fares. According to the 2000 New South Wales Audit Office, police have noted that TVMs that require exact payment or do not accept bills greater than $20 (Australian dollars) contribute to the number of passengers traveling without a valid fare. Different agencies may have different policies about whether these situations constitute fare evasion. As of 2000, CityRail in Sydney did not accept such TVM limitations as valid reasons for traveling without a ticket and cited passengers accordingly, while the London Underground did accept this as valid reason for non- payment (New South Wales Audit Office 2000). 3.12.3.4 Reliability of Fare Collection Equipment Ensuring that TVMs and fare validators are functioning reliably when passengers need them is perhaps the most important concern about fare collection equipment. While many agencies experience issues with the reliability of fare collection equipment, none appear to have docu- mented the issue as thoroughly as TTC, which has experienced many issues with the reliability of the PRESTO electronic fare collection hardware. Phase one of an audit of TTCâs revenue opera- tions estimated that the agency experienced â$3.4 million in revenue loss for 2018 . . . due to malfunctioning Metrolinx equipmentâ (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). The auditor general found that streetcar passengers frequently were unable to pay because the onboard single-ride vending machines (SRVMs) were out of service. TTC opted to disable credit/debit payment functionality on the new SRVMs following a pilot project that determined reliability would improve without this functionality (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). Phase two of the audit found that 56% of SRVM out-of-service incidents in a given month resulted from the coin box being full, suggesting that SRVM reliability could also be increased by ensuring that coin boxes were emptied more frequently (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019c). TTC passengers have expressed similar issues with the functionality of the onboard SRVMs. These concerns with SRVM reliability were validated when the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) conducted its fare inspection observations during its audit of revenue operations. SRVM reliability poses a challenge for fare enforcement. While fare inspectors were able to

188 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion validate whether the SRVMs were out of service when conducting onboard inspections, when conducting offboarding inspections, the fare inspectors were not able to reboard the streetcar to verify that the SRVMs were out of service. TTC has also experienced issues with the reliability of the PRESTO smart card validator. The reported availability rate of the validator was found to be overstated due to the prevalence of frozen PRESTO validators that could not accept fare payment but were logged as being in ser- vice (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019c). In the case of all-door boarding with validators at each door, it is worth noting that, if the back door validator is out of service and the vehicle is crowded, passengers may not reasonably be able to make it to the front of the vehicle to pay their fares, a circumstance that reinforces the importance of validator reliability. TTC (2020a) observed âincidents where customers claimed the machines [SRVMs] were not working although they had made no attempt to pay using the machines.â Additionally, during TTCâs audit of revenue operations, its fare inspectors noted that many regular passengers are aware of the machines always having issues, and some use it to their advan- tage to evade fare payment. For example, if one passenger either uses it as a valid reason or excuse while on-board the streetcar, others in earshot will often provide the same reason and follow suit if they did not pay their fare, and it would be difficult to prove if they evaded fare or if they had a valid reason for not paying. (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b) In the case of TTC, both passengers who have legitimately tried to pay but could not because of malfunctioning equipment and passengers who have used the prevalence of malfunction- ing equipment as an excuse during inspection have led to fare evasion and loss of revenue for TTC. Given the estimated revenue losses due to malfunctioning PRESTO fare equipment, TTC invoiced Metrolinx for lost revenue for the 3 years ending December 31, 2018 (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). While electronic fare collection systems may provide system availability reports, transit agencies have used their fare enforcement personnel to help verify availability of fare collection equipment at stations/stops as part of their duties. MTS code compliance inspectors visually inspect TVMs and platform validators at stations to make sure they are operational and report any problems (MTS 2017). These inspections can help in identifying potential overstated availability. Redundancy also helps address situations when a machine is out of service as well as provides increased options for passengers to minimize queueing. While station space (and, even more so, onboard space) for installing equipment may be limited, TCRP Synthesis 96 found that seven of the 28 agencies surveyed have a formal requirement to maintain at least two TVMs per station (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). 3.12.4 Vehicle Design In some cases, vehicle design may also limit operator interaction with passengers and have a negative impact on fare evasion rates. For example, TTC experiences a higher fare evasion rate on its open, proof-of-payment streetcar system than other modes. More noteworthy, however, is that TTC also has a higher fare evasion rate on its new four-door streetcars, introduced in 2014, that completely separate the operator from passengers by a floor-to-ceiling plastic divider that prevents any interaction (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). TTC has posited that fare evasion on older streetcars and replacement buses that operate along streetcar routes is likely lower, in part âbecause operators are more visible to boarding passengers on these alterna- tive vehiclesâ (TTC 2020a). All-door boarding also appears to influence fare-evading behavior. Fare evasion rates increased for rear doors on all vehicle types; the highest fare compliance was observed at the door closest to the operator (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b; TTC 2020a).

Findings and Applications 189  These experiences suggest that passenger proximity and interaction with the operator may influ- ence fare evasion rates. 3.13 New Fare Collection Technologies and Fare Enforcement Since the introduction of prepaid fare media and self-service fare collection, fare media have evolved. New fare collection technologies, such as systems that accept contactless fare media including smart cards, contactless bank cards, and mobile wallets, have introduced opportuni- ties to minimize fraud, increase ease of use, and enable quicker electronic validation of fares. While there are many advantages to new fare collection technology, the new technology also poses new challenges for fare enforcement and minimizing fare evasion. 3.13.1 Paper Ticket Challenges Paper tickets are susceptible to forgery and a variety of other more sophisticated fare evasion tactics. As described by Fürst and Herold (2018), âfalsifications and forgeries [of paper tickets] are becoming more professional; ticket inspectors are thus often unable to detect them in the short time they spend looking at the ticket.â To help prevent this type of evasion, it is suggested that agencies use paper with security features such as holograms or special imprints and periodi- cally change the type of paper and security features used (Fürst and Herold 2018). However, the authors acknowledge that this is often not practical, for a variety of reasons, such as hardware limitations that prevent the use of certain types of paper or the issuance of tickets on multiple types of stock (Fürst and Herold 2018; MultiSystems, Inc., et al. 2002). Due in part to these limita- tions of paper tickets, transit agencies are implementing newer electronic fare collection tech- nologies, which are described in more detail in the next section. A few transit agencies have also implemented a hybrid that uses a QR code to validate paper tickets electronically. Another challenge for paper tickets or transfers issued by fareboxes is how to handle short fares. In electronic fare collection systems, if a passenger has insufficient funds, the transaction is declined. However, if a passenger paying with cash at a farebox does not have sufficient money, it is treated as a short fare. For non-proof-of-payment systems, the operator may ask the pas- senger to take a seat. For proof-of-payment systems, short fares are more complicated. SFMTA, which operates as proof-of-payment systemwide, installed new fareboxes that issue paper proof of payment, including a code identifying the type of fare paid, the date and time issued, and, for short fares, the amount paid. Previously, operators issued torn paper transfers, even for short fares, which prevented transit fare inspectors from being able to enforce short fares but did help reduce passenger conflicts with the operator. 3.13.2 New Fare Collection Technologies Smart card fare collection systems are widely employed by most large, many medium, and a few small agencies in North America. Of the 18 transit agencies surveyed, all but NYCT, Sun Metro, and Valley Metro have a fully deployed smart card system. As of fall 2020, NYCT was in the process of completing the roll out of OMNY, which launched in 2019. Valley Metro has the Platinum Pass smart card for employer and school/university programs and is in the process of designing a new smart card system that would be available to the general public. Many of the existing systems are card-based systems in which the account information and transaction history are stored on the card and fare rules are stored on the validator, thus elimi- nating the need for real-time connection to the back office. Because transactions occur directly between a userâs card and the validator, transactions occur faster. However because the system

190 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion must write to a userâs card whenever a transaction (e.g., a boarding) occurs, these transactions are more complex and necessitate more complex (and typically more expensive) validators and cards. Additionally, the lack of real-time communications with the back office and the need to write to the card means there is an inherent delay associated with adding value via the web or an autoload process, which can result in passengers being unable to use stored value or a pass that they have loaded remotely and thus potentially result in unintentional fare evasion. Account-based systems eliminate much of the transaction complexity, as the card or other fare media serve as a credential linking the card with a transit account stored in the systemâs back office. The back office, rather than the validator, processes transactions. This also eliminates the delay in web-based loads, so passengers have near real-time access to use funds loaded to ride transit. However, due to the real-time connection with the back office, transaction times can be longer, and onboard validators using cellular service may temporarily lose connection with the back office. Mobile ticketing applications are also commonly employed by transit agencies of all sizes. Visual validation ticket options, for which the operator, conductor, or fare inspector visually inspects the ticket presented on a mobile device to confirm its validity, require no hardware or communications infrastructure on the part of the transit agency. Many mobile ticketing applica- tion vendors receive a percentage of every ticket sale processed. While this reduces fare revenue income for a transit agency, it vastly reduces the up-front or capital costs associated with obtain- ing the application. Electronic validation of mobile tickets is often seen in conjunction with a broader electronic fare collection system that offers smart cards, because the same validator can be used to validate both types of fare media. Electronic validation of mobile tickets may occur by scanning a barcode or QR code or through a near-field communication tap, similar to the way a passenger may tap a smart card. Mobile ticketing can be very convenient because it makes use of a device (smartphone) many passengers already have in their pocket and eliminates the need to stop at a TVM or other pur- chase location. However, in some cases, a mobile ticket may be too convenient. As discussed in Pollan (2013), â[c]onceivably, a passenger might have the ticketing app set to complete the purchase the moment a fare inspector is spotted boarding the car.â This use case was discussed extensively in Portlandâs popular press after it resulted in a local court case (State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama) on whether fare inspections met the requirements for a valid admin- istrative search (Shepherd 2018). After Rosa Giovanna Valderrama (also known as Ana Del RocÃo) was asked for proof of payment as she exited the train, the TriMet road supervisor con- ducting the fare inspection observed the passenger activate her mobile ticket in her presence, indicating that the individual had not paid the fare to ride. (Unrelatedly, TriMet has since dis- continued its visual validation mobile ticketing application, and passengers paying with their phone must tap an on-platform validator on the rail platform or an onboard validator on the bus upon boarding, which is the same behavior required of TriMetâs smart card users.) For agencies that continue to use mobile ticketing applications that require visual validation on proof-of-payment systems, â[t]iming then is everything; a delay built into the transaction process can reduce the likelihood that an individual can apply this trick successfullyâ (Pollan 2013). However, agencies must weigh the degree to which such a delay reduces the convenience of a mobile application to passengers and whether it is worth the reduced opportunity for evasion in a proof-of-payment environment. Alternatively, for recently activated mobile tickets, a countdown can display on the ticket to indicate that it was just activated, enabling transit agencies to establish policies that enable fare enforcement personnel to issue warnings or cita- tions to individuals who wait to activate their mobile tickets. For example, RTDâs mobile ticket- ing app provides a banner across the screen for the first two minutes after a ticket has been activated, allowing transit security officers to determine whether a ticket was very recently State of Oregon v. Rosa Giovanna Valderrama (2018) is discussed further in Section 3.7.4, Constitutionality of Fare Enforcement.

Findings and Applications 191  activated. If transit security officers believe a passenger purchased a mobile ticket after boarding the vehicle, they may issue a warning or citation. Some agencies with installed validators have begun offering or planning for acceptance of open payments. Fare collection systems accepting open payments allow passengers to directly pay their fare by using a bank-issued contactless credit/debit card when boarding. Open pay- ments, similar to mobile ticketing applications, make something a passenger is already carrying (a contactless bank card) into fare media, avoiding the burden of exchanging their universally accepted currency (cash, credit card) into transit-accepted currency (a transit ticket or smart card). Accepting open payments also opens up acceptance of mobile wallets like Apple Pay and Google Pay. This way, passengers may load a compatible bank card into their smartphoneâs mobile wallet and simply tap their phone on the transit agencyâs validator to pay when boarding. Be In, Be Out (BIBO) represents an emerging ticketing experience that is fully contactless and passive. BIBO âidentifies the presence of a passenger (represented by the device they carry), and calculates the fare based on the duration of their detected presenceâ (World Bank n.d.). As described by the World Bank (n.d.): The objective of BIBO is to manage the fare collection without requiring the customer to interface with a ticketing system. This allows customers to walk on and walk off the vehicle without any delays to either the service or the customer . . . The customer carries a detectable device, which is linked to a customer account. The vehicle is equipped with a system that can detect such devices. When the customer enters the vehicle, the presence of the device is detected and recorded. When the presence is no longer detected (i.e., the device is no longer on the vehicle) the customer is deemed to have left the vehicle. The applicable tariff is calculated, and charged against the customerâs account. While BIBO has been piloted extensively in Europe, no examples of BIBO deployments in full revenue service appear to exist in North America. Although this passive experience may be seen as convenient for passengers, impacts on fare inspection and enforcement would need to be taken into account if BIBO were to be widely deployed in North America. 3.13.3 Overview of the Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic Ticketing Fraud can be deterred significantly by electronic fare media. Further, these systems provide other advantages, including customer convenience, better data for transit agencies, and simpli- fication of inspection operations. The importance of ease of payment for passengers cannot be overstated. As discussed in Sec- tion 3.1.1, multiple studies focused on classification of fare evaders have determined there are unintentional or âitâs not my faultâ evaders who typically pay but may evade due to barriers to payment (Delbosc and Currie 2016b; Salis et al. 2017). Representing about 25% of all evaders in the Salis et al. (2017) study, this group of unintentional evaders is not insignificant and may be reduced through targeted interventions. Salis et al. (2017) suggest that while âtraditional strategies such as increased inspection activities or awareness and information campaigns might be unproductiveâ in addressing these accidental fare evaders, transit agencies âcould reduce fare evasion [for accidental evaders] by making it more easy and simple to access the system.â Barriers to system access may include issues related to fare collection equipment such as TVM and validator quantities, placement, functionality, and reliability, as well as other barriers that can be addressed by improved options in fare collection technology. For instance, offering auto- load functionality, which allows passengers to set up automatic payments once and effectively forget about reloading their smart card or alternative fare media, can help address evaders who do not realize that they are low on funds or who cannot reload at their station or stop because

192 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion of queuing at a TVM that would cause them to miss their ride. Account-based systems further reduce this barrier by ensuring funds are available as soon as the passenger loads them to their transit account. TTC has identified âadditional payment options (e.g., open payment) to support passengers who wish to pay every timeâ as an action that should be considered to help reduce fare evasion (TTC 2020a). The introduction of smart cards, mobile ticketing, and open payments each provides passengers with additional and more convenient ways to pay. In addition to improvements to customer convenience, electronic ticketing can help counter public perceptions that large numbers of passengers are not paying their fares. Electronic ticket- ing solutions that include electronic validation, which requires passengers to tap their smart card, phone, or other fare media prior to boarding, âcan help dispel the myth that everyone cheats. Observing other riders . . . tapping at the platform reader . . . can reassure the patron that the other passengers are good, honest citizensâ (Pollan 2013). This can promote an environment wherein passengers feel obligated to pay their fair share, since other passengers are doing so. Transit agencies also benefit from the improved data available from electronic fare collec- tion systems. Indeed, â[o]ne of the selling points of implementing smart card technology has been that the agency gets much improved data of the travel habits of its ridersâ (Pollan 2013). Depending on the technology and its associated business rules, electronic tickets can provide detailed origin and destination data that can be used by transit agencies to improve service plan- ning efforts. Agencies have also used electronic fare collection data to better price institutional and employer pass programs by tracking fare media taps (Pollan 2013). A large amount of data are available from electronic fare collection systems that, if harnessed, can provide transit agencies with significant insights about their passengers and their behavior. Another advantage of electronic fare collection systems is that smart cards and other elec- tronic ticketing options are quicker and easier to inspect than legacy fare media. As part of the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) noted that the audit observations focused on smart cards because examining legacy fare media was âlogistically challenging.â Fare gates for electronic fare collection systems can also assist with inspection. LA Metroâs alert gating program features a colored light alert . . . on each gate [that] registers whether the entering patron has a valid fare, insufficient value on the TAP card, or did not tap. The light shows a red or green indication depending on whether valid fare is indicated. Fare inspectors may be present and can apprehend people who pass through when a red indication is displayed. (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012) Similarly, TTC fare gates and onboard validators display a yellow light and a different sound for use of discount/concession cards to help revenue protection personnel or operators know to check the passengerâs fare eligibility (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). As part of procur- ing new fare gates, BART and WMATA are looking at additional colored lights to indicate the specific type of discount/concession card. While inspection operations may be simplified by electronic ticketing, transit agencies have reported mixed experiences as to whether electronic fare collection reduces boarding times. The different experiences are dependent on the prior validation process used by the agency. The transit agency of Münster, Germany, reported that under electronic ticketing, boarding took longer than it did with visual validation of paper tickets/passes, which ultimately led the agency to move to all-door boarding with validators at each door and an increase in the number of fare enforcement personnel (Keuchel and Laurenz 2018). However, transit agencies transitioning from magnetic stripe tickets to contactless fare media may see a decrease in boarding and dwell times. TCRP Report 165 suggests that the default time for a passenger to pay via visual inspec- tion of a mobile phone is 2 seconds and via smart card is 2.75 seconds, versus 4 seconds for mechanical ticket validator, 4.5 seconds for exact change in the farebox, and 5 seconds for a magnetic stripe ticket (Kittelson and Associates, Inc., et al. 2013).

Findings and Applications 193  Relatedly, another TCRP study found that boarding times with prepayment were faster than with onboard payment. TCRP Report 90 found that with prepayment, boarding times averaged 2.5 seconds per passenger per door, while onboard payment times averaged 3.5 seconds for smart cards and 4 seconds or more for exact change and swipe/dip cards (Levinson et al. 2003). Although new electronic fare collection technologies are considered more secure and a way to improve revenue collection controls, âthere is the fear that electronic systems will not be immune to criminal acts in the long runâ (Fürst and Herold 2018). In addition to the fear that these systems in time will be susceptible to fraud, there is also fear âof system breakdowns and resulting revenue lossesâ (Fürst and Herold 2018). There is also still some concern âas to whether the [electronic] systems are sufficiently transparent for passengers who want to be sure that they have the correct ticket with them,â which suggests that real-time availability of fare and account information is important to encourage adoption (Fürst and Herold 2018). Finally, there is also the concern among some passengers that tapping their smart card when transferring between modes may result in double charging. While Metro Transit encourages all passengers using its smart card to tap every time they board, to address this concern, passengers using stored value to pay their fare are deemed to be fare evading only if they do not tap on the platform or bus validator prior to the first boarding of their journey. Conversely, this would be considered fare evasion on TransLink services. Opportunities to evade using electronic tickets, particularly through the misuse of reduced fare media, is discussed in the following section. 3.13.4 Fare Evasion Under Electronic Ticketing Although electronic ticketing is less prone to ticket forgery and fraud, passengers can still evade fares under it. Tapping on at the beginning of every ride may require âa change in habitâ for many passengers (Pollan 2013). TCRP Synthesis 96 notes that electronic fare collection has âprovided a new fare evasion offense whereby a patron with a card with value on it does not âtap inâ to the system to pay a fare (and have it deducted). Knowingly or not, without âtappingâ the person has avoided paying a fareâ (Larwin and Kaprowski 2012). In addition, as previously mentioned, passengers may not be fully aware of whether their smart card or other electronic fare media has sufficient funds for their travel: With the paper system, the passenger can see that the fare is valid from the printed information. Electronic systems rely on tonal and visual indicators on the validator that the transaction has been com- pleted. The patron receives no readable receipt of the transaction. There is only an electronic record of the transaction either on the card or back on the central system. The risk exists that a patron will misinterpret indicators on the platform device and will board the train thinking the card is encoded with valid proof of payment when in fact it is not. (Pollan 2013) Thus, passengers may board thinking they have completed the necessary steps to pay their fare, when in reality they have not. Passengers in possession of a pass product valid for the trip at hand may fail to tap upon boarding since they have already âpaidâ their fare by loading the pass product onto their fare media. Different agencies treat this failure to tap differently, since the passenger âhas deprived the agency not of revenue but of dataâ (Pollan 2013). For example, Metro Transit and RTD encourage passengers to tap every time they board, but do not cite passholders who fail to tap and instead may escort those passengers off the vehicle to a validator to tap at the next stop (Pollan 2013). Some agencies explicitly do not require passholders to tap every time. Caltrain in the San Francisco Bay Area only requires monthly passholders to tap on and off for the first trip of the month, which must occur prior to the 15th, according to Caltrainâs website (http://caltrain.com). However, for agencies with pass programs that are priced on the basis of usage data or that do not receive revenue unless passholders tap, getting passholders to tap every time they board

194 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion directly affects the fare revenue collected. Some agencies have gone as far as to define not tapping as fare evasion so they can cite riders, hopefully encouraging them to change their behavior in the future. For example, in Seattle, regional monthly Puget Passes are accepted by participating ORCA regional agencies, and each agency receives its share of Puget Pass revenue on the basis of recorded travel. Aboard Sound Transit trains, â[r]iders with a valid pass on an ORCA card will be cited and risk the same fine as a nonpaying passenger if the ORCA card was not tapped prior to boarding the trainâ (Pollan 2013). Others have opted to focus on customer education to encourage desired tapping behavior, in spite of the potential for lost revenue. In Phoenix, âValley Metro invoices employers based on actual trips taken on each employeeâs Platinum pass. Rather than citing Platinum pass holders for failing to tap, the agency has increased its public communications and marketing efforts to encourage all passengers to tap their cardsâ (Pollan 2013). With regard to handheld devices, it is worth noting that in account-based electronic fare col- lection systems, a loss of connectivity between a fare inspectorâs handheld device and the central back office can introduce opportunities for fare evasion. As observed by Pollan (2013), a wireless handheld device that is not communicating with the central system in an account-based system cannot immediately verify that the cardholder has paid the fare. A cardholderâs claim that the fare has been paid cannot be verified. A dead zone in wireless coverage, whether in a tunnel or the canyons of downtown high-rises, risks becoming a free-fare zone. A known area of noncoverage opens up the opportunity for chronic fare evasion. 3.13.5 Fare Evasion Through Misuse of Discount/Concession Fare Products The misuse of discount/concession fare products continues to be a significant problem with electronic fare collection systems, and agencies are making adjustments to their business pro- cesses to help combat the issue. The misuse of discount/concession fare productsâthat is, boarding with a fare product that a passenger is not eligible to useâis an ongoing challenge for transit agencies. Prior to the introduction of its electronic fare collection system, DART deter- mined that a substantial number of evasions were for reduced fare violations and estimated that these made up 26% of all fare evasions on light rail and 3% of all fare evasions on the Trinity Railway Express commuter rail line. TTC is also addressing issues with the fraudulent use of child concession smart cards. There are three main ways that transit agencies have approached addressing the misuse of discount/concession fare products. The first is to limit the loading of discount/concession fare products only to a card that is coded as a discount/concession card. This prevents passengers from loading other products that they may not be eligible for onto their card. These cards can be made available to the general public, and the cardholder is responsible for providing proof of eligibility when requested. The second option associates a card with a specific individual. This makes it possible to ensure that the individual applying for the card is eligible and that only one card is provided to each individual. This approach can transition the responsibility for eligibility verification from time- of-use to time-of-purchase, thereby reducing dwell times and fare disputes/conflicts with pas- sengers and allowing operators to focus on safe and on-time operations. The main drawback of this approach is that the ability to obtain the card may be constrained. Despite these measures, passengers can still obtain discount/concession fare eligibility cards fraudulently (e.g., through resale), thereby gaining access to fare discounts for which they are not eligible and reducing the fare revenue collected by agencies. Handheld devices used for inspecting electronic fare media and issuing citations are discussed in detail in Section 3.13.6.

Findings and Applications 195  Transit agencies are also integrating smart cards with discount/concession fare IDs that prove a passengerâs eligibility for discounted fare products by printing the ID on a smart card asso- ciated with the individual. Doing so means that these passengers no longer need to carry a sepa- rate ID in addition to their fare media to prove eligibility. In addition, integrating fare eligibility into the fare media means that the fare system itself can perform an eligibility check and prevent ineligible passengers from loading discounted fare products onto their fare media. While photo ID can be helpful during fare inspections and in the event a passenger pays the discount fare in cash, there are concerns about the possibility of special identification cards with a name and photo increasing stigma for certain populations who are eligible for discount fares. With the introduction of account-based fare collection systems, transit agencies are beginning to explore setting up the back office to not only store the account holderâs information but also his or her photo. As part of MBTAâs new fare collection system, the fare inspection handheld device will populate a picture of the account holder when a discount fare card is inspected. If the card is being used by someone else, MBTA will be able to freeze that account and issue a cita- tion for fraud. This eliminates the need to print a photo on the card and also reduces the cost of printing specialized cards. Transit agencies can also implement other controls to minimize the misuse of discount/ concession cards. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) identified many necessary changes to help TTC prevent fraudulent use of child concession smart cards, including ⢠Visually differentiating child concession smart cards and adult smart cards, ⢠Changing PRESTO validators to display a different colored light and make a different sound for child concession smart cards than for other types of concession cards, ⢠Considering adding a display unit to TTC vehicles to indicate the concession card type for operators, ⢠Determining whether adequate controls exist and are consistently applied by distributors issuing child concession smart cards, and ⢠Confirming that fraudulently used child concession smart cards are deactivated. The auditor general also recommended that TTC immediately stop issuing additional child concession smart cards until measures could be put in place to control their usage (City of Toronto Auditor General 2019b). As TTC continues to negotiate with Metrolinx, the regional system operator, about many of the suggested changes, TTC has ceased distributing child con- cession smart cards at TTC-controlled locations, although child concession smart cards con- tinue to be available from regionally controlled distributors (TTC 2019c). TTCâs experience illustrates the scale at which this type of fraud may exist in electronic fare collection systems without proper controls in place. 3.13.6 Fare Inspection Handheld Devices Technology also has implications for fare inspection. The introduction of smart cards and other electronically validated fare media made it necessary for fare enforcement personnel to have a way to read that fare media and confirm that passengers had paid their fare. Unlike paper tickets, which usually include a printed time stamp or other information that can be visually verified, electronic fare media often must be read by using special hardware and software, which is typically bundled in a handheld device that fare inspectors carry. These handheld devices may be able to read magnetic stripe tickets, smart cards and other contactless media, and QR codes printed on paper or visually displayed in a mobile app. Some devices are designed and able to read multiple types of fare media, or personnel may be required to carry multiple devicesâfor example, a device to read magnetic stripe tickets and a device to read smart cards. Handheld

196 Measuring and Managing Fare Evasion devices, such as those used by LA Metro, may even be able to deduct fare if there is sufficient stored value. In addition to being necessary to inspect electronic fare media, handheld devices such as these introduce opportunities for improved fare inspection operations. As suggested by the LACMTA Inspector General (2010), fare inspection handheld devices for LA Metro âwill increase the accuracy and facilitate the tracking of the number of fares checked. In turn, this will provide more accurate, complete, and timely information . . . to measure fare inspection activities and productivity.â Transit agencies are integrating additional functionality into the handheld devices used for fare inspection or issuing separate devices. This functionality may include electronically issu- ing a citation, looking up whether an individual has received a prior warning or citation, or logging fare inspection data electronically. These technology enhancements help automate manual processes and increase the productivity of fare enforcement personnel by reducing time spent issuing citations and manually recording information at the end of their shift. The City of Toronto Auditor General (2019a) noted that it takes, on average, â20â30Â minutes to issue a ticket, including time for customer educationâ and that âan estimated 40% of shift time is used for ticketing, documentation and travel,â including inputting inspection information upon return to the office. Similarly, the King County Auditorâs Office (2018) estimated that fare enforcement personnel spent around 10% of on-duty time manually inputting informa- tion and noted that Sound Transit âfound that the amount of time its officers spent entering data decreased from 90Â minutes per shift to 15Â minutes, after they replaced their readers with new devices.â The most common enhancement among the transit agencies surveyed was the ability to issue citations electronically and print them by using a Bluetooth printer. These citation applications often enable fare enforcement personnel to swipe or scan a driverâs license and prepopulate information, such as name, date of birth, and address. Further, drop-down menus can make it easy to select the type of fare evasion and other information. This functionality, as well as elec- tronic record of the citation, can help in analyzing fare evasion data and minimize data entry at the end of the shift. While there are advantages to issuing citations electronically, it is worth noting that transit agencies may have reasons for continuing to issue handwritten citations. RTD discontinued electronically printing citations, as transit security officers asked to return to issuing hand written citations from a ticket book so that they would not need to carry a printer. MTS citations are handwritten because the San Diego County Superior Court system does not accept electronically generated citations. WMATA citations are handwritten because the agency serves multiple jurisdictions, and each has its own citation forms. As part of fare enforcement, transit agencies maintain logs of fare citations issued. In some instances, transit agencies may input these logs into electronic databases. These databases may be used by fare enforcement personnel to look up prior fare enforcement encounters. In the absence of electronic databases that are accessible in the field, fare enforcement personnel of transit agencies that check for previous contacts before issuing a warning or citation need to contact dispatch. New fare enforcement handhelds with access to this information in the field present increased access to information. Transit agencies surveyed as part of TCRP A-45, especially those with a warning-first policy, expressed interest in being able to access the data- base in the field. Being able to access the database quickly to determine whether someone is a repeat offender can help fare enforcement personnel determine whether to issue a warning or citation. Warning-first policies are discussed in the section on fare enforcement discretion in Section 3.3.2.3, Standard Operating Procedures.

Findings and Applications 197Â Â During the audit of TTCâs revenue operations, the City of Toronto Auditor General (2019b) outlined the importance of having quick and easy access to this database: [I]t is important for [revenue protection personnel] to know if they are addressing a passenger who is a first-time or repeat fare evader. The fine amount of the ticket can be higher if the person is a repeat evader. It may also alert the [revenue protection personnel] if the passenger is potentially more likely to walk away, or may potentially present a higher threat to their own personal safety. King County Metro, SFMTA, and TTC are in the process of developing cloud-based fare enforcement databases to enable access to fare enforcement histories in the field. For SFMTA and TTC, the applications will be integrated with the records management systems to provide access to historical records. A number of agencies surveyed already have access to this informa- tion in the field through their records management system (Metro Transit, RTD) or a propri- etary fare enforcement database (Sound Transit). Instead of having a database available in the field, The Rapid, a smaller transit agency, uses an Excel spreadsheet to track fare evasion offenses by individual and determine whether to issue a warning or citation at the end of shift as fare enforcement information is entered. Transit agencies are also enabling fare enforcement personnel to input information electroni- cally into fare inspection logs from the field. Historically, fare enforcement personnel recorded fare inspection information in a notebook or on a form, which was then entered into a spread- sheet by the individual or by administrative staff, if entered at all. This information was often incomplete and prone to data entry errors, which limited its usefulness for analyzing fare inspec- tion data. In addition to issuing warnings and citations electronically, there has been growing interest in applications for logging this information electronically. TTCâs Information Tech- nology Department created an application to input inspection data in real time by using fare enforcementâs smartphones. The application enables personnel to input the number of inspec- tions, verbal warnings, written warnings, tickets, and arrests. It will also track the streetcar line, vehicle number, route, direction of travel, stop/intersection where boarded, and stop/intersection where disembarked. Before this application was implemented, these details were manually entered into a spreadsheet and used to run statistics. 3.13.7 Other Technology Improvements to Measure and Help Manage Fare Evasion In addition to fare enforcement and inspection data, researchers and agencies are exploring the use of data from APCs, fare dispute key data from fareboxes, and fare collection data to estimate fare evasion rates and potential fraud issues. One specific application would use APCs to send real-time passenger counts back to a central system that can in real time run âcomparisons of the number of boardings and the ticket validation data. When discrepancy reaches a certain threshold, an alarm can inform the operator, who can decide to send a ticket inspector teamâ (Dauby and Kovacs 2007). Use of these data to make risk-based deployment decisions has the potential to help transit agencies work smarter when it comes to fare enforcement.